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Abstract 
Unnecessary medical treatments place a significant burden on health systems striving for 
universal health coverage (UHC). This thesis studies inappropriate treatment incentives in the 
private sector in South Africa, where plans to implement a national health insurance system (NHI) 
foresee the contracting of private physicians to deliver publicly-funded health care. Private 
providers are increasingly recognized as necessary partners for UHC success in many low-and-
middle-income countries (LMIC). However, aligning the incentives of these actors with UHC and 
public health goals requires a better understanding of incentive effects in these settings.  
I conduct two field experiments with incognito standardized patients (SPs), to both 
evaluate appropriate care provision and experimentally vary the treatment incentives facing 
private physicians. First, I run a within-subject experiment with 89 private primary care 
physicians (GPs) in Johannesburg, to investigate the causal impact of improving patients’ 
financial protection (insurance cover) on physicians’ quality of care delivery. The results suggest 
that more insured patients receive a higher level of visible clinical effort, but a lower level of 
technical care quality – including a higher likelihood of inappropriate antibiotic treatment. 
Second, I use data from the same experiment to evaluate the impact of patient insurance on the 
quantity and costs of care. I find that more insured patients are more likely to receive unnecessary 
diagnostic tests and treatment procedures, and receive more and more expensive branded drugs, 
resulting in significantly higher care costs. The results on antibiotic treatment and drug treatment 
quantity and costs occurred despite the absence of any financial incentives attached to drug 
prescribing for GPs, which suggests the presence of alternative motives for physicians’ treatment 
decisions that might vary with patient insurance – including intrinsic or altruistic motives. Third, 
I explore the scope for leveraging such intrinsic motivations to improve physicians’ treatment 
choices. I conduct a randomized (between-subject) experiment with 80 GPs, to evaluate the 
impact of intrinsic, informational incentives from private performance audit and feedback (A&F) 
on physicians’ antibiotic treatment choices and care costs. The findings suggest that private A&F 
can significantly reduce the likelihood of inappropriate antibiotic treatment for common viral 
infections that present in primary care, without simultaneously reducing appropriate antibiotic 
use for bacterial infections or increasing other inappropriate drug treatments. However, improved 
performance on antibiotic use does not coincide with significantly lower treatment costs or any 
improvements in measured diagnostic effort or accuracy. There is indicative evidence that 
prescribing norms and perceived patient expectations may play an important role in mediating 
private physicians’ treatment choices in all three empirical chapters.  
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1 Introduction 
Unnecessary medical treatments are avoidable contributors to rising health expenditure around 
the world. Despite the widespread availability of evidence-based treatment guidelines, scarce 
resources are frequently misused in the provision of clinically inappropriate and inefficient 
healthcare (Rosenberg et al., 2015). Recent literature has drawn attention to this problem of 
“overuse” in health systems striving for universal health coverage (UHC), where money spent on 
harmful, ineffective or expensive care is money diverted from other essential services (Berwick, 
2017).1 While aggregate global costs are unknown, an estimate from the US is indicative: over 
USD 270 billion of healthcare spending in 2013 was estimated to be overuse (Brownlee et al., 
2017). This type of waste tends to co-exist with the underuse of clinically appropriate yet 
inexpensive therapies, poor overall quality of care, and significant unmet healthcare need, 
particularly in low and middle-income countries (LMIC) (Saini et al., 2017; Das et al., 2018). 
The inappropriate use of antibiotics is perhaps the best documented form of such overuse globally 
(Brownlee et al., 2017). The emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
accounted for almost 76% of the increase in antibiotic consumption worldwide between 2000 and 
2010 (Van Boeckel et al., 2014). In South Africa – the context of this thesis – antibiotic use 
escalated by 175% over the same period (Republic of South Africa, 2015). Comparable studies 
have documented inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions for common viral infections in 55% of 
patient cases in China (Currie et al., 2014), in 62% of cases in India (Dehn Lunn, 2018), and in 
72% of cases in South Africa (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2019).2 The result in South Africa occurred 
despite the presence of a robust antibiotic regulatory system in line with WHO recommendations 
(WHO, 2001, 2015; Holloway et al., 2016), including published standard treatment guidelines 
and diagnostic frameworks to rationalise antibiotic use (NDoH, 2014; Brink et al., 2016). 
This thesis studies what drives such overtreatment at the level of physician-patient encounters. It 
explores this question in the context of a renewed global push for universal health coverage 
(UHC), where improved financial protection for patients and universal access to basic health 
services have become central aspirations of many health systems – and concurrently, where there 
 
1 Some stark estimates of overuse include 6.2 million unnecessary caesarean sections each year, at a cost of USD 2.32 billion (50% 
of these in China and Brazil) (Gibbons et al., 2010); over 22% of percutaneous coronary interventions in Israel; and up to 60% of 
endoscopies in the US (Brownlee et al., 2017). 
2 In the South African study, the rate of inappropriate antibiotic prescribing was 78% in the public sector and 67% in the private sector. 
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is scarce evidence that improving access to health services consistently ensures the delivery of 
necessary, clinically-effective care (Scott and Jha, 2014; Das et al., 2018). 
In most countries, the private sector tends to play a prominent role in health service delivery. For 
instance, private providers account for over 50% of all reported treatment for diarrhoea and cough 
in children in sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix A.1) ( Wadge et al., 2017).3 With limited public 
sector capacity to expand healthcare access, LMIC governments in particular increasingly rely on 
private providers to deliver publicly financed healthcare. In South Africa, government plans to 
implement an ambitious national health insurance system by 2026 similarly foresee the 
contracting of private physicians to expand access to free primary healthcare, and to function as 
gatekeepers to the national health system (Republic of South Africa, 2019). This creates a context 
where healthcare provision is increasingly subject to market incentives, and patients (healthcare 
consumers) are progressively more sheltered from the costs of healthcare overuse. In this setting, 
the contractual or implicit agency relationships between physicians, patients and third-party 
payers - how they are structured and incentivised - are likely to have important influences on 
healthcare provision.  
This thesis therefore explores agency problems in the provision of health services in a LMIC 
setting, where physicians are subject to market incentives. There is comparative evidence that 
private providers generate more costly care than the public sector (Pongsupap and Lerberghe, 
2006; Blaauw and Lagarde, 2019), but little evidence that rates of over-treatment are any worse 
– particularly with respect to antibiotic treatment – and indeed some evidence that certain aspects 
of care quality are better, which makes it unclear whether the higher costs simply price in higher 
quality (Pongsupap and Lerberghe, 2006; Das et al., 2016; Blaauw and Lagarde, 2019). Existing 
studies on incentives for provider behaviour in LMIC settings tend to focus on the public sector, 
so little is known about incentive effects in the private sector (Das and Hammer, 2014). Moreover, 
despite growing third-party payment in healthcare, there is scarce research on how these payers’ 
efforts to regulate healthcare decisions on the supply and demand sides can interact (Bardey and 
Lesur, 2006) – for instance, how patient cost-sharing may also incentivise provider decisions. By 
focusing on the microenvironment of individual physician-patient interactions, this thesis 
investigates the role of private physicians, the incentives they respond to (including possible 
incentives from patient cost-sharing), and how this can inform policy choices for rationalising 
healthcare use in increasingly resource-constrained settings.4  
 
3 Equivalent figure are much higher in South Asia and South East Asia (around 80% and 65%), respectively. Notably, even in the 
poorest quintiles of the populations, the majority of these private providers from whom people report seeking care are formal, for-
profit providers (not informal or non-profit providers) (Wadge et al., 2017). 
4 I restrict my analysis to the formal, for-profit segment of the private healthcare sector in South Africa. The relative sizes of the 
informal or non-profit sectors are unknown; however, they are likely to be insignificant in the urban setting of this study 
(Johannesburg). 
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The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows. Section 1.1 sets out the definitions 
and methods employed for analysing “appropriate” healthcare provision in the following 
chapters. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 outline the two related sources of health market failure that motivate 
this thesis: i) the combination of asymmetric information and externalities in healthcare provision, 
particularly in antibiotic treatment; and ii) the combination of asymmetric information and the 
dual role of physicians as diagnostic and treatment providers. Section 1.4 discusses a role for 
physicians’ intrinsic motivations in mediating these market failures. Finally, Section 1.5 presents 
the main research objectives and a roadmap for this thesis.  
1.1 Understanding “Appropriate” Healthcare Provision: Definitions and 
Challenges 
1.1.1 Terminology 
Defining appropriate  healthcare is the first step to investigating over-treatment. This study adopts 
a definition that is synonymous with “right care”, as characterised by Vikas Saini and colleagues 
(Saini et al., 2017). Broadly speaking, it refers to care choices that fulfil three criteria (WHO, 
2000): i) evidence-based (safe and clinically effective), which addresses the technical quality and 
clinical necessity of care; ii) cost-effective (delivers targeted outcomes at least cost); and iii) 
patient-centred (responsive to individual patient needs, constraints and preferences).5 The notion 
of appropriate healthcare therefore captures the considerable linkages between quality and 
efficiency in healthcare spending.6 
Any deviations from this standard of care may be considered overuse or under-use – in other 
words, inappropriate care. Overuse is used synonymously with over-treatment and over-
provision in this study, and refers broadly to the delivery of “any services that are unnecessary in 
any way” (Brownlee et al., 2017).7 This includes “the provision of medical services that are more 
likely to cause harm than good” (Brownlee et al., 2017). It also includes the provision of necessary 
yet cost-ineffective care - that is, care choices that are clinically indicated, but where there are 
cheaper alternatives available with equivalent benefit (a prime example being the use of branded 
drugs over accessible generic equivalents). This latter form of overuse can also be termed over-
 
5 Note that “appropriate healthcare” is used interchangeably with “appropriate (physician) effort” in this study. 
6 For instance, while quality cannot increase indefinitely without increasing cost, cost-effectiveness necessarily requires that care 
quality be maximised for a given cost. Moreover, going beyond a single point of care use, poor quality care can lead to higher costs 
further down the patient care pathway. For example, a physician that fails to take the time to understand a particular patient’s ailment 
and preferences, and tailor a therapeutic regime accordingly, might save time (and cost) during that single encounter. However, higher 
future costs may be incurred if subsequent treatment failure or patient non-adherence leads to more serious health complications down 
the line. 
7 While overuse can also refer to patients’ healthcare choices, this thesis focuses only on physician behavior. Therefore, the term can 
be used synonymously with overtreatment and overprovision here. 
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charging. Conversely, underuse indicates “the failure to use effective and affordable medical 
interventions (or care processes)” (Glasziou et al., 2017), and is used interchangeably with under-
treatment and under-provision.8  
1.1.2 Challenges in measurement and identification 
Studying the drivers of over-treatment under these definitions poses two challenges. The first is 
a problem of measurement. Appropriate care – as defined above - is necessarily patient and case-
specific (Das and Hammer, 2014). For the researcher or third-party regulator, systematically 
determining what is appropriate care in a given clinical context - to identify any unnecessary 
treatment - is problematic on the basis of direct observations, surveys or administrative data 
alone.9 For a defined clinical case, the first two criteria of appropriate care (evidence-based and 
cost-effective) may be established to some extent from validated national or international clinical 
guidelines. However, defining the clinical case itself on the basis of what physicians tell patients, 
or enter in their administrative records, has its limitations – given room for diagnostic error, 
imprecise clinical coding, and the conflict of interest for the treating physician who also gives the 
diagnosis (which in turn, determines the assessment of his treatment choices). Moreover, even 
where the clinical case can be defined with reasonable certainty, commonly-used methods for 
measuring inappropriate treatment have additional scope for measurement error: direct 
observation and clinical vignettes can induce Hawthorne effects (Leonard and Masatu, 2010), 
administrative data can be of very low quality in some LMIC settings, and patient surveys can 
suffer from recall bias and patient misunderstanding of clinical procedures (Onishi et al., 2010).  
A second challenge is one of identification. Empirically answering the question of who primarily 
drives healthcare choices at the physician-patient level, and what drives them, is a challenge. 
Healthcare is widely characterised as an expert service, where patients cannot perfectly assess the 
quality or necessity of the care they receive (Darby and Karni, 1973). In this view, ‘expert’ 
physicians inevitably have considerable influence on how healthcare resources are consumed. 
The theory of supplier-induced demand (SID) (Evans, 1974; Fuchs, 1978) accordingly argues 
that, under market provision of healthcare, profit-maximising physicians drive over-consumption 
(given the informational asymmetries and basis of trust in the physician-patient relationship). 
Nevertheless, there is little robust, causal evidence to support this view. Fundamentally, the 
 
8 While Saini et al. (2017) highlight the concurrent prevalence of overuse and underuse at the health system-level, these issues can 
also co-exist in the treatment of the same patient. For instance, physicians’ underuse of necessary diagnostic processes (including the 
necessary patient history-taking or examination) can lead to diagnostic uncertainty or inaccuracy, and potential overuse of incorrect 
treatments (overtreatment) for the same case. 
9 In OECD countries, electronic health records (EHR) and billing data are widely used in quality and cost monitoring. However, in 
most LMIC settings EHR systems are rare and administrative data quality is often very poor. Therefore alternative methods of quality 
measurement have been used in these settings, including direct observations, patient exit interviews, and standardized patients (SP) 
(Das and Hammer, 2014) 
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healthcare choices observed from individual clinical encounters may be due to the influence of 
the patient (patient demand, or other factors) or the physician (demand inducement, or otherwise); 
the problem is in separating the two. This issue has received little empirical attention (Currie et 
al., 2014; Lu, 2014; Gottschalk et al., 2018). Moreover, evidence of significant over-treatment 
also in the public sector (with salaried providers) runs counter to the SID characterisation of such 
behaviour being purely profit-motivated (Mohanan et al., 2015; J. Das et al., 2016; Lagarde and 
Blaauw, 2019). Most existing studies on SID are observational, and rely on aggregated or 
administrative data, which makes it impossible to control for all potential confounders of 
treatment decisions in clinical encounters and isolate the relative influence and motivations of the 
physician.  
To overcome these two challenges, this thesis draws on an audit study approach, using under-
cover standardised patients (SP) (Rethans et al., 2007). By standardising all patient and case-
specific drivers of treatment choices, this approach allows appropriate care to be determined ex 
ante, and evaluated ex post.10  Moreover, by allowing experimental variation in aspects of the 
patient and clinical case presentation of research interest, it allows the researcher to not only 
identify the physician’s influence in driving healthcare choices, but also to explore their potential 
motivations in doing so. The SP method is commonly recognised as the “gold standard” in care 
quality measurement (Das and Hammer, 2014). This study builds on a growing body of 
observational and field experimental studies using SPs to evaluate the clinical performance of 
healthcare providers in LMIC settings (Madden et al., 1997; Kwan et al., 2019). Much of this 
literature has used SPs to describe and compare the quality of healthcare providers in different 
settings (Pongsupap and Lerberghe, 2006; Mohanan et al., 2012, 2015; Sylvia et al., 2014; J. Das 
et al., 2016; Daniels et al., 2017, 2019; Christian et al., 2018). Only a handful of studies have 
adopted an experimental approach, using SPs to exogenously vary and investigate specific drivers 
of providers’ treatment behaviours (Currie et al., 2011; Currie et al., 2014; Lu, 2014; Gottschalk 
et al., 2018). The use of SPs in impact evaluations of randomised provider quality interventions 
is similarly scarce (Das et al., 2016; Mohanan et al., 2017; Harrison et al., 2000; Mathews et al., 
2009).11 This thesis specifically contributes to these latter, more nascent applications of SPs in 
field experimental research. 
 
10 In this study, the 2014 edition of the South African Standard Treatment Guidelines (STG) and Essential Medicines List (EML) was 
employed to determine appropriate treatments for the clinical cases presented by SPs (see Section 4.1 for further details on the SP 
clinical cases used in this study). These guidelines are updated every five years by the national Department of Health, and serve as 
useful benchmarks for evidence-based and cost-effective treatments in the South African context. Appropriate diagnostic procedures 
(for the defined clinical cases) were also established in procedural checklists developed by the research team in consultation with 
clinical experts in the relevant fields (see Section 4.2.1 for further details). 
11 Another two studies either use SPs to evaluate interventions targeting provider attitudes (rather than their care quality performance, 
per se) (Li, Lin and Guan, 2014) or use non-blinded SP visits where providers are aware of being assessed (which risks a Hawthorne 
effect confounding the estimated intervention impact) (Sanci et al., 2000). 
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1.2 Market Provision of Healthcare under Externalities 
Informational asymmetries – between the physician and patient, and between the physician and 
healthcare regulators (government or third-party payer) – are fundamental features of healthcare 
markets. They result in what Ma and McGuire (1997) consider a missing market in healthcare: 
physician payment on the basis of clinical effort. While healthcare quantity may be easily 
observable and (somewhat) contractible, 12  clinical effort is not (McGuire 2000). As neither 
patients nor third-party regulators can accurately determine or contract for appropriate physician 
effort, a physician’s supply of such effort in any given patient case will entail some private cost 
and positive externality for which he is not compensated. This suggests that appropriate effort 
will in general be under-supplied relative to what is in patients and payers’ best interests. 
Private physicians also have clear incentives to respond to market demand, even where that 
demand does not reflect appropriate care. For instance, patients are commonly said to demand 
antibiotics without any clinical indication (Dempsey et al., 2014; Fletcher-Lartey et al., 2016; 
Farley et al., 2018), and found to prefer branded prescription drugs over generic equivalents 
despite the higher costs (Himmel et al., 2005; Shrank et al., 2009). Where payment for health 
services is conditioned on patient or service volume, private physicians have direct incentives to 
over-supply those services that they believe patients demand (or where any negative demand 
response to over-supply is expected to be low). Conversely, where no payment incentives are 
attached, physicians may under-supply aspects of care where there is little demand response – 
that is, aspects of care that patients cannot easily assess or respond to, such as the technical quality 
of care. Haas-Wilson (1994) highlights a distinction between the observable, interpersonal aspects 
and amenities of care, and its less observable technical quality – a distinction that affects the 
extent to which physicians can ‘price in’ the quality they supply in patient fees. Das et al. (2016) 
also find that market-determined prices reward observable aspects of care (such as time spent 
with the patient, the extent of history-taking and examination, and the quantity of medications), 
but not its unobserved technical quality (the accuracy of diagnoses, or appropriateness of 
treatments). Studies comparing ambulatory care in the public and private sectors of LMIC concur 
that, while the private sector performs better in terms of the amenities and observable aspects of 
care that patients would more readily value (including waiting and consultation times, and patient 
communication), there is little difference in technical quality (Pongsupap and Lerberghe, 2006; 
Das et al., 2016; Blaauw and Lagarde, 2019). 13 
 
12 Ma and McGuire (1997) argue that even healthcare quantity may not be perfectly contractible due to the possibility of fraud in what 
is reported to healthcare payers.  
13 Indeed, Blaauw and Lagarde (2019) find that private providers are more likely than public providers to provide incorrect diagnoses 
for the same clinical case – although they are also more likely to communicate any diagnosis to the patient. 
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The non-contractibility of (unobserved) appropriate effort is particularly problematic in the 
treatment of infectious diseases - including in the rational use of antibiotics. Determining whether 
antibiotic treatment is necessary for a particular patient case will require some costly clinical 
effort from the physician,14 who is not compensated for this - nor for any broader benefits this 
effort will have on public health, in containing unnecessary growth in antibiotic resistance. The 
economic theory on externalities argues that market provision of goods that generate benefits 
(costs) to third-parties, that are unaccounted for in market prices, will lead to under-provision 
(over-provision).15 The non-contractibility of appropriate care in general, and the public health 
spill-overs from appropriate antibiotic use in particular, therefore predict that antibiotics will often 
be misused relative to the patient’s and public’s best interests.16 
Taken together, both theory and evidence support the conclusion that (free) market provision of 
healthcare is likely to prioritise those aspects of care that the market can observe and reward. This 
raises the question of how private providers may be incentivised to provide appropriate care - 
especially those aspects that are unobserved, generate externalities, or conflict with actual or 
perceived market demand. 
1.3 Healthcare as a Credence Good 
The potential for inefficiency from market provision of healthcare has long been recognised in 
the economic literature on ‘credence goods’ (Darby and Karni, 1973). Credence goods are 
characterised by consumers’ inability to identify the goods that best fit their needs (i.e. to self-
diagnose) and to verify the quality of the goods they consume. Consumers must therefore rely on 
experts – like trained physicians – to diagnose and treat their needs. Another important 
characteristic of these goods is that there are economies of scope to diagnosis and treatment 
provision (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). In other words, it is costly or complicated for 
consumers to get second opinions, so the expert who gives the diagnosis and treatment 
recommendation has an advantage in providing the treatment as well.  
The information asymmetry between expert sellers and consumers, and the inherent conflict in 
sellers’ diagnostic and treatment functions, raises the possibility of three types of fraudulent 
behaviour in these markets (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006): overprovision, where more 
services are provided than required for the consumer’s needs (service quantity is over-supplied); 
under-provision, where the services provided fail to treat the consumer’s needs (service quality 
 
14 There is an additional effort cost if the patient demands antibiotics in cases where it is inappropriate (as often reported), and the 
physician needs to take the time to explain to and persuade the patient that antibiotic treatment is unnecessary. 
15 In these cases, some form of government regulation of private provision is generally proposed, such as (‘Pigouvian’) corrective 
taxes or subsidies to bring market incentives in line with optimal provision.  
16 This tendency for over-use may be further compounded under market provision if there is significant patient demand for antibiotics. 
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is under-supplied); and overcharging, where appropriate services are provided for the consumer’s 
needs, but the seller overcharges for its quality.17 Field studies from the SID literature (Gruber 
and Owings, 1996; Gruber et al., 1999; Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014) initially documented the 
existence of over-provision for profit in healthcare markets using observational data. More 
recently, evidence from controlled laboratory and field experiments have supported those earlier 
findings, contributed new findings on over-charging and under-provision, and proposed certain 
institutional and incentive mechanisms that might mediate these behaviours (Dulleck et al., 2011; 
Currie et al., 2014; Lu, 2014; Gottschalk et al., 2018).  
1.3.1 Insurance in credence goods markets 
The incentives for fraudulent expert behaviour are, in theory, worsened under consumer insurance 
(or third-party payment, more generally). In healthcare, standard theory on ex-post moral hazard 
stipulates that patients will demand more unnecessary healthcare when they are insured, and do 
not face the full upfront costs attached (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970). At the 
same time, the problems of asymmetric information between patients and expert physicians may 
be worsened: less cost-conscious, insured patients have less incentives to retrospectively verify 
and hold physicians to account for the quality or necessity of their care, even where this is possible 
through some search or informational cost to the patient (Pauly, 1978, 1988). The theory of 
second-degree moral hazard argues that profit-oriented physicians will exploit the anticipated 
moral hazard and lower cost-sensitivity of insured patients to increase their own fraudulent 
behaviour (i.e. to over-supply or over-charge aspects of care where they can profit, and under-
supply those aspects that are uncompensated).  
Despite its theoretical appeal, robust field evidence that physicians respond in this way to patient 
insurance is scarce. A series of observational and quasi-experimental studies have documented a 
positive relationship between health insurance coverage and treatment choices (and related health 
expenditure) (Lundin, 2000; Card et al., 2008; Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; 
Baicker and Goldman, 2011; Martin et al., 2017). However, as with the SID literature discussed 
previously, these studies fail to isolate the influence of physicians’ fraudulent behaviour in 
response to insurance from patient-side drivers (the fraudulent demands or selective needs of 
insured patients). Only one study, by Lu (2014), succeeds in fully isolating physician responses 
to patient insurance. Using an audit study approach with SPs, Lu (2014) randomises both 
physicians’ financial incentives for drug prescribing and the SP’s insurance status.18 The author 
 
17 Note that, according to the definitions of overuse and underuse employed in this thesis (see Section 1.1), all three types of fraud 
(over-provision, under-provision and over-charging) can indicate overuse, whereas only over-provision and under-provision can 
indicate underuse. 
18 Financial incentives for prescribing are exogenously varied in this study through the SPs’ stated preferences on where to buy  any 
prescribed drugs. A financial incentive is provided when the SP asks to buy any prescribed drugs from an affiliated pharmacy, from 
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finds that, when physicians have a financial incentive to prescribe, they write prescriptions that 
are 43% more expensive for insured patients compared to uninsured ones. Conversely, physicians 
do not respond to patient insurance when they have no financial incentives attached. Taken 
together, these results suggest that physicians’ response to patient insurance is driven by profit 
incentives (second-degree moral hazard) rather than any altruistic considerations for patients’ 
financial welfare (perfect agency). This is an important finding that merits further investigation, 
given on-going expansion in formal insurance and for-profit healthcare provision worldwide. 
1.3.2 Institutional remedies for expert fraud  
In theory and in laboratory settings, it has been shown that imposing the strict condition of liability 
- which holds sellers liable for providing sufficient quality to resolve consumers’ needs – may be 
an effective institutional constraint on expert fraud (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck et 
al., 2011). 19  However, implementing this condition in healthcare markets is likely to be 
problematic for two reasons. First, liability requires verifiability of service outcomes. 20  In 
practice, verifying and attributing health outcomes to specific health services and to specific 
providers is not straightforward, given the myriad external and patient-related factors that can 
also influence outcomes. Second, the lab experiments that test this condition do not consider the 
effects of diagnostic uncertainty or inaccuracy. The credence goods literature generally assumes 
that experts can diagnose with certainty, and all lab experiments in this area take the diagnosis as 
given (Kerschbamer and Sutter, 2017). In practice, the considerable uncertainty that is common 
in clinical decision-making means that strong liability conditions for under-provision can 
inadvertently lead to more over-provision - a tendency known as ‘defensive medicine’ (Baicker 
et al., 2007). The credence goods literature does not distinguish over- or under-provision due to 
diagnostic uncertainty (or inaccuracy) from fraudulent profiteering. 
Pauly (1978, 1988) and others have further argued that some aspects of healthcare may be more 
characteristic of a ‘search’ or ‘experience’ good, rather than a pure credence good. In these cases, 
through costly search or repeated provider interactions, patients may lower their informational 
disadvantage (Wolinsky, 1993) to deduce certain qualities of providers (and their services) ex 
ante or infer the quality of services provided ex post. In this view, two alternative market 
 
which the prescribing physician would receive a profit-share. This incentive is removed when the SP states a preference for purchasing 
any prescribed drugs at an external pharmacy. 
19 In theory, Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) also find that another condition of verifiability, which allows consumers to learn the 
quality of the goods they receive, is effective in preventing over-charging. However, ensuring verifiability in a lab setting was far less 
effective than predicted (Dulleck, Kerschbamer and Sutter, 2011). Kerschbamer et al. (2017) put the latter result down to 
heterogeneous social preferences among sellers, and the presence of ‘anti-social’ sellers that respond counter to predicted behaviour 
under verifiability. 
20 In healthcare, the closest institutional solution to implementing liability is a malpractice litigation system, which would rely on the 
verifiability of health outcomes. 
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mechanisms may be useful in limiting fraudulent behaviour: provider competition and reputation-
building opportunities.21  
In general, the results from altering competition and reputational incentives in practice (both in 
lab and field settings) suggest the obvious: these mechanisms that function through market 
demand responses are unlikely to bring about improvements to service aspects (price or quality) 
unless those aspects are observable and salient to consumers. While price is easily comparable 
and highly salient (at least to consumers with little or no insurance, or to third-party payers), 
appropriate servicing (over- or under-treatment) is not.22 Therefore, while price competition has 
been found to drive down market prices, providers may instead compromise on service quality 
aspects that are less observable, and that cannot trigger the same demand response (Dulleck et al., 
2011; Mimra et al., 2016).23 Competition or reputational incentives are then likely to be effective 
only insofar as they target service aspects where provider performance can be easily observed, 
measured and compared. As the previous sections highlight, the issues in systematically 
observing or measuring appropriate healthcare – particularly its technical quality - mean that these 
regulatory mechanisms have significant limitations in healthcare markets.24   
To summarise, there are a number of gaps in the literature on credence goods (as applicable to 
healthcare), and on insurance in these markets in particular, which this thesis seeks to address. 
First, the literature generally takes experts’ diagnostic accuracy as given, and abstracts from the 
substantial uncertainty that is common in medical scenarios. The inappropriate care choices and 
unnecessary costs that can stem from diagnostic uncertainty or inaccuracy in real-world settings, 
as distinct from fraudulent profiteering, have not been investigated in lab or field settings.25 
 
21 There is some conceptual overlap in the competition and reputation-building provider incentives evaluated in the literature. 
Competition effects are commonly tested by investigating provider responses to variations in the number of other competitors in the 
market (Gottschalk et al., 2018; Rasch and Waibel, 2018), endogenous price-setting (Mimra et al., 2016), consumer search and choice 
(Dulleck et al., 2011; Gottschalk et al., 2018), and public reporting of comparable competitor information (Dulleck et al., 2011; Mimra 
et al., 2016). Reputation-building incentives are usually tested by evaluating provider responses to variations in the likelihood of 
repeat customer interactions (Dulleck et al., 2011; Schneider, 2012; Rasch and Waibel, 2018), and to public reporting of provider 
performance (Mimra et al., 2016).  
22 Repeat business incentives have shown some effect in reducing prices, but no effect on over- or under-provision on average (Dulleck 
et al., 2011; Schneider, 2012; Rasch and Waibel, 2018). Schneider (2012)’s analysis of reputational incentives in the car repairs market 
also notes an interesting relationship between customer learning and reputation effects: under the possibility of repeat business, 
mechanics were less likely to over- or under-provide services that were easier for motorists to verify the quality or necessity of post-
service. 
23 For instance, Dulleck et al. (2011) find that the combination of consumer choice, endogenous price-setting and public reporting of 
price information with multiple sellers in a lab setting stimulated price competition and lowered market prices. However, it also led 
to greater fraud in the form of under-provision (more under-supply in quality). Mimra et al. (2016) find that public posting of pricing 
and quality information in a lab setting lowered prices but exacerbated under-provision and over-charging - once again indicating 
some trade-off between price competition and quality fraud. Volpp et al. (2003) provide some supportive evidence from the field: 
risk-adjusted AMI mortality rates rose in New Jersey after deregulation of hospital prices, indicating a decline in care quality in 
response to greater price competition - although no evidence is given that demand elasticity rose and prices actually fell post-
deregulation.  
24 Field studies evaluating the quality impact of public reporting in healthcare find little to no effect on targeted technical quality 
outcomes (Ketelaar et al., 2011), and some perverse effects on non-targeted outcomes, quality reporting fraud, and patient selection 
(Dranove et al., 2003; Werner and Asch, 2005; Gravelle et al., 2010). 
25 The study design in Lu (2014) also negated the need for physicians’ to exert much diagnostic effort - as the SPs presented each 
physician with prior laboratory test results - and minimised the potential for diagnostic uncertainty or inaccuracy. Hence, it does not 
  25 
Second, how physician experts may trade-off between the experiential aspects of healthcare and 
the purely credence aspects has not been explicitly modelled or considered in this literature. Third, 
it is unclear how different levels of patient cost-sharing (insurance co-payment) affect physician 
behaviour in these markets. Partial insurance (some patient cost-sharing) may have different 
incentive effects on physicians than full insurance (no cost-sharing) (Kerschbamer and Sutter, 
2017). Lastly, the institutional remedies proposed in the literature for regulating expert fraud – 
liability, competition or reputational incentives – have informational requirements that are 
unrealistic in real-world settings. Instead, Kerschbamer and Sutter (2017) conclude that experts’ 
“moral constraints” (or pro-social preferences) may have an important role in regulating 
fraudulent behaviour where institutional solutions are infeasible. While these authors propose 
leveraging experts’ moral constraints through job selection – implying the constraints are largely 
fixed, individual attributes – this thesis explores how such intrinsic constraints may also be 
mobilised through targeted incentives (as detailed further in Section 1.5). 
1.4 Role of Intrinsic Motivation  
The previous sections highlight a conflicting duality in the physician’s role under market 
incentives - as expert agents in healthcare decision-making and custodians of public health on the 
one hand, and as profit-maximising economic agents on the other. Where appropriate care 
conflicts with patients’ actual or perceived preferences, private physicians have clear rationale to 
prioritise and oversupply those services that they believe patients will value – or at the very least, 
not object to. Moreover, regulators’ inability to systematically verify and compensate appropriate 
care provision means that financial or reputational incentives, tied to imperfect and simplified 
measures of such provision (such as pay-for-performance or public reporting programs26 tied to 
aggregate performance metrics), are likely to be of only limited value in countering these over-
treatment incentives (Berenson and Rice, 2015). In this context, finding ways to leverage 
physicians’ intrinsic motivation (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Galizzi et al., 2015) – be it 
professionalism, or altruistic concerns for patient health and financial welfare – may be a way 
forward. While intrinsic motivation  has been understood in slightly different ways in different 
 
provide much insight into how physicians may vary their diagnostic effort (and their resulting diagnostic accuracy) in response to 
patient insurance. 
26 This includes social accountability initiatives, like the community monitoring initiative tested with public providers in Uganda by 
Björkman and Svensson (2009). While the Hawthorne effect – that is, provider responses to knowingly being monitored – has been 
proven beneficial in improving monitored aspects of care (Leonard, 2008; Schwartz et al., 2013), the issue remains that it is often 
difficult to assess whether observed aspects constitute (or lead to) “appropriate” care. For instance, observing that a provider completes 
monitored aspects of clinical effort does not guarantee that the resulting diagnosis will be accurate and the treatment appropriate. It 
also does not guarantee that providers will not subsequently compromise (and lower their effort on) non-monitored aspects of care.  
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literatures (Galizzi et al., 2015; Brock et al., 2016), this thesis broadly defines it as any physician 
motivation that aligns with patient welfare, independent of financial or reputational gain.27  
The notion that healthcare providers may be intrinsically motivated is not new (Galizzi et al., 
2015) - it has been evidenced both in the lab (Kolstad and Lindkvist, 2013; Hennig-Schmidt and 
Wiesen, 2014; Lagarde and Blaauw, 2017) and in the field (Lundin, 2000; Granlund, 2009; 
Ashraf, Bandiera and Lee, 2018). 28  The literature generally identifies two sources of this 
motivation: i) individual-specific endowments, that are fixed and unique to individual providers, 
and ii) environmental factors, that can shape the motivations of all providers (Franco et al., 2002; 
Ashraf and Bandiera, 2017). The discussion on leveraging intrinsic motivations in healthcare has 
often emphasised the first source, proposing that recruitment practices must be designed to 
identify and select (highly) intrinsically motivated individuals into health professions (Lagarde, 
Huicho and Papanicolas, 2019). Another body of work, inspired by behavioural economic theory, 
has begun exploring whether intrinsic motivations may indeed be malleable (in line with the 
second source) - and how workplace and job attributes (Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2010; Ashraf 
and Bandiera, 2017; DellaVigna and Pope, 2017), social and behavioural reinforcements (Brock 
et al. 2013), or informational incentives (Kolstad, 2013; Lee, 2018) may be used to improve the 
performance of the average health worker. A key finding in Leonard et al. (2015) is that the first 
source is useful for improving provider performance only in the public sector in Tanzania, but not 
in the private sector. Das and Hammer (2014) argue that this may be due to a stronger impact of 
market incentives in disciplining provider behaviour in the private sector. However, as suggested 
previously, there may be cases where market incentives do not align with appropriate provider 
effort – either because market demand is not aligned with appropriate care, or because not all 
aspects of appropriate provider effort are observable to the market. This thesis therefore 
investigates both sources of intrinsic motivation among private physicians, and their potential for 
countering the market failures outlined in the preceding.  
 
27 Note that “intrinsic motivation” and “altruism” are used interchangeably in this thesis, for simplicity. It is recognised that altruism 
may be just one form of intrinsic motivation and conceptually distinct from other forms (such as professionalism). This simplification 
is perhaps more justified in healthcare than in other professions, as the goal of improving patient welfare is consistent with both 
professionalism and altruism among healthcare workers (professional excellence in the medical profession generally requires 
providing clinically optimal care to patients). 
28 For instance, it has been used to explain why some workers voluntarily take up low-paying or rural posts (Kolstad and Lindkvist, 
2013; Ashraf et al., 2018); why medical students choose to sacrifice their own cash payoffs to benefit unknown patients (Hennig-
Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014); and why physicians are more often observed to prescribe cheaper generic drugs to less insured patients, 
even when they have no financial incentives to do so (Lundin, 2000; Granlund, 2009). 
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1.5 Thesis Objectives and Roadmap 
Building on the findings discussed in previous sections, this thesis uses field experiments with 
unannounced standardised patients (SP) to examine three research questions in the market for 
primary healthcare services in South Africa: 
1. What is the impact of increasing patient financial protection (insurance) on the 
appropriateness (quality and efficiency) of care provided by private physicians? 
2. How can market pressures and intrinsic motivations mediate the healthcare choices of 
these physicians? 
3. What is the impact of intrinsic informational incentives from private audit and 
performance feedback (A&F) in lowering inappropriate antibiotic treatment and costs? 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the study 
setting in South Africa, and explains the relevance of this setting for the thesis objectives. 
Chapter 3 sets out a theoretical framework that models a typical physician-patient interaction in 
the private sector, replicating several features of this study setting. The model characterises the 
decision problem of a representative physician in this study, and the various institutional and 
incentive elements that shape it. Seven hypotheses on physicians’ effort and treatment choices 
under different incentives are derived for testing in subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 outlines the 
experimental methods and main data sources used in this thesis. The chapter also provides a 
description of the two empirical parts to this study, corresponding to two distinct field 
experiments.  
Chapter 5 evaluates the first (within-subject) field experiment, and tests the impact of varying 
the level of patients’ financial protection (insurance) on physicians’ care quality choices - 
including observable aspects of their clinical effort, as well as the accuracy of diagnoses and 
appropriateness of treatments given.  Using the same experiment, Chapter 6 evaluates the impact 
of patient financial protection on the quantity and costs of care provided by physicians. It 
evaluates this impact both on care aspects with direct financial incentives for physicians (fee-for-
service diagnostic tests and treatment procedures) and on aspects without any direct financial 
incentives attached (drug prescriptions for physicians that cannot dispense drugs). Chapter 7 
evaluates the second, randomised field experiment in this study, to test the effectiveness of private 
A&F compared to a passive educational intervention alone in lowering inappropriate antibiotic 
prescribing for a viral respiratory infection. The chapter also evaluates effects on treatment costs, 
and potential adverse spill-overs on appropriate antibiotic use and other inappropriate drug 
treatments. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the main findings from this study, 
its strengths and limitations, and its research and policy implications.
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2 Study Setting 
This chapter describes the overarching context of this thesis study in South Africa, and highlights 
why the country is a particularly relevant setting for exploring the research questions set out in 
Section 1.5.  
With a relatively young population of 54 million, South Africa faces a unique mix of challenges 
in overcoming the healthcare inequalities inherited from its colonial and Apartheid history, whilst 
combating a high burden of infectious diseases and high rates of antimicrobial resistance. Central 
to these efforts is an ambitious agenda to harness a prominent private healthcare sector, to deliver 
universal healthcare to all citizens within a new National Health Insurance system (NHI). In 
particular, the NHI seeks to contract private primary care physicians (GPs) to deliver publicly-
funded healthcare and function as gatekeepers to the national health system. These trends 
emphasise an increasingly central role for private GPs in South Africa, in determining the 
healthcare use and expenditures of a progressively better insured population. Understanding and 
aligning the incentives of these market-based providers with universal healthcare and public 
health will be crucial to the success of this agenda.  
As South Africa’s largest and fastest-growing urban centre - with a large private healthcare market 
- the city of Johannesburg presents an ideal microcosm for studying market incentives in 
healthcare provision in this context. The following sections highlight a number of institutional, 
epidemiological and policy developments that are relevant to understanding the contextual factors 
that may influence private physicians’ clinical decision-making in this setting, as well as the 
motivations for and timeliness of this study’s objectives.  
Section 2.1 explains the historical context of the South African health system, which has 
established a public-private dichotomy in the system today (Section 2.2). Section 2.3 describes 
the high burden of infectious diseases and antibiotic stewardship in the country. It is noted that, 
despite the majority of antibiotics being prescribed in primary care, most local antibiotic 
stewardship initiatives to date have been focused on the public hospital sector. Section 2.4 
describes the private market for primary healthcare in South Africa, characterised by a largely 
insured demand and a supply by independent private GPs. Finally, Section 2.5 outlines the current 
trend toward universal health coverage (UHC) in South Africa with the planned National Health 
Insurance system (NHI), and its implications for private GPs.  
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Figure 2.1. Provinces of South Africa 
Figure 2.2. Regions of the City of Johannesburg 
Notes. Apartheid-era racial segregation in Johannesburg had a distinct north-south divide. The northern suburbs around Sandton and 
Randburg, primarily in Regions C, B and E, were the previously whites-only residential areas. Apartheid policies since 1950 relocated black 
Africans previously residing in these areas to the newly-created southern suburbs in Regions D, G and (south of) F, and the northern peripheral 
suburbs in Region A. An exception to this north-south divide is the suburb of Alexandra, bordering Sandton in Region E, which was and still 
is a predominantly black African neighbourhood. Sandton and Randburg remain two of the wealthiest suburbs in Johannesburg today (and 
still predominantly resided by white South Africans), and are referred to as the “northern suburbs” in this thesis. See Appendix A.2 for a brief 
overview of historical spatial segregation in Johannesburg, and how it has translated into spatial inequalities in health and economic opportunity.  
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2.1 Historical Background 
South Africa’s history of institutionalised racial segregation has shaped its modern-day health 
system. Healthcare resources have been historically skewed in favour of the white minority 
population, urban centres, higher levels of curative care, and a private sector that predominantly 
serves the white, urban population (Wadee et al., 2003). The Apartheid regime that began in 1948 
enforced racial segregation by delineating strict whites-only areas within urban areas; relocating 
urban-residing blacks to rural homelands and urban peripheries, and regulating their movement 
into towns and cities. Healthcare facilities were similarly segregated, and urban health services 
and whites-only facilities were far better resourced than rural or blacks-only facilities. Primary 
healthcare was severely underfunded in the public system: by 1994, only 11% of public healthcare 
expenditure was being allocated to non-hospital primary healthcare services (McIntyre et al., 
1995). The private healthcare sector expanded rapidly in the 1980s, and the share of doctors 
working in the private sector increased from 40% to 60% over this decade (Coovadia et al., 
2009).29 At the same time, access to private healthcare was predominantly restricted to the white 
population, due to both the concentration of private providers in urban centres (where the white 
population largely resided) and the restriction of private health insurance cover to only this 
population group until the 1970s.  
After the first multi-racial elections in 1994, the new African National Congress (ANC) 
government ended institutional segregation and introduced a number of reforms to improve the 
public provision and distribution of basic health services.30 The public health system was better 
integrated, and developed into a comprehensive national health service, centred around primary 
care (which was also made available free of charge to all citizens). Spending on primary 
healthcare almost doubled as a share of public health expenditure (Coovadia et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, government spending on the public health system stagnated after 1997, while 
spending by private health insurers increased: between 1996 and 1999, annual real expenditure 
growth per public sector beneficiary was 1%, compared to 10% per private insurance beneficiary.  
 
29 Government funding further subsidised this growth, with tax subsidies for the private health insurance contributions of formal sector 
workers (amounting to 10-17% of the government health budget in 1994); government (employer) contributions to private health 
insurance membership for all civil servants and their beneficiaries (amounting to 16% of the health budget in 1992); and the training 
of all medical personnel (public and private) in the public sector (Wadee et al., 2003) – subsidies that continue to this day. 
30More generally, since the end of Apartheid, South Africa has enjoyed three decades of positive economic growth, and absolute 
poverty has declined. Today, it is considered an upper middle-income country and the largest economy in Africa. However, stark 
socio-economic inequalities exist – particularly along racial lines. Around 29% of the working-age population are unemployed, and 
this unemployment is largely concentrated among the young (55%), black (17%),30 and unskilled labour (Stats SA, 2015a, 2019). 
Only 6% of the black population have some form of higher education, and their median income falls in the income category below 
R4,800. Moreover, over 64% of black South Africans were classified as living below the poverty line in 2015. On the other hand, 
equivalent figures for the white population are 30% with higher education, median income in the category R38,400-76,800, and just 
1% living below the poverty line (Stats SA, 2015a, 2015b).  
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2.2 Two-Tier Health System 
As a result of historical disparities, South Africa today remains characterised by a two-tier, public-
private health system. Private healthcare is highly developed and comprises a substantial share of 
the national health system, despite a large, parallel public sector that offers free care to most 
citizens. Compared to other upper middle-income countries, South Africa’s total health 
expenditure as a share of GDP (around 9%) is relatively high. However, more than half of this 
expenditure comes from private sources (51%), and primarily from voluntary private health 
insurance schemes (43%) that cater to just 16% of the population.31 Revenue from general taxes 
account for less than 48% of total health spending, and yet fund healthcare for over 80% of the 
population that rely on the public system. This includes 16% of the population that rely on the 
public sector for hospital services, but choose to pay out-of-pocket (OOP) to access private 
primary care (Keeton, 2010). These characteristics are symptomatic of the historical under-
funding of public primary care in South Africa, and highligh utilisation preferences that are 
misaligned with health insurance affordability. 
Private insurance is increasingly unaffordable for the majority of South Africans,32  and the 
likelihood of cover varies by race - and relatedly, by education, location and wealth. In 2016, 
around 76% of the white population had private insurance, compared to just 11% of black 
Africans.33 Private insurance is also twice as likely in urban than rural areas, and positively 
associated with the level of education and household wealth (NDoH et al., 2019). 34  The 
distribution of healthcare benefits in the system favours the privately insured, as health insurance 
schemes spend almost six times more per capita than the public sector (Kula and Fryatt, 2013). 
This inequity in financing is reflected in the distribution of healthcare infrastructure and 
workforce. South Africa faces a general shortage of doctors (with less than 1 doctor per 1000 
population) (World Bank, 2017), and retention in the public sector has been particularly 
problematic. Although all medical training takes place in the public sector, most newly qualified 
doctors opt to shift into private practice in urban areas, mainly due to poor working conditions 
and workplace security in the public system (van der Spuyet et al., 2017). Various estimates 
 
31 These funds are spent almost exclusively on private healthcare services, although they also cover care sought by insured individuals 
in public facilities – which in practice, tends to be limited to highly-specialised, tertiary care (McIntyre, 2010). 
32 The population covered by private insurance schemes has declined in recent years, from 19.8% of the total population in the late 
1990s to just over 16% in 2016 (NDoH et al., 2019), due to dramatic increases in the cost of premiums and co-payments. 
33 Note that, according to the 2011 population census (revised in 2015), 79% of the South African population is black African, 9% is 
white, 9% is mixed-race, and 3% is Asian, Indian or other race (Stats SA, 2015a). 
34 While overall healthcare financing is progressive (the richest households contribute a higher share of their income to health 
expenditure), this is primarily driven by private insurance contributions that only benefit scheme members, and does not contribute to 
income cross-subsidisation within the health system. At the same time, there is some evidence of ‘reverse’ risk cross-subsidisation, as 
the distribution of healthcare benefits is regressive (pro-rich) and not in line with health need: the poorest households, that bear a 
heavier burden of ill-health, incur a smaller share of overall health service benefits within the system (Ataguba and McIntyre, 2012).   
 32 
 
suggest that between 70-80% of all doctors in South Africa work in the private sector (including 
those that work in both sectors) (Keeton, 2010; McIntyre, 2010).35  
These disparities in healthcare resources translate into significant inequalities in healthcare 
access, quality, and financial protection (Harris et al., 2011; Lagarde and Blaauw, 2019b). As 
previously mentioned, despite the small population covered by private insurance, the use of 
private outpatient services is comparatively high - even in the poorest quintiles of the population. 
Uninsured individuals frequently opt to pay fully OOP to access private primary care services 
with lower wait times, greater choice of healthcare professionals, and perceived higher quality 
than in the public sector (Harris et al., 2011).36 For instance, it is estimated that 26% of the adult 
population (aged over 15 years) that utilised outpatient care in 2016 chose to consult private 
outpatient services – and this figure is higher in urban areas (32%). Of these individuals, 28% 
paid out-of-pocket (NDoH et al., 2019).  
2.3 Burden of Infectious Diseases and Antibiotic Stewardship 
South Africa faces a relatively high burden of disease for an upper-middle income country - 
particularly from infectious diseases such as AIDS/HIV, TB and other lower respiratory 
infections. It has the highest absolute number of people living with HIV anywhere in the world 
(19% of the country’s adult population (NDoH et al., 2019), and 17% of the world’s HIV+ 
population). 37  While non-communicable diseases are becoming more prevalent, certain 
communicable infections remain a significant mortality and morbidity burden. According to civil 
registration data, TB was the leading cause of all mortality in 2015 (accounting for 7.2% of all 
deaths) (Stats SA, 2017); while AIDS/HIV-related conditions, TB and pneumonia were the three 
single leading causes of premature mortality (as measured by the number of years of life lost 
(YLL)) (Groenewald et al., 2017). Around half of all premature mortality was attributed to 
HIV/AIDS in 2012 (Pillay-van Wyk and Bradshaw, 2017).38 
The growth in antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is particularly problematic in South Africa, where 
high rates of AMR (for both Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria) co-exist with this high 
 
35 In 2015, the private sector employed around 1 general practitioner (GP) and 0.9 medical specialists per 1000 of the insured 
population, compared to equivalent figures of 0.2 GPs and 0.1 specialists per 1000 of the uninsured in the public sector (CCSA, 2018). 
36 Measured clinical quality is also been found to be higher in the private sector (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2019b). 
37 However, the number of deaths attributable to the disease has been falling, and overall life expectancy has increased rapidly since 
2005 (from 51.6 to 62.9 years in 2015) due to improved access to antiretroviral treatment and other related health initiatives (WHO, 
2018). 
38 The main causes of mortality vary by population group. Non-communicable diseases were the leading causes of mortality among 
the white and Asian/Indian population groups in 2012, accounting for 80% of deaths; while HIV/AIDS and TB accounted for the 
majority of deaths among black Africans (38%). The mortality burden of other lower respiratory infections (including pneumonia) is 
more evenly distributed - as the third and fifth leading causes of mortality among the black and white population groups in 2012, 
respectively (Pillay-van Wyk and Bradshaw, 2017). 
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incidence and mortality burden of bacterial diseases (Gelband and Duse, 2011). The prevalence 
of these conditions makes access to effective antibiotics imperative and, paradoxically, threatens 
the effectiveness of available ones (DeNegre et al., 2019). AMR is a natural, evolutionary 
outcome of antibiotic use over time, and it inevitably develops faster in settings where bacterial 
diseases are more common. Nevertheless, the misuse of antibiotics for viral infections, the use of 
shorter antibiotic courses than necessary, and the overuse of multiple or broad-spectrum 
antibiotics unnecessarily exacerbate this problem (Tonkin-Crine et al., 2017).   
Policy attention on the issue has grown in recent years, as antibiotic use escalated in South Africa 
- increasing by 175% between 2000 and 2010 (Republic of South Africa, 2015).39 The South 
African Antibiotic Stewardship Programme was initiated in 2012, and brought together a group 
of multidisciplinary experts to implement stewardship initiatives within healthcare facilities, 
designed to encourage appropriate antibiotic use. This was followed by the development of a 
National Strategic Framework on Antimicrobial Resistance (NDoH, 2014a) in 2014, to cohere 
national efforts to contain AMR. South Africa now has the most active AMR surveillance system 
in Africa, a drug regulatory system that prohibits the sale of antibiotics without prescription, and 
an Essential Drugs List (EDL) and evidence-based Standard Treatment Guidelines (STG) (NDoH, 
2014b) to regulate and guide antibiotic use in the public health system.  
These initiatives have tended to focus on characterising the extent of AMR in the country; and on 
antibiotic stewardship in the hospital environment (Boyles et al., 2013; Brink, Messina et al., 
2016) and in the public sector. South Africa has very little experience or evidence on successful 
antibiotic stewardship in primary care – particularly in the private sector. This is despite 75-80% 
of antibiotics in the country being prescribed in primary care (mostly for community-acquired 
respiratory infections) (Brink, Van Wyk, et al., 2016), and almost 80% of the main prescribers 
(the doctors) working in the private sector. One exception was a 4-day prescriber training 
intervention, which was found to be effective in reducing antibiotic prescribing for upper 
respiratory tract infections in primary care (Meyer et al., 2001). This trial was nevertheless 
conducted in public clinics, and almost 20 years ago. A more recent initiative by Brink, Van Wyk 
et al. (2016) provides a ‘diagnostic stewardship’ framework to aid the differential diagnosis and 
management of common respiratory infections in primary care. However, its effectiveness is yet 
to be evaluated. Besides these educational (or ‘decision-aide’) initiatives, aimed at improving the 
knowledge or awareness of physicians and pharmacists, there is still a paucity of active 
stewardship interventions in this sector (or efforts to evaluate their impacts) to match those seen 
in South African hospitals (Brink, Messina, et al., 2016; Brink, 2017).  
 
39 This increase was primarily driven by increases in the use of trimethoprim and broad-spectrum penicillin. 
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Prescribing practices in the private sector also remain relatively unregulated.40 The STGs are 
publicly available to guide the prescription choices of both public and private healthcare 
providers, but they are primarily directed at the public sector. A recent survey of primary care 
providers in South Africa (mostly private) also revealed very little reported use of existing 
guidelines in antibiotic choices (Farley et al., 2018): only 39% of respondents reported using 
guidelines in prescription choices, and 80% expressed demand for clearer guidelines in hard-copy. 
While overall antibiotic use has remained fairly stable in the private sector in recent years 
(Schellack et al., 2017), the sector has seen a large increase in the prescription of newer, more 
expensive therapies. Moreover, a related study to this thesis (Blaauw and Lagarde, 2019), 
comparing inappropriate antibiotic use for a viral respiratory infection in the public and private 
primary care sectors of Johannesburg, found that inappropriate prescribing in the private sector – 
while lower than in the public sector – was still very high (67%, compared to 78% in the public 
sector).  
There has also been little effort to investigate the drivers of inappropriate antibiotic treatment 
decisions in South Africa, to inform the design of stewardship initiatives. A few recent studies 
have sought to address this gap (Farley et al., 2018; Lagarde and Blaauw, 2019b; Manderson, 
2019). They reveal that, while physicians display relatively good knowledge of AMR and correct 
antibiotic use, actual or perceived patient demand for antibiotics may be an important influence. 
Farley et al. (2018) find that, of 269 primary care physicians surveyed, 67% reported feeling 
pressure from patients to prescribe antibiotics. At the same time, respondents had relatively good 
knowledge of correct antibiotic use and AMR, and better knowledge was associated with more 
appropriate self-reported prescribing behaviours. Moreover, there was significant demand from 
respondents for more information on appropriate antibiotic use, both for themselves and for 
patients. This latter finding suggests that physicians, given their time constraints, may 
inappropriately prescribe antibiotics because they feel ill equipped or wish to avoid having to 
explain to expectant patients why antibiotics are not needed. Educational aids may facilitate 
discussions with patients in this case. In another qualitative study, Manderson (2019) finds that 
patients did not generally demand antibiotics during direct observations of consultations in 
primary care; however, physicians reported perceiving patient demand for antibiotics during the 
same consultations in subsequent interviews. In addition, Lagarde and Blaauw (2019b) report that 
physicians were less likely to prescribe inappropriate antibiotics in practice (when performance 
was assessed through unannounced standardised patients) when patients actively expressed 
reluctance towards receiving unnecessary antibiotics – again, underscoring physicians’ sensitivity 
 
40 The only prescribing constraint imposed on private providers is any restrictions pertaining to the insurance cover of private patients 
(although this is left to the prerogative of private insurers, and only applies to the 16% of the population with private insurance cover).  
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to patient demands, whether positive or negative. They also find that better diagnostic and 
guidelines knowledge are good predictors of appropriate treatment in practice (Blaauw and 
Lagarde, 2019).  
Overall, current evidence on antibiotic use in South Africa suggests that active interventions to 
address inappropriate prescribing in primary care, informed by rigorous research on its drivers – 
particularly in the private sector - are urgently needed. To this end, primary care physicians 
consistently demonstrate a high demand for clearer information and education on AMR and 
appropriate antibiotic use - both for themselves and for patients. Evidence from other contexts 
suggests that education-based initiatives may indeed lead to better prescription outcomes (van der 
Velden et al., 2012). However, the relative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of such initiatives, 
in comparison to other possible interventions, must be evaluated more thoroughly in the South 
African context.   
2.4 Private Market for Primary Health Care 
South Africa’s private healthcare market is particularly prominent in the urban province of 
Gauteng, where Johannesburg is located. Around 40% of private health insurance beneficiaries, 
and 45% of all private doctors, dentists and pharmacists are based there (McIntyre, 2010; CMS, 
2018). Among all 52 districts in South Africa, the city of Johannesburg has the fourth highest 
number of private GPs per capita, and the third highest number of private specialists per capita 
(CCSA, 2018).  
Although highly privatised health systems are not uncommon in developing countries 
(Mackintosh et al., 2016), the South African healthcare market is distinctly more formalised and 
regulated. Market demand largely comes from privately insured patients, whereas market supply 
of primary care is provided by self-employed, private GPs.  
2.4.1 A largely insured demand 
Around 72% of all expenditure on private outpatient services (including primary care services) in 
South Africa comes from private insurance funds, and 28% from OOP payments (NDoH et al., 
2019). Market-based primary care is therefore predominantly funded through private health 
insurance, provided by around 80 insurance schemes – locally known as “medical schemes.” 41 
Medical scheme membership is not legally required, but most formal sector employers offer 
subsidised scheme membership to their staff. All insurance plans must cover a prescribed 
 
41 Although the schemes are non-profit (and open schemes cannot refuse membership to any applicant) as per the MSA, scheme 
administration is usually outsourced to for-profit companies. 
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minimum benefits package, which includes care for certain chronic diseases and hospital-based 
interventions. Beyond this, plan options can differ in the premiums charged to members (the flat 
monthly contributions), the benefits covered, and the deductibles and co-payments attached to 
health service use.  
Medical schemes commonly offer Medical Savings Accounts (MSA) to cover primary care 
expenditures (including drugs), with a certain amount of funds (‘savings’) allocated per annum. 
These accounts are funded through a portion of members’ monthly premium contributions,42 and 
the amount of allocated savings varies by insurance plan. In general, the higher the premiums 
charged, the higher the annual savings allocation to MSA. Once these savings are depleted, the 
patient would need to pay for any subsequent primary care OOP, until the account is replenished 
the following year. Therefore, the higher the savings allocation, the lower the likelihood that the 
beneficiary incurs any OOP expenditure for primary care in a given year (all else equal).    
Medical schemes often have designated or preferred provider networks, comprised of independent 
private providers with whom they have specific payment or patient volume agreements 
(contracts).43 However, there is very little price regulation in the market. Medical schemes set 
their own prices (maximum reimbursement rates (MRR)) for specific healthcare services, but 
often allow contracted providers to balance-bill patients above those rates (i.e. to charge patients 
an additional fee above the MRR). Most medical schemes also allow beneficiaries to consult 
providers outside their networks, and directly access specialists and higher levels of care without 
a prior referral (‘gate-keeping’). However, external providers tend to charge higher prices and 
increase OOP expenditure for scheme beneficiaries, as patients are expected to pay these provider 
fees upfront and claim back from the schemes later (up to the MRR).  
The schemes also have very little oversight of the quality or choice of services supplied by 
providers. Providers have no obligation to report on their care quality performance or costs, so 
there is no publicly available data for determining the cost-effectiveness of medical interventions 
or technologies.44 Quality reporting is voluntarily undertaken by some providers and private 
 
42 The MSA were designed to allow members to take greater ownership of (and rationalise) their own primary care expenditures. 
However, they necessarily limit risk pooling at the primary care level, and further reduce member contributions to risk pooling at 
higher levels of care. They may also incentivise members with little or no remaining savings to by-pass primary care in order to avoid 
OOP costs, and unnecessarily utilise better-covered specialist care. Moreover, as members cannot draw on these account funds for 
any other uses, there are concerns that generous savings allocations create incentives for overuse of primary care services - both by 
healthy members seeking to fully benefit from available funds, and from providers expecting patients to be relatively price-insensitive 
to services paid for through these accounts (CCSA, 2018). Indeed, the average claims-to-savings ratio of beneficiaries has been 
consistently above 95% for open medical schemes in recent years, showing significant depletion of available funds in general (CMS, 
2018). 
43 Providers are free to be contracted by several medical schemes and also see uninsured patients paying OOP. 
44 The costs of health service claims have increased substantially in recent years. Annual claims expenditure rose by 590% in real 
terms between 1980 and 2016 (CCSA, 2018), largely due to the price-setting power and heavy capacity investments of private 
hospitals (which have driven over-utilisation and prices). These costs have almost entirely been passed down to scheme members, as 
reflected in rapidly rising insurance contributions and co-payment rates. For instance, between 2000 and 2017, inflation-adjusted 
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organisations. However, this tends to be limited to the hospital sector, and the care quality data 
reported is often not comparable or made publicly available (Carvounes et al., 2017; CCSA, 
2018). The schemes primarily rely on claims data submitted by providers for their beneficiaries 
(which contain diagnostic and procedural data, as recorded by providers) to infer limited aspects 
of care quality from reported utilisation of specific preventive services or hospitalisations. This 
administrative data is also very limited, covering only the scheme’s beneficiaries (rather than 
providers’ full patient populations), and often reported to be inaccurate and discordant with 
clinical data (Carvounes et al., 2017).  
2.4.2 Supply: private general practitioners (GPs) 
GP services account for the majority of all OOP expenditure on private healthcare by the 
uninsured (almost 50%), highlighting the centrality of private GPs in delivering care to both the 
insured and uninsured populations (McIntyre, 2010). Individuals frequently forego free healthcare 
in public clinics to consult a private GP, due to the perceived higher quality of care in the private 
primary care sector, and the guarantee of seeing a doctor (nurses conduct most primary care 
consultations in the public sector). 
Most GPs are paid fee-for-service (FFS), where a unit fee is paid per service provided. Such 
volume-based payment has raised concerns around perverse provider incentives to over-supply 
well-remunerated services relative to what patients need (CCSA, 2018). Evidence of such 
‘supplier-induced demand’ (SID) in the South African primary care sector is relatively scarce, 
although some indicative evidence can be gleaned from statistics published by the Council for 
Medical Schemes (CMS) on GP visit claims (CMS, 2018). Comparing the geographical 
distribution of GP visit claims to medical schemes in four South African provinces, a consistent 
pattern is clear: areas in the highest quintile in terms of local per capita expenditure on GPs have 
the highest local GP density45 and the highest share of total GP visit claims (over 55% of visit 
claims in all four provinces).46 While these statistics fail to account for potential differences in 
local patient characteristics that may contribute to differences in GP utilisation across areas, the 
striking consistency in the positive association between GP expenditure and GP density across all 
 
average monthly contributions per member have increased by 72% (CMS, 2018). The medical schemes themselves have managed to 
retain stable cash reserves of approximately 32% of gross annual contributions over the last decade - well above the necessary 25% 
mandated under the MSA (CMS, 2018). This discrepancy between high and rising costs for members, and high and stable cash reserves 
for the medical schemes, has called into question the statutory role of medical schemes as non-profit entities that act in the sole interest 
of their beneficiaries. 
45 The relative GP density of an area (postal code) is determined by comparing the area’s share of total practicing GPs in the province, 
and its average patient load per local GP, to other areas in the province. 
46 This pattern is particularly stark in Johannesburg’s province of Gauteng, where areas ranking in the top 20% in terms of local per 
capita GP expenditure have an average GP density that is around 90% higher than in areas ranking in the bottom 20%, and account 
for 75% of all GP visit claims. 
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four provinces analysed suggests some level of demand-inducement is plausible (whereby GPs 
compensate for lower patient loads with a higher number of visits and expenditure per patient).  
As all medical practitioners in South Africa, GPs must complete a five-year Bachelor degree in 
Medicine and a two-year clinical internship in order to practise. They must also be registered with 
the Medical and Dental Board of the Health Professional Council of South Africa, which is the 
primary regulatory body for medical practitioners. Beyond this, more active on-going regulation 
of professional practice and standards is generally absent in the private sector. For instance, there 
is no systemic requirement for GPs to follow evidence-based treatment protocols, pursue 
professional development activities, undergo peer review, or adhere to other forms of quality 
monitoring or reporting.   
There are nevertheless two (weak) sources of implicit regulation and cost-control in the private 
GP market (as detailed below). The first comes from the existence of contracted provider 
networks for medical schemes (as noted in the previous section), which distinguish ‘contracted-
in’ GPs from those that are ‘contracted-out’. The second comes from the existence of drug 
dispensing licenses for GPs, which create cost-sharing incentives for ‘dispensing’ GPs that are 
absent for ‘non-dispensing’ ones.  
2.4.2.1 Contracted-in vs. contracted-out GPs 
Private GPs are not obliged to join medical schemes’ provider networks in order to see insured 
patients (these patients are usually also covered for consultations with external providers). 
However, the majority of GPs in South Africa choose to contract with at least the larger medical 
schemes, as it can benefit them in two ways. First, they are guaranteed direct reimbursement from 
schemes up to their maximum rate (MRR) or a negotiated tariff for each service provided, which 
enables them to take the administrative and OOP burden off their patients (who will then not need 
to pay up-front and claim back from the schemes themselves). Second, they can benefit from 
higher patient volumes, as schemes often have incentives for beneficiaries to see providers within 
their networks. Hence, in areas with a high number of insured patients, particularly from a few 
large medical schemes, ‘contracting-in’ can be beneficial to both local GPs and patients. In the 
city of Johannesburg for instance, 71% of active GPs are reported as contracted-in with medical 
schemes.47  
 
47 This is calculated from the population of GPs listed as active in Johannesburg on the online Medpages database (which is estimated 
to list approximately 80% of all medical practitioners in South Africa), with non-missing data on contracting status (N=967). 
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These provider networks ensure some level of oversight on costs and standards of care,48 although 
this oversight is not systemised, and the consequences of suboptimal standards on network GPs 
are unclear (CCSA, 2018).49 The prices of ‘contracted-in’ GPs tend to be lower, as schemes can 
negotiate cheaper overall tariffs and restrictions on balance-billing in return for preferential 
channelling of beneficiary volumes and higher MRR’s (through preferred payment contracts). As 
a result, patients are less likely to have to co-pay to cover these GP consultation rates (which are 
more likely to be on par with their scheme’s MRR).  
2.4.2.2 Dispensing vs. non-dispensing GPs 
The majority of private GPs in South Africa are ‘non-dispensing’, meaning they do not have a 
licence to dispense drugs (they can only prescribe). In Johannesburg, non-dispensing GPs account 
for approximately 60% of all active GPs. Doctors that wish to both prescribe and dispense drugs 
to their patients must complete a dispensing course and be licensed by the Department of Health. 
In many parts of the world, where doctors make a profit from drug dispensing, licensing doctors 
to both prescribe and dispense is often argued to create incentives for doctors to over-prescribe 
(Chou et al., 2003; Park et al., 2005; Iizuka, 2007, 2012; Rischatsch et al., 2013; Kaiser and 
Schmid, 2016). On the contrary, in South Africa, dispensing licences for GPs operate in practice 
as a cost-containment mechanism. Since 2004, new regulations on drug pricing transparency have 
reduced GPs’ ability to profit from dispensing. All GPs must purchase drugs at fixed single exit 
prices (SEP), set yearly by a national drug-pricing authority. A small dispensing fee may be added 
to the cost of each drug sold to patients, and these fees are also set at a fixed percentage of each 
drug’s SEP. Nevertheless, dispensing GPs rarely charge patients separately for each drug 
dispensed, as the pricing formularies are administratively complicated. Most dispensing GPs 
charge a flat consultation rate, inclusive of all drugs, which creates strong incentives for 
containing unnecessary prescription costs. Dispensing GPs’ consultation rates tend to be higher 
than those of non-dispensing GPs, and the larger medical schemes also offer higher MRR for 
dispensing GPs to cover drug costs.50  
A related study suggests that the cost-containment incentives from GPs’ dispensing status can 
indeed be quite powerful (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2019a): dispensing GPs in Johannesburg 
prescribed significantly more inappropriate and more expensive treatments when their obligation 
 
48 For instance, the criteria for entering GP networks often include some quality assessment, supposedly through peer review (by 
independent GP associations). However, the methods of assessment, their frequency, and the consequences for GPs that do not meet 
quality standards are unclear. 
49 The strongest form of oversight applies to schemes’ Designated Service Provider (DSP) networks, where there are often restrictions 
on referrals to network-specialists only, and requirements to follow certain treatment protocols and prescribe only formulary-listed 
medicines. However, these requirements vary between schemes, and the extent to which they are enforced in practice is unclear. 
50 Some dispensing GPs also offer a lower consultation rate in cases where they do not dispense drugs (for instance, where they do 
not recommend any drug treatment, or where they do not have the necessary drugs in stock and must prescribe instead). 
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to dispense was removed - that is, when patients asked for a prescription instead. Given the 
implied cost constraints to dispensing, and that dispensing status is voluntary for GPs in South 
Africa, some selection bias in GPs’ decision to dispense is likely. In Johannesburg, for instance, 
dispensing GPs were more likely to be located in less affluent areas, accept poorer patients, and 
display higher levels of measured altruism toward patient welfare than non-dispensing GPs 
(Blaauw and Lagarde, 2019). 
2.5  Universal Health Coverage (UHC) Policies 
The South African government has committed itself to progressing universal health coverage 
(UHC) for all citizens. Central to this effort are plans to dismantle the current public-private 
dichotomy and establish a single state-run health system; underpinned by national health 
insurance for the whole population; and centred on universal access to integrated and quality 
healthcare, initiated at the primary care level. An outline of planned reforms up to 2026 has been 
set out in two government bills tabled in the South African parliament at the time of writing: the 
2019 National Health Insurance (NHI) bill, and the 2018 Medical Schemes Amendment bill. 
Certain aspects of these proposals are worth noting in the context of this thesis, as detailed below. 
The NHI bill proposes to set up a single, state-run insurance fund (‘NHI fund’) which will pool 
mandatory tax contributions from all employed citizens (along with the government health 
budget) and purchase healthcare services on behalf of the whole population.51 It aims to eliminate 
OOP expenditure for a comprehensive set of healthcare benefits and ensure equal access for all 
patients.52 Accordingly, enrolment in the NHI system will be mandatory for all South Africans, 
and a universal package of health services and medicines will be made available free at the point 
of use. The fund will contract with accredited healthcare providers to deliver these services, in 
line with cost-effective treatment guidelines and at prices determined by a central committee. To 
gain NHI accreditation, healthcare providers will have to meet certain performance standards and 
be certified by the Office of Health Standards Compliance. In addition, they will be expected to 
routinely collect and relay specific care quality performance data, for monitoring and assessment 
by the fund.  
These proposals promise to tackle many of the inequities and inefficiencies in the current two-tier 
system - in standardising healthcare access, eliminating OOP costs for essential care, reducing 
 
51 NHI implementation is being phased over a period of 9 years, and the system is planned to be operational by 2026. 
52 Access to NHI-funded services would be conditional on user registration at a contracted primary healthcare provider, which will 
also function as their point of entry into the health system. All specialist or hospital care may be accessed only through referral by the 
relevant primary care provider. The fund can refuse reimbursement of health services in cases where it is not included in the universal 
benefits package, where there is no medical necessity for the service, where the service is not cost-effective according to treatment 
guidelines, or where the patient does not comply with prescribed referral pathways.  
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care fragmentation, and enforcing quality and cost-effectiveness in care provision. Nevertheless, 
serious concerns remain regarding its sustainability53 and acceptability to all stakeholders. In 
particular, there are questions on its attractiveness to the private healthcare sector, and the 
population that rely on it. All current medical scheme beneficiaries will be obliged to contribute 
to the NHI fund and will no longer receive tax breaks to offset their medical scheme contributions. 
To avoid payment for duplicative cover, the NHI bill states that medical schemes may only 
provide complementary cover for health services not covered under the NHI benefits package 
once the fund is operational.54  
The Medical Schemes Amendment bill sets out a number of reforms to medical scheme 
operations, in order to pave the way for full NHI implementation. Perhaps most crucially, the bill 
states that all co-payments on health services covered by the schemes will be abolished, 
eliminating all OOP expenditure by beneficiaries. Another amendment states that medical 
schemes must cover a more comprehensive package of health services (perhaps similar to what 
the NHI will eventually cover) than just the prescribed minimum benefits that they are currently 
obliged to cover. The expectation is that this coverage will gradually fall as the NHI comes into 
operation, at which point the schemes will only provide complimentary cover.55   
The NHI implications for private GPs are of particular relevance to this study. The public sector 
lacks the health workforce and capacity to service the NHI system, so the contracting of private 
providers and facilities to deliver NHI-funded services is an essential part of government 
proposals. Sustainable contracting of private GPs will require that contractual terms and working 
conditions are sufficiently attractive to these providers, whilst maintaining incentives for cost-
control.56 A number of contracting models for private GPs are currently being explored, including 
capped FFS tariffs and sessional contracts. Part-time sessional contracts for private GPs to work 
in public clinics were trialled in NHI pilot sites between 2012 and 2017.57 However, uptake of the 
 
53 The system is expected to cost around R265 billion (USD 17 billion) by 2022 (Ngcuka, 2019), and a history or corruption and 
resource misuse in the public healthcare sector raises questions about the state’s capacity to govern such a complex and costly system.  
54 In practice, there is likely to be a significant market for such top-up insurance products – for instance, to cover discretionary medical 
procedures that are unlikely to be covered by NHI, and to allow direct access to specialist care for people wishing to avoid the wait 
times and mandatory referral pathways under NHI. 
55 Other proposals in the bill include the abolishment of medical scheme brokers, whose increasingly costly services have shown little 
return in growing beneficiary numbers; and the set-up of a central beneficiary registry, to gather data on consumer profiles and 
behaviours in the medical schemes market, for informing the NHI design. 
56 While the exact contractual terms for individual GPs are still to be defined, the latest proposals for organising primary healthcare 
delivery at the local level are the following (Republic of South Africa, 2019). Contracting Units for Primary Health Care (CU) will 
be set up at the sub-district level, managed by a horizontal network of local healthcare providers (including a district hospital, primary 
care facilities or clinics, and individual GPs). These units will be responsible for primary care provision within defined geographic 
areas (sub-districts), and are expected to contract with the NHI fund on a capitation basis (they will be paid a fixed amount over a 
defined period of time for each NHI-registered individual in their area). The CU’s will then be responsible for contracting and 
remunerating accredited private GPs in their areas. 
57 The proposed reforms to primary health care were rolled out in 11 pilot districts between 2012 and 2017. The sessional contract 
trialled with GPs contracts required them to work a portion of their time each week in a designated public healthcare clinic, for which 
they were paid a fixed hourly rate (sessional rate). The basic rate was set at the maximum public sector rate for doctors.   
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sessional contracts was very low (only 330 GPs had been contracted by 2017/2018) (NDoH, 
2019). GPs flagged several issues with the pilot contract, including a lack of clarity in the contract 
terms; sessional rates that were not high enough or market-related; limited clinical autonomy and 
inability to work at their own practice location; and the high workload and poor working 
conditions in public clinics (Blaauw and Lagarde, 2015; Hongoro et al., 2015). Capped FFS tariffs 
without any form of cost-sharing by individual GPs can also incentivise unnecessary care 
provision, if GPs respond to capped prices by increasing service volumes to maintain their 
profits.58 While the current FFS model of GP payment is unlikely to be sustainable in the NHI 
context, in the absence of convincing evidence on the perverse incentives and costs of FFS in a 
prospective universal health insurance system, ensuring buy-in from GPs and other stakeholders 
for payment models that move too far from the status quo will be a challenge.  
For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to underline the following points from this chapter. 
The thesis primarily focuses on the population of private GPs that are i) contracted-in with 
medical schemes, ii) non-dispensing, and iii) paid FFS. These GPs comprise the majority of 
primary care physicians in South Africa, and they are currently not subject to much cost 
containment incentives or quality control. Moreover, these GPs will be increasingly exposed to 
fully financially-protected patients both in the private sector (as OOP payments are eliminated in 
medical schemes) and in the future NHI system. Understanding how their treatment decisions 
may change with the level of patient insurance under current contracting terms – and equally, how 
they may be incentivised to rationalise inappropriate treatments - can therefore inform the future 
contracting of these providers. 
 
58 While the CU’s will be subject to cost-sharing incentives (through capitated payment methods), it is unclear how and to what extent 
these incentives will be passed on to individual GPs in their areas.  
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3 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter seeks to model a typical physician-patient interaction in the private primary 
healthcare sector, replicating certain features of the thesis context in South Africa. The following 
framework is an extension of those proposed in McGuire (2000) and Bardey & Lesur (2006). It 
includes two agents: a risk-averse patient and a physician (assumed risk-neutral). As in standard 
physician agency models with asymmetric information, it is assumed that healthcare consumption 
is determined by physicians at the point of care access (either objectively, or based on beliefs 
about patient preferences): patients trust physicians, to some degree, to make healthcare choices 
on their behalf. The market for physician services is monopolistically competitive, as commonly 
modelled (Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1981; Dranove and Satterthwaite, 1992; Gaynor, 1994; 
McGuire, 2000; Gaynor, Ho and Town, 2015), where physicians retain some market power from 
service differentiation, switching costs, and a high degree of trust in physician-patient 
relationships, but patients have some choice over the physician they consult.59 The physician’s 
payment incentives are fixed – I assume he is paid fee-for-service (FFS) and does not dispense 
drugs (‘non-dispensing’).60 However, the insurance status of the patient can vary: the patient can 
be ‘uninsured’ (paying fully out-of-pocket (OOP)), ‘low-insured’ (with limited insurance cover, 
paying partially OOP), or ‘high-insured’ (with full insurance cover). A third-party payer (health 
insurer) fixes the reimbursement rates for all physician services and prescribed drugs in the 
market.61 This set-up closely approximates the current institutional context in South Africa, where 
the majority of private primary care physicians are paid FFS, non-dispensing, and contracted-in 
with all large insurers that fix reimbursement rates and offer varying levels of patient insurance. 
The consultation scenario to be modelled is the following: the patient presents to the physician 
reporting a set of symptoms, and carrying a single (unknown) underlying illness. Information is 
incomplete: patient preferences are known to the physician, but the physician must conduct a 
number of observed and unobserved actions to gather private information about the patient’s 
 
59 The physician’s market power in this model stems from both asymmetric information and monopolistic competition.  
60 While he is paid a unit fee for any tests or treatments he administers during a consultation, he is not affected financially from the 
prescription of drugs. 
61 I abstract from any variations in reimbursement procedures, and assume that all physician services are claimed for directly by the 
physician rather than the patient (which reduces the scope for balance-billing), while all prescribed drugs must be purchased from 
pharmacies by patients paying up-front and claiming from the insurer later. As the physicians in this model are assumed to be 
‘contracted-in’ with the third-party payer (as with the majority of private physicians in Johannesburg), de facto price regulation can 
be reasonably assumed.  
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condition. The problem for the physician is that the patient’s symptoms can be compatible with 
multiple underlying illnesses of varying severity, and an accurate diagnosis greatly increases the 
likelihood that he prescribes an appropriate treatment to cure the patient. He must first deploy 
costly clinical effort and the necessary diagnostic procedures to identify the true illness, and then 
exert further effort to identify a therapeutic recommendation that is both clinically-indicated and 
aligned with the patient’s preferences and financial constraints. Moreover, he must do this whilst 
satisfying his own objectives, which may not always be aligned with those of the healthcare 
consumer (the patient) or payer (the insurer; and the patient, if not high-insured). This raises the 
possibility of imperfect agency in the physician-patient and physician-insurer relationships.  
The patient cannot observe whether the physician exerts the necessary effort to diagnose and treat 
his illness appropriately. That is, he cannot observe the technical quality of the care he receives. 
However, where there are cost implications to poor quality care, and the patient is not fully 
insured, he may infer it from subsequent OOP costs. 62  63  In essence, the informational 
disadvantage of the patient with respect to technical quality (and hence his demand elasticity) is 
determined by the salient costs of poor quality care to that patient:64 when a patient’s OOP share 
of health expenditure is high, he may be more aware of the cost implications of poor quality care, 
and more willing to invest in obtaining and responding to better information on his physician’s 
performance.  
Unlike McGuire (2000), I allow that physicians may attach some weight to patient welfare in their 
utility, independent of any related business gains. The framework further builds on Bardey & 
Lesur (2006) by considering that i) physicians not only choose service volume (quantity) but also 
effort, and that ii) they are subject to dynamic (indirect) financial incentives from competition (in 
addition to immediate payment incentives). In the framework extensions (Section 3.4), I allow 
that effort is not a homogeneous input, as modelled by McGuire (2000), but that it can have 
several dimensions – some more easily observable to the patient than others (Chalkley and 
Malcomson, 1998). A final extension proposed is that physicians’ intrinsic motivations (how they 
value patient welfare for its own sake) may not be fully fixed or exogenous, as commonly 
modelled. Instead, I consider how certain informational incentives can improve physicians’ 
intrinsic motivations for benefiting patients.  
 
62 For instance, poor quality care can result in additional care costs where poor diagnostic or therapeutic accuracy leaves the underlying 
illness un-treated, and results in the patient needing to seek additional care elsewhere. 
63 The patient may also infer care quality from subsequent treatment outputs and care outcomes, if he is willing to incur some 
informational cost of his own (for instance, in seeking out publicly available care quality information). 
64 This in turn determines the degree to which he delegates decision-making authority to the physician: the patient is more likely to 
trust the physician to make decisions on his behalf (and consequently, have a lower demand response to technical care quality) when 
his informational disadvantage is greater, relative to the physician. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 outline the objectives of the patient and 
physician, respectively. The physician’s decision problem and optimality conditions are also 
presented in Section 3.2, and their implication are discussed in Section 3.3. Framework extensions 
are considered in Section 3.4, and a concluding discussion is presented in Section 3.5.  
3.1 The Patient 
A patient 𝑗′s benefit from a clinical encounter with physician 𝑖  (𝑈𝑖𝑗) is an increasing, concave 
function of two arguments:65 the quantity of physician services provided in the encounter 𝑥,66 and 
the effort expended by the physician  𝑒  (which determines the technical quality and cost-
effectiveness of any treatments).67 The quantity of physician services 𝑥 is perfectly observed by 
the patient. Effort 𝑒 can be both a ‘diagnostic’ (physical and cognitive effort to arrive at an 
accurate diagnosis) and ‘therapeutic’ (cognitive effort to identify clinically-indicated and cost-
effective treatments for a specific diagnosis) 68  care input. It can therefore have both easily 
observable physical components, and more hidden cognitive components. However, it is assumed 
here for simplicity that 𝑒 - insofar as it contributes to technical care quality - is not directly 
observed by the patient.69 70 The patient’s benefit function is then given by: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗(𝑒, 𝑥) =  ℎ𝑖𝑗(𝑒, 𝑥) +  𝑥𝑖𝑗 +  𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑒)                                      (1)  
where ℎ𝑖𝑗 is the marginal health stock attributable to consultation 𝑖𝑗, and 𝑚𝑖𝑗 is the quantity of 
medications prescribed.  ℎ𝑖𝑗 is an increasing, concave function of the technical quality of care 
received (captured by unobserved physician effort 𝑒, which in turn affects the appropriateness of 
any drug treatment 𝑚); and to a lesser extent, of the quantity of physician services 𝑥.71 72  ℎ𝑖𝑗 is 
 
65 The concavity of the benefit function reflects the patient’s risk aversion. It may be reasonable to assume that 𝑈𝑗 is initially increasing 
and then eventually decreasing in 𝑥, as certain healthcare procedures may actually harm the patient if administered at excessive levels.  
66 This includes all diagnostic tests or procedures ordered during the consultation, which the physician is compensated for.  
67 “Quality” in this context of a physician-patient interaction refers to the clinical quality of care, which reflects the care process 
through which the health system’s structural inputs are transformed into health outcomes (Donabedian, 1988). As effort is linked to 
both quality and cost-effectiveness, higher effort is also assumed to minimise costs without any tradeoff on necessary quality.  
68 Therapeutic effort can also extend to explaining appropriate treatment choices to patients and ensuring compliance - especially 
where those choices run counter to patient demands. 
69 The simplifying assumption here is that effort is uni-dimensional, and that all effort is “appropriate” in improving the technical 
quality of care. This assumption is relaxed in Section 3.4, where it is considered that that some types of effort – particularly the 
observable types - may instead affect interpersonal aspects of care quality (i.e. patient experience) rather than its technical aspects.   
70 Even where it is not directly observed, 𝑒  may be partially inferred ex post from subsequent health and cost outcomes. This 
assumption is discussed further in Section 3.4. 
71 It is likely that |ℎ𝑥(. )| < |ℎ𝑒(. )| at most values of 𝑥 and 𝑒 (except in extreme cases), as it is the technical quality of care (rather 
than quantity) that should primarily determine health impact. As with 𝑚, it is also plausible that 𝑥 is decreasing in 𝑒 (as greater 
appropriate physician effort should minimize the need for multiple diagnostic tests or procedures). However, building on other 
modeling approaches in the literature (McGuire, 2000), I assume here that 𝑥 and 𝑒 are independent. Modeling 𝑥 as a decreasing 
function of e will not change the main implications of this framework (presented in Section 3.3) 
72 I abstract here from any random factors that can also influence ℎ𝑖𝑗, as this does not change the framework’s implications. 
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not perfectly verifiable by the patient: while he can observe his aggregate health state 𝐻𝑗 (and any 
changes to it), the patient faces some uncertainty in the extent to which any changes are directly 
attributable to a specific consultation 𝑖𝑗 . It follows that he cannot perfectly verify how the 
physician’s care changes his health state.  
The quantity of medications 𝑚 is a decreasing (concave) function of 𝑒: 𝑚′(𝑒) < 0, 𝑚′′(𝑒) < 0. 
Higher effort improves the physician’s diagnostic and therapeutic accuracy (decreases clinical 
uncertainty). With more effort, physicians are able to minimise diagnostic uncertainty, identify 
the most appropriate treatments for individual patients, and therefore prescribe fewer medications 
in total.73 74 Where physicians stint on effort, they compensate by prescribing more (and more 
types of) medications, as a wider range of medications increases the likelihood of addressing the 
true illness under diagnostic uncertainty.  It further appeases the patient, and the (non-dispensing) 
physician incurs no cost to prescribing.  
The observable components of the physician’s care (𝑥 and 𝑚) also enter the patient’s benefit 
function independently of any contribution to health stock. This captures the notion that where 
patients cannot perfectly verify the necessity or quality of the care they receive, they will derive 
some independent value from observed care quantity (perhaps inferring that a higher quantity of 
care should correlate with a larger gain in health stock).75 An important assumption is that at any 
level of 𝑒, |ℎ𝑒| > |𝑚𝑒|.
76 The patient is always better off with higher physician effort, despite the 
countervailing utility effect of fewer prescribed medications. This is plausible given potential 
adverse reactions and long-term health costs to over-medicating and inappropriate medications, 
which may limit (or even counter) the positive utility effect of prescribing more medications. 
There are also three types of costs from a clinical encounter. First, there is a cost 𝑝𝑥 per unit of 
physician services (𝑥) provided. Second, there is an average unit price 𝑝𝑚 for the medications 
prescribed. As with the quantity of medications (𝑚), this unit price 𝑝𝑚 also falls with 𝑒: 𝑝𝑚
′ (𝑒) <
0.  This can be for two reasons. Physicians that expend more effort are able to identify cheaper 
drugs, such as cheaper branded or generic substitutes on the market. Moreover, in the absence of 
sufficient effort for diagnostic or therapeutic accuracy, the physician compensates by prescribing 
more first-in-class and expensive drugs in the belief that newer, more costly drugs increase the 
 
73 Precautionary antibiotic use is a common example of where diagnostic uncertainty results in unnecessary drug prescriptions (Leigh 
et al., 2019), particularly for respiratory infections (Whaley et al., 2013; Brink et al., 2016).  
74 Aside from minimizing diagnostic uncertainty, higher effort can also reduce the number and inappropriateness of medications 
prescribed by countering patient demands for medications. For instance, physicians report prescribing inappropriate antibiotics in 
order to avoid lengthy explanations to demanding patients as to why antibiotics are unnecessary (Dempsey et al., 2014).  
75 This may be particularly relevant to medications and other treatments that provide symptomatic relief. As patients can directly 
observe and attribute any symptomatic effects (unlike health outcomes), they may derive some utility from the quantity of such 
treatments independent of any effect on health comes (including any negative health effects from over-treatment). 
76 The increase (decrease) in health benefit from a given increase (decrease) in 𝑒 is always larger than the corresponding decrease 
(increase) in 𝑚(𝑒). 
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likelihood of addressing the (unknown) underlying illness77 - and at worst, that it just appeases 
the patient. However, the physician’s ability to lower 𝑝𝑚 through exerting more effort falls with 
his effort level: 𝑝𝑚
′′ (𝑒) < 0. Lastly, there is a total consultation cost of 𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑅  for a particular illness 
episode, where 𝑝𝑅 is the physician’s flat consultation fee, and 𝐶𝑅 is the number of (current and 
future) consultations required to resolve the illness episode (including any repeat consultations, 
either with the same physician or other physicians). The total number of consultations required 
𝐶𝑅 is decreasing in the physician’s effort during a given encounter: 𝐶𝑅
′ (𝑒) < 0. The harder the 
physician works to diagnose and treat a patient appropriately, the less likely it is that the patient 
will require further consultations to address the same illness.78 However, the more effort he exerts, 
the smaller the marginal reduction in repeat consultations for the patient: 𝐶𝑅
′′(𝑒) < 0.  
The patient’s OOP share of these costs is determined by the co-payment parameter 𝜃𝑗, which is 
decreasing in the patient’s level of insurance (𝜃𝑗 = 0 for high-insured, 0 < 𝜃𝑗 < 1 for low-insured, 
and 𝜃𝑗 = 1 for uninsured patients).
79 
A patient 𝑗′s net benefit (𝑁𝐵) from a consultation 𝑖𝑗 is then: 
𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗 =  𝑈𝑖𝑗(𝑒, 𝑥) − 𝜃𝑗( 𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑒) +  𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑒)𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑒) + 𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑗)                    (2) 
Note that, while the OOP cost components of this function are perfectly observable to the patient, 
𝑈𝑖𝑗(𝑒, 𝑥) is neither fully observable nor perfectly verifiable given the patient’s uncertainty around 
ℎ𝑖𝑗(𝑒, 𝑥). 
3.2 The Physician 
Drawing on a general consensus in the literature (Galizzi et al., 2015), the physician’s utility from 
a clinical interaction is an increasing and separable function of two arguments: the profit 
generated by his medical choices 𝜋, and the welfare (or net benefit) of the patient (𝑁𝐵). The 
weight (𝛽𝑖) that physician 𝑖 attaches to patient welfare (for its own sake) is a measure of his pro-
 
77 This relationship between diagnostic uncertainty and more expensive drug choices is indicated in Takemura et al. (2005)’s analysis 
of antibiotic choices for patients with and without advance diagnostic testing. As with the relationship between uncertainty and the 
quantity of medications, this reflects the notion of defensive medicine: greater clinical uncertainty encourages physicians to “do more”, 
in order to avoid malpractice liability risks. It follows that |𝑝𝑚
′ (𝑒)| and |𝑚′(𝑒)| will likely be greater the higher the expected 
malpractice liability costs.  
78 Where the physician manages to resolve the illness in a given consultation, and no further consultations are required, 𝐶𝑅=1.  
79 I abstract from common non-linearities in insurance contracts (where the co-pay can vary with the level and types of services 
claimed) and assume 𝜃𝑗 is fixed here. 
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social preferences (altruism), and is assumed heterogeneous across physicians and exogenous.8081 
Although altruism may be considered conceptually different from physicians’ professionalism (or 
intrinsic motivation), the nature of the medical profession is such that significant overlap between 
intrinsic motivation and altruism can be reasonably assumed: professional excellence is likely to 
be heavily correlated with consistently delivering benefit to the patient. As such, while 
acknowledging there may be some conceptual differences, I assume here that intrinsic motivation 
incorporates altruism as well.82 Section 3.4.2 extends this discussion on intrinsic motivation and 
its sources in greater detail.  
A physician 𝑖’s profit from a consultation with patient 𝑗 is made up of three components: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗 =  𝑛𝑖𝑗(𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗)𝑝𝑅 + (𝑝𝑥 − 𝑐)𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝐶(𝑒𝑖𝑗)                                                (3) 
The first component is the product of the flat consultation rate 𝑝𝑅
83 and the number of future 
consultations 𝑛 that the physician gains from his performance during the interaction. 𝑛 is an 
increasing function of the net benefit (𝑁𝐵) he generates for the patient (McGuire, 2000).84 This 
captures the dynamic incentives facing the physician in any given consultation: his performance 
not only determines his immediate payoff from the consultation, but also impacts his reputation 
in the market and future business.85 A patient is more likely to return to the same physician when 
his 𝑁𝐵 is higher, and may also recommend the physician to friends and family. The rate at which 
𝑛 changes with 𝑁𝐵 (its elasticity) is a measure of the market competition facing the physician 
and the informational disadvantage of the patient (asymmetric information). The higher the 
number of (well-known) competitors in the market, and the more responsive the patient demand 
with respect to changes in 𝑁𝐵, the more business the physician gains for a given increase in 
 
80 In practice, pro-social preferences can be a combination of individual-specific aspects (i.e. intrinsic, or natural altruism) and 
common (homogeneous) aspects within a defined physician population (social or professional norms that can be nurtured). This is in 
line with Ashraf & Bandiera (2017b)’s modelling of “altruistic capital” (Ashraf and Bandiera, 2017). For simplicity, I assume only 
individual-specific aspects are significant here.  
81 𝛽𝑖 is assumed uniformly-distributed in the interval [0,1]. 𝛽𝑖 = 0 for purely profit-motivated physicians, who act in their patients’ 
interests only so far as it increases their future business. Where 0 < 𝛽𝑖 < 1, physicians are partially altruistic, but weight patient 
welfare (for its own sake) lower than their profits. Where 𝛽𝑖 = 1, physicians give equal weight to patient welfare and profit. I make 
the assumption here that physicians never weight patient welfare for its own sake higher than profit (which may be more justified in 
the private sector context of this study than in the public sector).  
82 Altruism is often modeled as a particular form of intrinsic motivation in the literature (Besley and Ghatak, 2018). Other forms of 
intrinsic motivation relate to reference-based utility, whereby agents are motivated to knowingly perform well relative to professional 
benchmarks or social standards (Kolstad, 2013). It follows that interventions appealing to physicians’ intrinsic motivations – for 
example, audit and private feedback on clinical performance (see Chapter 7) – can be interpreted as essentially targeting 𝛽𝑖. This is 
discussed further in Section 3.4.2. 
83 I assume here that the consultation rate 𝑝𝑅 is exogenous (fixed by a third-party e.g. the insurer) and constant across all patient types, 
regardless of their insurance cover and how much they pay OOP.  
84 Where the net benefit (𝑁𝐵) is zero, the physician gains no future consultations from his performance and 𝑛=1. 
85 While the total pay-off from any future consultations is the sum of the consultation rate 𝑝𝑅 and any FFS profit (𝑝𝑥 − 𝑐)𝑥, the FFS 
profit would depend on the physician’s future choices of 𝑥, and is thus uncertain. I therefore assume for simplicity that the physician 
only considers the fixed (and guaranteed) component of his future payoffs (the consultation rate 𝑝𝑅) in optimizing his choices of 𝑥 
and 𝑒 in any given consultation. Considerations of future opportunities for demand inducement are omitted here. 
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patient 𝑁𝐵: the patient (and his friends and family) are then more responsive to performance 
differentials between physicians.86  
The physician is paid FFS for all services 𝑥  at the fixed unit price 𝑝𝑥 , which include any 
diagnostic tests or procedures that can be administered or ordered during consultations. He incurs 
a fixed unit cost 𝑐 for these services, so his total FFS profit for providing 𝑥 services is (𝑝𝑥 − 𝑐)𝑥. 
I assume that 𝑝𝑥 > 𝑐, which ensures the participation of physicians in FFS payment contracts, 
and reflects the imperfect competition in the physician market. The physician also incurs a cost 
to effort 𝐶𝑖(𝑒). This captures the behavioural (communication, examination), cognitive and time 
costs involved in delivering high-quality and cost-effective care - including the costs to changing 
any persistent treatment habits or behavioural norms that run counter to appropriate care.87 While 
this is not a monetary cost per se, physicians can attach a monetary value to their effort supply. 
This value is not reimbursed, as effort is difficult to verify and contract for by patients or third-
party payers, and therefore enters the physician’s profit function as a net cost.88 The marginal 
effort cost is given by 𝐶𝑖′(𝑒)  > 0, and this is assumed constant for all levels 𝑒. 
The physician’s problem is then to choose the optimal quantity of services 𝑥  and effort 𝑒 to 
maximise his objective function, given by: 
𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑒, 𝑥) =  𝑛𝑖𝑗(𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗)𝑝𝑅 + (𝑝𝑥 − 𝑐)𝑥𝑖𝑗  − 𝐶𝑖(𝑒) +  𝛽𝑖(𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗)                        (4) 
From (4), it can be seen that patient net benefit enters the physician’s objective function at two 
points. The physician considers patient welfare in his decision-making due to both its impact on 
his future business (his competitive or market incentives) and his concern for patient wellbeing 
for its own sake (his altruistic incentives). Asymmetric information in the physician-patient 
relationship is characterised by the assumption that - unlike the patient - the physician has perfect 
information on 𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗, given his medical expertise and knowledge of patient preferences.    
The optimal choice of service quantity 𝑥∗ is then determined by the first-order condition: 
 𝑐 − 𝑝𝑥 = ( 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵)𝑝𝑅 +  𝛽𝑖 )(𝑈𝑥 − 𝜃𝑗𝑝𝑥)                                          (5) 
 
86 This requires that both informational and search barriers to patients’ demand responses are low (Pauly, 1988); that the costs to 
obtaining accurate information on 𝑁𝐵 are significantly lower than the expected benefits to patients, and that patients are aware of 
alternative, accessible sources of care in the market. For instance, interventions to facilitate public reporting of care quality metrics, 
or greater patient choice among healthcare providers, essentially seek to improve this demand elasticity. 
87 This can include any behavioural costs involved in changing physicians’ default treatment patterns, such as in switching better-
known branded drugs for lesser-known generic equivalents.  
88 𝐶𝑖(𝑒) is assumed heterogeneous across physicians. Although not explicitly modelled here, it is likely to depend on physicians’ 
clinical knowledge, competence, or even age. The more knowledgeable or capable the physician, the smaller the likely cost to effort; 
and the older the physician, the more likely that treatment habits become engrained and harder to overcome. 𝐶𝑖(𝑒) may also be 
affected by common environmental factors, including the accessibility and utility of clinical decision aides, such as evidence-based 
treatment guidelines. Interventions to improve access and periodic reference to such guidelines may lower effort costs for all 
physicians, and act as effort enablers. 
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and the optimal effort choice 𝑒∗ by: 
 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑒) = ( 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵)𝑝𝑅 +  𝛽𝑖) (𝑈𝑒 − 𝜃𝑗(𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑅
′ (𝑒) + 𝑝𝑚
′ (𝑒)𝑚 + 𝑝𝑚𝑚
′(𝑒))            (6) 
It is assumed for simplicity that 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵), the elasticity of physician 𝑖’s business with respect to 
the net benefit he generates for a patient, is positive and constant across all patient types 
(uninsured, low-insured and high-insured) and all components of patient net benefit. 89  90 
However, 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵) is assumed heterogeneous across physicians, to reflect variations in the level 
of market competition facing individual physicians (for instance, in the number of local 
competitors). 
3.3 Framework Implications  
The two first-order conditions offer a number of hypotheses about physicians’ decision-making 
under different patient insurance statuses, as detailed in the following. 
3.3.1 Demand-inducement 
From (5), under a constant FFS payment 𝑝𝑥 for 𝑥, the physician always induces demand for his 
services: at the physician’s optimal choice 𝑥∗, the marginal benefit for the patient 𝑈𝑥 is lower than 
their marginal cost 𝜃𝑗𝑝𝑥  for all insurance types.
91 
Hypothesis 1: The physician over-supplies the quantity of healthcare services 𝑥, relative 
to what the patient would demand under perfect information and free choice (where it 
must be that 𝑈𝑥 =  𝜃𝑗𝑝𝑥),
92 regardless of patient insurance type. 
This demand-inducement behaviour is possible because patients cannot perfectly observe 𝑈𝑥 
(asymmetric information), which allows the physician to influence demand beyond the patient’s 
optimum. In addition, this result is driven by positive FFS profits (𝑝𝑥 > 𝑐 ): in a perfectly 
 
89 Nevertheless, it may be that certain types of patients are more responsive to their realised net benefit, either through greater effort 
in understanding the benefits of certain care procedures, or through greater information sharing among peers (which can generate 
greater business elasticity from these patients). Moreover, patients’ ability to observe the different components of their net benefit will 
also vary: the quantity of care (𝑥 and 𝑚) will be more observable than technical quality (or physician effort 𝑒), and the contribution 
of unobserved effort 𝑒 to care costs will be more observable than its contribution to health stock. This can result in variations in the 
demand response 𝑛′(𝑁𝐵) across different patients and components of care. These issues are discussed further in Section 3.4. 
90 A further implicit assumption here is that the physician’s business elasticity does not change with his market share (aggregate 
business). This can be justified if individual physicians’ market shares are too small to matter to patients. 
91 This follows from the condition that 𝑐 < 𝑝𝑥, and the assumptions that 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵) and  𝛽𝑖 are non-negative. For equation (5) to hold, it 
must be that 𝑈𝑥 < 𝜃𝑗𝑝𝑥 at the physician’s optimum. 
92 This is the premise of the supplier-induced demand (SID) literature (Arrow, 1963; Evans, 1974; Fuchs, 1978), and is one form of 
physician moral hazard considered in models of imperfect physician agency (McGuire, 2000). 
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competitive market where 𝑝𝑥 = 𝑐, the physician has no incentive for demand-inducement, even 
under asymmetric information. 
Moreover from (5), since 𝑈𝑥 is decreasing in 𝑥, the physician’s capacity for demand-inducement 
is greater for more insured patients (all else equal). This is the second-degree moral hazard 
hypothesis (Balafoutas et al., 2017). Less-insured patients suffer larger financial costs to demand 
inducement and would have a larger (negative) demand response to any suspected unnecessary 
costs. Physicians therefore have both altruistic and competitive incentives to induce less demand 
from these patients. Where the patient is fully insured (𝜃𝑗 = 0) however, the physician is able to 
induce sufficient demand such that the marginal benefit to the patient 𝑈𝑥 is actually negative at 
the physician’s optimal choice 𝑥∗. 
Hypothesis 2: The more insured the patient (the lower the out-of-pocket price 𝜃𝑗𝑝𝑥), the 
higher the quantity of physician services supplied (𝑥∗). 
Note that there are two constraints on the physician’s propensity to induce demand: 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵) and 
𝛽𝑖. The competitive (market) pressures facing the physician and his individual altruism compel 
him to consider patient welfare in his decision-making. These constraints are also the factors that 
differentiate the extent of demand-inducement by patient insurance type (i.e. that generate the 
second-degree moral hazard behaviour). In the absence of any altruistic or competitive pressure 
(i.e. 𝛽𝑖 = 0 and 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵) = 0), the physician would induce demand equally and infinitely for all 
patients (irrespective of insurance status).93 
3.3.2 Effort-stinting 
From (6), we see that - unlike the quantity of physician services, 𝑥 - physician effort 𝑒 is always 
under-supplied at the physician’s optimum, for all insurance types. This is another form of 
physician moral hazard in imperfect agency models (Ma and Mcguire, 1997). Again, this effort-
stinting behaviour is made possible by asymmetric information and motivated by an 
uncompensated cost to physician effort 𝐶𝑖(𝑒). 
 
93 It is more realistic to assume some upper bound on demand-inducement, due to a de facto budget constraint imposed by the patient 
(determined by their total income, net of insurance premiums) or the insurer (determined by contractual limits on total claims). This 
may still result in lower 𝑥∗ for less-insured patients, who are likely to have a lower overall claims limit and budget for healthcare 
expenditures. 
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Hypothesis 3: The physician under-supplies effort 𝑒, relative to what the patient would 
demand under perfect information and choice (i.e. where it must be that 𝑈𝑒 =
 𝜃𝑗(𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑅
′ (𝑒) + 𝑝𝑚
′ (𝑒)𝑚 + 𝑝𝑚𝑚
′(𝑒))), regardless of patient insurance type. 
Moreover from (6), the more elastic the patient’s OOP payments with respect to effort (i.e. the 
higher the value of 𝜃𝑗|𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑅
′ (𝑒) + 𝑝𝑚
′ (𝑒)𝑚 + 𝑝𝑚𝑚
′(𝑒)|), the higher the 𝑒∗ chosen. The choice of 
𝑒∗ is then higher for less insured patients, who have larger OOP payments at all levels of 𝑒. Hence, 
physicians have a greater propensity to stint on effort for high-insured patients - which is another 
variant of the second-degree moral hazard hypothesis (Balafoutas et al., 2017). 
Hypothesis 4: The more insured the patient, the lower the overall effort supplied by the 
physician (𝑒∗), and the lower the technical quality of care outputs (accuracy of diagnoses 
and clinical-appropriateness of treatment choices). 
Moreover, as higher effort increases physicians’ diagnostic and therapeutic accuracy, and allows 
physicians to source more cost-effective treatment alternatives, the lower 𝑒  for high-insured 
patients limits physicians’ capacity for minimising drug treatment quantity and costs for these 
patients. 94  High-insured patients therefore have more (and more inappropriate) medications 
prescribed, and incur a higher overall cost of medications than low-insured ones (since 𝑚′(𝑒) <
0  and  𝑝𝑚
′ (𝑒) < 0). This result occurs despite the absence of any direct financial incentives 
attached to drug prescribing for the non-dispensing physician. Therefore, it is not driven by 
greater demand-inducement for profit – but rather, by poorer clinical effort with high-insured 
patients.   
Hypothesis 5: The more insured the patient, the higher the quantity and costs of 
medications prescribed (𝑚(𝑒∗) and 𝑝𝑚(𝑒
∗)). 
As lower effort increases the number and cost of medications, and increases the likelihood of the 
patient needing further care for the same illness, both the financial costs to and (negative) demand 
response from any degree of effort-stinting by physicians will be greater for less insured patients. 
Once again, physicians have both altruistic and competitive incentives to supply more effort (stint 
less) for less insured patients. Therefore, the same two constraints that prevent the physician from 
inducing infinite demand for his services also prevent him from supplying zero effort: the 
 
94 Higher effort can also correspond to fewer and more appropriate treatments through another channel. Explaining to patients (who 
derive some utility from the quantity of medications) why certain popular medications like antibiotics or a higher quantity of 
medications may not always be beneficial can be time and effort-consuming for the physician. Therefore, unless the physician chooses 
to expend such effort, he may simply give in to appeasing the patient with more medications.    
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competitive pressures he faces 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵) and his altruism 𝛽𝑖  again force him to consider the 
patient’s welfare in his choices of effort 𝑒. These constraints result in different levels of effort 
being supplied to uninsured, low-insured and high-insured patients; 𝑒∗ will be the same for all 
insurance types and equal to 0 when 𝛽𝑖 = 0 and 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵) = 0. 
3.4 Framework Extensions  
Two key assumptions of the preceding model are modified in the following. First, it was assumed 
that patient demand elasticity 𝑛′(𝑁𝐵) is the same for physician service quantity 𝑥 and all types 
of physician effort 𝑒. In practice, how patients respond to different physician inputs can vary 
depending on the relative visibility of those inputs. Physician effort 𝑒 may be less recognisable 
(visible) to patients than service quantity 𝑥, resulting in lower demand elasticity with respect to 
effort. Types of physician effort can also be differentiated in a similar way: diagnostic effort that 
involves physical engagement with the patient (for example, physical examinations or diagnostic 
tests) will be more visible to the patient than physicians’ cognitive effort in clinical decision-
making, and hence generate higher demand elasticity. The implications of such heterogeneity in 
physicians’ care inputs are discussed in Section 3.4.1.  
Second, it was assumed that physicians’ intrinsic motivation (which drives their concern for 
patient welfare for its own safe) is uni-dimensional and exogenous to the regulatory environment 
in which physicians practice. Section 3.4.2 discusses the implications of relaxing this assumption, 
and allowing third-party regulators a role in augmenting physicians’ intrinsic incentives for 
appropriate effort.  
3.4.1 Observable vs. hidden effort 
Clinical effort 𝑒 was previously modelled as a homogenous care quality input, contributing only 
to the unobserved technical quality (and subsequent cost-effectiveness) of care. However, it was 
noted that 𝑒  may be decomposed into a number of different physician inputs (Chalkley and 
Malcomson, 1998) - some easily observable (henceforth denoted 𝑒𝑜),  and others largely 
unobservable to the patient (denoted 𝑒𝑢). Effort can also relate to other aspects of care quality, 
including its interpersonal (verifiable and subjective) dimensions of patient experience and 
satisfaction (Haas-Wilson, 1994). While some observable physical effort  𝑒𝑜 (in the form of 
history-taking, examination and patient communication) will be necessary for the physician to 
reach an accurate diagnosis and treatment, it is by no means sufficient. The physician will need 
to invest additional cognitive effort 𝑒𝑢 in determining the most appropriate diagnostic procedures 
for gathering relevant information on the patient’s clinical case, and in processing that information 
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to arrive at a correct diagnosis and treatment. In this view, it is 𝑒𝑢 that ultimately determines 
(unobserved) technical care quality, while 𝑒𝑜 may contribute to patient experience (and enhance 
interpersonal aspects of care).  
An alternative interpretation of 𝑒𝑢 is that it is the appropriateness of any observed effort 𝑒𝑜,95 
which implies some level of complementarity between 𝑒𝑜 and 𝑒𝑢. However, Propper et al. (2008) 
and Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) suggest that observed and unobserved care quality inputs 
may indeed be treated as substitutes by providers.96 97 In essence, physicians can ‘price in’ aspects 
of their costly effort that patients observe and value by stinting instead on unobserved effort and 
increasing care costs. This trade-off is possible as long as patients are relatively cost-insensitive. 
In other words, physicians’ propensity to increase observable (interpersonal) effort at the expense 
of technical care quality and unnecessary costs should be greater for high-insured patients.  
To formally model these considerations within the current framework, consider that patient 
benefit is now an increasing function of three arguments: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗(𝑒
𝑜, 𝑒𝑢, 𝑥) =  ℎ𝑖𝑗(𝑒
𝑢, 𝑥) +  𝑥𝑖𝑗 +  𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑒
𝑜, 𝑒𝑢) +  𝑒𝑜                        (7)  
Three key features of this function can be noted.  As patients directly observe  𝑒𝑜, they are likely 
to derive utility from it in a similar way to observed 𝑥 and 𝑚, independently of any effect on 
health outcomes.  𝑒𝑜  therefore appears as a separate, independent argument in patient utility. 
Secondly, the health outcomes attributable to consultation 𝑖𝑗 are only a function of 𝑒𝑢 (and 𝑥, as 
before), reflecting the notion that only appropriate physician effort – in other words, effort that 
determines the technical quality of care - matters for patient health (and subsequent care costs). 
Observable effort can have a health or cost impact, but only in combination with appropriate 
cognitive effort. Therefore, while observable effort can be utility-enhancing in itself (patients 
value their care experience, and would always prefer a more visibly engaged doctor), I assume 
 
95 In essence, 𝑒𝑜 is the act of “doing something”, while 𝑒𝑢 guides these actions to “doing the right thing”. Whether the observed care 
(𝑒𝑜) is necessary or appropriate for a clinical case is not easily verifiable by the patient. Therefore, 𝑒𝑢 may be taken as at least partially 
unobserved. 
96 For instance, in response to competition on quality, UK hospitals were found to prioritise observable and monitored aspects of care 
quality (wait times) at the expense of unobserved aspects, evidenced in improved wait times but worsened hospital mortality outcomes 
(Propper et al., 2008) 
97 The impact of increasing patient or payer visibility on associated aspects of physician care (be it price or quality) is modelled in 
Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992). While most empirical evidence on provider competition through public reporting of quality metrics 
comes from the hospital sector, similar evidence on the effects of direct financial incentives attached to measured and publicly reported 
quality metrics can be found for instance in literature documenting the effects of the UK’s pay-for-performance initiative in primary 
care (the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF)). The QOF contained both competitive profit incentives from public-reporting of 
provider performance and explicit financial incentives attached to measured indicators, whereas former initiatives in the UK hospital 
sector relied only on competitive profit incentives from public-reporting. Reviews on the impact of P4P schemes generally suggest 
that, while there have been modest positive effects on some targeted (incentivised) process indicators of care quality, there is little 
evidence of effects on health outcomes (Doran, Maurer and Ryan, 2017) and some evidence of detrimental effects on non-incentivised 
aspects of care quality (Doran et al., 2011). It is nevertheless difficult to separate the effects of the competitive (reputational) incentives 
from the monitoring and public reporting of care quality indicators from the effects of the financial incentives themselves.  
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that only 𝑒𝑢  matters for a health or cost impact. Thirdly, the quantity of medications 𝑚 is a 
decreasing (concave) function of 𝑒𝑢 (𝑚𝑒𝑢
′ (. ) < 0,  𝑚𝑒𝑢
′′ (. ) < 0) and an increasing (concave) 
function of 𝑒𝑜 (𝑚𝑒𝑜
′ (. ) > 0, 𝑚𝑒𝑜
′′ (. ) < 0). Physicians supply a greater number and variety of 
medications to compensate for less appropriate diagnostic and therapeutic effort (𝑒𝑢). However, 
a higher quantity of medications contributes to patients’ subjective care experience (and potential 
satisfaction) and may enable more immediate symptomatic relief (without necessarily addressing 
the underlying illness, and despite potential longer-term risks), and therefore aligns with 
physicians’ efforts to be seen to be “doing something” (𝑒𝑜).98 99 
The patient’s net benefit (𝑁𝐵) is now given as: 
𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 𝑈𝑖𝑗(𝑒
𝑜, 𝑒𝑢, 𝑥) − 𝜃𝑗(𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑒
𝑢) + 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑒
𝑜, 𝑒𝑢)𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑒
𝑜, 𝑒𝑢) + 𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑗)             (8) 
The number of consultations for a particular illness episode (𝐶𝑅)  and the average price of 
prescribed medications (𝑝𝑚) are also decreasing in 𝑒
𝑢: with more appropriate effort, physicians 
are able to diagnose and treat the underlying illness more effectively (and therefore lower the 
number of repeat consultations necessary to resolve the same illness episode), and also identify 
more cost-effective treatments on the market. However, 𝑝𝑚  is increasing in physicians’ 
observable effort 𝑒𝑜. This relationship reflects patients’ actual or perceived preferences – ceteris 
paribus - for relatively more expensive options among equivalent treatments, such as branded 
drugs over generic equivalents. Patients may, for instance, infer a higher quality of treatment from 
better-known, branded drugs (Himmel et al., 2005; Shrank et al., 2009). Therefore, physicians 
seeking to improve the patient’s experience of their care (through higher 𝑒𝑜) may reasonably 
prioritise the prescription of relatively more expensive drugs, all else equal.  
The physician’s objective function is then: 
𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑒
𝑜, 𝑒𝑢, 𝑥) =  𝑛𝑖𝑗(𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗)𝑝𝑅 + (𝑝𝑥 − 𝑐)𝑥𝑖𝑗 – 𝐶𝑖
𝑜(𝑒𝑜) – 𝐶𝑖
𝑢(𝑒𝑢) +  𝛽𝑖(𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑗)         (9) 
where 𝐶𝑖
𝑜(𝑒𝑜)  and 𝐶𝑖
𝑢(𝑒𝑢)  are the uncompensated costs to observed and unobserved effort 
respectively. For simplicity, I assume the marginal costs to both observed and unobserved effort 
are equal, positive and constant: 𝐶𝑖
𝑜′(𝑒𝑜) = 𝐶𝑖
𝑢′(𝑒𝑢). Maximising (9) with respect to 𝑒𝑜 and 𝑒𝑢, 
the physician’s optimal choices of each effort type are given by the first-order conditions: 
 𝐶𝑖
𝑜′(𝑒𝑜) = (𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵)𝑝𝑅 +  𝛽𝑖)(𝑈𝑒𝑜 − 𝜃𝑗(𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑜 (. )𝑚 +  𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑒
𝑜(. )))                  (10) 
 
98 This reflects a finding that physicians often prescribe unnecessary medications – particularly antibiotics – purely to satisfy actual 
or perceived patient expectations, rather than due to poor clinical judgement (Dempsey et al., 2014; Ashworth et al., 2016).   
99 For the same reasons, it is reasonable that 𝑥 may also increase with 𝑒𝑜 (and fall with 𝑒𝑢), somewhat in line with Ma and McGuire 
(1997)’s modelling of patient demand for medical services (𝑥) being influenced by their observations of physician effort (𝑒𝑜). 
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and  
 𝐶𝑖
𝑢′(𝑒𝑢) = (𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵)𝑝𝑅 +  𝛽𝑖)(𝑈𝑒𝑢 − 𝜃𝑗(𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑅
′ (𝑒𝑢) + 𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑢 (. )𝑚 + 𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑒
𝑢(. )))     (11) 
From (10), it can be seen that at any level of 𝐶𝑖
𝑜′(𝑒𝑜), physicians provide a higher level of 𝑒𝑜 to 
high-insured patients (with 𝜃𝑗 = 0) than to low-insured ones (with 𝜃𝑗 > 0) at their optimum.
100 On 
the other hand, they provide a lower level of 𝑒𝑢 to high-insured patients compared to low-insured 
ones, as indicated in (11).101  It follows that high-insured patients will also receive a higher 
quantity and average cost of prescribed medications.102 103 
In sum, the cost-sensitivity of the patient (captured by their level of cost-sharing) affects 
physicians’ relative choices of observed and unobserved (appropriate) effort, and subsequent 
treatment quantity and costs.104 Physicians exploit the lower cost-consciousness of high-insured 
patients to supply lower technical quality and less cost-effective care to these patients (captured 
in a lower 𝑒𝑢). At the same time, patients in monopolistically competitive markets still choose 
among competing providers on the basis of some observable factor of value – be it price or patient 
experience (which determine providers’ reputation in the market). Hence, physicians’ reduced 
ability to compete on cost (price) for high-insured patients means they are likely to prioritise 
observable effort 𝑒𝑜 for these patients (Haas-Wilson, 1994; Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000; 
Gaynor, Ho and Town, 2015).105 These considerations imply an amendment to Hypothesis 4 and 
a new Hypothesis 6.106 
Hypothesis 4 (amended): The more insured the patient (the lower the 𝜃𝑗), the lower the 
unobserved, appropriate effort supplied by physicians (𝑒𝑢); and the lower the technical 
 
100 This follows from the assumptions that 𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑜 (. )𝑚 > 0, 𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑜(. ) > 0 and 𝑈𝑒𝑜  > 0, while 𝑈𝑒𝑜  is decreasing in 𝑒
𝑜. 
101 Consider that 𝐶𝑅
′ (𝑒𝑢), 𝑝
𝑚𝑒𝑢
(. ) and 𝑚𝑒𝑢(. ) are all < 0, while as assumed previously, 𝑈𝑒𝑢  > 0 and decreasing in 𝑒𝑢 .  
102 Physicians’ optimal choices of 𝑥 are unchanged from those discussed in Section 3.3. 
103 While these results compare patients with no cost-sharing (fully-insured) to patients with some level of cost-sharing (partially-
insured), it can be shown that the same pattern of results also hold for comparisons of patients with different levels of cost-sharing: 
patients with lower levels of cost-sharing (lower 𝜃𝑗) would receive higher 𝑒
𝑜, lower 𝑒𝑢 and higher treatment costs.  
104 While demand elasticity 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵) is assumed to be equal for both observed and unobserved effort in equations (10) and (11), it is 
reasonable to expect that it may be higher for observed effort for all patients. Nevertheless, this would not change the hypothesised 
effort choice differences by insurance type (Hypotheses 4-6). 
105 From the patient’s net benefit function in (8), it can be shown that high-insured patients would indeed demand more 𝑒𝑜 at their 
own optimum than low-insured ones.   
106  These hypotheses rely on the assumption that technical care quality and cost-effectiveness can only be inferred indirectly through 
their OOP cost implications for patients (and hence, only by partially-insured patients). However, the same hypotheses can also be 
derived if we allow that technical quality (or efficiency) can be inferred more directly, with some search or informational cost to the 
patient – for instance, in seeking out publicly available care quality information, or patient education tools. This aligns with the 
conception of healthcare as a search or reputation good, rather than a pure credence good (Pauly, 1978, 1988). In this context, patients’ 
demand for (and willingness to invest in) better care quality information would depend on the costs of poor quality care to them, which 
in turn would increase in their level of cost-sharing: low-insured patients would invest more in better observing 𝑒𝑢, and exert more 
competitive pressure on physicians to increase it. 
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quality of care outputs (accuracy of diagnoses and clinical-appropriateness of treatment 
choices). 
Hypothesis 6: The more insured the patient, the higher the observable effort supplied (𝑒𝑜) 
- in terms of the quantity of history-taking, examinations, patient communication and 
consultation time.107 
3.4.2 Intrinsic incentives for effort 
In previous sections, the objective of the third-party payer (the ‘principal’ health insurer) was not 
explicitly discussed. Here, I consider the role of the insurer in regulating the physician’s 
healthcare choices in line with its objective. The insurer’s problem is to maximise the patient’s 
health stock ( ℎ(𝑒, 𝑥))  whilst minimising its healthcare payments to the physician (( 1 −
𝜃)( 𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑅(𝑒) + 𝑝𝑚(𝑒)𝑚(𝑒) + 𝑝𝑥𝑥)), subject to the physician’s participation constraint (𝑝𝑥 >
𝑐). The model set out in this chapter implies that the insurer can only manipulate extrinsic 
incentives - which appeal to physicians’ financial or reputational concerns - to motivate high 
quality and cost-effective care. These include the reimbursement structure (the FFS and flat 
consultation rates, 𝑝𝑥 and 𝑝𝑅), the patient insurance status (the cost-sharing parameter, 𝜃𝑗) and 
the level of competitive pressure on individual physicians (the business elasticity, 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵)).108  
Physicians’ intrinsic motivations (captured in 𝛽𝑖) were assumed to be uni-dimensional, exogenous 
and fixed. In this section, I relax that assumption. Specifically, I allow that some types of intrinsic 
motivation may be endogenous to the regulatory environment, and leveraged through intrinsic 
incentives for physician effort. First, I distinguish two sources of intrinsic motivation: the ability 
to complete pro-social or altruistic tasks (‘altruism’), and the ability to knowingly perform well 
relative to a trusted benchmark (‘professionalism’).109 I assume that the motivation physicians 
derive from the former source is fixed (an exogenous endowment). However, I allow the 
motivation derived from the latter source to vary, depending on the incentive environment. 
Physicians’ intrinsic motivation can then be re-defined as an increasing function of two 
arguments: 𝛿𝑖(𝛽𝑖 , 𝐸𝑖). 𝐸𝑖 =  ?̅? − 𝑒𝑖 captures the current performance of physician 𝑖 (𝑒𝑖) relative 
to some trusted professional (or social) benchmark ?̅?, and reflects the physician’s professional 
motivation for effort (which is increasing (decreasing) in how far the physician is knowingly 
 
107 Note that this reinforces Hypothesis 5: both this higher observed effort (Hypothesis 6), and lower unobserved appropriate effort 
(Hypothesis 4), result in a higher quantity and cost of drug treatments for high-insured patients (Hypothesis 5). 
108 Insurers may increase competitive pressure on contracted physicians by making comparable care quality and cost information on 
competitors publicly available, for example.  
109 The latter source of intrinsic motivation aligns with the notion of ‘reference-based utility’ (Heffetz and Frank, 2008). 
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performing below (above) the trusted benchmark).110 𝛽𝑖  remains the fixed, physician-specific 
endowment of intrinsic motivation (or altruism).  
Substituting 𝛿𝑖 for 𝛽𝑖 in equation (6),
111 the physician’s optimal effort choice is now determined 
by the condition: 
 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑒) = ( 𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵)𝑝𝑅 + 𝛿𝑖(𝛽𝑖, 𝐸𝑖))(𝑁𝐵𝑒)                                                (12) 
In this context, an intrinsic incentive for effort is defined as something that solely increases the 
marginal intrinsic utility from effort (𝛿𝑖 ).
112 If physicians can perfectly self-assess their own 
relative performance (i.e. perfectly observe 𝐸𝑖), the only way for insurers to increase intrinsic 
incentives for physician effort is by increasing ?̅?  (the performance benchmark). This is not 
straightforward (and perhaps infeasible) where such benchmarks are based on evidence-based or 
established professional standards. Nevertheless, the assumption that physicians can perfectly 
observe 𝐸𝑖 is quite weak, given a common finding that physicians often struggle to self-assess 
and benchmark their own performance (Davis et al., 2006). This creates a role for the insurer in 
monitoring and feeding back new information on the physician’s relative performance, to generate 
intrinsic informational incentives for effort. Reflecting the usual problems in measuring and 
contracting for care quality (Pauly, 1980; Ma and Mcguire, 1997), the insurer cannot perfectly 
monitor or evaluate appropriate physician effort either. The insurer’s relative monitoring accuracy 
(compared to the physician’s own self-assessment) depends on the strength of its monitoring 
technology, which can vary.113  
Formally, the physician cannot observe 𝐸𝑖,
114 but instead observes 𝐸?̂? ~ N(𝐸𝑖, 𝜎). If 𝐸?̂? < 𝐸𝑖, the 
physician could benefit from better information on his current performance - more accurate 
performance information can function as an intrinsic incentive, and improve physician effort. The 
insurer has access to a performance monitoring technology 𝑡, which can be used to (imperfectly) 
audit and feedback on physician performance. Using 𝑡 to audit physician 𝑖, the insurer observes 
𝐸?̃? ~ N(𝐸𝑖, 𝛼(𝑡)). For simplicity, assume that the insurer’s monitoring capacity is always more 
accurate than the physician’s ability to self-assess performance (i.e. 𝛼(𝑡) < 𝜎), and the absolute 
 
110 Assuming that 𝑒𝑖 is uniformly distributed within some closed, non-negative interval [0,?̌?] and the benchmark ?̅? falls within this 
interval, 𝐸𝑖 is then uniformly distributed within the interval [?̅? − ?̌?, ?̅?]. 
111 Recall that 𝑁𝐵𝑒 = 𝑈𝑒 − 𝜃𝑗(𝑝𝑅𝐶𝑅
′ (𝑒) + 𝑝𝑚
′ (𝑒)𝑚 + 𝑝𝑚𝑚
′(𝑒)) 
112 Conversely, an extrinsic incentive is anything that changes market demand responses (𝑛𝑖
′(𝑁𝐵)) or the physicians’ payment 𝑝𝑅. 
This corresponds to reputational or direct financial (payment) incentives.  
113 In addition to quality monitoring with administrative data (including electronic health records and billing data), which tends to be 
infeasible in many LMIC settings where data quality is often poor, Das and Hammer (2014) provide an overview and comparison of 
alternative provider quality measurement tools. 
114 Note that both the physician and insurer are assumed to be perfectly aware of ?̅? (the benchmark standard), but struggle to observe 
𝐸𝑖 because of their inability to perfectly observe or self-assess individual performance 𝑒𝑖. If this condition does not hold, physicians 
can also be intrinsically incentivised with better information on benchmark standards (for example, professional best-practice 
guidelines) 
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level of the insurer’s accuracy depends on the technology 𝑡. Following performance feedback 
from the insurer, the absolute change in the physician’s marginal intrinsic utility from effort (and 
hence, his optimal effort choice) would be proportional to |𝐸?̃? − 𝐸?̂?|. The larger the deviation in 
the physician’s self-assessment from the insurer’s feedback, the greater the change in his effort.115 
As long as 𝐸?̃? > 𝐸?̂? (i.e. 𝑒?̃? < 𝑒?̂?), the feedback should increase intrinsic incentives for effort.
116  
It is implicitly assumed that physicians have perfect information on the benchmark ?̅?, and only 
struggle to assess their individual performance 𝑒𝑖 relative to it. Where this benchmark is evidence-
based clinical guidelines, or professional best-practice standards, keeping up-to-date with or 
recalling this information can be costly to physicians. These effort costs are captured in 𝐶(𝑒). In 
practice, if this information is not easily accessible or comprehensible, the costs to maintaining 
perfect knowledge of ?̅?  may be prohibitive. In these circumstances, additional enabling 
interventions, that seek to improve knowledge of trusted benchmark standards, can both lower 
these effort costs and complement the informational incentive effects of performance feedback.117  
Furthermore, to isolate the purely intrinsic effect of performance feedback, extrinsic motives 
(such as financial or reputational concerns) should remain unaltered. This would require that no 
financial incentives are attached to monitored performance, and that individual performance 
information is kept private (to avoid any reputational or market demand effects from public 
performance reporting (Kolstad, 2013)).  
To summarise, an additional testable hypothesis from this discussion is as follows: 
Hypothesis 7: Where physicians have perfect information on shared best-practice 
standards, but struggle to self-assess their own relative performance and fall below those 
standards, private performance feedback can generate intrinsic incentives for increasing 
clinical effort, and improve audited aspects of care for all patients.118  
 
115 The implication is that physicians who are assessed as the worst relative performers should have the greatest intrinsic incentives 
for improvement.  
116 Where 𝐸?̃? < 𝐸?̂?, the feedback could indeed act as an effort disincentive. However, acknowledging that clinicians (as with individuals 
in general) tend to have fairly optimistic assessments of their own performance (Baumann et al., 1991; Dunning et al., 2004; Berner 
and Graber, 2008), objective feedback should serve as an effort incentive in most cases. Formally, this implies that 𝐸?̃? > 𝐸?̂? on 
average, which would require that 𝐸?̂? ~ N(𝐸?̿?, 𝜎), where 𝐸?̿? < 𝐸𝑖. 
117 An effort enabler is something that lowers the marginal cost to effort, including educational materials or clinical decision aides for 
physicians. Such interventions can function as both effort enablers (by lowering 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑒), physicians’ marginal cost to effort) and effort 
incentives (by improving physicians’ knowledge of ?̅? if there is a knowledge gap, and altering their marginal intrinsic utility of effort 
𝛿𝑖). 
118 Although this discussion has focused on intrinsic incentives for physician effort, the same result could also apply to physicians’ 
service quantity, if feedback was instead based on ?̅? − 𝑥𝑖. 
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3.5 Discussion 
This framework’s results have a number of policy implications. In the presence of positive fee-
for-service profit for physicians and an uncompensated cost to clinical effort, the provision of 
health insurance leads to poorer technical quality and more costly care than financing healthcare 
out-of-pocket. The physician anticipates a higher tendency for moral hazard from more insured 
patients, and exploits this to increase his own moral hazard behaviour: over-supplying health 
service quantity and under-supplying clinical effort (technical quality) relative to what the patient 
and payer would choose under perfect information. These two forms of physician moral hazard 
are regulated by the physician’s competitive and intrinsic incentives, implying a role for policy 
levers in shaping these incentives.  
In the model, the patient delegates healthcare decisions to the physician, who acts as an imperfect 
agent: the physician cares about his own profits and effort costs, in addition to patient welfare. 
Ensuring high-quality and cost-effective care in such a context would require leveraging these 
physician motives through an appropriate balance of intrinsic (altruistic, professional) and 
extrinsic (profit, reputational) incentives. First, developing physicians’ intrinsic motivations 
(professionalism, and related altruism), perhaps through regular professional audit and feedback 
of individual performance, may be one lever. This requires that barriers to clinical effort are 
relatively low. For instance, where physicians’ knowledge and recall of relevant best-practice 
standards are weak, complementary interventions - for example, interventions that improve the 
accessibility of clear treatment guidelines and other clinical decision aides – could be beneficial 
in improving physicians’ performance capacity.119 A similar intervention is evaluated in Chapter 
7.  
Second, increasing physician competition through competitive market regulation, and increased 
patient choice and information, can further incentivise appropriate care choices - provided that 
patients are well-informed and hold correct beliefs about the relative benefits of different care 
inputs. Relatedly, introducing a higher degree of cost-sharing in the physician payment structure 
– for example, by increasing fixed payment components (e.g. the flat consultation rate 𝑝𝑅) or 
including drug costs in physicians’ flat consultations rates – may reduce both types of physician 
moral hazard (and any resulting over-provision of medications). While such interventions are not 
evaluated in this thesis, evidence from previous studies lend support to these predictions. 
 
119 As stated previously, where there is a knowledge gap on best-practice standards among physicians, these knowledge-based effort 
“enablers” can improve physicians’ performance capacity, lower their costs to effort, and function as complementary intrinsic 
incentives for effort. 
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Physician cost-sharing, for instance, has been shown to improve the cost-effectiveness of 
prescription choices in a related study in South Africa (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2019a).   
These interventions can be expected to lower physician moral hazard for the average patient. 
However, the model is unclear on the extent to which they can bridge the predicted differences in 
physicians’ care choices for high- and low-insured patients. It can be seen from (4) and (5) that 
any increase in physicians’ intrinsic motivation 𝛽𝑖 or patient demand elasticity 𝑛𝑗
′(𝑁𝐵) should 
reduce unnecessary care costs and improve care quality for all patients, regardless of insurance 
type. However, whether higher baseline intrinsic motivation or competition (demand elasticity) 
would reduce or increase the second-degree moral hazard behaviour (i.e. reduce or increase the 
health service quantity and quality differential between high- and low-insured patients) is not 
obvious from the physician’s optimality conditions (4) and (5). This would require further 
assumptions, for example on the shape of the patient’s marginal utility functions.120 Chapters 5 
and 6 attempt to explore this issue empirically, by testing for potential interactions between 
measured baseline physician altruism and competition on the one hand, and the level of patient 
insurance cover on the other.121  
A further model limitation is the strong assumption that physicians respond only to perfect 
information on patient net benefit and preferences (which are assumed to be perfectly known to 
physicians). It may be reasonable to allow that, given the high degree of uncertainty and imperfect 
information inherent in medical encounters, both physicians and patients must rely to some extent 
on their beliefs about the efficacy and value of different clinical inputs and outputs. The role of 
physician beliefs is not explicitly accounted for here. However, it is intuitive to think of these 
beliefs as embedded in how physicians perceive patient utility and demand elasticity with respect 
to specific care choices. A common example in this study’s context (see Section 2.3) is 
physicians’ reported beliefs that patients expect antibiotic treatment even for uncomplicated viral 
infections. Actual or anticipated patient demands are often cited as a reason for excessive 
prescribing of antibiotics, particularly in primary care (Currie et al., 2014).122 A role for such 
beliefs is considered in contextualising the results of the physician incentive experiments 
evaluated in Chapters 5-7.
 
120 If the marginal utility functions are all linear, then an increase in altruism or competition would have no effect on the service 
quantity or quality difference between high- and low-insured patients. 
121 The subsample analyses in those chapters are nevertheless heavily limited by their small sample sizes. 
122 An important distinction exists between patients’ perceived net benefit, which is subjective and ultimately what determines patient 
responses (i.e. patient demand elasticity) and drives the competition effect on physician choices, and patients’ realised net benefit, 
which may be more visible to providers (given information asymmetries) and important in driving the physician altruism effect. 
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4 Study Description, Methods and Data  
The empirical component of this thesis study includes two field experiments conducted with 
private primary care physicians (GPs) in Johannesburg between February 2018 and March 2019. 
This study is embedded in a larger study investigating antibiotic prescribing behaviour in primary 
care, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and co-led by my academic 
supervisor, Dr. Mylene Lagarde (hereafter referred to as the “ESRC study”). As such, it has shared 
a number of ESRC study resources, including some of its funding, fieldworkers, clinical advisors, 
and local research and institutional contacts. Baseline data for the field experiment described in 
Section 4.3.2 is also drawn from the ESRC study results. The research methods and tools were 
developed jointly, and adapted to this study purposes where necessary. Certain fieldwork 
activities were also conducted in parallel, including the training of fieldworkers and recruitment 
of research participants. Further details on areas of overlap are outlined in the relevant sections 
below.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 gives an overview of the standardised patient 
(SP) methodology employed in fieldwork. The SP method was used to create experimental 
variation in patient characteristics and for primary data collection in the two field experiments 
described in Section 4.3. Section 4.2 gives an overview of the main data sources, outcomes and 
variables of interest in this study. Finally, Section 4.3 details the design and implementation of 
the two field experiments and their corresponding SP visits. 
4.1 Standardised Patient Methodology 
Following Rethans et al. (1991) and Das et al. (2012, 2016), I employ an audit study approach 
with unannounced SP visits to primary healthcare providers to evaluate the appropriateness of 
care delivered during clinical interactions. SPs record rich details on several aspects of each 
interaction in a questionnaire immediately after the consultation (and retain all dispensed drugs, 
receipts and prescriptions), allowing an unparalleled insight into both the process and therapeutic 
outputs of physician-patient interactions. Moreover, the standardisation of patient symptoms, 
script and characteristics allows control of patient-level heterogeneity, to isolate the effects of 
variation in physicians’ choices alone. To leverage this latter feature, I also follow Lu (2014), 
Currie et al. (2012, 2014) and Gottschalk et al. (2017) to employ the SP method within healthcare 
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field experiments: firstly, to create exogenous variation in the insurance status of the patient in 
Part 1 of this study (to identify the impact of patient insurance on physician behaviour); and 
secondly, to vary the severity of the clinical condition in Part 2 (and evaluate the effects of a 
randomised performance intervention).123   
4.1.1 Clinical cases: description and relevance 
Each SP in this study presented with one of two clinical cases, which differ only in their severity: 
‘uncomplicated’ (viral) acute bronchitis in an otherwise healthy young adult (Clinical Case 1), 
and ‘complicated’ (bacterial) acute bronchitis in a HIV+ young adult (Clinical Case 2). In both 
cases, the SP presents to the physician with visible symptoms (a cough) and an opening statement 
that can indicate multiple underlying conditions, and that would require further questioning and 
examination to arrive at an accurate diagnosis and therapeutic decision. This allows assessment 
of the physician’s clinical effort when presented with vague information and a number of possible 
diagnoses with overlapping symptoms. Brief summaries of the case histories and SP opening 
statements for the two clinical cases are presented in Table 4.1.124 
In Clinical Case 1, the patient presents with a persistent cough, which started with a cold a week 
earlier.125 Upon relevant questioning, the patient reveals that the cold subsided after 4-5 days, and 
the only persisting symptoms are the cough, tiredness and a slightly irritated throat.  Appropriate 
history-taking should rule out a number of ailments (including TB, HIV, asthma, sinusitis and 
allergies), whilst relevant examination should support these conclusions and eliminate other 
serious conditions like pneumonia (for instance, no crackling should be audible in a chest 
examination). The likely viral nature of the condition can be inferred from the lack of severity 
and short duration of reported symptoms. While the production of coloured sputum when 
coughing does not confirm a bacterial pathogen, that the patient reports only the production of a 
little white sputum (when asked) should further confirm the likely viral infection. As with all self-
limiting viral infections, no drug treatment is necessary to cure the patient. Advice to drink plenty 
of fluids and seek follow-up medical attention only if symptoms persist beyond a few weeks or 
get worse should suffice. Some over-the-counter (OTC) symptomatic medication may be 
considered to relieve the patient’s symptoms. However, the prescription of antibiotics is both 
unnecessary and potentially harmful in this case.  
 
123 See Section 4.3 for a description of the two study parts, corresponding to the two field experiments conducted in this study.  
124 In the first field experiment detailed in Section 4.3, the SPs portraying Clinical Case 1 are also subject to variations in their insurance 
status (low-insured or high-insured). As such, the opening statement for Clinical Case 1 varies slightly according the SP’s insurance 
status in that experiment. These variations are discussed in Section 4.3.1.2, and summarised in Table 4.4. 
125 While this patient states that they had the “flu” (rather than a cold) in their opening statement (see Table 4.1), in South Africa 
doctors and patients often use “cold” and “flu” interchangeably in colloquial terms. Accordingly, both terms are taken to mean the 
same thing here: a common cold.  
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Clinical Case 2 builds on Clinical Case 1, with a HIV+ patient and more severe symptoms. In this 
case, the patient presents with a cough that has lasted two weeks, beginning with other cold 
symptoms that have now subsided. In addition, the patient reports that they were feeling feverish 
the day before, and is HIV+. If questioned appropriately, the patient would reveal that their cough 
has turned productive of yellow-green sputum over the last 3-4 days, and offer further details 
regarding their HIV history and on-going treatment. Further questioning and examination should 
rule out other possible conditions (including TB, asthma, sinusitis, allergies and pneumonia). The 
combination of the patient’s HIV+ status (which indicates greater susceptibility to bacterial lower 
respiratory tract infections), the duration and worsening of symptoms (recent development of 
yellow-green sputum), and the reported feverishness should indicate that an underlying bacterial 
infection is likely. In this case, the doctor would be expected to prescribe a short course of 
antibiotics.126 OTC symptomatic medications may also be considered here.  
Table 4.1. Description of SP clinical cases and opening statements 
 
Clinical Case 1 
Uncomplicated (viral) acute bronchitis in 
otherwise healthy young adult 
Clinical Case 2 
Complicated (bacterial) acute bronchitis in 
HIV+ young adult 
SP opening 
statement in 
consultations 
“I had the flu last week but I am still 
coughing a lot.” 
 
“I had a cold. But this cough is not going away. 
And yesterday I was feeling a bit feverish. 
I am a bit worried because I am HIV positive.” 
Description of 
clinical case 
• Young healthy adult (20-35 years) 
• Had a normal cold (runny nose, sore 
throat, cough) that started a week ago 
• Nose and throat symptoms have 
resolved, but the cough has persisted for 
7 days (which is why they have come to 
the clinic) 
• Cough is only productive of small 
amounts of whitish / clear sputum 
• No fever, shortness of breath, chest 
pain, or other significant symptoms 
• No other diseases or family history, and 
not on any medications 
• No other signs to find upon 
examination 
• Young adult (20-35 years), HIV+ 
• Had a normal cold (runny nose, sore 
throat, cough) that started two weeks ago 
• Nose and throat symptoms have resolved, 
but cough has persisted for two weeks and 
gotten worse 
• Cough has recently become productive of 
yellowish / green sputum 
• Reports feeling feverish the day before; 
but no shortness of breath, chest pain, or 
other significant symptoms 
• On ARV treatment, but no other 
medications 
• No other signs to find upon examination 
 
In both cases, SPs were trained to give information beyond their opening statements only when 
probed by the doctor, to allow the doctor to demonstrate active clinical effort. Detailed question-
 
126 The recommendation in South African standard treatment guidelines is a 5-day course of Amoxicillin (500 mg, three times a day). 
If the patient has a penicillin allergy, the recommendation is a 3-day course of a macrolide like Azithromycin (500mg daily) (NDoH, 
2014). 
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and-answer (Q&A) scripts were developed for each case, to ensure SPs responded to clinical 
interrogation in a manner consistent with the underlying condition. Case-specific checklists of 
essential and recommended history-taking and examinations were also developed in consultation 
with clinical experts (as detailed in Section 4.2.1) to assess clinical effort, and SPs were trained 
to recall the checklist items completed by the physician during each visit and record them in a 
debriefing questionnaire immediately after (see Section 4.1.2).  
The two clinical cases were chosen for their relevance to the South African context and their 
compatibility with the SP methodology. Lower respiratory tract infections (LRTIs) are a leading 
cause of morbidity and premature mortality in South Africa (estimated as the 4th biggest 
contributor to premature mortality in 2010) (Mayosi and Benatar, 2014), and the most common 
overlapping symptom across a range of LRTIs is a persistent cough. In a setting where life-
threatening infectious diseases such as TB and pneumonia are highly prevalent, diagnostic 
uncertainty in differentiating less serious viral infections from these bacterial conditions has been 
identified as a key driver of excessive antibiotic use – 80% of which occurs in primary care, and 
mostly for acute respiratory infections (Brink et al., 2016). South Africa also suffers the world’s 
highest prevalence of HIV (21% of adults aged 15-49 are estimated to be HIV+) (Republic of 
South Africa, 2016), and the increased susceptibility of HIV+ patients to more serious respiratory 
infections is a further consideration in diagnostic decisions (Karim et al., 2009; Jaffer et al., 2017). 
Potential contra-indications with anti-retroviral therapy is also a factor in therapeutic decisions.  
These issues have led to calls for better ‘diagnostic stewardship’, and the national Department of 
Health and leading medical journals have published clear protocols for the diagnosis and 
treatment of acute respiratory illnesses in primary care (NDoH, 2014; Brink et al., 2016). These 
guidelines facilitated the development of essential care checklists and appropriate treatment 
protocols for the cases in this study, to enable assessment of physicians’ clinical effort and care 
quality performance.127 The two cases further satisfy essential criteria for use with the SP method 
(see Section 4.1.4), including posing a low risk of invasive procedures to SPs and involving 
minimal observable symptoms (to minimise the risk of detection). 
4.1.2 SP recruitment and training 
SP training was conducted in three stages. The bulk of the training was carried out over seven 
days (56 hours) in June 2018, where Clinical Case 1 was covered. This was done jointly with the 
ESRC study, as Clinical Case 1 was used in both studies. A 2-day ‘refresher’ training was then 
conducted in mid-July 2018, to refresh Clinical Case 1 and introduce the patient roles relevant to 
 
127 See Section 4.2.1 for details on how the checklists were developed and the treatments classified, and Appendix B.1 for a full list 
of checklist items. 
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the first field experiment in this study (see Section 4.3.1). Finally, Clinical Case 2 was covered 
over three days in November 2018.128 For brevity, only the first stage of SP training is described 
in the following (where most of the training for this study was carried out).129  
All fieldworkers were black African, educated to university-level, between the ages 20-40 years, 
and resident in Johannesburg or the surrounding areas of Gauteng Province. Candidate profiles 
were selected to represent an average young adult patient in Johannesburg, whilst an advanced 
level of education was considered necessary for certain demands of the SP role (including the 
need to identify and recall detailed features of the consultation). It was further required that 
candidates had no prior medical or nursing training that could influence their responses to or 
behaviour with GPs. Candidates were selected for training following an interview and a basic 
medical check-up to ensure they had no underlying medical conditions that could bias GPs’ 
clinical decisions in the study. It was important to ensure that all SPs were healthy, and remained 
so throughout the fieldwork, to maintain the face validity of the SP method. Interviews also 
assessed candidates on their general communication and presentation skills, and potential biases 
towards private GPs and health insurance.  
42 candidates were interviewed in total, and 23 were eventually selected to undergo the first 
training program in June 2018. The training was carried out by me and three members of the 
ESRC study team. It began by introducing the clinical case, the relevant SP opening statement, 
and related question-and-answer (Q&A) scripts designed to enable SPs to respond to clinical 
questioning in a manner consistent with the case (see Appendix B.2 for the case-specific Q&A 
scripts). Certain aspects of the opening statement and Q&A scripts were refined during training, 
following feedback from fieldworkers on local idioms and so forth.130 As SPs would be visiting 
GPs as new patients, the fieldworkers also had to come up with plausible reasons for why they 
were not visiting their regular doctor.131 
Important characteristics of SPs were emphasised and rehearsed throughout the training, 
including the standardisation and consistent presentation of case symptoms, the offering of case 
history details only when probed, and the accurate observation and recall of all necessary aspects 
of the consultation (as required in the SP debriefing questionnaire – see Appendix B.4). The 
fieldworkers initially focused on memorising the SP scripts, and then proceeded to practice 
through role-play and mock consultations with the research team. They were also trained on how 
 
128 The training was staggered in this way to align with the fieldwork schedules of the two experiments (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for a 
timeline of fieldwork activities corresponding to each experiment, including SP training). 
129 The 2-day refresher training is discussed briefly in the context of the corresponding experiment in Section 4.3.1. The final stage of 
training simply introduced Clinical Case 2 in a similar format to Clinical Case 1 in the first stage of training. 
130 The fieldworkers also participated in defining the social background of the patient, including their occupation in case the doctor 
questioned on this.  
131 Most fieldworkers cited visiting family members in the neighbourhood, or starting a new job in the area. 
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to improvise the script in responding to certain unexpected questions; and communicate all key 
pieces of information in a standardised, unaltered format in English, even if the doctor made 
conversation in a local tribal language.  
The tablet-based SP debriefing questionnaire was then introduced, which served as the primary 
data collection tool in SP visits. Appendix B.4 provides an overview of the questionnaire 
structure. Fieldworkers were familiarised with its contents and protocols,132 and questionnaire 
recording accuracy and submission (via an online app) was practised extensively with further 
mock consultations.133 To ensure that fieldworkers could correctly identify the different types of 
clinical advice and examinations that were covered in the questionnaire, mock examinations were 
demonstrated and practice consultations were arranged with trained doctors. These doctors also 
gave valuable feedback to the fieldworkers on portraying a credible patient. 
Fieldworkers were further briefed on how to handle potentially dangerous or unforeseen situations 
during consultations, including doctors insisting on administering invasive procedures like blood 
tests, receptionists insisting on SPs seeing alternative doctors to the ones they were scheduled to 
see, or medical emergencies presenting at the clinic. Again, clear protocols for handling these 
situations were practiced through role-play. At the end of the program, fieldworkers were sent on 
practice (unannounced) visits to consenting doctors that were not part of the study sample, to 
build their confidence in the field.  
Fieldworkers were continually assessed throughout the training, through informal observation by 
the research team, feedback from external training facilitators (the trained doctors), and short 
paper-based quizzes. The research team collated evaluations of individual fieldworkers on a daily 
basis. At program finish, 10 of these 23 fieldworkers were selected for the second stage of training 
in July 2018 (and participated in the first field experiment of this study – see Section 4.3.1). 10 of 
these fieldworkers were also retained for the final training in November 2018 (and participated in 
the second field experiment – see Section 4.3.2). 
4.1.3 Ethical considerations 
The unannounced SP method in field research fundamentally relies on participant blinding in 
gathering data. Method validity relies on doctors believing SPs to be real patients throughout the 
data collection process (the consultation). This is a necessary condition for claiming the SP 
method to be any superior to other methods of collecting similar data, such as clinical vignettes 
 
132 Fieldworkers were advised to find a quiet, private space within or in the vicinity of the GP clinic immediately after each 
consultation, to complete this questionnaire. 
133 Data was automatically uploaded onto an online server after each questionnaire submission, which facilitated daily monitoring and 
data quality checks. 
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or direct observations. Blinding avoids the risk of a Hawthorne effect, whereby doctors may alter 
their normal behaviour when they are aware of being observed (Beullens et al., 1997; Leonard 
and Masatu, 2010). This reliance inevitably raises certain ethical concerns, both from the 
perspective of the research participants (the GPs) and the researchers (SPs), which must be 
addressed. 
First, informed verbal and written consent was obtained from all participating GPs prior to the SP 
visits in each experiment. Measures were taken to ensure that all participating GPs understood 
the SP method and its use of blinding prior to consenting to the study.134 Consent to participation 
in the first experiment (‘Part 1’) was obtained during the GP recruitment process (see Section 
4.3.1). All recruiters were trained in explaining the SP method to GPs, and in answering any 
questions or concerns raised. This initial consent was then re-affirmed for participation in the 
second experiment (‘Part 2’) for the relevant sample of GPs (see Section 4.3.2). At both stages, a 
comprehensive study information sheet was shared with GPs to inform them of the study aims 
and different components.135  The contact details of a research team member and the ethics 
committee at Wits University (the local research institution that granted approval for this study) 
were also shared with all GPs at the time of recruitment, in case of further questions or concerns 
about the research.136 While GPs were not told exactly when they would be receiving SPs, they 
were told that they would receive two to four SP visits over a fixed time period of a few months.  
After the completion of SP visits in Part 1, a follow-up phone call was conducted with all 
participating GPs to ensure that no SPs had been detected (see Section 4.3.1.3).  
Potential risks to GPs, SPs and the actual patients of GPs were carefully considered, and 
safeguards were incorporated in the research design where appropriate. Risks to participant GPs 
were considered minimal, as the SP method involves no procedures or interventions that would 
require informed consent outside of a research setting. The method is designed to evaluate 
participants carrying out normal, routine tasks in their usual environment, and therefore entails 
minimal physical, psychological or behavioural intrusion. GPs also received their usual 
consultation fees for the SP visits, so they did not incur any financial loss from participation. 
Moreover, participant confidentiality is strictly protected through anonymisation of all 
identifiable data, and publication of study results only at an aggregate level. Confidential 
 
134 While SPs have been used in field research in South Africa before, their use remains relatively unknown to physicians, particularly 
in the private sector. Previous studies were all conducted in the public sector, and mostly without informed consent from individual 
providers (Christian et al., 2018; Harrison et al., 2000; Kohler et al., 2017; Mathews et al., 2009). 
135  See Appendix B.7 for an example of the study information sheet. 
136 GPs were further informed about their ability to opt out of the study at any stage. A link to opt out was sent via text message to 
each GP immediately after their consent to participation. 
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information on individual performance was fed back privately to some GPs as part of the study 
(see Section 4.3.2), but this was also subject to their informed consent.  
Risks to fieldworkers were minimised by following standard procedures for protecting SPs during 
their visits (King et al., 2019). The clinical cases used in this study are unlikely to result in any 
invasive investigations. Nonetheless, SPs were trained to refuse all invasive or risky procedures 
(for example, blood tests or injections). SPs were also taught exit strategies if they needed to 
terminate the clinical encounter. If that proved impossible, SPs were told to reveal themselves as 
researchers to avoid any risks. 
Finally, risks to the actual patients of participant GPs – for instance, from longer wait times for 
medical attention due to SPs booking consultation slots - were considered. However, it was not 
expected that SPs would add substantially to patient wait times, as a typical SP consultation would 
not last more than 10-15 minutes. In addition (although private GPs rarely receive emergency 
cases), in exceptional cases where there was a medical emergency in the clinic, the SPs were 
briefed to immediately step aside and allow consulting GPs to address the emergency first. 
Ethical approval for this study (and the use of SP methods) was obtained from the ethics 
committees of the London School of Economics (LSE) and the University of Witwatersrand 
(Wits).137 
4.1.4 Methodological considerations and limitations 
In addition to participant blinding, the validity of the SP method requires that SP presentations 
are standardised and uniform in all aspects except the experimentally varied feature (in this study, 
the insurance status of the SP or severity of the clinical case). The use of different fieldworkers 
poses a challenge to this. As mentioned earlier, the training of SPs plays a crucial part in 
standardising fieldworker presentations. In addition, as described in the relevant experiment 
designs in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, individual fieldworkers or fieldworker-pairs (matched on 
gender, age and physical appearance) were also randomised to individual GP visits in each 
experiment, to control for any non-random selection. Fieldworker or fieldworker-pair fixed 
effects were further included in all regression analyses presented in the empirical Chapters 5-7.  
As suggested previously, there are certain limitations to the use of SPs in field research. It restricts 
the types of clinical cases that can be employed to those that have minimal visible symptoms and 
do not require any invasive examinations for diagnosis. This limits the generalizability of study 
results. The use of only two (slightly varying) clinical cases in this study also limits the types of 
 
137 Institutional approval letters are shown in Appendix B.8. 
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clinical effort (history-taking and examination) and treatment recommendations that physicians 
can be assessed on. Where resources permit, the use of a broader range of clinical cases can allow 
a more holistic assessment. Moreover, SPs can only present to doctors as new, acute patients and 
have one-off interactions (the risk of detection would be very high with repeat interactions). This 
prevents participating doctors from demonstrating care continuity, which is an important 
dimension of care quality in primary care (particularly for chronic patients) and which they may 
provide to patients with repeated interactions.  
4.2 Data and Outcomes of Interest 
Before describing the two field experiments in this study, it is useful to first outline the data 
sources and outcomes of interest from those experiments (which are frequently referenced in the 
experiment descriptions in Section 4.3). Table 4.3 provides an overview of the primary and 
secondary data sources in this study, as well as the final outcomes and variables of interest drawn 
from those sources. Briefly, this study draws on two primary sources of data: i) the SP visits (as 
detailed in Section 4.3) and ii) the face-to-face interviews (‘GP interviews’) conducted with all 
participant GPs in the two field experiments. The timing of interviews and SP visits in each 
experiment is shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The GP interviews were designed to collect data on 
participants’ personal and clinical practice characteristics. The interviews also included a dictator 
game experiment (to elicit a measure of GP altruism) and a short knowledge quiz with clinical 
vignettes (to measure GPs’ diagnostic and therapeutic knowledge). Further details on the 
interview structure and content are provided in Appendix B.4, and relevant components are 
discussed alongside variables of interest in Section 4.2.3. The four secondary sources of data 
(listed in Table 4.3) are also discussed alongside related variables in the following sections.  
4.2.1 Care quality outcomes 
Similar to Das et al., (2016), I use four measures of care quality comprising both a physician’s 
(observable) care inputs and subsequent output (diagnosis and treatment choices). These measures 
are constructed for each SP consultation completed in this study, using data collected in the SP 
debriefing questionnaire and any dispensed drugs or prescriptions. The main portion of the 
debriefing questionnaire covered the consultation time, the case-specific checklists of history-
taking and examinations, any diagnostic tests or investigations ordered, the diagnosis and medical 
advice offered (if any), and the general quality of communication with the patient.138  Using this 
 
138 These sections of the questionnaire were validated by physicians on the ESRC study’s clinical advisory panel and lecturers at the 
Wits University medical school.  
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data, I first construct proxy measures of GPs’ clinical effort during a consultation. These measures 
gauge how hard a GP works in questioning and examining a patient in order to arrive at an 
accurate diagnosis and therapeutic recommendation. Second, I construct indicators on whether 
the GP gave a diagnosis and whether it was correct. Third, I examine the treatment offered: the 
appropriateness of any drugs prescribed or dispensed for the particular clinical case. Last, I 
examine the advice given by GPs on if and when to seek further medical attention with the same 
provider. Descriptive statistics on these outcomes are presented in Chapters 5 and 7 for the 
relevant samples in each experiment. 
4.2.1.1 Clinical effort 
Three measures of clinical effort are constructed. At a basic level, the consultation length is taken 
as one proxy for provider effort: the more time a GP spends with the patient, the more 
opportunities he allows himself to gather all essential case information. Not all time spent in a 
consultation is likely to be focused on the patient (or necessary), however. The SPs report whether 
providers spent any consultation time doing other things like answering phone calls and so on, 
and I deduct any such reported time from the total consultation length in each case.  
Consultation length also provides no information on how well the consultation time was used. 
Therefore, a second proxy measure captures the proportion of case-specific history-taking 
questions and examinations completed by the GP. Checklists of both essential and recommended 
history-taking and examinations for respiratory conditions, that would allow a GP to differentiate 
serious conditions like TB and pneumonia from less serious ones like mild bronchitis, were 
developed together with a panel of clinical experts in respiratory and infectious diseases in South 
Africa. Appendix B.1 lists these checklist items, and indicates those considered essential by the 
panel. SPs recorded which checklist items were completed by GPs in each consultation, and I use 
the proportion of all checklist items completed in each case as the second measure of provider 
effort.139  
Although the computational ease and transparency of this raw proportion measure is appealing, 
not all checklist items included are likely to be equally valuable in discriminating between high-
effort and low-effort GPs. Some items may require more cognitive effort than others, and some 
may be more habitual. For instance, asking if the patient is coughing up blood would be much 
more effective in quickly eliminating a serious TB diagnosis than asking about the patient’s TB 
history. To account for such differences in the discriminating value and difficulty of checklist 
items, I construct a third measure of clinical effort: a weighted, composite index score of 
 
139 I further disaggregate this measure into the shares of essential history-taking and examinations completed, and analyse these 
measures separately in Chapter 5. 
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completed history-taking and examination items using item response theory (IRT). First applied 
in the context of psychometrics and educational testing, IRT is a model-based approach to 
developing and scoring tests (or checklists) for estimating latent individual traits (such as ability, 
or in this case, effort). Using maximum likelihood methods, the IRT score assigns greater weight 
to items that are more difficult (less likely to be completed) and that discriminate better among 
GPs in terms of their effort quality (Das and Hammer, 2005). 
See Appendix B.6 for a discussion on the key assumptions of IRT, as applicable to this study. 
Appendices C.2 and E.1 provide a full list of included and omitted checklist items in the IRT 
analyses of Chapters 5 and 7, respectively. Items that were successfully completed in less than 
5% of sample consultations were dropped from the IRT analyses in both cases, as the maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure is not guaranteed to converge with items that have very low 
completion rates (Das and Hammer, 2005).  
4.2.1.2 Correct diagnosis 
After each consultation, the SPs recorded whether a diagnosis was given by the GP and what the 
diagnosis was. The specific diagnoses were then coded as ‘correct’, ‘partially correct’ or 
‘incorrect’ by members of the ESRC study research team and myself, in consultation with two 
respiratory and infectious diseases experts from the study’s clinical advisory panel. A strictly 
‘correct’ diagnosis required the doctor to communicate the diagnosis in exact technical terms to 
the patient (i.e. “acute bronchitis” or “bronchitis”). The limitation here is that what the physician 
tells the patient regarding their diagnosis may be simplified (for instance, given expected 
limitations to the patient’s medical knowledge). Hence, a ‘partially-correct’ diagnosis allowed for 
some generality in the communicated diagnosis (such as “chest cold”) and for select similar 
diagnoses (such as “tracheitis” or “post nasal drip”) where the researchers could agree that the 
doctor was referring to a correct diagnosis in more colloquial terms or had given a clinically-
related or very similar diagnosis, and where the correct pathogenic cause (viral or bacterial, 
depending on the clinical case) could be established with reasonable confidence.  
The SPs’ data collection tool also allowed them to record multiple diagnoses, if more than one 
was given. In these cases, where a correct or partially-correct diagnosis was recorded alongside 
an incorrect diagnosis, the combined diagnosis was coded as ‘incorrect’. The only exception was 
where a correct or partially-correct diagnosis was combined with a “cold” or “flu” diagnosis. In 
strict medical terms, the latter constitute incorrect diagnoses. However, acute bronchitis is usually 
preceded by flu-like symptoms, and SPs presenting with both Clinical Cases 1 and 2 in this study 
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communicate to doctors that their symptoms began with a “cold”.140  Therefore, a “cold” or “flu” 
diagnosis was coded as ‘correct’ (or ‘partially-correct’) if it was combined with another correct 
(or partially-correct) diagnosis.141  
Appendix B.1 lists the diagnoses considered ‘correct’ or ‘partially correct’ for both clinical cases 
presented in this study, as well as a range of ‘incorrect’ diagnoses that were recorded.  Based on 
this classification, I construct an indicator of a ‘correct’ or ‘partially correct’ diagnosis for each 
consultation where a diagnosis was given. 
4.2.1.3 Appropriate treatment 
The therapeutic outcome of the consultation is the third measure of care quality examined. All 
drugs and prescriptions given to SPs were collected after each consultation. Each drug item 
dispensed or listed in a prescription was recorded, using the name specified in the prescription or 
on the drug packaging. In prescriptions where GPs specified only the main active pharmaceutical 
ingredient (API) of a drug rather than a drug name, or where they specified a branded drug but 
explicitly wrote that generic substitutions were to be used, the name of the cheapest generic-
equivalent drug available on the local market was recorded.142 The recorded drug items were then 
matched to a corresponding item in a national medicines database managed by the South African 
Medicine Price Registry.143 This database contains the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) 
code for each listed drug - a drug classification system developed by the WHO. After individual 
drug items were matched to corresponding ATC codes, the resulting ATC groupings (drug 
categories) were classified as ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’ for each of the two clinical cases. 
This classification was done in collaboration with the ESRC study team and clinical advisory 
panel, and informed by evidence from recent systematic reviews (Becker et al. 2015; Smith et al. 
2014; Smith et al. 2017; Johnstone et al. 2013) and guidelines stipulated in the South African 
Standard Treatment Guidelines and Essential Drugs List (STG/EDL) for primary care (NDoH, 
2014; Perumal-Pillay and Suleman, 2017).144 Table 4.2 shows the classification of drug groupings 
for the two clinical cases considered in this study. Based on the ATC codes, indicators were also 
 
140 Discussions with local medical practitioners highlighted that, in the South African context, doctors often do not make a distinction 
between “flu” and “cold” in communicating diagnoses to patients. Accordingly, no distinction was made in coding a “flu” and “cold”. 
141 The only exception to this rule was where a “Cold” or “Flu” was combined with just “a viral infection”. In this case, the diagnosis 
was considered ‘incorrect’ as this combination could also indicate just an upper respiratory tract infection, which is an incorrect 
diagnosis.  
142 The cheapest generic-equivalent drug was found by searching the South African Medicine Price Registry  (http://www.mpr.gov.za) 
for all drugs with the same main API as the one specified in the prescription, and comparing the Single Exit Prices (SEP) per unit of 
these drugs. 
143 The database was downloaded from the South African Medicine Price Registry (http://www.mpr.gov.za) on 13 June 2018. 
144 The STG/EDL is a set of therapeutic guidelines and essential medicines that satisfy the priority health needs of the population, and 
determine the drugs available for use in the South African public healthcare sector. The EDL was developed according to WHO 
guidelines to curb rising pharmaceutical costs and irrational medicine use, and serves as a benchmark for evidence-based, cost-
effective therapeutic guidelines in the country (Perumal-Pillay and Suleman, 2017) . 
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constructed to specify whether a drug item was an antibiotic, a steroid, or other drug types of 
interest. 
Table 4.2. Appropriate drug treatments, by clinical case 
 
Clinical Case 1 
Uncomplicated (viral) acute bronchitis in 
otherwise healthy young adult 
Clinical Case 2 
Complicated (bacterial) acute bronchitis in 
HIV+ young adult 
Appropriate Cough suppressants/expectorants; Analgesics; 
Throat preparations (e.g. lozenges)  
Antibiotics (short course of Amoxicillin); 
Cough suppressants/expectorants; Analgesics; 
Throat preparations (e.g. lozenges)   
Inappropriate / 
harmful 
Antibiotics; Steroids; Nasal decongestants; 
Antihistamines; Bronchodilators; Probiotics; 
Vitamins; Other 
Steroids; Nasal decongestants; Antihistamines; 
Bronchodilators; Probiotics; Vitamins; Other 
 
Drugs were considered ‘appropriate’ if they are clinically-indicated for treating or mitigating the 
underlying condition (i.e. recommended), or are palliative low-schedule (OTC) symptomatic 
relievers with no contra-indications. Drugs classified as ‘inappropriate’ are neither clinically-
indicated nor low-schedule symptomatic relievers: unnecessary drugs are those with insufficient 
evidence to be considered either clinically effective or palliative and which are not included in 
the STG/EDL guidelines, while harmful drugs are those with sufficient evidence and expert 
consensus to be considered harmful or contra-indicated for the particular clinical case. In some 
cases, it is difficult to clearly distinguish between or build clinical consensus on which drugs are 
harmful and which are unnecessary. For instance, antibiotics for the uncomplicated acute 
bronchitis case (Clinical Case 1) may be simply considered unnecessary for the patient, given the 
underlying viral infection. On the other hand, it is ultimately harmful in the context of growing 
antibiotic resistance, and there is emerging evidence on the contribution of antibiotics to the 
incidence of adverse drug events (Linder, 2008). For this reason, my analysis focuses on the 
distinction between ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ drugs, without stressing too much the sub-
distinctions within these groups.  
A key difference in appropriate treatment between the two clinical cases is in the use of 
antibiotics. While antibiotics are considered inappropriate in the uncomplicated acute bronchitis 
case, they may be justified for the HIV+ patient with more severe symptoms (longer duration, 
coloured sputum, feverishness) where a bacterial infection is more likely. Indeed, the 2014 edition 
of the South African STG/EDL guidelines state that antibiotics may be considered for suspected 
acute bronchitis in HIV+ patients. These guidelines were recently revised at the end of 2018, and 
the recent edition of the STG/EDL guidelines published in January 2019 does not contain this 
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reference anymore. Nevertheless, given the timing of this study (mid 2018 – early 2019), and the 
likelihood that recent guideline revisions will take some time to be disseminated and adopted into 
routine clinical practice, the 2014 edition of the STG/EDL guidelines is maintained as a 
benchmark for evaluating appropriate treatment in this study.  
4.2.1.4 Follow-up advice 
In addition to classifying the drugs dispensed or prescribed, I also examine whether and under 
what circumstances the GP advised that the SP return for a repeat consultation (a ‘follow-up’). 
The SPs recorded whether such advice was given, and whether the recommendation was to return 
in the event of the cough getting worse (or if haemoptysis or shortness of breath develops), or for 
other / unexplained reasons. Acute bronchitis is most often self-limiting, and should not require 
any repeat consultation except in the event that it worsens and turns bacterial. The 
recommendation to return in the event of haemoptysis or shortness of breath is also reasonable: 
the GP may want to be cautious about a possible missed diagnosis of something more serious 
(pneumonia or TB). These specific cases were therefore considered ‘appropriate’ follow-up 
recommendations, whereas recommendations to return for other or unexplained reasons were 
considered unnecessary (‘inappropriate’). Accordingly, I construct indicators to specify whether 
any follow-up recommendation was given during the consultation, and whether this 
recommendation was ‘appropriate’. 
4.2.2 Care quantity and cost outcomes 
Two groups of care quantity and cost measures are also constructed for each SP consultation: the 
quantity and costs of any dispensed drugs or prescriptions, and the quantity and costs of all fee-
for-service (FFS) items provided by GPs.145 The drug quantity and cost outcomes are calculated 
by matching data recorded from prescriptions and dispensed drug labels to data available in a 
national medicines pricing database (as detailed below). The FFS costs are constructed from 
consultation receipts (where SPs paid in cash), insurance claims (where SPs had insurance cover), 
and fees recorded in the SP debriefing questionnaire. Summary statistics on these outcomes are 
presented for the consultation samples in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
 
 
145 The FFS items include the consultation itself (GPs are paid a unit fee per consultation) and any diagnostic tests or procedures 
ordered during the consultation that entail an additional fee above the unit consultation fee. Note that drugs are not included in FFS 
items, as they are either prescribed (and therefore entail no fee to the GP) or dispensed as part of the consultation fee (all dispensing 
GPs in the sample included drugs in their unit consultation fee, and did not charge extra). 
 76 
 
Table 4.3. Summary of study data sources and variables of interest 
 
 Primary sources  Secondary sources 
 SP visits   GP interviews  
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Outcomes               
    Care Quality                
Consultation length               
Checklist completion / IRT 
score               
Correct diagnosis               
Drug type (antibiotic, etc.) / 
Appropriateness of drugs                
Follow-up advice               
    Care Quantity & Costs                
Quantity & type of 
diagnostic tests/procedures               
Quantity / dose of drugs               
Branded drug               
Cost of prescription / drugs               
Cost of consultation       
(excl. drugs)               
GP characteristics               
Age, gender & ethnicity                
Contracting & dispensing 
status               
Altruism               
Diagnostic & therapeutic 
knowledge               
AMR knowledge               
Antibiotic beliefs                
Competitor density               
Northern suburb practice               
Group practice               
Patient load               
Notes. The Medpages database lists approximately 80% of all private medical practitioners in South Africa (https://www.medpages.info). The database 
provides practice details and a few personal characteristics for all listed GPs. The South African (SA) Medicine Price Registry (https://www.mpr.gov.za) 
contains the regulated Single Exit Prices (SEP) that can be charged for all drug items sold in South Africa. Dispensing doctors and pharmacists can charge 
patients a small dispensing fee above the SEP; however, these dispensing fees are also regulated at a certain share of the corresponding drug SEP (and are 
therefore proportional to the SEP). The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) codes are a drug classification system developed by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), which allows the grouping of drugs according to the anatomy they act on and their therapeutic, pharmacologic and chemical 
properties (https://www.whocc.no/atc/). The South African Standard Treatment Guidelines and Essential Drugs List (SA STG/EDL) for primary care 
are developed and updated by the South African Department of Health, to provide evidence-based treatment guidelines for specific clinical cases 
(http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/pharmacy/edlphc2014a.pdf). Although they were developed for the public healthcare sector, they provide the most 
comprehensive set of national clinical guidelines available in South Africa (and therefore serve as a useful benchmark for evidence-based care also in the 
South African private sector). The 2014 version of the STG/EDL was the most current at the time of study. Note that these guidelines were sometimes 
complemented with findings from recent Cochrane systematic reviews (where available) in assessing appropriate treatments in this study.  For further 
details on the sources or outcomes listed above, refer to Sections 4.2.1 - 4.2.3. 
 77 
 
4.2.2.1 Drug treatments 
The name and quantity of every drug item prescribed or dispensed in each SP consultation is 
recorded. The cost of each drug item is then obtained from the South African Medicine Price 
Registry (MPR) database, by matching each recorded item and its quantity to a unique identifier 
(a nappi code) in the database.146 The database contains the regulated Single Exit Prices (SEP) 
for defined quantities (packs) and for a single unit of each listed item. The total SEP cost of each 
item is then calculated by multiplying the recorded quantity by the corresponding unit SEP of the 
drug. Not all drug items recorded in the study are listed on this database. For instance, certain 
OTC medications and herbal remedies are not listed, so it is not possible to obtain SEP rates and 
nappi codes from the database in these cases. In such cases, the relevant nappi codes were sourced 
from the website of Medikredit (the firm that licences this national drug coding system), and retail 
OTC prices for the recorded quantities were obtained from the websites of Clicks and Dischem 
(the two biggest pharmacy chains in South Africa).  
In addition to the SEP cost of each prescription item, the ‘dispensed’ cost is also calculated. This 
represents the expected retail price of the item (that is, the price paid by the patient or insurer). 
To calculate this, a dispensing fee is added to the total SEP cost of each prescribed or dispensed 
item. The relevant dispensing fee is either the doctor’s fee (for dispensed drugs) or the 
pharmacist’s fee (for prescription items). These fees are set and regulated by the National 
Department of Health, and depend on the SEP of the drug: they usually comprise a fixed fee 
(increasing in the SEP) and a share of the SEP. Finally, a VAT at 15% of the dispensing fee is 
added to the total drug cost.  
The total drug cost is calculated in this way for each individual drug item and aggregated at the 
consultation-level. In addition to the total drug cost from each consultation, I am also interested 
in how this cost compares to the cheapest recommended treatment available on the market for the 
relevant clinical case, as this would give an indication of the cost-effectiveness of the observed 
treatment. The cheapest recommended treatment for each clinical case was determined by 
referring to recommendations in the 2014 STG/EDL, and pricing the cheapest options 
corresponding to those recommendations in the MPR database. For Clinical Case 1, this treatment 
option was paracetamol and a cough suppressant, which amounted to a total cost of R17.86 at 
June 2018 prices. For the more complicated Clinical Case 2, the equivalent option was 
 
146 Drug pricing is highly regulated in South Africa. The Department of Health sets a Single Exit Price (SEP) for all drugs sold in the 
country, and the SEP determines the cost of drugs to dispensing doctors and pharmacists. It is the regulated price at which drug 
manufacturers are obligated to sell to dispensing doctors and pharmacists. The SEP does not depend on volume, which maintains a 
high level of transparency in drug pricing. While retailers can charge patients a dispensing fee above the SEP, these fees are also 
regulated at levels proportional to the corresponding SEP. 
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paracetamol, a cough suppressant, and a short (five day) course of Amoxicillin, at a total cost of 
R32.63.  
The MPR database further specifies whether each listed item is a branded drug or a generic. I 
therefore construct another indicator for each dispensed or prescribed item to specify whether it 
is a branded drug or not.  
4.2.2.2 Fee-for-service procedures and consultation fees 
The total cost of each consultation (excluding the cost of drugs) was obtained by collating the 
receipts retained by SPs after each visit and the itemised claims submitted to the partnering insurer 
in Part 1 of this study (see Section 4.3.1). These costs included any fees that are paid to the 
consulting GP: the flat consultation rate, additional fees for any services administered during the 
consultation (such as in-room nebulisation), and the costs of any diagnostic tests that were ordered 
(which would require follow-up consultations).  
4.2.3 Provider characteristics 
In addition to basic socio-demographic characteristics, the following variables were constructed 
for each participating physician using data from the GP interviews. Descriptive statistics for these 
variables are presented for the respective GP samples in Chapters 5 and 7.  
4.2.3.1 Altruism 
The dictator game carried out during the GP interviews yields the measure of individual altruism 
used in this study. The game is a common economic experiment used to elicit pro-social 
preferences such as altruism using real monetary incentives (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). The use 
of monetary incentives and dictator anonymity, whereby GPs must anonymously decide how to 
split their monetary endowment between themselves and a patient charity of their choice, 
addresses the potential for ‘self-presentation’ bias in the use of surveys to measure such 
preferences: when individuals self-report their social preferences based on hypothetical payoffs 
rather than real monetary stakes, they may be more prone to over-report their degree of positive 
and socially-valued characteristics such as altruism (Smith, 1976).  
The consensus in the experimental economic literature is that the share of the monetary payoff 
given up by the dictator for the recipient can be interpreted as a measure of altruism. Accordingly, 
I compute and employ the proportion of the R300 cash endowment donated to a patient charity 
by individual GPs in the dictator game as the measure of physician altruism in this study. I 
examine the distribution of this altruism measure across the sample populations in Chapters 5 and 
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7, and construct an indicator to categorise ‘high altruism’ GPs as those that donate more than the 
sample median share to a patient charity.  
4.2.3.2 Provider knowledge 
GPs’ diagnostic knowledge and awareness of standard treatment guidelines are recognised 
foundations of clinical competence and performance (Miller, 1990). Following standard 
knowledge-evaluation methods, I rely on closed, multiple-choice questions from the GP 
interviews to measure GPs’ knowledge of the clinical presentation of different respiratory 
illnesses, their likely causes, and respective treatment guidelines in South Africa. As detailed in 
Appendix B.4, the knowledge quiz portion of the interview asks GPs to identify the diagnosis and 
pathogenic cause of four patient cases: i) uncomplicated (viral) acute bronchitis, ii) complicated 
(bacterial) acute bronchitis, iii) bacterial sinusitis, and iv) bacterial pneumonia. The quiz also 
queries the recommended drug treatment in national guidelines for three patient cases: i) common 
cold, ii) bacterial pneumonia, and iii) uncomplicated (viral) acute bronchitis.147 Answers to these 
11 questions are coded as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, and one point is awarded for each correct 
response. For the three treatment guidelines questions, only the choice of whether or not 
antibiotics are recommended for the patient case is used to determine a correct response.  
The first measure of provider knowledge is therefore the total score over all 11 diagnostic and 
therapeutic questions. While this gives an aggregate indication of differential diagnostic and 
therapeutic knowledge, I am particularly interested in GPs’ knowledge of the two acute bronchitis 
cases presented by SPs in this study; and also in analysing diagnosis, pathogenic cause and 
treatment knowledge separately. I therefore construct additional knowledge measures for these 
two individual cases, with separate indicators for knowledge of correct diagnosis, pathogenic 
cause and recommended treatment (note that a treatment guidelines question was not included for 
the complicated (bacterial) acute bronchitis case, so this case does not have a treatment knowledge 
indicator). This disaggregation is important because, for instance, a GP could successfully 
diagnose the uncomplicated case as ‘acute bronchitis’ but fail to identify the viral nature of the 
underlying condition. This would then alter the treatment he believes is appropriate. Analysing 
these knowledge components separately can thus allow better explanation of observed care 
outcomes.  
Another measure of provider knowledge that may be relevant to antibiotic treatment choices is 
GPs’ awareness of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and its causes. This awareness can influence 
GPs’ perceived risks of unnecessary antibiotic prescribing, and thereby mediate how GPs’ beliefs 
 
147 Appendices B.5 (a) and B.5 (b) for a description of these patient case vignettes.  
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or perceptions about antibiotic prescribing (discussed in the next section) translate into 
prescribing practices. A set of five questions in the GP interviews accordingly tests for knowledge 
and awareness of AMR. Answers to these questions are scored as ‘1’ if correct, and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Aggregate scores over the five questions are calculated for each GP, and a binary indicator is 
coded to categorise scores above the sample median as indicating relatively ‘high knowledge’ of 
antibiotic prescribing risks. 
4.2.3.3 Beliefs on antibiotic prescribing 
In determining appropriate therapy, regardless of whether the GP holds correct knowledge of 
what is recommended in national guidelines, he may hold different beliefs about whether what’s 
recommended should be adopted in a particular patient case. Three types of beliefs regarding 
antibiotic prescribing are examined in the GP interviews: antibiotic efficacy, prescribing norms, 
and perceived patient expectations. For each of the four patient cases presented to GPs in the 
diagnostic knowledge questions,148 GPs are first asked how likely it is that the patient recovers 
more quickly if they are given antibiotics. Responses to this question may be interpreted as beliefs 
about the efficacy of antibiotics for individual patient cases. Secondly, GPs are asked about their 
beliefs about peer norms in prescribing behaviour: how likely it is that other GPs would give 
antibiotics for each patient case. Thirdly, the interview asks about GPs’ beliefs about patient 
expectations: if they do not prescribe antibiotics for a specific patient case, how likely it is that 
the patient would choose to see another GP next time they are ill. While these beliefs are 
conceptually different from other behavioural influences, it is interesting to note possible 
interaction in the behavioural influences of, for instance, beliefs about patient expectations and 
altruism (more altruistic doctors may be more behaviourally responsive to beliefs about patient 
expectations), or beliefs about peer norms and competition (doctors under greater competitive 
pressure may be more likely to allow beliefs about peer norms to shape behaviour).  
The GP interview records responses to these questions as a scenario probability between 0 and 
100, with 0 reflecting a scenario that is believed to be not likely at all, and 100 indicating a 
scenario that is believed to be certain. For each question, a binary indicator is constructed to 
categorise beliefs that are relatively ‘positive’ on antibiotic prescribing (defined as a stated 
probability above the sample median for that question). This results in three indicators (one for 
each belief type) per patient case. I then aggregate these indicators by patient case, to create four 
categorical variables taking values 0-3 and reflecting the overall level of ‘positive’ antibiotic 
prescribing beliefs for each patient case.  
 
148 See Appendix B.5 (a) for vignette descriptions of these patient cases. 
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4.2.3.4 Competition 
In the absence of reliable data on patient flows, the literature on physician market competition 
has tended to favour locational measures of competition, such as area-level physician density (the 
number of physicians per 1000 population within defined areas) or average distance to a physician 
practice (Vallejo-Torres and Morris, 2018). This study similarly utilises two geographic measures 
of the competitive pressure on sample GPs.  
First, I construct an indicator of local competitor density. Given limitations in the data available 
for this study, it was not possible to estimate local population numbers at the suburban or district 
level of Johannesburg, to estimate area-level demand for GP services. As such, it is not possible 
to construct a GP density variable that accounts for local variations in population density within 
the City of Johannesburg (CoJ). I therefore construct a partial measure which calculates the 
number of rival GPs within a fixed radius of each sample GP’s practice, without adjusting for 
local population numbers.  Using the online Medpages database, which contains data on more 
than 80% of all private GPs active in South Africa (including the location coordinates of their 
primary practice address), and the geodist command on STATA, I calculate the straight-line 
(geodesic) distances between the practice location of each sample GP and those of all other private 
GPs in CoJ.  This allows me to compute the main proxies for localised GP competition in this 
study: the numbers of rival GPs practicing within a 1 km, 2km and 5 km radius of each sample 
GP location. The limitation here is that unaccounted local variations in population density could 
vary the level of demand that GPs compete for in their area. However, it may be argued that in 
such an urban setting, area-level (resident) population numbers are less relevant to the de facto 
demand faced by GPs, as many patients may visit practices in areas where they are not resident 
perhaps because they work in that area or for other reasons of convenience.  
Given this limitation (and given mixed findings in the literature as to the competitive effect of 
physician density (McGuire, 2000; Johnson, 2014)), I also construct a second measure of localised 
competitive pressure. I use GPs’ practice location in the wealthiest suburbs of Johannesburg (the 
‘northern suburbs’ of Sandton and Randburg – see Figure 2.2) as an indicator of potential price 
(or cost) competition. The price sensitivity of the local patient population in these suburbs is likely 
to be lower than in other suburbs of Johannesburg (particularly in the south), implying relatively 
lower price competition for GPs located there. A binary variable is accordingly coded for each 
GP, taking value ‘1’ if the GP’s primary practice is located in the northern suburbs, and ‘0’ 
otherwise. This alternative measure is not without limitations itself. As with all locational 
measures of competition, it is hampered by the endogeneity of GPs’ practice location decisions.  
Nevertheless, the two measures together (rather than any one) should give a more balanced 
indication of the competitive pressure on individual GPs in Johannesburg.   
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4.3 Study Design  
4.3.1 Part 1: Within-subject experiment 
The first part of this thesis study involved a within-subject SP field experiment, where each 
participating GP received unannounced visits from two SPs varying only in their insurance status. 
See Figure 4.1 for a timeline of fieldwork activities related to the experiment, as described in the 
following subsections.  
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate the effects of patient insurance status on the 
quality and cost of care provided by primary care physicians (Research Question 1 - see Section 
1.5). Data from this experiment is analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. This part of the study partnered 
with a large private health insurer in South Africa, which contracts with a large majority of all 
private GPs in Johannesburg. Health insurance cover was provided to the SPs for the purposes 
and duration of this research. All participating GPs were contracted-in with the partnering health 
insurer, so they were expected to see any patient with the SPs’ insurance cover and to charge 
within the consultation rates set by the insurer.  
Figure 4.1. Timeline of fieldwork activities for study Part 1 
4.3.1.1 Provider sampling and recruitment 
The Medpages database of private primary care practitioners in the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) 
was used as the sampling frame for this study.149 The database consisted of 999 active private GPs 
within CoJ at the time of recruitment, both of dispensing and non-dispensing status, spread across 
the 16 townships and seven administrative regions of the city.150 Column (1) of Table 4.5 provides 
 
149  The Medpages database is a widely used healthcare provider directory in South Africa, and one of the largest and most 
comprehensive listings of private practitioners in the region. It contains contact, practice and basic demographic details on listed 
providers, updated on a quarterly basis. The version used in recruitment was downloaded in January 2018. 
150 Figure 2.2 (in Chapter 2) provides a map of these administrative regions in Johannesburg. 
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basic summary statistics on this GP population. 55% of all listed private GPs are male, with an 
average age of 51. The majority are non-dispensing (approximately 62%), and located in the 
northern suburbs of Sandton and Randburg (approximately 35%) or central Johannesburg (26%). 
Only non-dispensing GPs were targeted for recruitment in this part of the study, as the nature of 
their payment incentives were of particular interest in addressing the first two research questions 
outlined in Section 1.5. This is discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6. Non-dispensing GPs totalled 
614 listed individuals, and Column (2) of Table 4.5 provides summary statistics for this sub-
population. The average age of 50 years is comparable to the full GP population; however, the 
share of male GPs is slightly lower (47%).  Non-dispensing GPs are also more concentrated in 
the northern suburbs of Sandton and Randburg (44%). 
It was necessary to ensure that all participating GPs would accept the SPs’ insurance cover, and 
charge within the fixed consultation rates set by the partnering health insurer. Therefore, a total 
279 of these non-dispensing GPs that were not contracted-in with the health insurer were 
excluded. Of the remaining 335 GPs, a further 64 were deemed ineligible for the study as they 
were specialist GPs (such as urology specialists) or had begun practising as public health 
specialists, anaesthetists or other types of medical specialists.  
The remaining 271 eligible non-dispensing GPs were then sorted in random order into a 
recruitment list. Recruitment was done by calling providers at their GP practices, in order of their 
listing on the recruitment list. I carried out the majority of GP recruitment for this part of the study 
in May 2018, and some fieldworkers were trained as recruiters to assist.151 If a GP verbally 
consented to participating in the study, an automated email was sent to the GP with a study 
information sheet (summarising the information provided via the call).152 A text message was also 
sent with a link to opt-out of the study, allowing GPs the option to withdraw their participation at 
any stage. Of the 271 GPs on the recruitment list, 208 were successfully reached – meaning, these 
GPs were successfully contacted and invited to participate in the study. Of these 208 GPs, 112 
(54%) were successfully recruited into the study – that is, they consented to taking part and did 
 
151 Strict recruitment protocols were established, and all recruiters were appropriately briefed and periodically monitored as a quality 
check. A recruitment call script was developed, covering an explanation of the SP research methodology and information on the broad 
objectives, structure and timing of the study. GPs were informed that the SP visits would entail no cost to them in terms of time or 
lost earnings, as each visit (by design) would last the length of a normal consultation and be subject to the usual consultation fee for 
an insured patient. However, they were told that they would be approached for a brief telephone survey (to check for any SP detections) 
and a face-to-face interview following the visits. They were also told that they would have the opportunity to receive private and 
confidential feedback on their performance during the SP visits at a later stage. This feedback was offered to GPs as part of the 
intervention in Part 2 of this study (see Section 4.3.2), and all GPs not included in that intervention were given the opportunity to 
request feedback after the study’s conclusion. The confidentiality of all identifiable individual-level data, and reporting of study results 
only at the aggregate level, was also emphasised. Where GPs had more specific questions or concerns that could not be addressed 
using the call script, recruiters were asked to put them in touch with me or a member of the ESRC study team to follow up. All 
recruitment calls were made during GPs’ working hours, and call-backs were arranged if GPs were busy consulting. 
152 An online system was built using the REDcap software, which enabled the tracking of recruitment calls, the recording of GP 
responses and participation consent, and the programming of automated emails. 
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not opt-out at a later stage. 34 (30%) of these recruited GPs were also part of the ESRC study 
sample.  
The difference in the number of GPs that were reached and the number that eventually consented 
raises the possibility of self-selection bias in the study sample: the GPs who consented to 
participation may be fundamentally different from those who refused. Table 4.5 compares basic 
socio-demographic characteristics of the final sample and interviewed sub-sample in Columns (3) 
and (4) (see the following sections for details on these samples) with those of the sampling frame 
of non-dispensing GPs, although the number of comparative metrics with available data is limited. 
The two samples are comparable to the sampling frame in the average age of GPs (49 years in 
both samples, compared to 50 in the sampling frame), and in the number of GPs located in the 
wealthier northern suburbs of Sandton and Randburg (43% and 45%, relative to 44% in the 
sampling frame). However, they hold a slightly higher representation of male GPs (52% and 51%, 
relative to 47% in the sampling frame). 
It is difficult to attenuate this self-selection concern, apart from noting that the GPs who refused 
to participate did so for a number of different reasons: time and work pressures, periods of 
unavailability (leave) over the study period, multiple practice locations with little foresight on 
their future rotas, planned relocation, and so on. Some GPs also raised concerns about potential 
links between the study aims and the planned National Health Insurance (NHI) reform in South 
Africa, and its implications for future regulation of their private practice. This issue was foreseen 
by the research team, and recruiters were trained to explain that the study was an independent, 
academic piece of work investigating the drivers of care quality and cost in primary care, with no 
links to any government or regulatory body. Despite this, a few GPs still refused to participate 
due to these concerns.  
4.3.1.2 SP visits with health insurance 
Every GP in this experiment received two SP visits, each presenting one of two patient roles: a 
“low-insured” Patient Role A, and a “high-insured” Patient Role B. Both roles presented with 
Clinical Case 1 (uncomplicated (viral) acute bronchitis). The only distinction between these roles 
is therefore the patient’s insurance status; the clinical case and case-specific Q&A scripts are 
identical.  
The insurance plans assigned to the two roles are further identical in the breadth of their covered 
primary care services and accessible provider networks. Crucially, they are also identical in the 
maximum service rates (MRR) that can be charged by contracted primary care providers.153 
 
153 This includes the flat consultation rate and the fee-for-service rates for other healthcare services.  
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However, they have important differences in the insurance premiums charged (the monthly 
premium charged for the “high-insured” plan is roughly double that for the “low-insured” plan), 
and in certain limits on total annual claims. The annual allocation of medical savings per patient, 
which is used to pay for primary care services such as routine GP consultations and every-day 
medicines, is substantially lower for the “low-insured” plan. This imposes a tighter budget 
constraint on the “low-insured” patient’s fully-covered primary care expenditures, and increases 
the likelihood that they incur out-of-pocket (OOP) care expenditure over the course of the year. 
Therefore, while the breadth of services allowable by their insurance will not differ between the 
two patient roles in any given consultation, the likelihood that it leads to some level of OOP 
expenditure for the patient (either from the consultation, or in future consultations due to depletion 
of the patient’s medical savings) is much higher for the “low-insured” role. See Appendix B.3 for 
details on the insurance plans. 
To ensure that treating GPs were aware of the SP’s specific insurance cover, and the extent of 
their medical savings constraints, each patient role had a slightly different consultation opening 
statement (see Table 4.4). These statements are slight variations on the basic opening statement 
for Clinical Case 1 (provided in Table 4.1). The key difference in these statements between Patient 
Roles A and B is the degree of concern the patient communicates regarding their medical savings, 
to distinguish a relatively more cost-conscious “low-insured” patient. While it is tempting to liken 
this distinction between “low-insured” and “high-insured” patients to that of ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ 
patients, it is important to note that the insurance plan of the “low-insured” is by no means basic; 
it is still one of the more comprehensive plans offered by the partnering health insurer. Moreover, 
in a country where only 16% of the population have any private medical insurance at all, the plan 
certainly constitutes a ‘premium’ product for the average South African.   
Table 4.4. SP opening statements, by patient role 
Patient Role A 
“Low-insured” & Clinical Case 1 
Patient Role B 
“High-insured” & Clinical Case 1 
“I’ve been having this cough that is not going away. I had 
a cold a week ago, which is better now, but I’m still 
coughing a lot. 
My medical savings are a bit low, so I wasn’t sure if it’s 
serious enough to come today. But I thought better to 
make sure anyway.” 
“I had flu a week ago, which is a bit better now. But I am 
still coughing a lot - the cough is not going away. 
I’m not sure if it’s that serious, but my medical aid is 
quite good, so I thought no harm in getting checked out” 
 
Each of the 10 fieldworkers recruited for this part of the study was assigned a specific patient role 
and corresponding insurance cover – five were assigned the “low-insured” Patient Role A, and 
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five were assigned the “high-insured” Patient Role B.154 Certain items were added to the SP Q&A 
scripts to address insurance-specific questions that may be asked by GPs, such as questions on 
the level of available medical savings (although it was not expected that many GPs would ask for 
such details). The second stage of SP training (over two days in July 2018) specifically covered 
the insurance-specific aspects of these two patient roles. Fieldworkers were briefed on the details 
of their specific insurance cover, and their new role-specific opening statements and Q&A scripts 
(see Appendix B.3 for the role-specific scripts and insurance plan details). Fieldworkers also 
adjusted the occupation and social background of their patient roles, in case of related questioning 
by doctors, to account for the likelihood that the “high-insured” insurance plan would only be 
offered in highly-paid jobs or affordable for individuals from wealthy backgrounds. 
All SP visits took place over three weeks in July-August 2018, under my supervision and a local 
fieldwork company’s coordination. The five fieldworkers who were assigned the “low-insured” 
SP role were each paired with one of the five fieldworkers assigned the “high-insured” role. Each 
recruited GP was then randomly allocated to visits by one fieldworker pair.155 As the SP method 
requires that all patient characteristics apart from insurance status are standardised across the two 
SPs visiting any one GP, it was important to match fieldworkers as closely as possible on the 
basis of gender, height, physical appearance, and other personal traits. Efforts were also made to 
match paired visits on the time of day (morning or afternoon), but this proved logistically very 
difficult to uphold for all visit pairs; as such, this particular constraint was relaxed. To control for 
learning or order effects, whereby GPs may perform better during the second SP visit due to 
having seen a similar clinical case in the first one, the sequencing of paired visits was randomised 
for each GP, such that some GPs saw the “low-insured” SP first whilst others saw the “high-
insured” first. Moreover, at least a two-day gap was maintained between paired visits to the same 
GP, to minimise this learning effect and reduce the likelihood of detection.  
Each fieldworker was given a set of items to take to their scheduled consultations. A personal 
fieldwork journal was provided, detailing their schedule of visits to complete each day. An 
electronic tablet was provided for completing the SP debriefing questionnaire, along with a hard-
paper copy of the questionnaire in case of technical issues with the electronic version. 
Fieldworkers were also given a sealable plastic bag for each consultation, labelled with their 
names and the unique identifiers of GPs they were scheduled to see. They were instructed to seal 
any receipts or prescriptions from each consultation inside these bags.  
 
154 It was not possible to pool fieldworkers and patient roles in this experiment, as specific insurance cover (‘high’ or ‘low’ cover) had 
to be bought for each individual in their own name for the purposes of this research. 
155 Some of these random GP-fieldworker pair combinations had to be manually adjusted, as the overlap in fieldworkers and some 
participant GPs with the ESRC study meant that some of the fieldworkers had already visited the same doctor or another doctor at the 
same GP practice during the ESRC study fieldwork. 
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Table 4.5. Sampling summary statistics (Part 1 of study) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All GPs 
Non-dispensing 
GPs  
Final 
Sample 
Interview  
Sub-sample 
Observations (N) 999 614 89 75 
     
Gender     
Female 45% 53% 48% 49% 
Male 55% 47% 52% 51% 
Age (mean) 51 50 49 49 
Dispensing status     
Non-dispensing 62% 100% 100% 100% 
Dispensing 38% 0% 0% 0% 
Contracting status 
    
Contracted-in 71% 60% 100% 100% 
Contracted-out 29% 40% 0% 0% 
Practice location     
Northern periphery(Region A & Alexandra) 8% 9% 4% 3% 
  Northern Suburbs (Regions B & E, excl. Alexandra) 35% 44% 43% 45% 
  Western Suburbs (Region C) 12% 13% 16% 16% 
  Central Johannesburg (Region F, excl. Jo'burg South) 26% 25% 20% 17% 
  Southern Suburbs (Regions D & G, & Jo'burg South) 19% 9% 17% 19% 
          
Source: Medpages database, author's calculations  
Note: 'All GPs' included the 999 private GPs listed as active in the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) in the online medical practitioner database, Medpages, 
which includes approximately 80% of all medical practitioners in South Africa. 'Non-dispensing GPs' are the subsample of all listed GPs that do not have 
drug dispensing licences. The 'Final Sample' includes the 89 GPs that were successfully visited by both SPs in Part 1 of this study, and the 'Interviewed 
Sub-sample" includes the 75 GPs of these visited 89 who were also successfully interviewed following the SP visits. ‘Contracting status' refers to GPs' 
contracting terms with private medical schemes. 'Contracted-in' GPs are those who are contracted into schemes' provider networks, and therefore have 
less discretion over their service pricing for insured patients. The 'Northern Suburbs' include the wealthier suburbs of Sandton and Ranburg in Regions B 
and E - see figure 2.2 for a map of the administrative Regions A-G in CoJ. 
 
Due to the random allocation of visits to individual fieldworkers and the geographical dispersion 
of recruited GPs, fieldworkers were often unable to complete their three to four scheduled visits 
a day. In these cases, visits were rescheduled or swapped with a later visit, as long as these swaps 
did not violate the minimum two-day gap between paired visits. Consultation appointments were 
scheduled in advance where possible, and fieldworkers were advised to arrive at least 15 minutes 
before their scheduled consultation times to avoid any delays. At the end of each fieldwork day, 
the fieldworkers met with the fieldwork company team for a debriefing, to drop off the sealed 
plastic bags and contents from the day’s consultations, and to flag any issues that arose during the 
day.  
Of the 112 recruited GPs, 89 were successfully visited by both patient roles (both paired visits) 
and satisfied the eligibility criteria for this part of the study. 13 of the 112 recruited GPs could not 
be visited for a number of reasons. Some of these GPs were unavailable during the fieldwork 
period, some could not be contacted for scheduling an appointment, and some could not be visited 
by any of the five fieldworker-pairs (due to at least one fieldworker in each pair having previously 
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visited the same GP, or other GPs in the same practice, during the ESRC study fieldwork). A 
further 10 recruited GPs were visited by SPs, but it was discovered that they were actually 
dispensing GPs (having dispensed medications during the SP visits) and were therefore not 
eligible to participate. The visits to these 10 GPs were subsequently dropped from the final 
sample. This resulted in 89 retained GPs, and 178 completed and valid consultations (at a visit 
completion rate of 79%) that form the ‘final sample’ in this part of the study. Summary statistics 
on basic GP characteristics for this final sample, comparable to those for the sampling frame, are 
shown in Column (3) of Table 4.5.  
4.3.1.3 SP detection survey 
In November 2018, the 89 GPs in the final sample were telephoned to conduct a short SP detection 
survey. Each GP was asked if they recalled having suspected any patient they had seen over the 
last few months to be a fake patient. If the GP answered yes, they were then asked how many 
patients they had been suspicious of. 15 of the 89 GPs reported at least one suspected patient (3 
of these 15 GPs reported 2 suspected patients, 1 GP reported 3, and another reported 6). For each 
suspected patient, the GPs were asked for their recollection of the patient’s age, gender, 
symptoms, approximate time of visit (the month, and whether it was the first- or second-half of 
the month), and any specific reason for their suspicion. 
Based on this information, and my records on the fieldworker pair that completed each GP’s visits 
and their timing, it was possible to assess whether each suspecting GP’s recollection matched (or 
approximated) their actual visit experience, and thus whether their detection was valid.156 This 
assessment was first done by me and three members of the ESRC study team independently, and 
then discussed together to come to a consensus on conflicting assessments. It was agreed that only 
2 of the 15 GPs reporting a suspicion were likely to have detected an SP during their two visits. 
While we cannot be fully certain that these detections are valid, we assessed that the likelihood 
of a correct detection is sufficiently high in these two cases. 
 
156 To assess these cases systematically, members of the ESRC study team and I first developed a protocol for classifying valid SP 
detections. This was informed by one member (my academic supervisor)’s previous experience in conducting similar SP studies. We 
agreed that the reporting of similar symptoms to our clinical cases was the initial screening criteria for valid detections. 5 of the 15 
suspecting GPs fulfilled this criteria in at least one of their reported cases. It was also agreed that this was a necessary but insufficient 
condition for classifying a valid detection, as a lot of patients would be presenting to GPs with similar flu-like symptoms to Clinical 
Case 1 during that time of year (as it was the flu season). For these five GPs, we then looked at the reported gender and age of the 
suspected patients, and the timing of their visits, to compare these to their actual SP visits. We also considered the reasons specified 
for the GP’s suspicion. As this was quite a subjective assessment, each of us classified the five cases independently, and then compared 
our conclusions to come to a consensus.   
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In the final sample of 89 GPs, this represents a likely detection rate of 2%. In my empirical 
analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 (which draw on data from this experiment), I check the robustness 
of all results to excluding these detection cases from the sample.  
4.3.1.4 GP interviews 
Following the SP detection survey, all GPs in the final sample were approached for a 20-30 minute 
face-to-face interview, to collect additional data on personal and clinical practice characteristics 
(as described in Section 4.2). GPs were telephoned at their practices to schedule the interviews, 
and enumerators followed a set script during these scheduling calls. See Appendix B.4 for an 
overview of the interview structure and components. All interviews took place at GPs’ practices, 
between November 2018 and February 2019.  
Of the 89 GPs in the final sample, interviews were successfully completed with 75, resulting in a 
non-participation rate of 16%. The majority of the 14 GPs that did not complete an interview cited 
time constraints as reasons for their inability to continue with the study (30 minutes was required 
for the interview during their working hours). Four GPs were either not reached or did not confirm 
an interview time by the end of February 2019, and were not pursued further due to budgetary 
constraints on the study. Lastly, one GP had moved abroad and was therefore not contacted for 
the interview. As a result, complete data on all GP characteristics listed in Section 4.2.3 is only 
available for this sub-sample of 75 GPs (hereafter, the ‘interview sub-sample’). While the final 
sample contains data on all necessary outcomes for answering Research Question 1 (see Section 
1.5), the interview sub-sample with additional data on provider-level characteristics (including 
altruism) is required to fully answer Research Question 2. Both samples are therefore drawn on 
in Chapters 5 and 6, which seek to address these questions in their analyses.  
Summary statistics on basic GP characteristics for this interview sub-sample, taken from the 
Medpages data, are shown in Column (4) of Table 4.5. 
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4.3.2 Part 2: Between-subject randomised experiment 
The second part of this study involved a randomised field experiment to evaluate the impact of a 
private performance feedback intervention on the appropriateness of care delivered by private 
GPs – namely, their antibiotic treatment decisions and treatment costs. A timeline of all fieldwork 
activities in this experiment is presented in Figure 4.2.  
The purpose of the experiment was to investigate Research Question 3 (see Section 1.5), and its 
outcomes are analysed in Chapter 7. The experiment details are provided in the following 
sections, and a brief overview is as follows. Each sampled GP was first randomised into one of 
two interventions: i) receipt of a written summary of clinical guidelines for common respiratory 
infections (‘control’ intervention), or ii) receipt of private, individualised feedback on clinical 
performance during ‘baseline’ SP visits (conducted as part of the ESRC study) and the same 
written summary of clinical guidelines (‘treatment’ intervention). These interventions were 
delivered at the end of the GP interviews for this sample.157 Following the intervention, each 
participant GP received ‘end-line’ SP visits from two SPs varying only in their clinical case 
(Clinical Case 1 or Clinical Case 2).158  
Figure 4.2. Timeline of fieldwork activities for study Part 2 
GP participants were drawn from the ESRC study sample, and baseline data was also taken from 
the ESRC study results. The sampling protocol and stages of the experiment are described below. 
GP drop-out rates at the randomisation, intervention and end-line visit stages are also detailed 
there (and later summarised in Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7). Basic summary statistics on the ‘initial 
 
157 The interview itself is described in Appendix B.4. 
158 Note that all SPs in this second experiment presented as uninsured patients (paying in cash), to mirror the ‘baseline’ SP visits in 
the ESRC study. The insurance status of SPs was not a variable of interest in this experiment (unlike in Part 1), and it was logistically 
easier for SPs to be uninsured and pay for consultations in cash. Hence, the only variation in SPs presenting to the same GP in this 
experiment was the SP clinical case.  
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sample’ of randomised GPs and the ‘final sample’ of (end-line) visited GPs are presented in Table 
4.6, alongside comparable statistics for the Medpages GP population and the sampling frame. 
4.3.2.1 Provider sampling and randomisation 
The sampling frame for this experiment was a sub-set of GPs who participated in the ESRC study 
and received visits from SPs presenting Clinical Case 1 in that study.159 The ESRC study sample 
was randomly drawn from the Medpages population of private GPs practicing in the City of 
Johannesburg. 160 
A total of 122 private GPs received an SP visit with Clinical Case 1 in the ESRC study, and form 
the sampling frame for this experiment. Results from these visits also provide the baseline data 
for this part of the study. Of these 122 GPs, efforts were made to exclude those sharing large 
group practices. This decision was taken partly to facilitate fieldwork, as several fieldworkers had 
visited GPs as part of the ESRC study, and it was increasingly difficult to find recruited 
fieldworkers that had not already visited certain group GP practices in the study. It was also done 
to limit potential spill-over of any treatment effects from treated GPs to control GPs practising in 
their vicinity. 15 group practice GPs were excluded as a result.161 In addition, another 8 GPs were 
excluded either because they could not be contacted for the SP detection survey in the ESRC 
study or refused to take part in it, or because they reported detections in the survey that were 
assessed to be valid.  
The remaining 99 GPs (the ‘initial sample’) were then stratified according to their drug dispensing 
status, contracting status with medical schemes, and baseline performance on the main outcome 
of interest (whether they had prescribed an inappropriate antibiotic for Clinical Case 1), and 
randomised to one of two intervention groups: ‘control’ or ‘treatment’. The randomisation 
resulted in 50 GPs assigned to the treatment group, and 49 to the control group. A comparison of 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.6 shows that the treatment group has slightly older GPs on 
average, and also a larger share of male GPs, in this initial sample.  
 
159Note that there were also experimental variations in some SPs presenting Clinical Case 1 in the ESRC study (similar to the insurance 
variation in Part 1 of this study). This study considers only those ESRC study SP visits where the ‘basic’ Clinical Case 1 was presented 
(by uninsured SPs, with no experimental variation).  
160 That study included both drug-dispensing and non-dispensing GPs, as well as GPs both contracted-in and -out of medical schemes’ 
provider networks (see Section 2.2.4 for a description of these GP practice variations); and the random sampling procedure employed 
there first stratified the GP population according to dispensing and contracting status. As such, the sample in this experiment also 
contains both dispensing and non-dispensing doctors, of contracted-in and contracted-out status. 
161 Although it was decided to exclude group practice GPs from the experiment sample, around 6 GPs that were retained in the sample 
were later found to be working within group practices; this was initially missed in the sampling stage, as these GPs had slightly 
different practice addresses to other GPs working at the same group practices (so they were assumed to be in solo practices).  
 92 
 
4.3.2.2 Randomised interventions 
The treatment in this experiment comprised of confidential, written feedback on GPs’ individual 
performance during the baseline SP visits (with Clinical Case 1) in the ESRC study. GPs in the 
treatment group were handed this feedback in a sealed envelope at the end of their GP interviews, 
which followed the same format as the interviews in Part 1 of this study (see Appendix B.4). 
Interviewers were trained to invite the GPs to open and review the feedback, to ensure (where 
possible) that the GPs actually read the contents and complied with the treatment. See Appendix 
B.10. (a) for an example of the written feedback sheet, and Appendix B.9 for the interviewer 
script in delivering the intervention.  
Feedback was offered on three areas of GP performance during baseline visits: antibiotic 
prescribing, clinical effort, and drug treatment costs. As antibiotics are not indicated for Clinical 
Case 1, GPs were informed whether they correctly abstained from prescribing antibiotics for this 
case. For clinical effort, the proportion of case-specific history-taking and examination checklist 
items completed by GPs during their baseline visits was reported.162 Lastly, GPs were told how 
much the medications they had dispensed or prescribed for the patient would cost on the local 
market, and how this cost compared (in multiplier terms) to the cheapest, appropriate treatment 
available for the clinical case.163  
Individual performance was reported only relative to evidence-based benchmarks (i.e. how GP 
performance compared to evidence-based treatment guidelines, clinical effort best-practices, and 
locally cost-effective treatment choices). It was decided that no peer-comparative performance 
information would be provided (for example, comparing individual GP performance to the sample 
average), in order to avoid potentially harmful benchmarking. For instance, if the average 
antibiotic prescribing rate is high within the sample (as reported in Chapter 7), peer-benchmarking 
may validate and encourage such prescribing behaviour as being the ‘norm’ among peers.  
In addition to performance feedback, treatment group GPs were also given an educational 
supplement with a summary of national clinical guidelines for diagnosing and treating common 
respiratory illnesses that tend to present in primary care (including the clinical cases in this 
 
162 See Section 4.2.1 for details on how these checklists were devised, and Appendix B.1 for a full list of all case-specific history-
taking and examination items included in these checklists.  
163 See Section 4.2.2 for details on how drugs were priced in this study. The cheapest treatment that was considered appropriate for 
Clinical Case 1 - based on advice from national respiratory and infectious diseases experts, recommendations in the South African 
Standard Treatment Guidelines and Essential Medicines List (STG/EML), and prices in the South African MPR – was paracetamol 
and a cough suppressant, priced at a total R17.86. 
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study),164 and a summary of the ESRC study from where the feedback performance data was 
taken.165  
Control group GPs did not receive the individualised feedback on their baseline performance. 
They were only given the educational supplement and the summary of the ESRC study. This was 
also given in a sealed envelope at the end of their GP interviews. See Appendix B.10. (b) for an 
example of the control group leaflet.166  
Table 4.6. Sampling summary statistics (Part 2 of study) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
All 
GPs 
Sampling 
Frame 
Initial Sample Final Sample 
 Treat Control Total Treat Control  Total 
Observations (N) 999 122 50 49 99 37 43 80 
         
Gender         
Female 45% 33% 20% 39% 30% 24% 35% 30% 
Male 55% 67% 80% 61% 70% 76% 65% 70% 
Age (mean) 51 52 54 53 53 55 53 54 
Dispensing status 
        
Non-dispensing 62% 50% 41% 43% 42% 41% 44% 43% 
Dispensing 38% 50% 59% 57% 58% 59% 56% 57% 
Contracting status 
        
Contracted-in 71% 79% 84% 82% 83% 81% 81% 81% 
Contracted-out 29% 21% 16% 18% 17% 19% 19% 19% 
Practice location  
       
   Northern periphery                         
(Region A & Alexandra) 
8% 4% 6% 4% 5% 3% 5% 4% 
   Northern Suburbs                               
(Regions B & E, excl. Alexandra) 
35% 29% 18% 33% 26% 16% 32% 25% 
   Western Suburbs  
(Region C) 
12% 13% 12% 8% 10% 13% 5% 9% 
   Central Johannesburg                          
(Region F, excl. Jo'burg South) 
26% 21% 27% 22% 24% 30% 23% 26% 
   Southern Suburbs                                 
(Regions D & G, & Jo'burg South) 
19% 33% 37% 33% 35% 38% 35% 36% 
                  
Source: Medpages database, author's calculations 
Note: 'All GPs' included the 999 private GPs listed as active in the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) in the online medical practitioner database, Medpages, which 
includes approximately 80% of all medical practitioners in South Africa. 'Sampling Frame' includes the subsample of 122 GPs from the ESRC study that 
were considered for Part 2 of this study. Note that 2 of these 122GPs are not listed in the Medpages data, and are hence exlcuded from the calculated 
percentages listed here. 'Initial Sample' includes the 99 GPs from the sampling frame that were assessed to be eligible for this study, and randomised to 
either the treatment or control groups. Note that 1 GP of the 50 randomised to the treatment group is also not included in the Medpages data.  The 'Final 
Sample' includes the 80 GPs that successfully recieved the intervention and were visited by both end-line SPs in Part 2 of this study. "Contracting status' 
refers to GPs' contracting terms with private medical schemes. 'Contracted-in' GPs are contracted into schemes' provider networks, and therefore have 
less discretion over their service pricing for insured patients. The 'Northern Suburbs' include the wealthier suburbs of Sandton and Ranburg in Regions B 
and E - see figure 2.2 for a map of the administrative Regions A-G in CoJ. 
 
164 These include the common cold, acute bronchitis, influenza, acute bacterial sinusitis and pneumonia. 
165 It was explained that the ESRC study was focused on investigating antibiotic prescribing behaviour in primary care, and was 
motivated by the high rates of antibiotic prescribing in South Africa and the growing issue of antimicrobial resistance. 
166 All GPs who participated in either Part 1 of this study or the ESRC study (but who were not in the treatment group of this 
experiment) were also offered individual feedback on their performance in the two studies upon request once the experiment was 
concluded. Moreover, all GPs were offered feedback on the aggregate results from the two studies.   
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4.3.2.3 GP interviews and intervention delivery 
Following a similar protocol to the scheduling of interviews in study Part 1, the 99 GPs in the 
initial sample were approached for face-to-face interviews after completion of the SP detection 
surveys in the ESRC study. The GPs were not informed about the intervention at the time of 
interview scheduling, to ensure that this knowledge did not influence their decision to interview. 
At the start of each interview, consent was sought from each GP for continued participation in the 
study.167 The GPs were given the study information sheet again at this stage (see Appendix B.7 
for the information sheet) and informed that continued participation could entail private 
performance feedback and further SP visits. The feedback intervention took place at the end of 
these interviews, subject to GPs’ consent to continued participation. Besides being informed about 
the possibility of receiving private performance feedback and further SP visits, GPs were blinded 
to the experiment details and their treatment status throughout the whole study period, to prevent 
this knowledge from influencing their decisions to participate or their responses to the 
intervention.  
83 of the 99 GPs in the initial sample were successfully reached and scheduled for an interview. 
12 of the 99 GPs declined the interview, predominantly stating work time constraints. The other 
four GPs who were not interviewed were either unreachable on their contact numbers over the 
interview scheduling period, or had moved overseas.  
The 83 scheduled interviews were carried out over November 2018-February 2019. This resulted 
in an intervention non-participation rate of 22% in the treatment group (11 of the 50 treatment 
group GPs in the initial sample) and 10% in the control group (5 of the 49 control GPs in the 
initial sample). Other aspects of intervention delivery, and the implications of different non-
participation rates in the treatment and control groups, are discussed in Chapter 7. 
4.3.2.4 End-line SP visits 
As stated previously, the baseline outcomes for this experiment were taken from the SP visits 
with Clinical Case 1 in the ESRC study. Following the feedback intervention, each of the 83 
participating GPs that received the intervention (i.e. those that completed an interview and 
consented to ongoing study participation) was sent two SPs presenting Clinical Case 1 and 
Clinical Case 2. The aim of these visits was to collect end-line data to evaluate certain effects of 
the feedback intervention (as discussed in Chapter 7). Apart from their clinical case, the two end-
line SPs were otherwise identical, including in their insurance status: both presented as uninsured 
 
167 Note that this experiment (study Part 2) was framed as a continuation of the ESRC study, as all participant GPs in this experiment 
were initially recruited for that study.  
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patients and paid for the GP consultations in cash. This ensured that any incentives deriving from 
the insurance status of the patient (as explored in Part 1 of the study) were balanced across the 
two SPs.  
10 fieldworkers were employed in this part of the study. Unlike in Part 1, each fieldworker was 
trained to play both clinical cases in this experiment. Clinical Case 1 was introduced in the first 
stage of SP training (as detailed in Section 4.1.2), and Clinical Case 2 was introduced in the third 
stage in November 2018.168 This latter training emphasised fieldworkers’ ability to differentiate 
the presentations of the two (similar) clinical cases. Fieldworkers had to memorise a number of 
details on the history and therapeutic regimen of the HIV+ patient in Clinical Case 2. Extensive 
role-play, mock consultations and practice in recall (whilst varying the clinical case) ensured that 
fieldworkers were comfortable with the new clinical case and in switching between the two cases.  
As in Part 1, fieldworkers were grouped into five fieldworker-pairs, with pairs matched as closely 
as possible on age, gender and physical appearance. The gender-matching was relaxed for one 
pair, where a male was paired with a female (due to uneven numbers of male and female 
fieldworkers). Each participating GP was then randomly allocated to one fieldworker pair, and 
each fieldworker within a pair was randomly allocated to one of the two clinical cases to present 
to each GP. Again, to control for potential learning effects where GPs systematically perform 
better during the second SP visit, the order of the two visits was randomised; and to reduce the 
likelihood of detection, at least a two-day gap was maintained between the two SP visits to the 
same GP. Other fieldwork protocols were also the same as in the SP visits in Part 1 (see Section 
4.3.1.2). 
The visits in this experiment were completed over a longer period relative to the visits in Part 1, 
given the need to follow the scheduling of GP interviews where the intervention took place. The 
interviews were staggered over November 2018-February 2019, to align with GP availability. 
Therefore, the SP visits in this experiment also spanned a similar period: December 2018-March 
2019. The majority of all end-line visits (96%) were completed within 3-4 weeks of intervention 
delivery (i.e. completion of the corresponding GP interview). However, six visits were delayed 
and completed between 1-3 months of intervention delivery. These six delayed visits all occurred 
with control group GPs, and resulting implications for balance in visit characteristics between the 
treatment and control groups are discussed in Chapter 7.  
Of the 83 interviewed GPs, 80 were successfully visited at end-line by both SPs. Of the three GPs 
that were lost to follow-up, one GP had retired since the interview, one had stopped seeing acute 
 
168 Some of these 10 fieldworkers also took part in the second stage of training in July 2018, if they were also employed as SPs in Part 
1. 
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patients, and one refused to on-going participation in the study following the GP interview. This 
resulted in a ‘final sample’ of 80 GPs (37 in the treatment group, and 43 in the control) and 160 
valid consultations, with an attrition rate of 4%. Implications of this attrition are discussed in 
Chapter 7. Summary statistics on basic GP characteristics for this final sample are presented in 
Columns (6)-(8) of Table 4.6. Treatment and control group balance along observable GP 
characteristics and baseline outcomes in this final sample is also evaluated in Chapter 7.  
Unlike with the SP visits in Part 1, and with baseline visits in the ESRC study, an SP detection 
survey was not carried out following these end-line visits. It was decided with the ESRC research 
team that, given the very low detection rates among visits in Part 1 and in the ESRC study, it 
would not be cost-effective to carry out a similar survey here. 
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5 Physicians’ Effort Choices and Care Quality under 
Health Insurance 
5.1 Introduction 
A rapid expansion in health insurance has underpinned global efforts toward universal health 
coverage (UHC), characterised by a rising prevalence in third-party purchasing, and reduced 
financial participation of patients in their own care. To achieve broad coverage and patient choice 
in health services, many governments have also begun formally engaging the private sector within 
national insurance schemes (Odendaal et al., 2018; Rao et al., 2018). In South Africa, the 
government’s latest proposals for its planned national health insurance (NHI) reform include 
contracting private primary care physicians (GPs) to expand access to free care, and abolishing 
all patient co-payment in private insurance schemes (Republic of South Africa, 2018, 2019). 
Despite these trends, there is limited theory or evidence on the impact of insurance and third-party 
financing of market-based healthcare on providers’ care quality decisions.  Existing literature on 
the effects of insurance on physician behaviour tend to focus on choices of care quantity and costs, 
rather than quality - in part, due to problems in inferring care quality at the level of physician-
patient interactions (Pauly, 1978; Das et al., 2016). 
Healthcare quality depends on a number of physician inputs – broadly defined as “effort” - that 
are not easily verifiable, particularly by third-party payers, and therefore non-contractible (Ma 
and Mcguire, 1997).169 This chapter argues that the combination of greater financial protection 
for patients and third-party purchasing of care from private providers exacerbates a principal-
agent problem in incentivising appropriate physician effort, and can worsen the technical quality 
of care.170 Where physicians face an uncompensated cost to effort (where there are no immediate 
financial incentives attached), this effort will in general be undersupplied relative to what is 
 
169 Here, I distinguish between care quality inputs, which includes all forms of clinical effort, and care quality outputs (i.e. actual or 
realised care quality), which include the accuracy of diagnoses and appropriateness of any treatment. 
170 Technical quality is defined as the clinical effectiveness (how well clinical guidelines and medical science are applied to the 
diagnosis and treatment of a clinical case) and safety of care processes, as distinct from interpersonal aspects of care quality (in other 
words, patient experience). Note that all references to physicians’ care quality decisions in this chapter refer to process measures of 
care quality (reflecting what is done to and for the patient during the clinical interaction and any follow-up), as oppose to structural or 
outcome measures (Donabedian, 1980). 
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optimal for the patient.171 The extent of this undersupply (“effort-stinting”) may be determined 
by both the altruistic and market incentives physicians face (Allard et al., 2009) – incentives that 
can vary in the patient’s financial protection, as argued in Chapter 3.  
The theoretical framework predicts that, where technical quality coincides with significant 
unobserved physician effort (Chalkley and Malcolmson, 1998; Haas-Wilson, 1994), and has a 
direct impact in reducing current and future health expenditures (WHO, World Bank and OECD, 
2018), its supply will decrease with patient insurance. Private physicians have both altruistic and 
market incentives to supply more appropriate (and unobserved) effort to low-insured patients, for 
whom the financial consequences of poor quality care are greater and more tangible. Equally, 
given their need to compete for patients on some observable dimension of care (and their inability 
to compete on OOP costs with high-insured patients), physicians’ relative focus on improving 
patient experience and satisfying patient demands will increase in the level of patient insurance. 
This latter prediction also implies that, in situations where optimal care necessitates the refusal of 
patient demands (such as demand for unnecessary antibiotics), the competitive pressure on 
physicians to satisfy greater actual or perceived demands from less cost-conscious patients may 
be an additional channel through which technical care quality can deteriorate in the patient’s 
insurance cover.172 
To summarise, the primary hypotheses tested in this chapter are the following:173  
i) Private physicians supply more observable care inputs that enhance patient experience 
(e.g. physical effort and consultation time) when treating high-insured patients 
(Hypothesis 6).  
ii) However, they also supply less unobserved, appropriate care inputs for these patients; 
resulting in lower quality care outputs (including the accuracy of diagnoses and 
appropriateness of treatments) for high-insured patients (Hypothesis 4). 
To test these hypotheses, an experimental audit study with standardised patients (SPs)174 was 
carried out in Johannesburg. The experiment involved 89 private GPs, who each received 
randomly-ordered, incognito visits from two SPs that presented identical clinical cases and varied 
 
171 This is especially true under regulated prices, as in the context of this study setting, where providers have limited ability to extract 
compensation for their effort by setting higher fees. In Das et al. (2016)’s framework, on the other hand, providers are modeled as 
charging a piece rate per unit of effort in their consultation fees, which serves to incentivize their effort supply.  
172 These predictions extend Das et al. (2016)’s analysis of physicians’ effort choices with and without market incentives. Unlike in 
that study, this chapter considers a context with regulated prices (where physicians have limited capacity to ‘price in’ their non-
contractible effort), and where variations in market incentives may be generated by patient insurance. 
173 These hypotheses correspond to some of the hypotheses derived in Chapter 3. The specific numbered hypotheses are given in 
parentheses.  
174 See Sections 4.1 and 4.3.1 for a detailed description of the SP method and experiment (comprising Part 1 of this study). 
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only in their level of insurance cover: high-insured or low-insured. A controlled field experiment 
was necessary in this case, as the use of observational data presented three primary challenges. 
First, there are potential endogeneity issues related to patients’ selection into insurance and 
doctors’ selection of specific patient types to treat (with specific conditions or insurance). Second, 
it is difficult to isolate doctors’ responses to patient insurance alone, as insurance can also change 
the behaviour of patients. The SP method allows exogenous variation in the patient insurance 
status faced by the same GPs; and by standardising the script, behaviour and clinical cases of SPs, 
the influence of additional patient- or case-specific characteristics (including patient demand) can 
be controlled for. Third, measuring (or inferring) the quality of care provided in clinical 
interactions is challenging, as optimal care is both patient- and case-specific (Pauly, 1978; Das et 
al., 2016) and not all determinants can be verified in observational data. Moreover, not all aspects 
of provider behaviour that influence care quality are easy to measure or systematically reported. 
Again, by controlling the clinical case presented by SPs, optimal care can be determined ex ante, 
and - through detailed debriefing by SPs - be measured ex post.  
This chapter’s main contribution is in providing novel evidence that isolates the impact of patient 
insurance status on the quality of care delivery. The results demonstrate that physicians offer 
lower quality care outputs overall (less accurate diagnoses and appropriate treatment) to high-
insured patients, perhaps indicating less appropriate clinical effort with these patients (in line with 
Hypothesis 4). GPs offered a correct or partially correct diagnosis to 46% of high-insured patients, 
compared to 60% of low-insured ones (a 23% decrease). GPs also prescribed unnecessary 
antibiotics to 63% of high-insured patients, compared to 51% of low-insured ones (a 24% 
increase). Notably, this lower quality of care output does not coincide with poorer performance 
on observed aspects of effort for high-insured patients: there were no significant differences in 
consultation time, and doctors completed slightly more history-taking items and examinations for 
these patients, as measured by a composite index score and the share of essential physical 
examinations completed (although the magnitude of these differences are very small). Similarly, 
doctors were significantly more likely to advise high-insured patients to come back for a repeat 
visit in case of worsening symptoms (73% vs. 51% for low-insured patients).175 These latter 
findings provide some support to Hypothesis 6. 
 
175  While this advice may be considered appropriate, it is not essential for this clinical case, as an accurate diagnosis of an 
uncomplicated and likely viral respiratory infection in an otherwise healthy young adult patient should give the GP sufficient 
confidence that the illness is self-limiting and will not require any follow-up. However, the GP may wish to be conservative, reassure 
the patient, or display more communication effort by providing such advice anyway. It should be noted that there are clear fee-for-
service (FFS) payment incentives attached to advising patients to come back for repeat consultations, and GPs may be more inclined 
to do so when the patient is well-insured.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the chapter’s 
contributions to existing literature. The experimental methods and data are outlined in Section 
5.3, including a presentation of summary statistics on sample characteristics and the care quality 
outcomes of interest. The empirical framework is discussed in Section 5.4, followed by a 
presentation of the main results and robustness checks in Section 5.5. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the main findings and policy implications in Section 5.6.  
5.2 Literature Contributions 
This chapter builds on several strands of existing literature. Firstly, it draws on and develops the 
theoretical literature on quality contractibility problems under third-party purchasing. Chalkley 
and Malcomson (1998)’s analysis of hospital quality contracting is perhaps the most closely 
related theoretical work. They consider a setting where healthcare is paid for through insurance, 
and providers’ incentives for un-monitored quality rely on patients’ demand response. The 
authors argue that, where patient demand does not fully reflect quality (or where it reflects certain 
dimensions but not others), market incentives alone will be insufficient for maintaining quality 
and the optimal contract would depend on the degree of provider altruism (‘benevolence’). While 
they characterise an inevitable trade-off between incentivising quality improvement and cost 
reduction (unless the hospital is fully benevolent), this chapter argues that higher quality may also 
coincide with lower costs. The role of altruism and market incentives in ameliorating the quality 
contractibility problem is also addressed in Allard et al. (2009), where uncertainty around the 
treatment-outcome relationship captures patients’ limited ability to observe and verify appropriate 
physician effort. Building on their framework, this chapter proposes a role for variations in patient 
insurance (and implied variations in altruistic and market incentives) in determining physicians’ 
effort choices. Related work by Ma and Mcguire (1997) considers physicians’ optimal effort 
choices under different insurance-payment contracts, where quality is observable to the patient 
(and influences demand for physician services) but unverifiable by the third-party payer. The 
present chapter relaxes this assumption of complete information in the physician-patient 
relationship, and considers that physicians’ care quality choices may not always be visible (or 
comprehensible) to patients (Arrow, 1963). McGuire (2000) discusses physicians’ effort choices 
under asymmetric information, regulated prices (as a result of health insurance) and market 
incentives. However, the focus there is on the effects of different payment structures on care 
quality choices, rather than on the effects of varying patients’ insurance cover. Blomqvist (1991) 
further underlines the role of the contract structure – fee-for-service reimbursement (under 
conventional third-party insurance) or salaried payment of physicians (under a HMO-style 
organisation) – in determining provider choices under health insurance. The author nevertheless 
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ignores many aspects of care quality by assuming that physicians arrive costlessly at an accurate 
diagnosis, and by abstracting from any choices on diagnostic or therapeutic effort.  
Secondly, this chapter builds on the health policy literature documenting disparities in specific 
measures of care quality by patient insurance status. Most studies examine associations between 
patient insurance and three types of care quality metrics: health outcomes (Franks et al., 1993; 
Hasan et al., 2010; Spencer, Gaskin and Roberts, 2013; Woolhandler and Himmelstein, 2017), 
utilisation of specific services or treatments (Roetzheim et al., 2000; Churilla et al., 2017), and 
patient satisfaction (Shi, 2000; Abuosi et al., 2016). While they generally find a positive 
association between patient insurance cover and quality outcomes, the quality metrics considered 
are predominantly those that tend to be systematically monitored and publicised (such as mortality 
outcomes) and that are highly salient (or subjective) to patients. Moreover, these studies do not 
isolate the role of provider responses to insurance from other confounders. This makes it difficult 
to draw conclusions on the potential for policies that target provider behaviours in particular, 
relative to other patient-centred or structural interventions, in improving quality outcomes of 
interest. 
Thirdly, by focusing on the role of the physician, this chapter contributes evidence to an extensive 
body of empirical work on physician agency in general (see McGuire (2000) and Johnson (2014) 
for reviews), and a smaller sub-set on physician agency under health insurance (Mort et al., 1996; 
Lundin, 2000; Iizuka, 2007; Lu, 2014). The bulk of this literature relies on observational data, 
and where the impact of insurance is estimated, the results include the combined effects of health 
insurance on the behaviours of both patients and physicians. To my knowledge, only one field 
experimental study isolates the causal effects of patient insurance status on provider behaviour: 
Lu (2014) finds that hospital physicians in Beijing prescribe more inappropriate drugs to insured 
patients (compared to the uninsured) when they have direct financial incentives to do so (that is, 
when they gain a profit-share from prescribed drugs). Contrary to findings in this chapter, she 
finds no evidence of an insurance effect on inappropriate drug prescribing when there are no 
financial incentives attached.176 A limitation of Lu (2014) is that only one dimension of care 
quality is evaluated (inappropriate drug treatment for elevated triglycerides). Moreover, studies 
that examine the effects of patient insurance on provider behaviour generally compare the effects 
of insured patients to the uninsured. In such cases, other factors besides the insurance status of 
the patient itself - such as varying consultation rates and the immediacy of reimbursement - may 
confound physicians’ treatment decisions. In this chapter, different levels of insurance cover are 
 
176 GPs recruited for Part 1 of this study do not have a license to dispense drugs, and therefore do not gain (or lose) financially from 
their drug prescriptions.  
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compared (high-insured and low-insured),177 with identical reimbursement rates, reimbursement 
procedures, and contract terms between the insurer and provider. This is similar to experimentally 
varying the patient’s co-payment rate, as most famously done in the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment (HIE) in the 1970s (Newhouse, 1993). Although the HIE primarily examined 
demand-side responses to variations in the co-payment rate, the technical quality of care received 
by participants once they accessed care was also analysed, and no co-pay effect was found (Brook 
et al., 2006). However, the HIE was not designed for evaluating supply-side responses: the co-
payment rate was not randomised across or within providers, so the possibility that patients may 
choose to see different types of providers under different levels of co-payment cannot be 
controlled for. Additionally, the study’s use of claims data limits its ability to infer the actual 
quality of care provided, for the reasons discussed previously. 
In proposing altruism as one explanation for care quality differences by patient insurance, this 
chapter also relates to literature characterising physicians as ‘altruistic’ agents who incorporate 
patient welfare in their behavioural choices (alongside profit motives) (see Galizzi et al. 2015 for 
a detailed review). Empirical evidence of physician altruism largely comes from laboratory 
experiments with medical students (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Godager and Wiesen, 2013; 
Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Lagarde and Blaauw, 2017), or 
analyses of prescription data that consider the likelihood of generic-substitution in response to 
patients’ OOP costs (Hellerstein, 1998; Lundin, 2000; Granlund, 2009; Iizuka, 2012; Crea et al., 
2019). The former experimental literature is limited in its applicability to field settings with 
practicing physicians. The latter rely on administrative data, and hence cannot separate physician 
altruism from other decision drivers, including patient demands (patient moral hazard). Moreover, 
these observational studies do not consider physician altruism with respect to care quality. Lu 
(2014) succeeds in experimentally testing for physician altruism in prescribing decisions (separate 
from profit or market incentives, or patient demands), and finds no supportive evidence. However, 
as stated previously, this study too gives limited consideration to physician altruism in effort 
choices (care quality). Admittedly, unlike in Lu (2014), the present chapter cannot isolate the 
influence of physicians’ altruistic incentives from those of market incentives in explaining 
variations in physicians’ choices by health insurance. However, it evaluates a broader range of 
care quality indicators, and also tests for heterogeneous insurance effects with respect to an 
experimental measure of baseline physician altruism. 
 
177 Further details on the insurance covers used in this study are provided in Section 4.3.1 and Appendix B.3. The insurance covers 
vary in the level of medical savings available to patients for financing their primary care needs in any given year, which is effectively 
equivalent to variations in their de facto annual co-payment rates 
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This chapter further relates to literature on provider competition on quality under free patient 
choice. However, it differs from existing works in a number of ways. Most existing evidence 
relates to competition in the hospital sector, rather than in primary care; and focus almost 
exclusively on hospital mortality rates as a measure of care quality (Gaynor, 2006; Barros et al., 
2016). Moreover, very few studies acknowledge a potential role for patient observability and 
information in creating heterogeneity in provider competition across different aspects of care 
quality and patient types. When prices are fixed and providers are unable to compete on cost, 
theoretical models predict that providers will instead compete on quality, as long as prices are 
fixed above marginal cost (Gaynor, 2006). Related evidence is mixed. Studies on the UK NHS 
and the US Medicare systems show that increased competition under fixed prices leads to lower 
mortality rates for cardiac patients (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Kessler and Geppert, 2005; 
Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2016) – measures that are commonly monitored and used as a 
basis for hospital reimbursement. However, there are also studies showing null or opposite effects 
on cardiac and other outcomes (Mukamel, Zwanziger and Tomaszewski, 2001; Gowrisankaran 
and Town, 2003; Colla et al., 2016). In general, theoretical models abstract from patients’ limited 
ability to infer care quality objectively, and the potentially high search and switching costs that 
can prevent patients from responding to poor quality.178 Acknowledging this, a few papers have 
noted that provider competition under fixed prices is likely to be higher for aspects of care quality 
that are more observable to patients (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 1992; Haas-Wilson, 1994; 
Propper, Burgess and Gossage, 2008). Two studies on competition and quality in primary care 
show that increased patient choice among providers with fixed prices improved subjective 
(patient-reported, and therefore observed) measures of care quality, but had a null or smaller effect 
on objective and less observable measures of technical quality (Dietrichson et al., 2016; Gravelle 
et al., 2018).  
The literature is generally ambiguous on the effects of provider competition on quality when there 
is also price competition (Gaynor, 2006; Gaynor, Ho and Town, 2015). In this chapter’s context, 
patients’ OOP prices are not entirely fixed for both patient insurance types. While prices are 
largely fixed (and near zero) for high-insured patients given their negligible de facto co-payment 
rate, prices may be reduced for low-insured patients with appropriate effort and care quality 
outputs (implying scope for some level of price competition for these patients).179 However, 
 
178 Some exceptions are Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992), Kranton (2003) and Allard et al. (2009) 
179 ‘Prices’ in this study context refer to out-of-pocket costs for patients. Prices for individual services and treatments are capped by 
the health insurer at the same level for both patient insurance types. Therefore, ‘price competition’ in this context refers to competition 
on patients’ out-of-pocket care costs, which may be altered by setting prices below the price cap or through the provider’s choice of 
services and medications. Whilst some theoretical models suggest that price competition will lower care quality (as it increases its 
relative marginal cost) (Gaynor, 2006), this is likely to hold only in contexts where price-cutting alone reduces provider profit, or 
where the price elasticity of demand is greater than the quality elasticity. In this study context, however, price and quality competition 
are complementary: a decrease in total costs for the patient is driven by an increase in appropriate provider effort.  
 104 
 
causal evidence on the effects of varying the degree of price competition for patients – through 
variations in patients’ price elasticity of demand (through their level of insurance cover, or 
otherwise) - on providers’ care quality choices is currently lacking. One exception is Volpp et al. 
(2003), who provide quasi-experimental evidence that risk-adjusted AMI mortality rates rose in 
New Jersey after deregulation of hospital prices, indicating a decline in care quality in response 
to greater price competition - although no evidence is given that demand elasticity rose and prices 
actually fell post-deregulation. Interestingly, Haas-Wilson (1994) identifies a trade-off between 
competition on price and observable aspects of quality only, with providers supplying higher 
observable quality at higher prices (and vice versa). On the contrary, no trade-off is found between 
price and less observable technical care quality. This chapter develops this literature by allowing 
for both varying degrees of informational asymmetry in care quality and varying levels of de facto 
price competition for patients (by exogenously varying the patient’s insurance cover). In doing 
so, it provides new evidence on the effect of varying providers’ cost (price) competition on their 
choices of both observable and more hidden aspects of care quality inputs and subsequent outputs.   
Lastly, this chapter adds to the growing literature using SPs for evaluating the clinical quality of 
care (Beullens et al., 1997; Glassman et al., 2000; Rethans et al., 2007) - more recently, also 
within LMIC settings (Das and Gertler, 2007; Mohanan et al., 2012; Das and Hammer, 2014; 
Daniels et al., 2017). A closely related work to the present one is Das et al.(2016)’s use of SPs to 
study the influence of market incentives on the care quality of dual-practice physicians in India. 
The authors find that, for the same clinical case, the same doctors deliver better quality care in 
their private practices relative to their public ones. While this and other studies shed light on the 
average quality of care in their respective settings, very few exploit the potential for SPs to be 
used within field experiments, to evaluate the effects of different patient and situational factors 
on providers’ care quality responses. Even in the few experimental SP studies that examine 
providers’ therapeutic choices, corresponding effects on non-contracted aspects of care quality 
(including clinical effort and diagnostic accuracy) are rarely evaluated. 180  Building on these 
works, this chapter presents novel field-experimental evidence on the effects of patient insurance 
on a richer set of care quality measures.  
 
180 Some exceptions are Currie, Lin and Zhang (2011), Currie, Lin and Meng (2014), and Daniels et al. (2019). However, the first two 
studies consider only a very limited set of clinical effort indicators and do not consider diagnostic accuracy. 
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5.3 Experimental Methods and Data 
5.3.1 Experimental design 
To identify the causal effect of patient insurance at the physician-level, the experiment employed 
a within-subject, audit study approach, where each participating physician received two incognito 
visits from SPs with different levels of insurance cover. The SPs were either ‘high-insured’ (with 
a high level of medical savings to finance their primary care expenditures) or ‘low-insured’ 
patients (with a low level of medical savings).181 These SPs corresponded to either Patient Role 
A (low-insured) or Patient Role B (high-insured), as described in Section 4.3.1.2. The within-
subject experiment design exposes the same physicians to both types of insurance cover, and 
hence controls for any physician-level heterogeneity that might confound the estimated insurance 
effect on the average physician. To ensure that the difference in financial protection (likelihood 
of OOP expenditure) between the two SP types was credible, the SPs were provided with formal 
insurance cover from an insurance company that contracts with all participating physicians. 
Physicians would therefore be aware of the type and level of insurance cover attributable to each 
SP type. The SPs also indicated the extent of their financial protection in their opening statements 
to physicians, to emphasise this difference (see Table 4.4). 
The order in which the two SPs present to physicians may also confound the estimated insurance 
effect (generating ‘order effects’). For one, the likelihood of physicians detecting a fake patient 
may be higher with the SP that presents second, as both SPs presented with the same clinical case 
and script (differing only in their insurance cover) within just a few days of each other. Similarly, 
there may be learning effects, whereby physicians perform better in treating the second SP due to 
having encountered a very similar patient just a few days before. To minimise these potential 
effects, the order in which the two SP types presented to each physician was randomised, and at 
least a two-day gap was maintained between the two SP visits.182 It was also possible to control 
for the visit order in the regression analyses of the following sections, to ensure robustness of the 
main results to these potential confounders.  
Similarly, the audit study approach controls for all patient- and case-specific confounders, and 
the potential for selective matching of certain types of patients with certain physicians. By fixing 
the clinical case, it also allows better measurement of the quality of care provided during 
physician-patient interactions. For clean identification of the insurance effect, it was necessary to 
 
181 The annual medical savings available to the ‘high-insured’ patient was over 75% higher than that available to the ‘low-insured’ 
one. See Appendix B.3 for a brief overview of the insurance covers of the two SPs. 
182 87% of sample GPs received their two SP visits within 2-7 days of each other. For most remaining GPs, due to consultation 
scheduling delays, paired visits were conducted with a 7-14 day gap. The maximum 14-day visit gap was exceeded in one exceptional 
case, where a sample GP received his paired visits with a 26-day gap (due to being on leave within that period).  
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have otherwise identical SP visits except for the patient’s insurance cover. One concern is that 
there may be individual fieldworker effects, mediating physicians’ observed responses to patient 
insurance. It was not possible to pool individual fieldworkers and insurance covers in this 
experiment, as formal insurance cover had to be bought individually for each fieldworker. 
Fieldworkers were therefore assigned to just one insurance cover and SP role each (high- or low-
insured). It is possible that the fieldworkers assigned to one insurance cover may be very different 
from those assigned to the other. Even if fieldworkers assigned to the two insurance covers were 
balanced ex ante, they may behave differently ex post (during their visits) conditional on their 
insurance assignment. To control for both ex ante and ex post fieldworker variations across the 
two SP types seen by the same physician, each fieldworker was first matched with another of the 
opposite insurance cover based on physical characteristics, age and gender, to form fixed 
fieldworker-pairs. Each physician was then randomly assigned to visits by a unique fieldworker-
pair. It is then possible to control for fieldworker-pair fixed effects in the regression models 
estimating the main insurance effect.183 In addition, all fieldworkers were trained extensively to 
follow a standardised script and visit protocol, to minimise variations in presentation (see Section 
4.1.2 for details on SP training). A detailed discussion of the SP methodology and visits 
procedures used in this experiment is provided in Sections 4.1 and 4.3.1.2.  
Although the SP method standardises the presentation of patient characteristics that may confound 
the insurance effect, one limitation is that physicians’ may still infer those characteristics based 
on the patient’s insurance cover. As patients would usually opt into higher insurance cover, and 
only specific types of highly-paid jobs would provide the generous cover held by the high-insured 
patient (if the patient did not pay for it themselves), the physician may infer certain characteristics 
of individual patients, such as their socioeconomic status or their health-risk preferences, from 
the comprehensiveness of their insurance cover. While this cannot be controlled for, I ensure to 
some extent that any inferences made by physicians on patients’ socio-economic status will not 
be too dissimilar across the two insurance covers (e.g. one rich and one poor), as the low-insurance 
cover used in this experiment is still a highly comprehensive insurance product and a premium 
option for average South Africans.   
5.3.2 Physician sampling and participation 
The sampling and recruitment procedures used in this experiment are detailed in Section 4.3.1.1. 
Briefly, a total of 112 GPs were recruited into the study, of which 89 were successfully visited by 
 
183 As each fieldworker was assigned to a specific insurance cover, including both individual fieldworker fixed effects and the 
insurance variable in the statistical model may lead to a high degree of co-linearity. Fieldworker-pair fixed effects are good alternatives 
to control for any fieldworker bias in the estimated insurance effect, whilst avoiding the co-linearity issue. In the cluster fixed effects 
model, the inclusion of physician-level fixed effects effectively controls for fieldworker-pair effects that do not vary within-physician. 
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both SP insurance types. This resulted in a final study sample of 178 consultation visits. GPs were 
sampled from a population of non-dispensing physicians in Johannesburg (n=614), of whom 271 
were deemed eligible for the study. GPs were eligible if they were contracted into private health 
insurance schemes and were non-specialist physicians. Individual GPs were then contacted at 
random for participation in the study. Of the 208 GPs successfully contacted, 112 consented to 
participation. The ethical requirement to obtain informed consent from all participating GPs 
means the final study sample is not entirely random. Although GPs were randomly sampled for 
invitation to the study (from the pool of eligible GPs), some level of selection bias is inevitable 
in those that consented and those that were successfully visited by SPs. While this does not affect 
the internal validity of study results, it is likely to limit its external validity. As the care quality of 
GPs that refused participation is not observed, I am unable to verify the extent of this bias. Table 
4.5 (Columns (2) and (3)) compares basic socio-demographic characteristics of GPs in the study 
sample to those of the non-dispensing GP population in Johannesburg. The sample and sampling 
population are comparable in the average age of GPs (49 and 50 years, respectively), and the 
share of GPs located in the wealthier northern suburbs of Sandton and Randburg (43%, compared 
to 44% in the sampling population). However, the study sample has a slightly higher 
representation of male GPs (52%, compared to 47%). 
Interviews with sample GPs were carried out following the experiment, to collect additional data 
on GPs’ socio-demographic and practice characteristics. These interviews were also used to 
obtain measures of GPs’ personal attributes, including individual altruism (through a dictator 
game), clinical knowledge (through a short quiz), and beliefs pertaining to the prescription of 
antibiotics. While all 89 GPs successfully visited in the experiment were invited to interview, 9 
GPs refused to participate,184 and 5 GPs were either not reached or did not confirm an interview 
time before the end of February 2019 when the interviews were concluded. This resulted in a sub-
sample of 75 GPs with whom both the experiment and the interviews were successfully 
completed. The data collected from interviews inform secondary, sub-sample analyses of interest. 
The validity of these secondary results could be threatened if GPs that refused to be interviewed 
were systematically different from GPs that did not.  Using care quality data from the SP visits, 
Appendix C.1 shows that participation in interviews was not meaningfully associated with any 
care quality outcome of interest. The first panel of Appendix C.1 also shows no meaningful 
association between GPs’ basic socio-demographic characteristics and their likelihood of 
participation.  
 
184 The GPs that refused to participate in the interviews mainly cited times pressures, as 30 minutes was requested during their work 
hours to complete the interview. 
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5.3.3 Sample characteristics 
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics on study sample characteristics. As stated earlier, the 
average age of sample GPs is 49 years, 52% are male, and approximately 43% have practices 
located in the wealthier northern suburbs. Moreover, the average GP’s practice has 7.5 other 
competing GPs located within a kilometre radius. Table 5.1 also summarises additional 
characteristics for the interviewed sub-sample of 75 GPs. A large majority of these GPs are white 
(63%) and only 16% are black-African (or mixed race).  GPs of Asian or Indian origin are the 
second largest racial grouping in the sample (21%). A majority of sample GPs work in group 
practices (55%), and they report seeing an average 22 patients a day (based on the previous week’s 
patient load). For a measure of GP altruism, the share of a R300 cash endowment that each GP 
chose to donate to a patient charity during the interview’s dictator game was calculated (see 
Section 4.2.3), and “altruistic” (or “high-altruism”) GPs were categorised as those that donated a 
share at or above the sample median. Notably, a large majority of GPs (63%) chose to donate the 
full amount. Hence, only the GPs that donated the full R300 were categorised as “altruistic.”  
As a measure of GPs’ clinical knowledge, the average score in the interview’s knowledge quiz is 
shown, indicating diagnostic and therapeutic knowledge on a number of respiratory infections 
(see Section 4.2.3 for details on the knowledge quiz contents). On average, GPs scored 
approximately 7 out of a maximum 11 points. On the questions that specifically covered the 
clinical case presented by SPs in this experiment (an uncomplicated case of acute bronchitis), 
only 19% of GPs were able to accurately name the case as “acute bronchitis” when presented in 
vignette-form. However, a large majority (83% of GPs) correctly identified its likely viral cause, 
which is perhaps more important in determining appropriate treatment (non-prescription of 
antibiotics). Indeed, this is reflected in a relatively low perceived effectiveness of antibiotics for 
the vignette case: on average, GPs felt there was only a 25% likelihood that the case would resolve 
more quickly with antibiotic treatment. Contrarily, in a question that specifically asked for the 
recommended treatment for a named uncomplicated acute bronchitis case (revealing the 
diagnosis), 75% of GPs chose antibiotic treatment. This discrepancy suggests there may be some 
confusion among GPs on what “acute bronchitis” is, or how it presents.185 186 GPs seem relatively 
 
185 This discrepancy may also present if GPs disagreed with treatment guidelines (as known to them). They may choose antibiotic 
treatment as the guideline recommendation for acute bronchitis (when the diagnosis is named) because they have poor knowledge of 
treatment guidelines (even if they understand what “acute bronchitis” is, when named). At the same time, they may report a low 
perceived effectiveness of antibiotics for the case simply because they disagree with (their incorrect knowledge of) the guidelines.  
186 There are some limitations to the therapeutic knowledge questions in the quiz. Firstly, when asking GPs to identify recommended 
treatments for specific cases, the quiz named the case (e.g. “acute bronchitis” in an otherwise healthy adult) but did not provide a 
description of the case presentation (as in the diagnostic knowledge questions, where the case was described in vignette-form). This 
makes it difficult to understand if GPs were able to correctly link named diagnoses (e.g. “acute bronchitis”) to their actual clinical 
presentations, and therefore to understand if they chose recommended treatments on the basis of known case presentations (which is 
ultimately what would matter for predicting choices in clinical practice). Secondly, some level of reporting error in the therapeutic 
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unable to characterise the (vignette-form) case presentation as “acute bronchitis” or identify the 
recommended treatment for a case so-named. However, this does not affect their ability to identify 
the presentation’s likely viral cause, nor prevent them from holding relatively accurate beliefs 
about the effectiveness of antibiotics for the case.  
Table 5.1. Summary statistics – physician-level characteristics 
   Mean SD 
a. Socio-demographic characteristics  
  
Age* 49 (11.27) 
Male* 0.52 (0.50) 
Black/Coloured 0.16 (0.33) 
Asian/Indian 0.21 (0.41) 
White 0.63 (0.49) 
b. Personal characteristics   
Altruism: is (highly) altruistic 0.63 (0.49) 
Knowledge: correctly named clinical case in vignette 0.19 (0.39) 
Knowledge: correctly identified viral cause of clinical case in vignette 0.83 (0.38) 
Knowledge: correctly identified treatment guidelines for acute bronchitis  0.25 (0.44) 
Knowledge: overall clinical knowledge score (max. 11) 7.35 (1.56) 
Knowledge: AMR knowledge score (max. 5) 3.80 (1.02) 
Antibiotic beliefs: efficacy for clinical case in vignette1 25.16 (30.05) 
Antibiotic beliefs: prescribing norms for clinical case in vignette2 62 (26.51) 
Antibiotic beliefs: patient expectations for clinical case in vignette3 53.73 31.74 
c. Practice characteristics   
Is in a northern suburb* 0.43 (0.50) 
Local GP density (no. competing GPs within 1 km radius)* 7.45 (5.61) 
Average daily patient load (previous week) 22.15 (11.75) 
Is a group practice 0.55 (0.50) 
Observations 75  
Notes: Most data presented here are taken from the GP interviews conducted with participants in Part 1 of this study 
(see Section 4.2.3 and Appendix B.4). * The average age, share of male GPs, share of GPs located in the northern 
suburbs of Sandton and Randburg, and the measure of local GP density were calculated using data from the online 
medical practitioner database Medpages, for the full sample of 89 GPs. These four measures therefore have 89 
observations (not 75). See Section 4.2.3 for further details on how certain listed GP characteristics were measured.  
1 GPs were firstly asked what was the likelihood (between 0 and 100, with 100 indicating certainty) that the patient in 
the vignette case would recover faster with antibiotics (rather than without). 2 They were then were asked how likely 
it was that other GPs would prescribe antibiotics to the patient in the vignette case. 3 Lastly, GPs were asked how 
likely it was that the patient would go to another GP the next time they needed medical attention if they did not 
receive antibiotic for the case.  
 
Moreover, GPs actual antibiotic prescribing practices may be determined by more than just their 
clinical knowledge (or beliefs) on indicated treatments. Firstly, their perceptions about the risks 
of inappropriate antibiotic prescribing, in the context of growing anti-microbial resistance 
(AMR), may play a role. On this, GPs were generally well informed about AMR and its 
 
knowledge quiz results is possible: these therapeutic knowledge questions were not incentivised monetarily (unlike the diagnostic 
knowledge questions that preceded them in the quiz), which may distort physicians’ motivations in correctly reporting knowledge. 
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challenges, with the average GP scoring approximately 4 out of 5 points on a short knowledge 
quiz specifically covering AMR. Secondly, perceived social norms can also play a role. The quiz 
explored how GPs perceived peer norms and patient expectations in prescribing antibiotics for 
the vignette case, and revealed relatively pro-antibiotic perceived norms: the average GP felt there 
was a 62% likelihood that other GPs would prescribe antibiotics for the vignette case (of 
uncomplicated acute bronchitis), and a 54% likelihood that patients would seek care elsewhere 
next time they fall ill if they were not given antibiotics for the same case.  
5.3.4 Care quality outcomes 
As described in Section 4.2.1, this study evaluates three aspects of care quality during physician-
patient interactions, covering both physicians’ (observed) care inputs and subsequent care quality 
outputs. Table 5.2 shows summary statistics for the care quality outcomes measured in SP visits.  
First, observed measures of physicians’ clinical effort are evaluated, including the consultation 
duration, and the raw proportion of the essential and recommended history-taking and 
examination checklist completed.187 This checklist was compiled by a panel of clinical experts, 
and designed to enable physicians to differentiate respiratory conditions of varying severity and 
overlapping symptoms. The average SP consultation lasted 10 minutes. In this time, physicians 
completed an average 49% of the essential and recommended care checklist, including 67% of all 
essential examinations and 45% of all essential history-taking. 
Table 5.2. Summary statistics – care quality outcomes 
   Mean SD 
a. Diagnostic effort 
  
Consultation length, in mins. 10.46 (5.48) 
Share of history-taking and examination checklist completed 0.49 (0.13) 
Share of essential examinations completed 0.67 (0.20) 
Share of essential history-taking completed 0.45 (0.17) 
IRT score 0.00 (0.89) 
b. Diagnosis   
Gave a correct or partially correct diagnosis 0.53 (0.50) 
c. Treatment   
Prescribed an antibiotic 0.57 (0.50) 
Prescribed other inappropriate drugs 0.94 (0.23) 
Gave appropriate follow-up advice 0.61 (0.49) 
   
Observations 178  
Notes: All consultation outcomes were measured using data collected from the post-consultation SP debriefing 
questionnaire (see Appendix B.4 for an overview of the questionnaire content). For further details on how these 
outcomes were measured, refer to Section 4.2.1. 
 
187 See Section 4.2.1 for details on how all care quality outcomes were constructed. 
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A composite index score using IRT analysis is also computed, weighting completed checklist 
items by their relative value in differentiating among physicians of different levels and quality of 
observed effort. See Section 4.2.1 and Appendix B.6 for a brief overview of IRT analysis and its 
underlying assumptions.188  Appendix C.2 lists the checklist items included in this chapter’s 
analysis and their corresponding results.189 The listed parameter estimates are used to weight the 
checklist items completed and predict a unique IRT score for each consultation. Figure 5.1 shows 
the distribution of this IRT score in the study sample. By construction, the distribution of the score 
is centred at a mean of 0, and individual IRT score values are interpreted as standard deviations 
(SD) from the mean. All IRT scores in this sample fall within approximately 2.25 SD of the mean.  
 
Figure 5.1. Sample distribution of predicted IRT scores  
 
188 One assumption necessary for IRT analysis is a uni-dimensional latent space. In other words, responses to all items included in the 
IRT score must reflect only one latent trait: provider effort. To validate this, the eigenvalues from exploratory factor analysis of items 
included in the score were checked, and the first eigenvalue is almost twice as large as the second one (while the differences between 
others are significantly smaller). This supports a single factor solution, and the assumption of uni-dimensionality. 
189 Not all items from the essential and recommended care checklists were included in the IRT analysis, for two reasons. First, some 
items were completed only in a few consultations, and those completed in less than 5% of cases were excluded following Das and 
Hammer (2005), to ensure convergence of the maximum likelihood function used in the analysis. In particular, history-taking questions 
about fast breathing (tachypnea) or palpitations were asked in only 2% of consultations, and therefore excluded from the IRT score. 
Second, the validity of the IRT analysis requires that individual items are conditionally independent of each other. However, some 
items in the checklist had clear overlap. For instance, whether a physician asks the history-taking question on “coughing up blood” 
may depend on whether he had already asked the patient about a “productive cough”, and the question on “any allergies” may preclude 
the specific question on “allergy to penicillin.” In such cases, the overlapping items were combined into a single item that was indicated 
as completed if any of the combined items had been completed. 
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Following physicians’ effort inputs, the second aspect of care quality evaluated is their diagnostic 
output: whether the diagnosis given to the patient was correct or partially-correct.190 A diagnosis 
was given in almost all consultations (> 99%); and physicians gave a correct of partially-correct 
diagnosis in 53% of these cases.  
The final aspect of care quality evaluated is the appropriateness of physicians’ therapeutic outputs. 
One indicator of this is whether any unnecessary antibiotic was prescribed for the clinical case. 
Comparable to other studies in China and India (Das and Hammer, 2007; Currie et al., 2014), I 
find a high average rate of inappropriate antibiotic prescribing for an uncomplicated viral 
infection: an antibiotic was prescribed in 57% of all consultations. As shown in Appendix D.1, 
the most commonly prescribed antibiotic groups were broad-spectrum penicillins (or penicillin-
clavulanates) and macrolides. Note that this rate of inappropriate prescribing is much higher than 
that predicted by GPs’ beliefs about the likely effectiveness of antibiotics for this clinical case 
when presented in vignette-form during interviews (see Table 5.1): the average GP believed that 
the patient had only a 25% likelihood of recovering quicker with antibiotics. These results appear 
in line with common findings of a ‘know-do gap’ in the literature (Das and Gertler, 2007; Leonard 
and Masatu, 2010; Gertler and Vermeersch, 2013), where physicians’ care quality performance 
in practice is shown to be lower than that indicated by measures of their knowledge. One 
explanation for this discrepancy, as noted earlier, is GPs’ perceptions of relatively strong 
prescribing norms and patient expectations for antibiotics for the same case (when presented in 
vignette-form).191 
Another indicator evaluated is whether any other inappropriate drugs - including steroids, nasal 
decongestants, bronchodilators, antihistamines or vitamins - were prescribed. The results show 
that this occurred in a very large proportion of consultations (94%). Appendix D.1 shows that the 
prescription of steroids was particularly common, occurring in 60% of all consultations. These 
rates of inappropriate treatment are also much higher than the rate of incorrect diagnoses, 
suggesting that an accurate (pronounced) diagnosis is unlikely to be sufficient for correct 
 
190 See Appendix B.1 for a list of diagnoses considered correct or partially correct. Further details on how the diagnosis measures of 
care quality were constructed are provided in Section 4.2.1. A strictly ‘correct’ diagnosis required the doctor to communicate the 
diagnosis in exact technical terms to the patient (i.e. “acute bronchitis” or “bronchitis”). The limitation here is that what the physician 
tells the patient regarding their diagnosis may be simplified (for instance, given expected limitations to the patient’s medical 
knowledge). Hence, a ‘partially-correct’ diagnosis allowed for some generality in the communicated diagnosis (such as “chest cold”) 
and for select similar diagnoses (such as “tracheitis” or “post nasal drip”). This chapter accordingly combines both outcomes in its 
analysis of diagnostic accuracy. Such considerations were taken into account also in coding specific diagnoses, particularly with 
regards to local colloquial terminology. One example was in coding a “flu” diagnosis. In strict medical terms, this is incorrect. 
However, acute bronchitis is usually preceded by flu-like symptoms; and discussions with local medical practitioners highlighted that, 
in the South African context, doctors often do not make a distinction between “flu” and “cold” in communicating diagnoses to patients. 
Accordingly, no distinction was made in coding “flu” and “cold,” and both were coded as partially-correct if they were combined with 
a bronchitis or similar diagnosis (since a cold preceded the acute bronchitis according to the case history). 
191 This mirrors qualitative findings elsewhere that anticipated patient expectations do influence providers’ reported treatment choices 
– particularly under market competition - even where they know those choices are clinically inappropriate (Das and Hammer, 2007). 
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treatment. This may demonstrate physicians’ uncertainty around their pronounced diagnoses, 
which they compensate for by prescribing different, non-clinically indicated drugs. As discussed 
before, it may also indicate a ‘know-do’ gap influenced by other non-clinical factors in treatment 
choices – such as norms or habits, and anticipated patient demands.192 Lastly, the appropriateness 
of any advice to the patient to come back for a repeat consultation is evaluated: in 61% of 
consultations, physicians appropriately advised patients to return for a repeat consultation if 
symptoms worsen.  
5.4 Empirical Framework 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to estimate differences in physicians’ care quality 
performance for low-insured and high-insured patients. To identify the impact of patient 
insurance, I must estimate the following: 
𝑄𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                 (1)   
where each quality measure 𝑄 from consultation 𝑖 with physician 𝑗 is regressed on an indicator 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 which equals 1 if the patient in consultation 𝑖 is high-insured (and 0 otherwise).
193 
𝛽1 measures the insurance effect of interest. It is unnecessary to control for other physician-level 
covariates to obtain unbiased estimates of 𝛽1: as the same physicians are observed under both 
levels of 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 , these physician-level covariates are balanced across the two levels. 
Estimating this equation with pooled OLS requires the assumption that the error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑗 are 
independent and identically-distributed (constant variance). However, the within-subject study 
design, where each physician is observed twice (under each patient insurance cover), means 
observations of the same physician (and corresponding error terms) are likely to be correlated. 
This potential clustering of data at the physician level must be accounted for, to avoid under-
estimating the likelihood of type-I errors (false positives) and allow robust inference. Four 
methods are commonly proposed for handling cluster-correlated data, and the optimal approach 
is largely study-dependent (and to some extent, subject to disciplinary preferences (McNeish and 
Kelley, 2019)). These include a paired-sample t-test (‘response simplification’); an OLS model 
with a (physician-level) cluster-robust variance estimator; a (physician-level) cluster fixed effects 
model; and a linear mixed effects model (LMEM), where individual physicians are treated as 
random (rather than fixed) effects (Cameron and Miller, 2015).  
 
192 These findings on the relatively low diagnostic accuracy and high prevalence of inappropriate treatment on average align with 
Hypothesis 3 in Chapter 3, which posits that appropriate effort will in general be under-supplied (and related inappropriate treatment 
oversupplied) relative to what is in any patient’s best interests (due to the contractibility problem with respect to appropriate effort). 
193 For ease of interpretation, only linear regression models are used to obtain the main results, although robustness checks with logistic 
regression models are later carried out for all binary outcomes.   
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Appendix C.3 gives an overview of these four approaches, and their relative strengths and 
limitations. In general, the three linear regression approaches (OLS with cluster-robust standard 
errors, cluster fixed effects, and LMEM) are preferred to the paired-sample t-test, given their 
ability to control for potential confounders of the insurance effect - including any fieldworker-
pair effects.194 195 I estimate the main results in the following section using the cluster fixed effects 
model,196 with and without a cluster-robust variance estimator. Subsequent sub-sample analyses 
are conducted using linear OLS with the cluster-robust variance estimator (and including 
fieldworker-pair fixed effects), as the inclusion of physician fixed effects prevents estimation of 
physician-level covariate effects. To check the sensitivity of main results to the estimation 
approach, corresponding results from a paired-sample t-test and the LMEM with random intercept 
and slope are shown in Appendices C.5 and C.6.197  
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Effects of patient insurance cover on care quality outcomes 
5.5.1.1 Observed clinical effort 
Table 5.3 shows estimates of the insurance effect on observed measures of clinical effort. Panel 
A presents results from a fixed effects model with normal standard errors, whilst Panel B shows 
estimates from the same model with the addition of a cluster-robust variance estimator. All results 
are shown to be robust across the two specifications.  
Column (1) shows that the average consultation time for low-insured patients was 10.34 minutes, 
and this is not significantly different for high-insured ones. Similarly, there is no difference in the 
raw proportion of essential and recommended care checklist items completed by insurance cover 
(Column (2)): for both SP types, physicians completed just under 50% of all checklist items. 
 
 
194 The cluster fixed effects model is preferred to the LMEM due to its ease of specification, and the need for fewer assumptions for 
valid inference. Moreover, it automatically controls for all fixed physician-level confounders of the insurance effect without need for 
explicit specification of these confounders as model covariates. These include fieldworker-pair effects, as fieldworker-pairs are fixed 
for each physician. The use of a cluster-robust variance estimator is also feasible with this model, given the relatively large number 
of clusters (89 sample physicians). 
195 Fieldworker pair effects must be explicitly controlled for in the LMEM and marginal model through the inclusion of fieldworker-
pair fixed effects. However, they will be automatically controlled for in the cluster fixed effects model in this study context. 
196 The cluster fixed effects model is estimated through the mean-differencing method (applying linear OLS to the mean-differenced 
version of (2)), as suggested by Cameron and Miller (2010). The model is also estimated including the cluster-robust variance 
estimator, to account for any residual within-cluster correlation (Arellano, 1987). 
197 The LMEM specification includes the cluster-robust variance estimator (to correct for potential bias in the variance estimates of 
𝛽1 from misspecification of the covariance structure (Liang and Zeger, 1986)) and fieldworker-pair fixed effects. An independent 
variance-covariance structure is assumed, as with the default case for the mixed command in STATA 15. 
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Table 5.3. Effect of insurance cover on diagnostic effort 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    Consultation 
length 
Checklist 
completion 
Essential 
exams 
Essential 
history 
IRT score 
Panel A: provider-level fixed effects      
High-insured 0.24 0.02 0.05** 0.03 0.22** 
  (0.80) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) 
Obs. 178 178 178 178 178 
R-squared  0.00 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 
      
Panel B: provider-level fixed effects & cluster-
robust standard errors      
High-insured 0.24 0.02 0.05** 0.03 0.22** 
  (0.81) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) 
Obs. 178 178 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 
      
Mean of low-insured 10.34 0.48 0.65 0.43 -0.11 
      
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Panel A presents estimates from a fixed effects (mean-differenced) model estimated with 
linear OLS model. Panel B shows results from a fixed effects model, as in Panel A, with the addition of a cluster-robust variance 
estimator.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When evaluated on the IRT score however, physicians scored 0.22 standard deviations (SD) 
higher when treating high-insured patients compared to low-insured ones (Column (5)), indicating 
a relatively small positive effect of insurance cover on clinical effort. This effect is still substantial 
in comparison to those reported for interventions considered to be successful in the literature: 
Gertler and Vermeersch (2013), for example, find that the introduction of performance pay in 
Rwanda increased a standardised clinical effort score by 0.13 SD. The effect of patients’ insurance 
cover is found here to be almost 70% larger.198 Figure 5.2 displays the cumulative distribution 
functions of the IRT scores for high- and low-insured patients. The two functions are shown to 
diverge noticeably for IRT scores above the mean: the distribution for high-insured patients 
dominates that for low-insured patients for all IRT scores in this range.  
Isolating only the essential examination items from the full care checklist,199 Column (3) of Table 
5.3 shows that physicians completed a slightly higher share of essential examinations for high-
insured patients (70% compared to 65% for low-insured), although the magnitude of the effect is 
very small and translates into just 0.3 more examinations per patient in absolute terms. No 
significant differences are detected in essential history-taking.200  
 
198 While consultation time is not found to differ by patient insurance cover, it is still positively correlated with the IRT score (although 
to a small extent): a one standard deviation increase in consultation time is associated with an increase of 0.06 standard deviations in 
the IRT score (see Table Column (1) of Appendix C.7). 
199 ‘Essential’ history-taking and examinations were those categorised by a panel of clinical experts to be crucial among all checklist 
items for enabling physicians to rule out more severe respiratory illnesses with overlapping symptoms to those of the clinical case in 
this study. 
200 Looking at individual checklist items, Appendix C.4 shows that physicians were significantly more likely to perform a number of 
essential history-taking and examination items for high-insured patients compared to low-insured ones. For instance, in conducting 
essential history-taking on possible night sweats or the patient’s TB history, physicians were almost twice as likely to successfully 
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Figure 5.2. Cumulative distribution of checklist completion, by patient insurance type 
5.5.1.2 Diagnosis & Treatment 
Table 5.4 presents estimates of the insurance effect on diagnosis and treatment outcomes, and 
follows the same format as Table 5.3. A diagnosis was communicated to patients in almost all 
consultations in this experiment (177 of 178 consultations). This contrasts with Das et al. (2016)’s 
SP audit study of private providers in India, where only 43% of providers offered a diagnosis to 
patients presenting with unstable angina or asthma. Conditional on pronouncing a diagnosis, 
however, physicians’ diagnostic accuracy was significantly poorer for high-insured patients. 
Column (1) of Table 5.4 reports that physicians offered a correct or partially-correct diagnosis to 
46% of high-insured patients, compared to 60% of low-insured ones - indicating a 23% lower 
likelihood of an accurate diagnosis for high-insured patients. 
Columns (2)-(4) of Table 5.4 report the estimated insurance effect on treatment outcomes. The 
main treatment outcome of interest in this study is the prescription of antibiotics. As stated 
previously, antibiotics are not recommended for the uncomplicated acute bronchitis case 
presented in this experiment; and yet, an antibiotic was prescribed in 57% of all SP consultations. 
Moreover, Column (2) indicates that high-insured patients were 24% more likely to receive 
inappropriate antibiotic treatment compared to low-insured ones (63% vs. 51%). No significant 
 
complete these items with high-insured patients. A notable exception is asking about a penicillin allergy, which is essential when 
prescribing penicillin-based antibiotics: physicians were 40% less likely to ask about this with high-insured patients when prescribing 
an antibiotic (despite an equivalent prevalence of penicillin among prescribed antibiotics for both insurance types), indicating poorer 
safety in prescribing practices for these patients – see Section 5.5.1.2. 
 117 
 
differences are detected in the likelihood of prescribing other inappropriate drugs (including 
steroids, bronchodilators, antihistamines, etc.) by patient insurance type (see Column (3)). 
Table 5.4. Effect of insurance cover on diagnoses & treatment outputs 
 
The higher likelihood of antibiotic treatment for high-insured patients coincides with a 
significantly lower likelihood of being asked about any penicillin allergies by the prescribing 
physician (see Appendix C.4). This is despite penicillin and penicillin-clavulanates being the most 
frequently prescribed antibiotic groups (see Appendix D.1) and being no less prevalent in 
prescriptions for high-insured patients compared to low-insured ones. Conditional on being 
prescribed an antibiotic, high-insured patients were almost 40% less likely to be asked about 
penicillin allergies than low-insured ones.201 This suggests that high-insured patients are more 
susceptible to both inappropriate antibiotic treatment and poorer safety in prescribing practices. 
Appendix C.7 indicates that pronouncing a correct or partially-correct diagnosis cannot predict 
the likelihood of antibiotic prescribing (see Columns (5) and (6)), echoing results from the 
knowledge quiz in the provider interviews.202 However, checklist completion has a negative 
 
201 Among physicians that prescribed an antibiotic to both insurance types, 37% asked high-insured patients about a penicillin allergy, 
compared to 61% that asked low-insured patients the same question. 
202 In the quiz question that asked about recommended treatment for an uncomplicated case of acute bronchitis, physicians were 
explicitly told what the diagnosis was, and yet 75% chose inappropriate antibiotic treatment for the case. As stated previously in 
Section 5.3.3, this may be due to confusion among GPs about the actual presentation of “acute bronchitis” (the quiz question did not 
provide a description of the case presentation, alongside the diagnosis name). Alternatively, this may lend support to two arguments 
in Chapter 3: i) that, in addition to the (diagnostic) clinical effort necessary to arrive at a correct diagnosis, physicians must exert 
further therapeutic effort to identify correct, clinically-indicated treatments for that diagnosis; or ii) that there are alternative drivers 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    Correct / 
partially-
correct 
diagnosis 
Antibiotic 
Other 
inappropriate 
drugs 
Appropriate 
follow-up 
advice 
Panel A: provider-level fixed effects      
High-insured -0.14* 0.12** 0.04 0.21*** 
  (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) 
Obs. 177 178 178 178 
R-squared  0.04 0.05 0.03 0.10 
     
Panel B: provider-level fixed effects & cluster-robust 
standard errors 
 
   
High-insured -0.14* 0.12** 0.04 0.21*** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) 
Obs. 177 178 178 178 
R-squared  0.04 0.05 0.03 0.10 
     
Mean of low-insured 0.60 0.51 0.92 0.51 
   
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Panel A presents estimates from a fixed effects (mean-differenced) model. Panel B shows 
results from a fixed effects model, as in Panel A, with the addition of a cluster-robust variance estimator. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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association: a one SD increase in the IRT score is associated with a 13 percentage point decrease 
in the likelihood of antibiotic prescribing. This suggests that the slightly higher IRT score for 
high-insured patients may be attenuating the difference in antibiotic prescribing by insurance 
type; although, the IRT score difference (0.22 SD) is perhaps too small to fully eliminate the 
difference in inappropriate treatment.203   
Lastly, physicians were significantly more likely to give appropriate advice on return visits (i.e. 
to advise the patient to return for a repeat consultation should the symptoms worsen) to high-
insured patients: high-insured patients received this advice in 72% of consultations, compared to 
51% for low-insured patients (Column (3) of Table 5.4). Two contextual observations should be 
noted here. First, while such advice may be beneficial in reassuring the patient, it is by no means 
necessary given the uncomplicated, self-limiting nature of the clinical case. Viral acute bronchitis 
in an otherwise healthy young patient should resolve on its own without any treatment. A 
thorough examination and accurate diagnosis (as well as a physician’s confidence in their 
diagnosis) should therefore negate the need to give such advice. Second, there are clear fee-for-
service (FFS) incentives for physicians in recommending repeat consultations. Therefore, 
communicating such advice may be viewed at least partly in terms of supplier-induced demand 
(discussed further in Chapter 6), rather than as purely care quality. 
5.5.2 Heterogeneous effects 
The differences in care quality outcomes by the level of patient insurance are hypothesised to be 
driven by corresponding differences in physicians’ altruistic and competitive incentives for the 
two patient types. A related question is whether the extent of baseline physician altruism or 
competition can mediate the insurance effect. The predictions in Chapter 3 are ambiguous on this, 
as a number of further assumptions would be needed to draw clear predictions on interaction 
effects. Here, I formally test for interactions between the effects of patient insurance and those of 
baseline physician altruism and competition, respectively. The measure of altruism in this study 
was collected for the sub-sample of 75 GPs who were interviewed following the SP visits (see 
Section 4.3.1.4).204 The two measures of competition employed here were collected for the full 
 
of treatment choices that are unrelated to appropriate effort (including market physicians’ sensitivity to perceived patient expectations, 
perhaps encouraged by prescribing norms).  
203 That GPs are still more likely to prescribe unnecessary antibiotics to high-insured patients (despite the higher IRT score with these 
patients, and the positive association between IRT scores and antibiotic prescribing) again indicates the presence of additional 
treatment drivers that are not captured in measured clinical effort.  
204 14 of the 89 GPs that were successfully visited by SPs were not interviewed, either because they refused to participate due to time 
pressures or because they could not be reached over the interviewing period. While this non-participation does not threaten the validity 
of the main results (as the interviews were used only to collect additional data for secondary and sub-sample analyses), it may affect 
the external validity of secondary analyses if GPs that were interviewed were significantly different from those that were not. However, 
Appendix C.1 shows that the likelihood of non-participation was not meaningfully associated with any of the care quality outcomes 
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sample of 89 GPs from the online Medpages database. Section 4.2.3 details how these measures 
were constructed, and Table 5.1 provides summary statistics for each measure (among other 
measures of GP characteristics). The two locational GP practice characteristics in Table 5.1 are 
taken as indicators of local GP competition (see Section 4.2.3 for further discussion on this). In 
addition to the commonly used competition measure of local competitor density, GP practice 
location in the wealthiest Johannesburg suburbs (the northern suburbs of Sandton and Randburg) 
is considered another potential indicator of low price (cost) competition, given the likely lower 
price sensitivity of the local patient population in these suburbs. 
Results on interaction effects are presented in Appendices C.9 and C.10. There is some evidence 
of a mediating effect of physician competition on the impact of insurance on inappropriate 
prescribing. Appendix C.10 indicates that physicians with a relatively low density of competing 
physicians in their locality had a significantly larger (positive) insurance effect on the likelihood 
of antibiotic prescribing. Physicians in the relatively wealthier northern suburbs of Johannesburg 
were also significantly more likely to prescribe any other inappropriate drugs to high-insured 
patients compared to low-insured ones. 
No significant interaction effects are detected on other care quality outcomes. However, I am 
unable to rule out the presence of any such effects due to the small sample size (150 observations), 
and the lack of sufficient power for reliably detecting small-moderate sized interaction effects. 
Two further limitations to this subsample analyses should be noted. Firstly, the lack of significant 
heterogeneous effects by physician altruism may be due to limited variation in the degree of 
baseline altruism in the study sample. In the dictator game during GP interviews (see Appendix 
B.4), most physicians (63% of the sample) donated their whole cash endowment to a patient 
charity (and were classified as ‘high-altruism’ GPs), and only 12% donated nothing. Secondly, 
there may be some level of measurement error in the indicators of GPs’ competitive pressures. 
Chapter 3 predicts that higher business elasticity (demand response) should affect physicians’ 
treatment quantity and cost decisions. However, the anticipated direction of patients’ demand 
response with respect to different outcomes (in particular, the inappropriate prescription of 
antibiotics) - and the extent to which its magnitude actually varies with the measures of 
competition used here - is unclear. The direction and magnitude of demand responses are likely 
determined by a number of factors, including the corresponding outcome’s alignment with patient 
welfare and preferences, the availability of well-known competitors in the market (alternative 
sources of care), and patients’ ability to recognise care that deviates from their preferences.  
 
measured in this study. Appendix C.1 also shows no notable associations between physicians’ basic socio-demographic characteristics 
and their likelihood of attrition. It is therefore unlikely that attrition is a major concern for the external validity of secondary results.   
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The GP density measure, for instance, indicates the number of alternative sources of care in GPs’ 
localities. Therefore, a higher GP density may be expected to increase demand elasticity. 
However, the extent to which competing alternatives are well-known to patients is unclear. Indeed, 
Satterthwaite (1979) argues that a larger number of alternatives in the market can actually increase 
search costs for the patient, and reduce demand elasticity and patient switching. In addition, the 
direction of any anticipated demand response can vary across different outcomes or patient types. 
For instance, whether higher competitive pressure on GPs results in more or less inappropriate 
prescribing for specific patient types would depend on whether GPs anticipate those patients to 
actually want such inappropriate care. In this case, the extent to which a higher GP density 
captures greater competitive pressure, and how GPs may be expected to respond to such pressure, 
can vary. This potential for measurement error must be noted in interpreting the evidence on 
heterogeneous effects by measures of baseline GP competition.205  
5.5.3 Robustness checks  
As outlined in Section 5.4, a cluster fixed effects model (with and without a cluster-robust 
variance estimator) was employed for estimating the main results, given its relative ease of 
specification and interpretation. Appendices C.5 and C.6 show that all results are robust to a 
simple paired-sample t-test and an alternative LMEM specification with a random intercept and 
slope per physician.  
Appendix C.8 presents results from a number of other robustness checks. Potential SP detection 
during the consultations in this study was a risk, as physicians were informed at recruitment that 
they would receive 2-4 unannounced SP visits over a period of 6 months. An SP detection survey 
was therefore carried out with all participating physicians once the SP visits were completed. 
Section 4.3.1.3 provides further details on the survey and how potential SP detections were 
categorised. While actual detections cannot be verified (as none of the physicians communicated 
any suspicions to the SPs during their consultations), two physicians were classified as having a 
reasonably high likelihood of valid detection based on their responses in the detection survey. 
Table Column (1) of Appendix C.8 checks the robustness of all main results to the exclusion of 
visit observations for these two physicians. The estimated results maintain their significance 
reasonably well for all outcomes.206  
 
205 An additional limitation of these locational measures of GP competition, as noted in Section 4.2.3, is that GPs’ practice location 
decisions are endogenous. 
206 There are marginal changes in the significance of estimated results for the share of essential examinations completed and the IRT 
score. There results nevertheless maintain p-values < 0.07. 
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Although the order of the two SP visits was randomised for each physician, Column (2) explicitly 
controls for the visit order to address any residual order effects driving the main results. All results 
are shown to be robust to this control. While all SP visits were to be paid for through health 
insurance, and physicians were expected to bill the costs to the health insurer directly, in 38 
consultations the SP was asked to pay the physician in cash and claim back from the insurer 
themselves. Cash payment is more immediate than insurance claim reimbursement, and this may 
generate additional treatment incentives for the physician independent of the insurance status of 
the patient. To ensure that potential cash effects do not confound the estimated insurance effect, 
the specification in Column (3) explicitly controls for cash consultations. Again, all results are 
found to be reasonably robust. Lastly, Column (4) shows the robustness of main results for 
continuous outcomes to the exclusion of extreme values (defined as observed values that are 
above or below 3 SD of the sample mean). 
5.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
In utilising an audit study approach and a within-physician experiment design, this chapter 
provides novel field-experimental evidence on the impact of insurance cover on physicians’ care 
quality choices, controlling for both physician- and patient-level heterogeneity. It finds that 
physicians exert more observable effort with high-insured patients (in terms of history-taking, 
examination and communication), but this does not translate into higher quality care outputs: 
physicians are 23% less likely to give a correct or partially-correct diagnosis and 24% more likely 
to give inappropriate antibiotic treatment to high-insured patients compared to low-insured ones. 
The higher rate of antibiotic prescribing also coincides with lower safety in prescribing practices 
for high-insured patients: physicians are 40% less likely to ask these patients about a penicillin 
allergy when prescribing an antibiotic.207 This is despite penicillin being the most frequently 
prescribed type of antibiotic in this study, and despite no differences in the rates of penicillin-
based (versus other) antibiotics prescribed by insurance group.  
These findings are generally supportive of the hypotheses tested in this chapter; that physicians 
prioritise observable effort (patient experience) for high-insured patients who are less cost-
sensitive, but this is not always aligned with appropriate effort that determines the technical 
quality of care outputs (including diagnoses and treatments). The difference in antibiotic 
prescribing is particularly striking, as it occurred despite the absence of any differences in patient 
demand, patient or provider knowledge, or financial incentives attached to drug prescribing - 
 
207 Among the sample of GPs that prescribed an antibiotic to both SP types, 37% asked the high-insured SP about penicillin allergies, 
compared to 61% that asked the low-insured SP. 
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common factors found to influence physicians’ prescribing behaviour in the literature (Currie et 
al., 2014; Lu, 2014). The likelihood of antibiotic prescribing is not significantly associated with 
the accuracy of pronounced diagnoses in this study either; suggesting that diagnostic accuracy is 
also insufficient for appropriate treatment. One explanation for this is that knowing the viral or 
bacterial cause of a disease is perhaps more important in the decision to prescribe an antibiotic 
than accurately naming or describing the disease. 208  Unfortunately, data on the believed 
pathogenic cause of communicated diagnoses was not systematically collected to verify this. A 
second explanation is that anticipated patient demand for antibiotics can play a role – even in the 
absence of actual demand. Qualitative research has shown that providers’ often perceive patients 
to demand unnecessary antibiotics (Das and Hammer, 2007) even in the absence of any (voiced) 
demand (Farley et al., 2018; Manderson, 2019). Moreover, evidence from interviews conducted 
in this study demonstrate that physicians perceive competitive pressures to prescribe antibiotics 
even where they believe it to be likely ineffective. The higher rates of inappropriate prescribing 
for high-insured patients may then be explained by greater anticipated demand for such treatment 
from more financially-protected patients.   
It is interesting to compare these results to Das et al. (2016)’s similar findings of a lack of 
association between observed clinical effort and appropriate treatment in the public and private 
primary care sectors in India: while providers in the private sector were found to exhibit higher 
observed clinical effort than those in the public sector, there was little difference in the quality of 
treatments given. The authors put this down to differences in provider training (public providers 
were more likely to be formally qualified) or earning incentives for inappropriate treatments 
(private providers earn more when they provide inappropriate treatments) off-setting the predicted 
positive association between observed effort and treatment quality. In the present study, these 
explanations do not hold: provider training is controlled for through the within-physician 
experiment design, and physicians have no direct financial incentives attached to drug prescribing 
(they do not dispense drugs or have any pharmacy affiliations).209  
 
208 A related explanation is that what the physician tells the patient (which is where the diagnosis data in this study is collected from) 
may not perfectly capture what the doctor knows (about the pathogenic cause, or otherwise) which is what would influence treatment 
choices. Conscious effort (and some degree of leniency) was given to coding the diagnoses, to account for the possibility of simplified 
patient communication. See Appendix B.1 for a list of communicated diagnoses that were considered correct / partially-correct. 
209 The implication is that separating the prescribing and dispensing functions of physicians (and thereby removing any financial 
incentives attached to prescribing), which has been shown to reduce inappropriate prescribing elsewhere (Chou et al., 2003; Park et 
al., 2005), is likely to be insufficient for eliminating the insurance effect on inappropriate treatment choices altogether. This contrasts 
with Lu (2014)’s finding: physicians in Beijing hospitals were only more likely to prescribe inappropriate treatments to insured patients 
when they received some financial benefit. A key difference is that the physicians in Lu (2014)’s study were all salaried, whereas 
physicians in this study are all paid fee-for-service and subject to market (competitive) incentives. Market incentives to prescribe 
antibiotics may present (even with no direct financial incentives attached) if physicians perceive that it is what patients want and that 
it would increase the likelihood of return visits. These incentives may be greater the more financially-protected the patient.   
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The conflicting effects of patient insurance on observable effort and the quality of care outputs 
may be partly reconciled by considering that not all aspects of physicians’ effort can be observed, 
and that physicians may reasonably infer the cost-sensitivity of patients from their level of 
insurance cover. First, it may be that some important aspects of clinical effort are unobserved, 
such as cognitive effort. If GPs supply more appropriate, cognitive effort to low-insured patients, 
this may offset their lower observable effort, and result in a higher quality of subsequent care 
outputs. This aligns with the notion of observable (physical) effort being necessary but 
insufficient for high-quality care outputs. Second, GPs may reasonably assume that low-insured 
patients are more cost-conscious (given their greater exposure to health expenditure) and more 
aware that poor-quality care outputs are likely to increase avoidable future costs. While care costs 
are considered in greater detail in the next chapter, it is worth noting here that an inappropriate 
antibiotic prescription is associated with an increase of R137 in total drug costs (which represents 
approximately 51% of the average prescription cost in this study (R268)). Inaccurate diagnoses 
can equally increase healthcare expenditures, by increasing the likelihood that patients need 
further diagnostic procedures or care in the future.  
That GPs exert more observable effort for high-insured patients but provide higher quality care 
outputs for low-insured patients is then consistent with both provider altruism toward patients’ 
financial welfare and providers’ competitive incentives to display more observable effort (from 
which patients more easily infer quality) to patients for whom they are less able to compete on 
cost. The latter competitive incentives may be driven by providers’ anticipation of relatively 
higher demand elasticity with respect to observable effort (patient experience) among high-
insured patients, and with respect to cost among low-insured patients. As with the private 
providers in Das et al. (2016), the physicians in this study have clear market incentives to satisfy 
what they believe patients want – even where they know such care is inappropriate.  
Therefore, in a context where physicians are paid FFS, with no payment incentives attached to 
care quality, greater financial protection for patients results in poorer quality outputs from 
physicians - leading to care that is more often not only inappropriate, but also potentially harmful. 
These results have implications for on-going policy efforts in South Africa (SA) and elsewhere, 
to incorporate the private sector in universal health insurance initiatives. The SA government’s 
plans to abolish co-payments in private health insurance schemes, and roll out an NHI system that 
would rely on private GPs, must weigh up the welfare benefits of improved financial protection 
and primary care access for patients (to potentially higher quality care than in the public sector) 
with potential decreases in the average quality of care in the private sector as a result. The related 
public health consequences in a country with already high rates of broad-spectrum antibiotic 
prescribing are equally important (Blaauw and Lagarde, 2019). While this study does not 
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investigate the effects of different payment incentives on physicians’ care quality choices under 
insurance, it is clear that eliminating patient co-payment without some alteration of supply-side 
incentives is likely to be inefficient. The competitive incentives that are argued to partly drive the 
insurance effects estimated in this chapter derive from FFS payment (with no direct incentives 
for care quality), which remains the predominant form of payment in the SA private sector. In 
this context, these insurance effects may be attenuated if the SA government directly contracts 
private GPs in the proposed NHI system under capitation or sessional contracts (rather than 
capped FFS tariffs, which is one of the current proposals). However, other incentives for poorer 
care quality (including cost-saving incentives under capitation, or low competitive incentives for 
effort under sessional contracts) may present instead, and must be controlled for (Zuvekas and 
Cohen, 2010). 210 
An important limitation of this study, which is common among similarly resource-intensive audit 
studies, is the small sample size. This was determined primarily by resource constraints, but 
inevitably results in low statistical power which poses two risks: a higher likelihood of false 
negatives, and a possibility of inflation in estimated effects sizes (Cohen, 1988; Button et al., 
2013). The former issue means I cannot rule out a true effect in some cases where none were 
detected, particularly in the sub-sample analyses that are more demanding in their total sample 
size requirements. The latter issue means that large detected effects, such as the insurance effect 
on antibiotic prescribing, must be interpreted with caution in case of inflation.  
External validity of the findings is a further concern. Ethical considerations mandated full 
informed consent from all research participants, meaning the study sample is not entirely random 
and will have some level of selection bias. While this does not threaten the internal validity of 
study results (given the within-subject experiment design), it does limit their generalizability to 
the full population of private GPs in South Africa. The focus on primary care further limits 
generalizability to secondary care settings, where lapses in care quality may arguably have more 
costly consequences. However, given the centrality of primary care in UHC efforts worldwide, 
as well as in the SA government’s plans to reform the national health system (through a proposed 
gate-keeping system), the focus in this chapter remains highly policy-relevant.  
The single clinical case used in this experiment (uncomplicated acute bronchitis) further 
constrains the generalisability of results to other clinical conditions. This is partially driven by the 
limitations of the SP method, which cannot support conditions with clear, visible symptoms or 
those that would require invasive procedures. Appropriate case management in this clinical case 
 
210 A further concern is the attractiveness of these contracting terms for GPs relative to the current FFS status quo. Preliminary evidence 
from GP contracting under the NHI pilot schemes suggest that moving too far from the current FFS payment terms will be difficult 
(NDoH, 2019).  
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also requires no treatment, whereas many clinical conditions (especially more severe ones) will 
require some curative treatment. Therefore, while the higher likelihood of little or no treatment 
for low-insured patients indicates more appropriate care in this setting, a similar result in other 
case contexts can signal under-provision (poorer quality) of care. Nevertheless, viral acute 
respiratory infections are some of the most common conditions that present in primary care, and 
are therefore good candidates for studying the quality of primary care in general. The SP method 
poses a further limitation here in assessing care continuity, which is a key component of primary 
care quality. Assessing care continuity would require repeat SP visits to the same doctor, which 
was not possible due to the increased risk of detection.  
Future research in this area should seek to validate these results in other contexts and clinical 
cases, and with larger sample sizes. Moreover, the present study only evaluates supply-side 
responses to patient insurance, and proposes one explanation for the results based on physicians’ 
anticipation of patient demands with respect to care quality. Further evidence is necessary to fully 
validate this theory. In particular, empirical validation of the demand-side component of this 
explanation (that patients’ relative demand elasticity with respect to patient experience and 
inappropriate care varies by insurance status), as well as additional qualitative research on 
physicians’ inferences from patient insurance, would be highly valuable in substantiating the 
proposed theory. Lastly, while higher insurance cover appears to exacerbate inappropriate 
prescribing behaviour, the rate of inappropriate antibiotic prescribing among low-insured patients 
is still very high (51%), and comparable to that found by Currie et al. (2014) for a similar clinical 
case in China (55%). A question for future research, then, is what kinds of interventions (aside 
from the elimination of positive financial incentives) are needed to reduce inappropriate 
prescribing for even low-insured or uninsured patients – for whom, in theory, both physicians’ 
altruistic and competitive incentives to minimise inappropriate prescribing should already be 
high.
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6 Second-Degree Moral Hazard in the Quantity and 
Costs of Care 
6.1 Introduction 
Rapidly rising healthcare costs have accompanied the expansion of formal health insurance in 
many parts of the world (Baicker and Goldman, 2011; Xu et al., 2018). Better financial protection 
for patients has been linked to higher healthcare utilisation, treatment intensity, and costs (Lundin, 
2000; Card et al., 2008; Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; Baicker and Goldman, 
2011; Martin et al., 2017) – including from wasteful or even harmful care (Long et al., 2012; 
Zhou et al., 2017). Nevertheless, evidence identifying the causal factors behind these trends is 
limited (Manning et al., 1987; Lu, 2014). As South Africa shapes its ambitious national health 
insurance (NHI) reform, which foresees the elimination of most out-of-pocket (OOP) health 
expenditure in the country, anticipating and offsetting potential effects on wasteful health 
spending will be crucial to the scheme’s sustainability. 
Arrow (1963) highlighted a key role for physicians’ and patients’ agency relationships in driving 
healthcare spending under insurance. Ma and Mcguire (1997) further underlined the interactions 
between two missing markets in healthcare: patient insurance conditional on health state, and 
physician payment conditional on appropriate clinical effort. These missing markets generate 
incentives for ‘hidden action’ (or moral hazard) from both insured patients and physicians, which 
can increase healthcare costs for third-party payers. Patients are more likely to demand 
unnecessary healthcare (or less likely to seek to minimise care costs) when they do not incur the 
full financial costs attached (Feldstein, 1973).211 An emerging body of literature further argues 
that greater financial protection for consumers (patients) generates additional, supply-side moral 
hazard in markets for credence goods like healthcare, where consumers cannot perfectly verify 
the necessity or quality of the services they receive (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008; Lu, 2014; 
Kerschbamer and Sutter, 2016; Balafoutas et al., 2017). Insurance in such markets generates 
 
211 The widespread inclusion of patient co-payments in insurance contracts seeks to limit such ex post patient moral hazard (Pauly, 
1968; Zeckhauser, 1970).  However, it is widely acknowledged that patients cannot always assess the relative value or need for care 
(Baicker et al., 2015), or drive healthcare decision-making in place of a better-informed, ‘expert’ physician (Zweifel and Manning, 
2000). The high degree of uncertainty in most clinical situations, and the stresses of decision-making under ill-health, mandate an 
important role for the physician in determining healthcare choices. 
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profit incentives for ‘expert’ suppliers to exploit their informational advantage with respect to 
both the consumer and insurer, and oversupply (or over-charge) less cost-conscious, better insured 
consumers to a greater degree.212 In essence, this ‘second-degree’ moral hazard argument is an 
extension of theories on supplier-induced demand (Arrow, 1963; Evans, 1974; Fuchs, 1978):213 
suppliers induce demand from consumers proportionally to anticipated increases in consumer 
moral hazard from better insurance.  
While this behaviour is usually understood as a response to direct financial (profit) incentives,214 
physicians have been shown to respond to many other stimuli in their treatment decisions. 
Physicians’ concern for patient benefits, costs and preferences (Lundin, 2000; Godager and 
Wiesen, 2013; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Lagarde and Blaauw, 2017); and their tendency to fall 
back on treatment habits (Hellerstein, 1998; Crea et al., 2019) or defensive medicine under 
diagnostic or therapeutic uncertainty (Baicker et al., 2007) can all play a role. A primary argument 
of this chapter is that such indirect- or non-financial factors can sustain more and more costly 
treatment for better-insured patients, even in the absence of any direct financial incentives for 
physicians.  
Variations in patient insurance can alter the competitive or altruistic incentives that physicians 
face - even where direct financial incentives are absent. If physicians are subject to some level of 
market demand (they compete for patients’ future business) or are at least partially altruistic, they 
can generate higher treatment expenditures for more insured patients through two channels. First, 
physicians may be simply responding to (correctly or incorrectly) anticipated patient preferences, 
even in the absence of any explicit patient demand. They may reasonably expect low-insured 
patients to be more responsive to treatment costs and for high-insured patients to prefer more and 
more expensive treatments (patient moral hazard).215 Second, some uncompensated effort may be 
required of physicians to minimise treatment costs – for example, in improving diagnostic and 
 
212 This is relative to what consumers or insurers would consent to under perfect information. 
213 This refers only to supplier-induced demand motivated by the will to maximizing income, whereas Léonard et al. (2009) note that 
demand-inducement can also be driven by a motive to maximize patient benefit (where the patient does not have full information, and 
therefore cannot choose the best care themselves). Johnson (2014) argues that the latter form, where demand is influenced in the best 
interests of the patient, is not supplier-induced demand at all, as “moving demand toward the patient’s optimum is a responsibility of 
physicians”. 
214 A study by Lu (2014) finds that although physicians in Beijing hospitals prescribe more and more expensive drugs to insured 
patients (compared to uninsured) when they have a direct financial incentive to do so (when the patient agrees to purchase the drug in 
the hospital pharmacy, from which physicians receive a commission), this difference by insurance cover is eliminated when the direct 
financial incentive is removed (when the patient states they will purchase the drugs elsewhere). The implication is that any oversupply 
in physician services may not exist in the absence of any positive financial incentives – such as fee-for-service payment systems that 
reward service volume (Blomqvist, 1991; Bardey and Lesur, 2006), or the ability of physicians to earn mark-ups or commissions from 
drug prescriptions (Iizuka, 2012; Lu, 2014). This reflects, for instance, policy efforts to separate drug prescribing and dispensing 
functions in health systems around the world, aiming to minimise wasteful prescribing practices (Morton and Kyle, 2011). 
215 This may be particularly true of demand for prescription drugs: while patients have been shown to prefer more expensive drugs 
(including branded drugs) in general, believing they are more effective (Cleanthous, 2002; Himmel et al., 2005; Shrank et al., 2009), 
their demand is also sensitive to out-of-pocket price (Leibowitz et al., 1985). 
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therapeutic accuracy to minimise unnecessary treatments, in changing costly treatment habits, or 
in sourcing more cost-effective treatment alternatives on the market. Here, physicians’ effort 
choices are likely to depend both on their anticipated effects on patient welfare and subsequent 
business opportunities (which rely crucially on the patient’s demand response), as well as on the 
effort costs involved.216 217 In either case, physicians are likely to supply more cost-minimising 
effort and fewer unnecessary or expensive treatments to more cost-conscious, low-insured 
patients – either because they anticipate these patients’ demand to be more responsive to 
unnecessary care costs, or because they care about patients’ avoidable OOP costs (Morton and 
Kyle, 2011).  
The potential for this type of indirect second-degree moral hazard from health insurance has 
received relatively little attention in the physician agency literature. It differs from conventional 
second-degree moral hazard, as the gains to physicians derive indirectly - from gains (or cost-
savings) to patients, and from effort cost-savings to physicians (effort-stinting) (Ma, 1994).218  
The two primary hypotheses tested in this chapter are therefore the following:219 
i) ‘Conventional’ second-degree moral hazard: in the presence of direct fee-for-service 
(FFS) incentives, physicians supply a higher quantity and cost of services to more 
insured patients, deviating from the best interests of the patient and insurer 
(Hypothesis 2). 
ii) ‘Indirect’ second-degree moral hazard: even in the absence of direct FFS incentives, 
physicians supply a higher quantity and cost of services to more insured patients, 
deviating from the best interests of the insurer (optimal care) as long as they a) are 
paid on the basis of patient volume for other services (i.e. are subject to some level 
of market incentives), or b) are altruistic towards patients’ OOP costs and anticipated 
preferences (Hypothesis 5). 220 
 
216 These effort costs can include the costs to higher diagnostic effort, and to sourcing more appropriate and inexpensive treatment 
options for the patient. 
217 A key assumption here is that physicians view their uncompensated effort and treatment quantity (and costs) as substitutes. For 
instance, physicians may substitute diagnostic and therapeutic accuracy with treatment quantity. This appeals to the notion of demand-
inducement as a form defensive medicine (Johnson, 2014): in the absence of sufficient clinical effort, the physician faces greater 
diagnostic and therapeutic uncertainty, and therefore prescribes more treatments to increase his chances of addressing the underlying 
illness. Moreover, physicians may require some effort to break habitual but wasteful practices - for instance, in switching from branded 
drugs to lesser known generics, or in adopting newer, more cost-effective treatments (Hellerstein, 1998; Frank, 2004; Crea et al., 
2019). 
218 Note that this result requires that physicians are paid fee-for-service or on the basis of patient volume for at least some types of 
care (otherwise they have no competitive incentives to consider patients’ demand responses in their treatment decisions), or that they 
are sufficiently altruistic towards patients’ avoidable OOP costs and anticipated preferences. 
219 These correspond to two hypotheses derived in Chapter 3. The specific numbered hypotheses are given in parentheses. 
220 The extent to which this indirect physician moral hazard is also a deviation from the patient’s best interests (their preferences and 
willingness-to-pay) will depend on the relative importance of the two underlying behavioural channels proposed: demand-inducement 
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The real-world extent and relative influence of these two types of physician moral hazard, 
compared to patient moral hazard, has become a matter of both academic and policy interest (Ma 
and Mcguire, 1997; Bardey and Lesur, 2006; Kerschbamer and Sutter, 2007). Nevertheless, 
empirically separating the prevalence of these distinct phenomena (as well as distinguishing either 
from the effects of adverse selection of sicker patients into health insurance) has eluded most 
work in this area to date, since the observed outcome is all the same: higher healthcare expenditure 
for more insured patients (Zweifel and Manning, 2000). To test the hypotheses in this chapter, I 
therefore utilise a novel, audit study approach to identifying supply-side moral hazard (Lu, 2014; 
Kerschbamer et al., 2016; Balafoutas et al., 2017). I draw on the same audit experiment as in 
Chapter 5, which was conducted with 89 private primary care physicians in Johannesburg (as 
detailed in Section 4.3.1). Each participating physician in the experiment received randomly-
ordered, incognito visits from two standardised patients (SP) that varied only in their insurance 
cover (‘high-insured’ or ‘low-insured’), holding all other aspects of the clinical case and patient 
presentation fixed. 221  The physicians were all non-dispensing, and therefore had no direct 
financial incentives attached to drug prescribing. However, they were paid FFS for individual 
consultations and for any diagnostic tests or procedures they conduct at their clinics. Hence, they 
had direct financial gains in increasing the number and costs of patient consultations, diagnostic 
tests and other FFS procedures,222 but not in increasing drug expenditures. This institutional set-
up allows simultaneous testing of both primary hypotheses.  
In addition to contributing new evidence on conventional second-degree moral hazard, this 
chapter provides novel field-experimental evidence of its indirect manifestation. The results 
support both hypotheses. Physicians deliver a higher quantity and cost of treatment for high-
insured patients, both when they have direct financial incentives to do so, and when they do not. 
According to national and international clinical guidelines, no diagnostic tests or drug treatments 
are necessary for the clinical case used in this experiment (an uncomplicated case of acute 
bronchitis). However, in line with Hypothesis 2, physicians were almost twice as likely to provide 
an unnecessary FFS test or procedure to high-insured patients compared to low-insured ones, with 
total consultation costs (excluding drugs) that were 7% higher on average (R485, compared to 
R455 for low-insured patients). Over-treatment with drugs was high in general: the average 
patient was prescribed 3.3 drugs items, including 2.6 inappropriate drugs, at an average 
 
to substitute for an under-supply in cost-minimising effort, or supply responses to (correctly) anticipated patient preferences (in other 
words, physicians’ perfect agency (Pauly, 1980). 
221 This creates exogenous variation in the patient insurance cover facing the same physician and overcomes potential issues of 
insurance endogeneity (patient selection into insurance, or physician selection of insured patients) and identification (the insurance 
effect on physician behaviour is cleanly isolated from other patient or physician-level confounders). The SP script was standardised 
to demonstrate the patient’s lack of information on their underlying illness and to eliminate any patient demands (or expressed 
preferences) for treatment – to create the necessary conditions to test for demand-inducement. 
222 Including those they refer to external laboratories, which may require a repeat consultation with the patient to discuss results. 
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prescription cost of R268. 223  Moreover, in support of Hypothesis 5, physicians wrote drug 
prescriptions that were 17% more expensive for high-insured patients (costing R289 on average, 
compared to R247 for low-insured patients). This latter result is primarily driven by physicians 
prescribing more and more branded (originator) drugs to these patients. Taken together, the 
findings indicate that greater financial protection for patients generates more unnecessary 
treatment and expenditure by private physicians, even in the absence of any positive demand from 
patients or direct financial pay-offs for physicians.   
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 outlines the chapter’s 
contributions to existing literature. Section 6.3 presents an overview of the field experiment, and 
summary statistics on the care quantity and cost outcomes of interest. The empirical framework 
is discussed in Section 6.4, followed by a presentation of the main results and robustness checks 
in Section 6.5. The chapter concludes with a discussion of main findings and potential policy 
implications in Section 6.6.  
6.2  Literature Contributions 
This chapter contributes to four strands of existing literature. Firstly, it develops the literature 
proposing a role for physicians in explaining the empirical association between insurance cover 
and healthcare costs (Pauly, 1980; McGuire, 2000). A number of theoretical frameworks predict 
that the quantity and costs of physicians’ treatment decisions will respond to patient insurance 
(Ma and Mcguire, 1997; Bardey and Lesur, 2006; Rischatsch, Trottmann and Zweifel, 2013). 
However, robust empirical evidence of this behaviour is scarce. Most existing studies that 
estimate the effects of insurance on treatment choices are based on observational data (Lundin, 
2000; Zweifel and Manning, 2000; Joyce et al., 2002; Card, Dobkin and Maestas, 2007; Wagstaff 
and Lindelow, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009), and therefore estimate the combined effects of patient 
and physician responses to health insurance (as well as adverse patient selection into insurance). 
This prevents them from isolating the relative influence of the physician from the patient, which 
is crucial from a regulatory perspective for controlling healthcare spending. The RAND and 
Oregon Health Insurance Experiments isolated the effects of moral hazard (patient or physician 
responses to insurance) from adverse selection of patients into insurance (Newhouse, 1993; 
Finkelstein et al., 2012): by randomly assigning patients to different levels of cost-sharing (co-
payment rates), they eliminate any systematic self-selection of specific types of patients into 
 
223 To put this figure in context, the cheapest recommended (symptomatic) treatment for the clinical case presented in this experiment 
was paracetamol and a cough suppressant, priced at R17.86 (see Section 4.2.2). The average drug cost recorded in this experiment is 
almost 14 times higher. 
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specific levels of insurance cover.224 However, because they do not also randomise the insurance 
cover facing treating physicians, they cannot fully isolate the role of patient moral hazard from 
physician moral hazard, or eliminate potential selection of patients into care-seeking from specific 
types of physicians conditional on assigned insurance status.225 Mort et al. (1996) and McKinlay 
et al. (1996) are two exceptions that identify physicians’ independent responses to patient 
insurance, and find that insurance affects physicians’ clinical decisions in ways that can increase 
care costs. Nevertheless, they rely on physicians’ reports of likely choices in specific clinical 
scenarios, rather than on observations of actual behaviour. This chapter adds to this literature in 
a number of ways. First, it utilises micro-level data on actual treatment decisions observed during 
physician-patient interactions. Second, by drawing on a controlled field experiment, it succeeds 
in creating random variation in the insurance status facing treating physicians, whilst controlling 
for all other patient-level confounders (including patient demands or adverse selection into 
insurance). Third, by fixing the clinical case presented by SPs, it can verify the necessity of 
physicians’ treatment choices – which is difficult to do from administrative data, and on the basis 
of reported diagnoses - and identify the insurance effect on inappropriate health expenditures. 
In utilising the SP audit approach, this study also contributes to an emerging literature using 
‘mystery’ shoppers or incognito SPs to identify supply-side moral hazard. These studies have 
found significant evidence of conventional second-degree moral hazard in response to consumer 
(or patient) insurance in a number of markets with credence goods characteristics, including 
computer repairs (Kerschbamer et al., 2016), taxi rides (Balafoutas et al., 2017) and drug 
prescriptions (Lu, 2014). Nevertheless, there is no field-experimental evidence of indirect second-
degree moral hazard as yet. A closely related study to the present one investigates the impact of 
patient insurance on physicians’ prescribing choices in Beijing hospitals (Lu, 2014). To identify 
the insurance effect, the author employs a similar controlled field experiment using SPs with 
varying insurance statuses, and finds that salaried hospital physicians provide prescriptions that 
are 43% more expensive to insured patients compared to uninsured ones when they expect a 
financial pay-off.226 This is a much larger effect than the one found in this study (a 17% increase 
 
224 However, the RAND experiment was challenged due to substantially higher levels of attrition by participants in the cost-sharing 
plans (attrition was almost 16 times higher than in the free care plan) (Nyman, 2007). If the likelihood of attrition was linked to the 
health status of participants or other characteristics that can influence their likelihood of needing care, this would invalidate the 
randomized assignment of insurance status to avoid adverse selection. 
225 Firstly, the randomly assigned level of cost-sharing may systematically affect where (and with what types of doctors) patients 
choose to seek care. If the doctors that treat high co-pay patients are systematically different from those that treat low co-pay patients, 
then differences in treatment choices and costs between high- and low co-pay patients can be either due to differences in the insurance 
status of the patient or due to systematic differences in the treating doctors. Secondly, even if there were no systematic differences in 
the treating doctors by the levels of patient co-payment, that patient insurance leads to more medical care and expenditure can be 
either due to patient demands or doctors’ independent responses.  
226  The financial pay-off comes from pharmacy profit-sharing when patients purchase prescribed drugs from the same hospital 
pharmacy. This pay-off is removed when patients opt to buy their drugs at an external pharmacy. 
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in prescription costs). However, there are important differences between this study and Lu (2014) 
that are worth noting. Firstly, unlike in Lu (2014), the physicians in this study do not receive 
direct financial pay-offs from their prescribing choices (as they are non-dispensing and have no 
pharmacy affiliations). While indirect financial pay-offs (market incentives) from treatment 
choices is one possible explanation for the insurance effect in this study, these indirect incentives 
are likely to be far less powerful than direct financial pay-offs (which could explain the smaller 
estimated effect). Indeed, Lu (2014) finds that when direct financial incentives for drug 
prescriptions are removed (that is, when the patient opts to buy their drugs at an external 
pharmacy), the insurance effect on prescription costs is eliminated.227 It should be noted that Lu 
(2014)’s sample was composed only of salaried physicians, so market incentives were largely 
absent in her study.228 Secondly, while Lu (2014) compares insured patients to fully uninsured 
patients, the present study compares two levels of patient insurance where any differences in 
physician incentives are likely to be more incremental. Thirdly, drug treatment is largely not 
recommended for the clinical case used in this study, whereas some treatment is clinically 
indicated for the two cases in Lu (2014).229 Therefore, appropriate treatment necessitates some 
positive prescription cost in Lu (2014); whereas no drug treatment is clinically indicated in this 
study, which allows a clearer analysis of the insurance effect on wasteful treatment and costs. 
Fourthly, in addition to drug prescriptions, this study also investigates the insurance effect on 
diagnostic tests and other FFS procedures which are not considered in Lu (2014). Finally, this 
study observes the insurance effect on the same physician (the same physicians are visited by 
both types of insured SPs). While the same hospitals are visited by both types of SPs in Lu (2014), 
the author cannot verify whether the same physicians were visited within each hospital, and is 
therefore unable to control for all physician-level characteristics that may confound the estimated 
insurance effect. As such, this chapter presents a strong methodological contribution to the 
literature concerned with identifying supply-side moral hazard in healthcare.230  
Relatedly, this chapter builds on an extensive physician agency literature on supplier-induced 
demand (SID) (see McGuire (2000) and Johnson (2014) for detailed reviews) – whereby 
physicians influence healthcare demand away from levels they assess to be in patients’ best 
 
227 The author concludes that this counters the ‘considerate doctor’ hypothesis. In other words, that physicians are not sufficiently 
sensitive to patients’ out-of-pocket costs.  
228 This may partly explain the null insurance effect on prescription costs in the absence of any direct financial incentives, unlike in 
this study with FFS physicians. The lack of market-based incentives in Lu’s sample may limit the tendency for indirect second-degree 
moral hazard.  
229 The clinical cases used in Lu (2014) were hypertension, and hypertension combined with elevated triglycerides and high blood 
pressure. 
230 Other experimental audit studies on patient-side influences on physicians’ treatment choices evaluate the effects of patient requests 
for branded drugs (Kravitz et al., 2005), patients’ signalled knowledge of appropriate treatments (Currie et al., 2011), and patients’ 
signalling of intent to seek second ‘expert’ opinions (Gottschalk et al., 2017). 
 133 
 
interests for profit. Most empirical work seeking to identify SID in healthcare have relied on 
exogenous variations in physicians’ income levels or fees. For instance, studies have found that 
the negative income shock implied by an increase in the local physician-to-population ratio 
increases rates of surgeries and highly profitable Cesarean sections (C-sections) (Fuchs, 1978; 
Cromwell and Mitchell, 1986; Gruber and Owings, 1996).231 Similarly, other studies have found 
increases in health service volumes (also mainly surgeries and C-sections) in response to 
Medicare fee reductions (Rice, 1983; Yip, 1998; Jacobson et al., 2010), particularly among 
physicians whose incomes were most affected (Nguyen and Derrick, 1997; Yip, 1998).232 Currie 
et al. (2014) present field-experimental evidence of SID using a similar SP audit approach to the 
present study. They exogenously vary the financial pay-offs from drug prescribing for Chinese 
hospital physicians (in a similar way to Lu (2014)), and find that such pay-offs increase the 
quantity and costs of physicians’ prescriptions.233 A fundamental assumption that distinguishes 
SID from other profit-maximising behaviour is that information is asymmetric, and patients are 
relatively uninformed. Most of this evidence on SID therefore comes from specialist, secondary 
care contexts, where the asymmetry in information between ‘expert’ physicians and patients is 
likely to be highest. More recent studies have sought to test whether physicians’ capacity for SID 
would vary with patient information, with mixed results. The most robust identification strategies 
in this area are found in two SP field experiments (Currie et al., 2011; Gottschalk et al., 2017). In 
Currie et al. (2011), SPs that signal knowledge of appropriate prescribing outcomes to their 
consulting physician are prescribed significantly less inappropriate medications (antibiotics) 
relative to uninformed patients;234 whereas in Gottschalk et al. (2017), patients that signal their 
likelihood of getting a second diagnostic opinion elsewhere are not treated significantly 
differently to patients that do not. The present chapter adds to this literature in two ways: it finds 
evidence of SID i) in a non-specialist, primary care context, and ii) in response to exogenous 
variation in patients’ insurance cover (and the implied cost-consciousness and care preferences 
of patients). 
Lastly, this chapter relates to a fourth body of literature on alternative, non-financial drivers of 
physicians’ treatment choices (Frank, 2004; Chandra et al., 2011) - and how these can vary with 
the patient’s insurance cover. Pauly (1980) argues that physicians have indirect financial 
 
231As the local physician density cannot plausibly affect the optimal treatment recommendation for the patient, these results have been 
interpreted as evidence of demand-inducement. 
232 Gruber et al. (1999), on the other hand, find an increase in C-sections in response to a Medicaid fee increase, suggesting that the 
resulting substitution effect dominates the income effect in this case (unlike in the other studies listed). 
233 They exogenously vary physicians’ financial incentives for prescribing drugs by sending SPs that express a preference for 
purchasing prescribed drugs either i) at the same hospital pharmacy, which will entail some profit-share for the prescribing physician, 
or ii) at an external pharmacy (which would involve no financial payoff for the prescriber). 
234 However, Currie et al. (2014) find that direct financial incentives are a much stronger driver of prescription choices than patients’ 
signalled knowledge. 
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incentives to minimise patients’ OOP costs for services they cannot charge for, as higher patient 
expenditure on these services reduces what patients can spend on physicians’ own (profitable) 
services.  This incentive is of course absent (or very small) with high-insured patients that do not 
incur OOP costs. Another argument is that physicians’ incur effort costs to minimising treatment 
expenditures for patients (Ma, 1994). First, they may incur some cost to changing habitual 
behaviours, which deter them from seeking newer, more cost-effective therapies for their patients. 
For instance, Crea et al. (2019) and Hellerstein (1998) find evidence of habit persistence in 
physicians’ prescribing behaviours, which prevent them from switching from branded to cheaper 
generic drugs. Cutler et al. (2019) also argue for persistence in physicians’ individual practice 
styles in explaining regional variations in Medicare expenditure in the US. Second, there is 
considerable uncertainty involved in clinical decision-making (Chandra et al., 2011), and 
substantial clinical effort may be required of physicians to minimise this. The absence of such 
effort (or physicians’ unwillingness to supply it) may support the tendency for defensive 
medicine, as noted in some studies (Baicker et al, 2007). Johnson (2014) characterises this 
tendency as an indirect form of SID, where a higher quantity of care is substituted for diagnostic 
or therapeutic certainty. Physicians’ incentives to supply such cost-minimising effort can depend 
on the OOP costs for the patient. For instance, a large literature considers that physicians are not 
purely profit-maximising, but are also motivated by patient welfare - including financial welfare 
(see Galizzi et al., (2015) for a review). In addition, physicians that rely to some extent on patient 
volume for their income have competitive (market-based) incentives to satisfy the likely greater 
expectation for cost-effective care from low-insured patients with higher OOP costs, to maintain 
their repeat business (Allard et al., 2009). Physicians may then supply relatively less cost-
minimising effort with more insured patients, resulting in higher costs for these patients even 
where physicians cannot charge for their treatment choices. 
Nevertheless, existing evidence on physicians’ treatment responses to patient insurance in the 
absence of direct financial incentives is mixed. From the literature investigating drug prescribing 
decisions in settings where physicians cannot dispense drugs, Iizuka (2012) finds that FFS doctors 
(with similar market-based incentives as the doctors in this study) are not sensitive to patients’ 
OOP costs in their choices of branded or generic drugs – contrary to results in this chapter. Crea 
et al. (2019) and Hellerstein (1998) similarly find no supportive evidence that higher patient 
insurance increases the prescription costs generated by non-dispensing doctors. By contrast, 
Lundin (2000), Granlund (2009) and Mott and Cline (2002) find that lower patient insurance 
increases the likelihood of physicians prescribing the cheaper, generic version of a drug (or 
allowing generic substitution by pharmacists). These studies are nevertheless limited in their 
reliance on administrative data, which – as discussed previously - makes it difficult to isolate the 
insurance effect on treatment choices, and to distinguish physicians’ choices from those of 
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patients. Moreover (with the exception of Iizuka (2012)), although the physicians in these studies 
do not gain financially from prescription costs, the influence of other market-based incentives 
(which partly motivate the indirect second-degree moral hazard hypothesis in this study) are 
generally not specified, not controlled for, or non-existent (as with the public sector physicians in 
Lundin (2000)). A more general limitation of these studies is that, beyond analysing the prescriber 
choice between a branded and more cost-effective generic version of the same drug, they do not 
investigate avoidable drug expenditures more holistically in each patient case (which may be 
determined by choices between equivalent drugs, the overall quantity of drugs prescribed, or even 
the clinical need for any drug treatment at all in a given patient case). This chapter therefore builds 
on these works in two ways: i) it considers a context where physicians have clear market-based 
incentives (even where they cannot charge for drug treatments), and ii) it draws on field-
experimental data to cleanly identify the insurance effect on physicians’ choices of both total and 
unnecessary (or avoidable) treatment quantity and costs.  
6.3 Experimental Methods and Data 
This chapter draws on the same within-physician, SP audit experiment as Chapter 5. The SP 
methodology, sample characteristics and experimental procedures are described there and in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.3.1, and will not be repeated in detail here. Briefly, 89 private primary care 
physicians in Johannesburg were recruited into the study, and each received unannounced visits 
from two SPs that varied only their insurance cover (one ‘high-insured’ with a very low expected 
co-payment rate, and one ‘low-insured’ with a higher expected co-payment rate).235 All other 
aspects of the SPs’ presentation and scripts were standardised - including their portrayal of an 
uninformed and undemanding patient. 236  All recruited physicians were paid FFS for their 
consultations and any procedures administered during the visit. However, they were non-
dispensing physicians, and therefore did not gain any direct pay-offs from their drug prescription 
choices. The clinical case presented by all SPs was an uncomplicated case of acute bronchitis in 
an otherwise healthy, young adult (Clinical Case 1). According to national and international 
clinical guidelines, no diagnostic tests or treatment are necessary for this case, although some 
mild palliative treatment may be considered to relieve the patient’s symptoms (NDoH, 2014; 
Brink et al., 2016). After each SP visit, the overall consultation and drug costs attributable to the 
 
235 The ‘high-insured’ SP had an insurance plan that allocated a higher level of medical savings to cover primary healthcare costs than 
that of the ‘low-insured’ SP (around 75% higher), and therefore had a much lower likelihood of having to co-pay for any care.  
236 All SPs presented to physicians as patients seeking information and expert advice on their underlying illness (uninformed patients), 
without any demands for specific treatments (undemanding patients). 
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visit were calculated using a number of data sources (see Section 4.2.2 for further details).237 The 
following section presents descriptive statistics for the main outcomes analysed in this chapter. 
6.3.1 Care quantity and cost outcomes 
Table 6.1 presents a summary of the care quantity and cost outcomes of interest from the SP visits. 
A prescription was given in all 178 consultations completed in this experiment. Drug expenditures 
for each consultation were computed by matching prescription items to corresponding items listed 
in the South African Medicine Price Registry (MPR), as detailed in Section 4.2.2. The MPR 
contains the unit Single Exit Price (SEP) for each listed drug, which specifies the maximum 
charges that can be applied to pharmaceuticals (excluding a regulated dispensing fee) in South 
Africa. The unit SEP was multiplied by the prescribed quantities to obtain the cost of each 
prescription item. The database further specifies whether a drug is the originator or a generic 
equivalent. Where physicians only wrote the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) of a drug on 
the prescription (rather than specifying a drug name), the price of the cheapest generic drug with 
the same main API in the MPR database was chosen to be matched to the prescription item. Some 
over-the-counter (OTC) prescription items were not included in the database. In these cases, the 
retail price was obtained from the two leading pharmacies in South Africa (DisChem and Clicks). 
For branded (originator) prescription items, a basic search was also conducted in the database to 
check for the availability of generic substitutes in the market. The costs of all FFS items were 
taken from itemised insurance claims submitted to the partnering insurer and any receipts 
provided from the consultations.  
Four groups of outcomes are analysed. First, the total drug expenditures per consultation are 
analysed, including the number of drugs prescribed and the average cost per drug item. The cost 
of each drug item is the product of the number of units of the drug prescribed (which indicates 
the treatment intensity with that specific drug) and the unit SEP price of that drug (taken from the 
MPR).238 As shown in panel a. of Table 6.1, the prevalence of over-treatment in the sample is 
high in general: for a clinical case that requires no drug treatment, the average patient was 
prescribed 3.31 drugs, at an average cost per drug of almost R80. This amounts to an average cost 
per prescription of R268.239 To put this in context, the cost of the cheapest available symptomatic 
treatment for the clinical case (which is the only treatment recommended for uncomplicated acute 
 
237 These sources include the debriefing questionnaire completed by SPs immediately after each visit (which noted any tests or 
procedures administered during the consultation, and any costs that had to be paid upfront in cash and be claimed back), the 
consultation receipts, the claims submitted to the insurer, the prescriptions from each visit, and a national drug price database that 
contains regulated pricing information for prescription drugs sold in the country 
238 The average cost per drug item therefore reflects both the average treatment intensity per drug, as well as the average unit cost. 
239 In comparison, Currie et al. (2014) find a lower number of 2.4 drugs prescribed for the average patient with flu-like symptoms in 
their SP audit study of hospital physicians in China. 
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bronchitis in clinical guidelines) was calculated from the MPR, and amounted to R17.86 - which 
is just 7% of the average prescription cost realised in this experiment.  
Table 6.1. Summary statistics – care intensity and cost outcomes 
 Mean SD 
a. All prescription items 
  
Number of drugs prescribed 3.31 (1.20) 
Average cost of prescribed drugs (ZAR) 79.52 (41.26) 
Total cost of drugs prescribed (ZAR) 268.46 (166.90) 
b.  Inappropriate prescription items   
Number of inappropriate drugs  2.57 (1.06) 
Average cost of inappropriate drugs (ZAR) 88.22 (52.37) 
Total cost of inappropriate drugs (ZAR) 227.42 (162.05) 
c.  Branded prescription items   
Likelihood of branded drug prescription 0.76 (0.43) 
Number of branded drugs 1.28 (1.01) 
Average cost of branded drugs (ZAR) 127.91 (72.37) 
Total cost of branded drugs (ZAR) 159 (148.87) 
d. Fee-for-service items   
Additional fee-for-service tests / procedures billed  0.08 (0.28) 
Number of additional fee-for-service tests / procedures billed  0.12 (0.43) 
Total cost of consultation, excl. drugs (ZAR) 469.58 (113.33) 
Observations (no. consultations) 178  
Notes: All consultation outcomes were measured using data collected from the post-consultation SP 
debriefing questionnaire, the prescriptions, itemized insurance claim submissions, and a national drug 
pricing database (the South Africa Medicine Price Registry). All listed figures are on a per prescription or 
per consultation basis. For further details on how these outcomes were measured and the data sources 
used, refer to Table 4.3 and Section 4.2.2.  
 
Second, prescribed drugs are classified as either ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’ for the 
uncomplicated acute bronchitis case, and total inappropriate drug expenditures are analysed in 
the same way.240 Panel b. of Table 6.1 shows that inappropriate drugs drive a large majority of all 
drug expenditures: 78% of all drugs prescribed and 85% of total prescription costs were composed 
of inappropriate drugs. The average patient was prescribed almost 2.6 inappropriate drugs, at an 
average cost of R88 per item and a total cost of R227 per prescription. Appendix D.1 shows that 
the most frequently prescribed inappropriate drugs were steroids and antibiotics. The most 
 
240 This classification was done in consultation with clinical experts in respiratory and infectious diseases in South Africa, and with 
reference to the South African Department of Health’s standard treatment guidelines for primary care (NDoH, 2014).‘Appropriate’ 
drugs for this case are classified as those that are recommended for symptomatic relief, but are not clinically-indicated or necessary 
for case resolution (as with any drug treatment in this case). Among the drugs prescribed, these included OTC analgesics, cough 
suppressants and expectorants, and throat preparations (see Appendix D.1). ‘Inappropriate’ drugs, on the other hand, are those that 
are neither recommended for symptomatic relief nor clinically-indicated (and potentially harmful) for this case. These included 
antibiotics (prescribed with or without probiotics), nasal decongestants, bronchodilators, antihistamines, steroids, vitamins and other 
drugs.   
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expensive prescription items were also antibiotics, at an average cost of almost R148 per item 
(accounting for more than 55% of the average total prescription cost). 
Third, branded (originator) drug costs are analysed as an indicator of avoidable drug 
expenditures.241 Over 75% of all prescriptions contained at least one branded drug item, at an 
average cost of almost R128 per item. In comparison, the average generic drug item prescribed 
was almost 57% cheaper (costing just R55) – see Appendix D.1. Branded drugs further accounted 
for almost 40% of all prescribed drugs and 60% of total prescription costs.  
Last, the FFS items charged to each consultation are considered (see last panel of Table 6.1). This 
includes the consultation fee, and the costs of any additional FFS diagnostic tests or procedures 
that were ordered during the consultation (including any external laboratory tests, that would 
require follow-up by the referring physician). Figure 6.1 displays the types and frequencies of 
FFS items charged for in the consultations. Given the uncomplicated nature of the clinical case, 
and its amenability to a reasonably accurate diagnosis with only history-taking and physical 
examination, all additional FFS procedures were considered to be unnecessary (over-treatment) 
in this case. The overall frequency of additional procedures is indeed low: a total 21 procedures 
were ordered in just 15 consultations (8% of all consultations). This is in contrast to the extent of 
over-treatment through drug prescriptions, as discussed in the preceding – despite the lack of any 
FFS incentives attached to the latter. The average consultation cost (excluding drugs, but 
including the consultation fee and other FFS charges) was approximately R470.  
 
 
 
241 Drugs are classified as either branded or generic using data from the MPR. Not all branded drugs had generic equivalents listed in 
the MPR. In these cases where generic substitution is not possible, the associated expenditure cannot be considered ‘avoidable’ (even 
if it is inappropriate). However, the share of such cases in this experiment is very small: of 228 branded drug items prescribed, only 
12 did not have a generic equivalent listed in the MPR.These corresponded to three unique drugs: Fluticasone Furoate (an inhaled 
corticosteroid), Budesonide-Formoterol Fumorate (a bronchodilator), and Telithromycin (an antibiotic). Excluding these cases does 
not affect the main results on branded (avoidable) drug expenditure in Section 6.5.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Types and frequencies of fee-for-service procedures ordered 
6.4 Empirical Framework 
The within-subject experiment design and SP method have some implications for the choice of 
empirical model. As each physician is visited by SPs of both insurance types, the sample is 
perfectly balanced in terms of physician and clinic characteristics in both ‘treatment’ arms (high-
insured and low-insured SP visits). Moreover, as the SP method allows exogenous variation in 
the insurance status of patients visiting participating physicians, it avoids systematic selection in 
the types of insured patients seen by specific types of physicians. These features negate the need 
to explicitly control for physician or clinic characteristics in the empirical model, in order to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the insurance effect. However, as each physician is observed twice, 
the pairs of ‘within-physician’ observations are likely to be correlated to some extent. This 
potential for data clustering at the physician-level means statistical inference based on standard 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is likely to be invalid, and an alternative approach is 
needed. 
In addition, a primary concern with the SP method is that physicians may respond differently to 
different SPs for reasons other than the insurance cover. For instance, the fieldworkers playing 
each type of SP may be systematically different, or behave differently conditional on assignment 
to a certain SP role. To address the former issue, fieldworkers were matched into pairs on the 
basis of observable characteristics (such as age, gender, and other physical characteristics), and 
each physician was randomised to visits by a specific SP pair. Behavioural standardisation was 
also emphasised during SP training (see Section 4.1.2). To address the latter concern, it is 
necessary to control for fieldworker fixed effects in the empirical model. However, as the SP type 
played by each individual fieldworker is fixed (each fieldworker was assigned to a specific 
insurance cover, as formal insurance had to be purchased in their names), including individual 
fieldworker dummies in the empirical model would create a high degree of co-linearity: the 
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fieldworker dummies would be perfectly co-linear with the binary insurance variable. An 
alternative solution is to control for differences across the fixed fieldworker-pairs. 
With these considerations in mind, I employ a physician-level fixed effects model of the following 
form to estimate the main results: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗  is the outcome of interest in consultation 𝑖  with physician 𝑗 ; 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗  is an 
indicator taking value 1 if the SP in consultation 𝑖  with physician 𝑗  was high-insured, and 0 
otherwise; 𝛿𝑗  are physician-level fixed effects; and 𝛽1  is the parameter to be estimated (the 
insurance effect).242 The physician fixed effects automatically control for fieldworker-pair effects, 
as the fieldworker pairs do not vary within-physician. Following Arellano (1987) and Cameron 
and Miller (2015), the fixed effects model is also combined with a cluster-robust variance 
estimator, to account for any residual correlation in the error term from data clustering at the 
physician level. Main results are presented for both specifications (fixed effects model with and 
without the cluster-robust variance estimator). All subsequent sub-sample analyses are conducted 
using linear OLS with the cluster-robust variance estimator only (and explicitly including 
fieldworker-pair fixed effects), as the physician fixed effects model prevents estimating the 
effects of physician-level variables.  
Robustness of all main results to alternative methods of handling clustered data is also checked 
in Section 6.5.4, including a paired sample t-test (‘response simplification’) and a linear mixed 
effects model (LMEM) with random intercept and slope. See Appendix C.3 for a discussion on 
these methods.  
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Effects of patient insurance cover on drug treatment quantity and costs 
Table 6.2 presents estimates of the high-insurance effect on total prescribed drug costs. Panel A 
shows results from a physician-level fixed effects model with normal standard errors, while Panel 
B shows results from an equivalent model with physician-level, cluster-robust standard errors. 
All results are shown to be consistent across the two specifications. Column (3) indicates that 
total prescription costs for high-insured patients are 17% higher than for low-insured ones (R289 
 
242 As detailed in Appendix C.3, the fixed effects model is just one of a few alternative approaches to controlling for potential clustering 
of data at the physician level. Other options include OLS with a cluster-robust variance estimator, response simplification or a mixed 
effects model with physician-level random effects. The fixed effects model was chosen for the main analysis due to its relative ease 
of specification, suitability in small sample sizes, and automatic control of fieldworker-pair fixed effects (as the fieldworker-pairs do 
not vary within-physician, they are implicitly controlled for in the physician-level fixed effects). 
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compared to R247). In purchasing power parity terms, the R42 difference in total drug costs per 
patient is equivalent to approximately USD 7.243  
Table 6.2. Effect of insurance cover on drug treatment intensity and costs – all drugs 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    
No. drugs 
Average drug 
cost 
Total drug cost 
Panel A: provider-level fixed effects    
High-insured   0.29*** 8.54* 42.21** 
  (0.10) (4.51) (16.17) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
R-squared  0.09 0.04 0.07 
    
Panel B: provider-level fixed effects & cluster-robust standard errors    
High-insured  0.29*** 8.54* 42.21** 
  (0.10) (4.53) (16.22) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.09 0.04 0.07 
    
Mean of low-insured 3.17 75.25 247.36 
    
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). Panel A presents estimates from a fixed effects 
(mean-differenced) model. Panel B shows results from a fixed effects model, as in Panel A, with the addition of a cluster-robust variance 
estimator. All outcomes are per prescription (per consultation). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Higher total prescription costs may be driven by physicians prescribing either a higher number of 
drugs or more expensive prescription items to high-insured patients. Columns (1) and (2) provide 
some evidence for both channels. High-insured patients were prescribed 9% more drug items 
(3.46 items, compared to 3.17 per low-insured patient), and each item was 11% more expensive 
on average (R83.80, compared to R75.25 for low-insured patients). 
As suggested previously, higher prescription costs for more insured patients may be partly 
explained by physicians’ substitution of poorer diagnostic and therapeutic accuracy with higher 
treatment quantity and costs for these patients.244 As high-insured patients are less sensitive to 
drug costs, this tendency for substitution may be higher with these patients. It was shown in 
Chapter 5 that physicians were 23% less likely to provide a correct or partially-correct diagnosis 
(conditional on pronouncing any diagnosis) and 24% more likely to prescribe inappropriate 
antibiotic treatment to high-insured patients, suggesting that diagnostic and therapeutic accuracy 
was indeed poorer for these patients compared to low-insured ones. Appendix D.2 indicates that 
a correct or partially-correct diagnosis is not significantly associated with prescription costs. 
 
243 This is based on the purchasing power parity rate of R6.2/USD for the South African Rand in 2018, published by the OECD and 
calculated from the OECD National Accounts Statistics – available from: https://data.oecd.org/conversion/purchasing-power-parities-
ppp.htm 
244 That is, if physicians believe more and more expensive drugs will compensate for lower clinical accuracy, by increasing the 
likelihood of successfully treating the unknown underlying illness. 
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However, the prescription of an antibiotic is associated with an R137 increase in total prescription 
costs, representing approximately 51% of the mean prescription cost in this experiment. This 
indicates that some level of substitution in physicians’ appropriate effort for higher prescribing 
intensity and costs is plausible. 
Table 6.3 presents estimates of the high-insurance effect on unnecessary drug costs, and follows 
a similar format to Table 6.2. Although no drug treatment is necessary for resolving the clinical 
case in this experiment, some OTC (low-schedule) symptomatic treatment may be recommended 
for reducing the patient’s reported symptoms. Therefore, aggregate drug expenditures may be 
attributed to either appropriate (recommended, low-schedule symptomatic drugs) or inappropriate 
drugs, with the latter constituting one form of unnecessary drug expenditure. In most cases, 
physicians also have a choice of prescribing either a branded or cheaper generic version of the 
same drug. Branded drug prescriptions generate avoidable drug costs in these cases, and constitute 
a second form of unnecessary drug expenditure. 
The results suggest that both types of unnecessary expenditure are higher for high-insured 
patients. Total inappropriate drug costs per patient are 16% higher for high-insured patients 
(R244, compared to R211 for low-insured patients). This is driven by both a marginally higher 
number of inappropriate drug items per prescription (2.65 items, compared to 2.48 for low-insured 
patients) and a higher average cost per inappropriate item (R93, compared to R83 for low-insured 
patients) – although the latter results are only weakly significant (at the 10% level). Greater 
diagnostic accuracy is again not significantly associated with inappropriate drug costs (Appendix 
D.3). The latter appear to be driven by antibiotic prescriptions (as with total prescription costs). 
In terms of branded prescription items, Column (4) of Table 6.3 shows no statistically significant 
difference in the likelihood of a branded drug being prescribed across insurance types. However, 
the number of branded drug items per prescription is higher for high-insured patients: these 
patients were prescribed 1.42 branded drugs on average, compared to 1.13 branded drugs per low-
insured patient. This represents a 26% increase in the number of branded prescription items with 
the higher insurance cover. The absolute difference in the number of branded drugs by insurance 
cover (0.29 drugs) is comparable to the difference in the number of all prescribed drugs (also 0.29 
drugs). Given the lack of an equivalent difference in the number of generics prescribed by 
insurance cover (see Appendix D.1), this indicates that branded drugs are wholly driving the 
estimated difference in the quantity of all drugs prescribed. Total branded drug costs are also 21% 
higher for high-insured patients (R174, compared to R144 for low-insured patients), although this 
difference is only weakly significant. No significant difference is detected in the average cost of 
branded drug items. Therapeutic accuracy is negatively associated with branded drug costs (see 
Columns (5)-(7) of Appendix D.3): an inappropriate antibiotic prescription is associated with a 
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R78 increase in total branded drug costs and a R43 increase in the average branded drug cost (per 
prescription), which suggests that physicians may have a preference for originator drugs over 
generics when prescribing antibiotics. 
Table 6.3. Effect of insurance cover on drug treatment intensity and costs – inappropriate and 
branded drugs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    No. 
inapprop
.drugs 
Average 
inapprop
drug cost  
Total 
inapprop 
drug cost 
Any 
branded 
drug 
No. 
branded 
drugs 
Average 
branded 
drug cost 
Total 
branded 
drug cost 
Panel A: provider-level fixed effects        
High-insured 
  
0.17* 10.09* 33.14** 0.07 0.29*** -0.02 29.81* 
  (0.10) (5.50) (16.48) (0.05) (0.11) (11.34) (17.43) 
Obs. 178 177 178 178 178 136 178 
R-squared  0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.03 
        
Panel B: provider-level fixed effects 
& cluster-robust standard errors 
       
High-insured  0.17* 10.09* 33.14** 0.07 0.29** -0.02 29.81* 
  (0.10) (5.52) (16.52) (0.06) (0.11) (11.35) (17.48) 
Obs. 178 177 178 178 178 136 178 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.03 
        
Mean of low-insured 2.48 82.99 210.85 0.73 1.13 128.54 144.09 
        
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). Panel A presents estimates from a fixed effects 
(mean-differenced) model. Panel B shows results from a fixed effects model, as in Panel A, with the addition of a cluster-robust variance 
estimator. All outcomes are per prescription (per consultation).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
6.5.2 Effects of patient insurance cover on fee-for-service items and costs 
Table 6.4 reports estimated high-insurance effects on all FFS items and costs from consultations. 
Unlike the drug prescription outcomes, this includes all outcomes that present direct financial 
incentives (gains) for physicians. Total FFS consultation costs (excluding drugs) were 7% higher 
for high-insured patients compared to low-insured ones (R485, compared to R455). As the 
consultation rate is generally fixed across the two insurance covers (the insurer sets the same 
maximum reimbursable consultation rate for both covers), the difference in average per-
consultation costs is likely to be primarily driven by additional FFS items ordered in the 
consultations. 245  Table 6.4 (Columns (1) and (2)) shows that high-insured patients are 
significantly more likely to receive these additional items: they are twice as likely to be ordered 
any FFS procedure, and are ordered 2.5 times as many procedures on average. Nevertheless, the 
 
245 The provision of any such additional services is indeed associated with an increase in total consultation costs of R198 (see Column 
(3) of Appendix Table D.4). 
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absolute magnitudes of these differences are small, given the low overall incidence of such 
additional procedures in this experiment. This might explain the relatively small difference in 
total (per) consultation costs as well. 
Table 6.4. Effect of insurance cover on treatment intensity and care costs – fee-for-service items 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    
Any FFS tests 
/ procedures 
No. FFS tests / 
procedures 
Total 
consultation 
cost (excl. 
drugs) 
Panel A: provider-level fixed effects    
High-insured   0.06* 0.10** 29.91** 
  (0.03) (0.05) (14.86) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
R-squared  0.03 0.04 0.04 
    
Panel B: provider-level fixed effects & cluster-robust standard 
errors 
   
High-insured  0.06* 0.10** 29.91** 
  (0.03) (0.05) (14.90) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 
    
Mean of low-insured 0.06 0.07 454.62 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. FFS = fee-for-service. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). Panel A presents 
estimates from a fixed effects (mean-differenced) model. Panel B shows results from a fixed effects model, as in Panel A, with 
the addition of a cluster-robust variance estimator. All outcomes are per consultation. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Appendix D.4 also indicates that physicians apply FFS charges that are proportional to their 
observed clinical effort: a one standard deviation increase in an IRT index of case-specific 
essential and recommended clinical effort is associated with an increase of R33 in total 
consultation costs. At the same time, greater diagnostic accuracy (a correct or partially-correct 
diagnosis) is associated with both lower overall consultation costs and a higher likelihood of 
additional FFS procedures. First, this implies that, unlike the observable aspects of effort reflected 
in the history-taking and examinations checklist, physicians are less able to price in their 
(unobserved) technical care quality (partly reflected in their diagnostic accuracy). Second, while 
diagnostic accuracy appears more likely with some additional costly test being performed, these 
additional services are ultimately unnecessary: low-insured patients are less likely to receive any 
additional FFS tests or procedures, and yet (as shown in Chapter 5) they are still more likely to 
receive a correct or partially-correct diagnosis.  
6.5.3 Heterogeneous effects 
The observed differences in treatment and cost outcomes by insurance cover are hypothesised to 
derive from physicians’ competitive and altruistic incentives (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed 
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discussion). The predictions in Chapter 3 are nevertheless ambiguous on potential interactions 
between the effects of baseline physician altruism and competition, on the one hand, and the 
insurance effect on the other – in other words, whether a change in physician altruism or 
competition should affect outcomes for high- and low-insured patients to different degrees. 
Appendices D.6 – D.8 report results from formal tests for interaction effects between the measures 
of physician altruism and competition used in this study and patient insurance.246  
No significant interaction effects are detected for the majority of outcomes. However, the 
insurance effect on the average cost of branded drugs prescribed is substantially larger in the sub-
sample of physicians with high altruism. While Chapter 3 predicts that higher altruism should 
reduce drug costs for both patient insurance types, these results suggest that high-altruism 
physicians may exert relatively more cost-minimising effort for low-insured patients.  
The insurance effect on the number of inappropriate drugs prescribed is also higher in the 
subsample of physicians located in the wealthiest northern suburbs of Johannesburg. This 
indicates that lower expected demand elasticity with respect to care costs (due to wealthier 
patients in these suburbs on average) increases inappropriate treatments relatively more for high-
insured patients. Where the cost elasticity of aggregate demand is low, physicians’ ability to 
compete on cost for high-insured patients is even lower, which generates very little incentive for 
cost-minimising effort. Physicians may instead try to compete more on treatment quantity for 
these patients, if they believe that less cost-sensitive patients want more care (i.e. display a higher 
degree of patient moral hazard).247  
The same limitations as those noted in Chapter 5 apply to these analyses of heterogeneous 
insurance effects (see Section 5.5.2). Most importantly, the very small sample sizes (ranging from 
113-178 observations) and lack of sufficient power for reliably detecting small-moderate 
interaction effects means I cannot rule out the presence of such effects where none were detected.  
6.5.4 Robustness checks 
As discussed in Section 6.4, a physician fixed effects model is just one of a few different 
approaches to dealing with potential data clustering at the physician level. I test the robustness of 
main results to two alternative approaches: a simple paired-sample t-test, and a mixed effects 
 
246 Section 4.2.3 details how these measures of altruism and competition were constructed, and Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 provides 
summary statistics for each measure (among other measures of GP characteristics). As in Chapter 5, two measures of GP competition 
are analysed here: a measure of local competitor density and GPs’ location in the wealthier northern Johannesburg suburbs of Sandton 
and Randburg (with a wealthier patient population, and potentially lower price competition). 
247 In the context of the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3, and in particular with respect to the optimality condition 
specified in equation (5), these subsample analyses results suggest that patients’ marginal net benefit (as anticipated by physicians) is 
a concave, diminishing function with respect to cost-minimising effort.  
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model with physician-level random intercepts and slopes. Appendices D.9 - D.12 report the 
results from these tests, and all results are robust to these alternative specifications (including to 
the inclusion of fieldworker-pair fixed effects in the mixed effects model).  
Appendix D.13 also presents results from a number of other robustness checks, as in Chapter 5. 
First, in Table Column (1), results are re-estimated excluding the four consultations where an SP 
detection was likely.248 All effect sizes pertaining to prescription outcomes become marginally 
smaller in magnitude when the suspected SP detection cases are excluded. The estimated effects 
on average drug cost, average inappropriate drug cost, and total branded drug costs are pushed 
beyond the 10% significance threshold. However, the majority of results maintain their 
significance with the exclusion of these suspected SP detection cases.  
As physicians may react differently to SPs depending on whether they had seen a similar clinical 
case recently (perhaps due to learning effects), the order of the two insured SP visits can confound 
the estimated insurance effect. The visit order was therefore randomised for each physician. To 
check for any residual order (learning) effects, Table Column (2) of Appendix D.13 presents 
results from a regression specification that explicitly controls for the SP visit order for each 
physician. All results are shown to be reasonably robust to this control. 
Table Column (3) further controls for 38 consultations where SPs were asked to pay the 
physicians’ in cash and claim back from the insurance later themselves.249 Again, most results are 
shown to be reasonably robust (only the estimated effect on total consultation costs becomes 
smaller in magnitude and slightly less significant).250 Lastly, Table Column (4) of Appendix D.13 
checks the robustness of main results for continuous outcomes to the exclusion of extreme 
values.251  Interestingly, most estimated effects become much larger in magnitude and more 
statistically significant. One exception is again the estimated effect on total consultation costs, 
which maintains its significance but almost halves in size. 
 
248 As previously explained, an SP detection survey was carried out with participating physicians shortly after the completion of all 
SP visits, where they were asked for details of patients they had suspected to be SPs in previous months. Each reported suspicion was 
then analysed independently by four researchers (including myself) and compared to the actual SP visits to those physicians. Decisions 
on valid detections were taken jointly, and it was decided that two physicians in the sample had a relatively high likelihood of a valid 
SP detection. The data taken from consultations with those two physicians are therefore excluded in the estimates presented in Column 
(1) of Appendix D.13. 
249 In the majority of cases, the physician’s practice claimed from the insurer directly. 
250 One reason for this may be that some of the estimated difference in total consultation costs by insurance cover may be driven by 
differences in the number of cash consultations: high-insured patients had slightly more cash consultations (two consultations more) 
than low-insured patients, and while the difference is not large, a cash consultation is associated with a substantial increase in total 
consultation costs of R351. Explicitly controlling for cash consultations may therefore marginally lower the estimated high-insurance 
effect on total consultation costs. 
251 Extreme values (outliers) are classified here as values that are more than 3 standard deviations higher or lower than the sample 
mean. This outlier robustness check was not conducted for results on the number of fee-for-service procedures, as the overall incidence 
of such procedures was very low, and removing outliers removed all 5 observations where more than one procedure was administered 
(and left only 10 observations in the sample where any procedure was administered). 
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6.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
This chapter investigates the impact of patient insurance cover on physicians’ choices of treatment 
intensity and costs. In utilising a within-physician audit study approach, it succeeds in isolating 
physician moral hazard from patient moral hazard and selection, and in distinguishing wasteful 
from optimal care – problems that have long impeded empirical work in this area (Johnson, 2014; 
Einav and Finkelstein, 2017). It finds that physicians generate more and more unnecessary care 
expenditures for high-insured patients both in the presence and absence of any direct financial 
gain. Physicians in this experiment have no financial interest in drug prescribing. Yet, high-
insured patients receive prescriptions that are on average 17% more expensive than low-insured 
patients. This difference is driven by both more over-treatment and more over-charging (in 
receiving more branded drugs in place of cheaper generic equivalents). High-insured patients also 
incur higher costs due to physicians’ direct financial incentives. They are twice as likely to be 
ordered unnecessary FFS tests and procedures during their consultations - although this 
contributes to only marginally higher consultation costs on average (7% higher, given a low 
incidence of such additional services overall).252 
While this chapter finds higher unnecessary FFS and prescription costs for high-insured patients, 
the previous chapter provides supportive evidence that diagnostic and therapeutic accuracy is also 
poorer for these patients: high-insured patients were 23% less likely to receive a reasonably 
accurate diagnosis, and 24% more likely to be prescribed an inappropriate antibiotic. While 
diagnostic accuracy is not significantly associated with prescription costs, an inappropriate 
antibiotic prescription is associated with an increase of R137 (representing 51% of the mean 
prescription cost in this experiment). A correct or partially-correct diagnosis is also associated 
with a small decrease of R25 in total consultation costs (FFS costs). Taken together, these results 
are consistent with the notion that providers may compensate for poorer diagnostic and 
therapeutic accuracy (and their under-supply of cost-minimising effort) with more and more 
costly treatments for high-insured patients – perhaps due to physicians’ anticipation of greater 
demand (or willingness-to-pay) for such treatments from these patients. The results further 
highlight how under-provision in care quality can co-exist with (and perhaps drive) over-
provision and over-charging of treatment quantity for better insured patients. 253   
 
252 The clinical case used in this experiment (uncomplicated acute bronchitis) is less amenable to over-treatment through diagnostic 
testing and treatment procedures than through drug prescription, as a fairly accurate diagnosis is possible with only clinical history-
taking and examination and without any recourse to diagnostic testing. This may explain the more significant and robust results with 
respect to drug prescribing.   
253 This reflects the framework predictions in Chapter 3 (Hypothesis 5) where the quantity and cost of medications are decreasing in 
appropriate provider effort, and are hence larger for high-insured patients at the physician’s optimum. The results further suggest that 
physicians’ fee-for-service items (denoted 𝑥 in Chapter 3) should also be a decreasing function of provider effort. 
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The finding that branded drugs primarily drive the estimated insurance effect on prescription costs 
is also consistent with costly habits in prescribing practices (Hellerstein, 1998; Rischatsch et al., 
2013). Rischatsch et al. (2013) suggest that resistance to generic substitution may be overcome if 
physicians’ care for patients’ financial welfare and if the cost savings to patients are substantial 
enough, which could explain the estimated differences in branded drug prescriptions by insurance 
cover. It may also be that physicians’ anticipate patients to prefer branded drugs over generics, 
especially where their OOP costs are low. This expectation is not unreasonable, given evidence 
that patients do often prefer more expensive, branded drugs (Himmel et al., 2005; Shrank et al., 
2009). At the same time, patient demand for prescription drugs appears highly elastic to OOP 
costs (Leibowitz et al., 1985). So it is further reasonable that physicians anticipate greater demand 
for more and more branded drugs from high-insured patients.254  
Although higher insurance is shown to increase prescription costs, the rate of unnecessary 
prescribing is still very high for low-insured patients: the average prescription for low-insured 
patients contained 2.48 inappropriate drugs on average (at a total cost of R211), and 73% of all 
prescriptions for low-insured patients contained at least one branded drug. This may reflect a 
general problem of over-prescribing, as noted also in other contexts (Lu, 2014; Das and Hammer, 
2007; Currie et al., 2011). The high level of non-incentivised costs in general, even for low-
insured patients, is in line with the implications of Hypothesis 3 in Chapter 3: when some 
uncompensated effort is required to minimise treatment costs, physicians will in general under-
supply this effort and generate higher treatment costs (that entail no cost to them) than what is 
necessary for the patient. 
Interestingly, overall rates of over-treatment – as well as insurance effects on unnecessary 
treatment costs - are much higher for financially non-incentivised drug prescriptions than for FFS 
procedures in this experiment.255 This may be explained by the limited scope for additional FFS 
procedures within the specific clinical case and primary care context of this experiment. Firstly, 
given the uncomplicated nature of the acute bronchitis case and the limited capacity available to 
physicians to provide additional services in-house in primary care clinics (or through external 
referrals that can guarantee follow-up consultations), physicians’ scope for inducing demand and 
 
254 This chapter’s findings are therefore consistent with both the notions of i) physicians being perfect agents for patients, acting on 
anticipated patient moral hazard and preferences (that is, providing more and more costly treatments to high-insured patients that can 
afford it, and lowering out-of-pocket costs for less-insured patients), and of ii) physicians being imperfect agents, inducing more 
demand from patients with a higher expected willingness-to-pay, to substitute for lower costly effort in minimising treatment costs. 
Both cases nevertheless represent imperfect agency with respect to the third-party payer. Unfortunately, the experiment was not 
designed to discriminate between these two distinct hypotheses in explaining the observed results. Further qualitative work may be 
useful to validate and better distinguish such underlying drivers. 
255 For example, an unnecessary FFS procedure was administered in only 8% of consultations, whereas a branded drug was prescribed 
in 76% of consultations, and each prescription contained 2.6 inappropriate drugs on average (at a total cost of inappropriate drugs of 
R227).   
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providing unnecessary procedures is very low. Secondly, the potential for repeated interactions 
with the same patient is arguably higher in the primary care setting of this study, which 
simultaneously increases physicians’ market-based incentives to supply services they believe 
patients want (such as prescription drugs) and their reputational pressures to limit demand-
inducement purely for profit. It is perhaps reasonable to expect that SID and conventional second-
degree moral hazard would be more prevalent in more severe clinical cases that require curative 
or emergency treatment (where patients’ ability to consider the necessity of clinical decisions 
would be more limited) and in higher levels of care (where repeated interactions would be less 
common).256  
The results further reveal some heterogeneous insurance effects. While Chapter 3 predicts that 
higher altruism or competitive pressures should reduce physicians’ demand-inducement and 
effort-stinting behaviour for all patients, this chapter finds that these factors may affect certain 
cost outcomes for high- and low-insured patients to different degrees. For instance, the insurance 
effect on the average cost of branded drugs is significantly higher in the subsample of high-
altruism physicians.257 The parallel effect on the number of inappropriate drugs prescribed is 
higher for physicians located in the wealthiest suburbs of Johannesburg, which suggests that 
lowering physicians’ cost pressures may lead to greater increases in unnecessary care costs for 
high-insured patients (relative to low-insured ones). A possible explanation for this latter result is 
that the high average level of physician altruism in the study sample may be attenuating the 
expected effects of low competition on cost outcomes for low-insured patients. 
Overall, the findings highlight the potential for exacerbating inefficiencies in healthcare provision 
under market incentives - in the form of over-provision or over-charging of treatment quantity - 
with greater financial protection for patients. They build on an earlier finding of another, 
simultaneous problem of higher insurance: greater under-provision in care quality, as evidenced 
in Chapter 5. In the context of the South African government’s latest proposals to eliminate patient 
co-payment in private insurance schemes, and contract private primary care physicians as gate-
keepers to its prospective NHI system, these results suggest that even incremental increases in 
patients’ financial protection can have significant cost implications by altering physician 
 
256 This could partly explain why estimated insurance effects under financial incentives are much higher in Lu (2014)’s hospital setting 
than in the present study (a 43% increase in drug costs for insured patients in Lu (2014), compared to a 7% increase in FFS costs for 
high-insured patients in this study). It could also explain the relatively larger conventional second-degree moral hazard effects detected 
in computer repairs (80% higher costs for insured customers in Kerschbamer et al. (2016)) and taxi rides (17% higher charges for 
customers claiming employer travel reimbursement in Balafoutas et al. (2017)), where the scope for increasing servicing is perhaps 
greater - and the scope for repeated interactions perhaps lower - than in primary care.  
257 The insurance effect on the number of branded drugs prescribed does not significantly vary by physician altruism, however. It may 
be that physicians expect all patients (including low-insured ones) to have a preference for branded over generic drugs. Therefore, 
rather than further lowering the relative number of branded drugs prescribed to low-insured patients, high-altruism physicians may 
seek to prescribe less expensive branded drug items to these patients as an alternative means to minimising their OOP costs (although 
no significant heterogeneous effects are detected on total branded prescription costs). 
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incentives. Presumably, these effects would be larger for patients transitioning from no insurance 
at all, and where potential demand-side moral hazard (as predicted in standard economic theory) 
can also occur.  
It is important to contextualise these findings with respect to the fixed supply-side incentives in 
this study. While the chapter says nothing about the relative merits of alternative market or 
payment conditions, some implications of the non-dispensing status and FFS payment of 
physicians in this study may be inferred. This chapter finds that increasing patients’ financial 
protection can still worsen unnecessary prescribing and impede generic substitution, even in a 
context where physicians cannot directly profit from prescribing. The suggestion is that 
eliminating the positive financial incentives on treatment quantity (FFS payment) may reduce 
conventional second-degree moral hazard, but so long as appropriate physician effort remains 
uncompensated or un-incentivised, indirect second-degree moral hazard may still persist with 
payment reform.258  
Inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions and branded drugs are the main drivers of prescription cost 
differences in this study. Initiatives to rationalise antibiotic prescribing and encourage generic 
substitution could therefore attenuate unnecessary expenditures, where payment reform proves 
insufficient. This will require more than just improving physicians’ knowledge or clinical 
competence, which were controlled for in this experiment. Finding ways to incentivise non-
contractible effort, especially where both altruistic and competitive incentives for supplying such 
effort are already high (for instance, with cost-minimising effort for low-insured or uninsured 
patients), will be key.  
There are a number of limitations to this chapter’s conclusions. As with Chapter 5, external 
validity is a concern given the limited scale and scope of the experiment. The focus on the primary 
care sector and a single, uncomplicated clinical case (where no curative drug treatment is 
indicated) limits extending conclusions to more serious cases, particularly in secondary or tertiary 
care where informational asymmetries between doctor and patient are likely to be more severe. 
This is a key limitation of the SP method, where clinical cases cannot present with observable 
physical symptoms or invite invasive investigations. The lack of a perfectly random study sample, 
given the ethical requirement to secure informed consent from all research participants, warrants 
further caution in extending conclusions to the wider GP population. Future research should test 
the validity of these findings in broader contexts and samples, and with different clinical cases.  
 
258 According to the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, this result holds as long as physicians face some level of market competition, 
or are sufficiently altruistic towards patients’ financial welfare. 
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A more conceptual limitation of this chapter is that, while it finds results consistent with the two 
physician moral hazard hypotheses, it provides only suggestive evidence on the underlying 
mechanisms that are hypothesised to drive them. More accurate measurement and greater 
variation in measures of physician competition and altruism would allow a more robust analysis 
of the potential influence of these factors. A larger sample size should also improve statistical 
power to facilitate analysis of heterogeneous effects. The presence and relative importance of the 
proposed behavioural channels behind these results - of physicians inducing more intensive and 
expensive treatment when diagnostic and therapeutic accuracy is low, anticipating better-insured 
patients to expect or accept more care, or maintaining costly treatment habits - must be validated 
in future qualitative research. In addition, future research testing the effects of varying the over-
arching financial or market incentives facing physicians – which are fixed in this study (FFS 
payment and non-dispensing status) and suggested to partly drive estimated results – would be an 
insightful extension.
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7 Private Performance Feedback and Appropriate 
Care 
7.1 Introduction 
A common assertion in the health economics and agency literature is that healthcare providers 
are, to some extent, intrinsically motivated to fulfil their roles (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Galizzi 
et al., 2015). Unrelated to profit or reputational gains, intrinsic motivation is often associated with 
providers’ self-image, and their ability to knowingly perform well relative to a trusted benchmark 
(Kolstad, 2013; Eilermann et al., 2019) – be it peer norms, or best-practice standards.259 Previous 
studies have accordingly shown that such motivation may be leveraged through the provision of 
information that makes effort more intrinsically rewarding – either in bridging existing 
knowledge gaps on benchmark standards, or in better informing providers of their own relative 
performance (Kolstad, 2013; Lee, 2018). In a context of excessive antibiotic use in the South 
African primary care sector, this chapter tests the incremental effectiveness of a private audit and 
feedback (A&F) intervention – informing physicians of their prescribing performance relative to 
evidence-based guidelines – compared to providing educational materials on the guidelines alone.  
Earlier findings from this study and others have shown that inappropriate antibiotic prescribing 
for uncomplicated respiratory infections is in general very high, and can persist even in the 
absence of any patient demand (Currie et al., 2014; Blaauw and Lagarde, 2019) - highlighting a 
key role for physicians’ decision-making. Despite the availability of clear, evidence-based 
guidelines on appropriate antibiotic use, the results show significant gaps in their uptake in daily 
clinical practice. Therefore, identifying physician-level initiatives that can best address this 
evidence-practice gap is an urgent policy concern. 
Such gaps have been commonly linked to providers’ lack of guidelines knowledge or diagnostic 
uncertainty; persistent habits and prescribing norms; and their limited ability to self-assess their 
own practice (Davis et al., 2006, Brink, Van Wyk, et al., 2016; Tonkin-Crine et al., 2017). 
Accordingly, educational materials and performance audit and feedback (A&F) – often linked to 
 
259 It follows that, in order to be effective, intrinsically-motivated providers must have correct knowledge of the relevant benchmark 
and be aware of how they perform relative to it. 
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published performance scorecards or financial incentives – have been widely used in performance 
improvement initiatives. Previous evaluations of these initiatives highlight a number of 
implications and limitations.  
Firstly, in comparisons of alternative interventions, physician education has been found 
frequently effective in lowering antibiotic prescriptions in primary care - often in combination 
with other intervention elements, such as A&F (van der Velden et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the 
quality of this evidence base is generally low (Tonkin-Crine et al., 2017); and repeated findings 
of a “know-do” gap in clinical practice (Das and Gertler, 2007; Leonard and Masatu, 2010)260 
suggest that physician education alone may only be of limited value in improving clinical 
performance, without additional incentives to raise performance in line with knowledge. Evidence 
on the incremental incentive effect of A&F - in bolstering educational interventions - is scarce.  
Secondly, in designing A&F initiatives, whether audited performance data is kept confidential or 
disclosed to a wider audience has important implications for associated incentives. Public 
disclosure of audit data (and its incorporation in financial incentive schemes) has been highly 
contested, particularly given problems in systematically measuring case-specific and risk-
adjusted quality of care through simple, finite metrics. A growing body of evidence further 
suggests that appealing to such extrinsic motives as financial or reputational concerns alone may 
be insufficient for improving care quality (Ketelaar et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2011; Berenson and 
Rice, 2015) and can indeed lead to perverse provider responses (Werner and Asch, 2005) – 
including up-coding of clinical data (Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2010), and ‘cream-skimming’ of 
low-risk patients (Schneider and Epstein, 1996; Dranove et al., 2003; Wadhera et al., 2018).261 
Private A&F instead appeals to physicians’ intrinsic motivations (or professionalism), and is 
hypothesised to work by providing physicians new information on their performance relative to 
a trusted benchmark. In this view, physicians are believed to be intrinsically motivated to improve 
care, but hampered by their limited ability to self-assess their own performance (Davis et al., 
2006). The new, private information from A&F increases the intrinsic returns to effort, by making 
physicians more aware of their current relative performance and subsequent improvement. 
Kolstad (2013) finds that such private audit information targeting intrinsic incentives is many 
times more effective in improving provider performance than public audit information targeting 
market incentives (market demand).  
 
260 This refers to instances where physicians’ actual clinical performance falls below that predicted by measures of their knowledge. 
261 ‘Up-coding’ (or ‘diagnosis-shifting’) refers to manipulation of reported diagnoses in administrative records, to record more severe 
or antibiotic-appropriate diagnoses than the true (known) diagnosis, in order to justify antibiotic treatment. ‘Cream-skimming’ refers 
to the deliberate selection by providers of less complicated clinical cases or low-risk patients for treatment. 
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Relatedly, in evaluating A&F effects, accurately measuring all intended effects, as well as 
unintended spill-overs on non-targeted aspects of care, has proved challenging. A common 
reliance on administrative data limits the scope and accuracy of performance measurement. In 
general, not all patient and clinical case characteristics that determine appropriate care are 
measured. Therefore, patient and case selection cannot be fully controlled for, and risk-adjustment 
in performance measurement is likely to be imperfect (Dranove et al., 2003).262 The appropriate 
use of antibiotics further depends on the diagnosis, and the accuracy of the latter cannot be verified 
from physician reports alone – given the scope for diagnostic error or inaccurate reporting.263 In 
addition, targeting aggregate antibiotic prescription rates in A&F interventions can generate 
unwanted spill-overs if physicians respond by reducing both inappropriate and appropriate 
antibiotic prescribing.  The potential for such unintended effects is in general ignored in previous 
intervention designs and evaluations.264  
With these considerations in mind, the present chapter evaluates a small, randomised controlled 
trial (RCT) testing the effects of private, individualised A&F in lowering inappropriate antibiotic 
treatment – where individual performance was reported relative to standard clinical guidelines - 
compared to the provision of educational material on the guidelines alone. 265  Standardised 
patients (SP) were used to measure performance outcomes, to overcome the limitations of 
administrative data in impact evaluation: all case and patient characteristics were standardised, so 
it was possible to determine appropriate care ex ante and to isolate and measure physicians’ care 
quality performance ex post. The RCT was conducted with 80 private, primary care physicians in 
Johannesburg. At baseline, all participating physicians received incognito visits from SPs 
presenting with an uncomplicated case of acute bronchitis, where no antibiotic treatment was 
clinically indicated. Physicians were then randomised to one of two interventions: i) receipt of 
written educational material on AMR and clinical guidelines for the diagnosis and treatment of 
common respiratory illnesses, or ii) receipt of the same educational material and a private A&F 
intervention. The A&F intervention provided written feedback to physicians on key aspects of 
their individual performance during baseline SP visits, including whether an antibiotic was 
 
262  “Risk-adjustment” refers to adjustment of performance outcomes (e.g. patient health outcomes) for differences in patient 
characteristics and the severity of clinical cases.  
263 As such, where pecuniary or reputational incentives are attached to measured performance, the potential for providers to game 
quality monitoring systems, either through the selection of lower-risk patients or the manipulation of reported diagnoses, cannot be 
controlled for. 
264 One exception is Meeker et al. (2016), who evaluate possible side-effects of peer-benchmarked A&F on diagnosis-shifting (from 
antibiotic-inappropriate to antibiotic-appropriate diagnoses) and repeat consultations for concerning diagnoses following consultations 
where antibiotics were not prescribed (indicating negative effects on appropriate antibiotic treatment). However, the authors’ reliance 
on electronic health record (EHR) and billing data is not optimal for ascertaining the true diagnoses and measuring clinical 
performance.  
265 This corresponds to a test of Hypothesis 7 in Chapter 3. 
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inappropriately prescribed.266 Following the intervention, end-line SP visits were conducted with 
the same clinical case to evaluate the impact of private A&F on reported aspects of physician 
performance. Unlike most previous studies, this experiment further tests for potential unintended 
effects of A&F on appropriate prescribing behaviour. A second SP clinical case where antibiotics 
would be clinically indicated - a more severe acute bronchitis case, in a HIV+ young adult - was 
also presented to participants at end-line, and rates of appropriate antibiotic prescribing for this 
case were compared across the two intervention groups.  
Three main findings are reported. First, the results suggest that private A&F can significantly 
reduce inappropriate antibiotic treatments: physicians randomised to the A&F intervention group 
were 46% less likely to give inappropriate antibiotic treatment at end-line compared to physicians 
that received educational materials alone. 267  Second, this result does not coincide with any 
significant differences in observable diagnostic effort or accuracy, suggesting that measured 
diagnostic performance may not be the primary barrier to appropriate treatment choices. 
Descriptive evidence points to habit persistence, and social norms in prescribing practices, as 
alternative barriers to appropriate antibiotic use. If physicians’ ability to objectively self-assess 
and improve their performance is hindered by engrained habits or social norms, it is possible that 
these barriers can be overcome with the new, objective information provided by A&F. Third, 
there is no evidence of negative spill-overs from the A&F intervention - either in reducing 
appropriate antibiotic treatments, or in encouraging the substitution of other inappropriate drugs. 
Physicians in the A&F treatment group were no less likely to prescribe clinically-indicated 
antibiotics for the more severe HIV+ patient case, and no more likely to prescribe other 
inappropriate drugs such as steroids.268  
While previous studies have evaluated the effects of A&F on antibiotic use, this chapter presents 
new causal evidence of its incremental effect relative to an educational support alone. The 
intervention also represents a novel initiative targeting prescribing practices in the primary care 
sector of South Africa - a country where most (if not all) antibiotic stewardship initiatives are 
focused on secondary care, despite findings that the majority of antibiotics are being prescribed 
in primary care (and mostly for respiratory infections) (Brink, Van Wyk, et al., 2016; Tonkin-
Crine et al., 2017). While its cost-effectiveness remains to be assessed, the results corroborate 
 
266 Two other performance outcomes were also reported: the proportion of all case-specific recommended or essential history-taking 
and examinations that were completed, and the cost of all drugs dispensed or prescribed (relative to the cheapest, recommended 
treatment on the local market for the case). Nevertheless, inappropriate antibiotic prescribing was the primary component of the A&F 
intervention, and performance on this aspect was purposefully emphasised in the written feedback form. The stronger emphasis was 
achieved by listing this performance aspect first, before the other two reported aspects, and using a larger font. See Appendix B.10 
(a) for an example of the feedback presentation. 
267 This result is calculated based on an end-line antibiotic treatment rate of 52% in the control group. 
268 It is plausible that the provision of educational materials also to the A&F treatment group, on recommended treatments for a number 
of respiratory conditions of varying severity, may have acted to minimise the risk of such unintended treatment effects.  
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similar conclusions elsewhere (Meeker et al., 2016) that the addition of individualised, private 
A&F to simple educational interventions may be a promising initiative to explore for rationalising 
antibiotic treatment choices on a larger scale.269 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 summaries the chapter’s main 
contributions to related literature. Section 7.3 outlines the RCT design and implementation, and 
summarises descriptive statistics on participants’ baseline characteristics and outcomes of 
interest. Section 7.4 presents the empirical framework, main results and robustness checks. 
Finally, Section 7.5 concludes with a discussion on the main findings, policy implications and 
limitations of the chapter’s analyses.   
7.2 Literature Contributions 
This chapter contributes to four bodies of literature. First, it builds on a large literature in 
economics that posits that agents – including healthcare providers – can have intrinsic motivations 
for supplying effort (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Berenson and Rice, 2015; Galizzi et al., 2015). 
“Intrinsic motivation” is broadly defined here as any motivation for effort that is unrelated to 
profit or reputational concerns. Intrinsically-motivated agents derive utility from performing a 
task for its own sake (‘pure’ intrinsic utility), performing well relative to a trusted benchmark 
(professionalism, or ‘reference-based’ utility), or performing tasks with positive social 
externalities (altruism, or ‘pro-social’ utility). Direct evidence of intrinsic motivation (and 
relatedly, altruism) among healthcare providers mainly comes from surveys or laboratory 
experiments (Sicsic, Le Vaillant and Franc, 2012; Godager and Wiesen, 2013; Hennig-Schmidt 
and Wiesen, 2014). Existing literature often depicts such motivation as an exogenous and fixed 
trait – one which, for example, explains why some individuals self-select into certain types of 
jobs (including low-paying or rural jobs) that may be deemed unattractive under standard 
economic models of utility-maximisation (Kolstad and Lindkvist, 2013; Ashraf, Bandiera and 
Lee, 2018). In this view, organisations can ensure intrinsically-motivated agents only through 
selection, rather than through influence (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Heyes, 2005; Delfgaauw and 
Dur, 2008; Brekke and Nyborg, 2010; Smith et al., 2013).270 This chapter instead aligns more 
closely with a recent literature proposing that agents’ intrinsic motivation can indeed be nurtured 
 
269 Meeker et al. (2016) evaluate a similar intervention to the present one with GPs in the US. They provide the same best-practice 
guidelines information to both treatment and control group GPs (as in this study) and find a marginal A&F effect of similar magnitude 
(a 47% reduction in inappropriate antibiotic use). Their study differs in two ways to the present one: they report individual performance 
relative to an anonymised peer performance benchmark (rather than best-practice guidelines) and use electronic health records (EHR) 
data to measure performance improvement (instead of SPs).  
270 Theories on motivational crowd-out moreover imply that, where such intrinsic motivation can be altered, it may only be reduced 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Empirical evidence of reductions in agent effort following the introduction of financial or other extrinsic 
incentives lend support to these theories (Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999; Georgellis, Iossa and Tabvuma, 2010). 
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or mobilised by organisations (Ashraf and Bandiera, 2017a), through the design of organisational, 
job or task attributes, and the provision of explicit intrinsic incentives for performance.  
In particular, this chapter develops a nascent body of empirical work evaluating intrinsic 
informational incentives for effort. Private performance feedback (A&F) has been proven 
effective in improving health worker quality and productivity (Ivers et al., 2012; Kolstad, 2013; 
Lee, 2018; Eilermann et al., 2019), particularly where baseline performance is low. The proposed 
mechanism is that the marginal intrinsic (reference-based) utility from effort is increased when 
health workers are supplied with new information on their relative performance. 271  Such 
interventions are distinct from those targeting extrinsic information incentives, in the form of 
public reporting or peer information sharing (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005; Mas and 
Moretti, 2009; Ketelaar et al., 2011), which trigger external reputational or competitive 
concerns.272 Private A&F interventions often involve (anonymised) peer comparisons (Kolstad, 
2013; Elouafkaoui et al., 2016; Hallsworth et al., 2016; Lee, 2018), where individual performance 
is reported relative to some aggregate peer performance benchmark. The intervention evaluated 
here instead benchmarks audited performance to objective, evidence-based clinical guidelines. 
The benefit of this approach is that it will be appropriate in all contexts, even where – as in this 
study’s context – average peer performance is also low. Moreover, there is little evidence that 
peer comparison in private A&F is any more effective than comparison to evidence-based clinical 
standards (Elouafkaoui et al., 2016).  
Benchmarking audited performance to clinical guidelines can also improve performance in two 
distinct ways: by bridging a gap in physicians’ knowledge of the guidelines themselves 
(improving knowledge) and by providing new information to physicians on their relative 
performance (aiding self-assessment). Although both mechanisms can be considered 
informational incentives that raise the marginal intrinsic utility to effort (see Section 3.4.2 for a 
discussion on this), they have very different policy implications.273 If knowledge of guidelines is 
the primary effort constraint for physicians, then a less resource-intensive educational 
intervention than A&F may be just as effective. Other studies evaluating A&F interventions that 
benchmark performance to best-practice standards do not untangle these two channels (Eilermann 
 
271 The implication is that a larger gap between baseline performance and the ‘best practice’ benchmark indicates a greater degree of 
‘new’ information for physicians following performance feedback, thereby stimulating a larger improvement in performance. This 
supports the idea that A&F interventions work by overcoming physicians’ limited ability to self-assess their own performance (Davis 
et al., 2006). 
272 The latter have proven less effective than intrinsic incentives, and can indeed result in perverse effects (Werner and Asch, 2005; 
Kolstad, 2013), Public reporting has been found effective in improving quality at the hospital level; however, there is little (if any) 
evidence of its effectiveness at the physician level (Marshall et al., 2000; Shekelle et al., 2008) or in stimulating the targeted demand 
response (Epstein, 2006; Ketelaar et al., 2011), and indeed some indication of system ‘gaming’ through provider selection of low-risk 
patients and manipulation of clinical case coding (Dranove et al., 2003; Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2010). 
273 Only the latter mechanism corresponds to a pure incentive. The former mechanism can also correspond to an effort “enabler,” that 
reduces marginal effort costs by bridging a knowledge gap.   
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et al., 2019). The intervention evaluated in this chapter therefore presents a novel addition to this 
literature: by providing basic educational materials on best-practice guidelines to all physicians 
(in both the A&F treatment and control groups), it ensures that all participating physicians have 
access to the guidelines information, and thereby isolates the pure incentive effect of private A&F 
from the knowledge-improvement effect of guidelines information alone.   
A third, specific body of related literature evaluates physician-targeted interventions to rationalise 
antibiotic treatment for respiratory infections (van der Velden et al., 2012; Tonkin-Crine et al., 
2017).274 A review by van der Velden et al. (2012) found that multifaceted interventions, that 
contained at least some educational materials for the physician, were most often effective in 
lowering overall antibiotic prescription rates. Tonkin-Crine et al. (2017)’s review of systematic 
reviews concludes, however, that available RCT evidence on the effectiveness of multifaceted or 
single interventions containing educational materials for physicians is generally of low quality. 
Moreover, the incremental effect of private A&F in improving the impact of physician education 
alone is unclear. While a few RCTs have evaluated private A&F interventions (Mainous et al., 
2000; Gerber et al., 2013; Elouafkaoui et al., 2016; Hallsworth et al., 2016; Meeker et al., 2016), 
they often include A&F as part of multifaceted interventions which prevent an understanding of 
its incremental effect (Gerber et al., 2013; Hallsworth et al., 2016); evaluate A&F interventions 
that feedback on organisation-level performance (rather than physician-level performance) 
(Mainous et al., 2000; Hallsworth et al., 2016); and evaluate effects on aggregate prescription 
rates, rather than untangling the desired effects on inappropriate prescriptions alone (Elouafkaoui 
et al., 2016; Hallsworth et al., 2016). One exception that is closely aligned to the present chapter 
is Meeker et al. (2016), who find that private, individualised A&F on inappropriate prescription 
rates (prescriptions for antibiotic-inappropriate respiratory diagnoses), combined with guidelines 
education, lowered inappropriate prescription rates by 47% compared to guidelines education 
alone. Meeker et al. (2016) benchmark individual performance to high-performing peers rather 
than objective, best-practice guidelines. Moreover, as in other studies in this literature, their 
reliance on administrative, physician-reported (EHR) data to evaluate prescription performance 
limits the accurate assessment of prescription appropriateness (which necessarily relies on 
reported diagnoses).  
This chapter therefore builds on a fourth body of literature utilising incognito SPs for evaluating 
physicians’ care quality performance (Beullens et al., 1997; Glassman et al., 2000; Das and 
Gertler, 2007; Rethans et al., 2007; Mohanan et al., 2012; Das and Hammer, 2014; Daniels et al., 
 
274 A range of interventions have been tested, including the provision of educational materials, educational meetings, outreach visits, 
A&F, point-of-care testing, financial incentives, delayed prescription strategies and enhanced patient communication (van der Velden 
et al., 2012; Tonkin-Crine et al., 2017). 
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2017). The SP method allows researchers to fix the clinical case (and hence, the diagnosis) and 
important patient characteristics, and thereby establish optimal care and prescription outcomes ex 
ante. It overcomes any potential for provider selection of low-risk patients, or manipulation of 
diagnoses coding, which can bias measured performance. Despite its growing use in evaluating 
provider quality in observational studies, the incognito SP method has rarely been employed in 
evaluating randomised provider quality interventions (Das, Chowdhury et al., 2016; Harrison et 
al., 2000, Mathews et al., 2009; Mohanan et al., 2017). One exception is Mohanan et al. (2017), 
who use SPs to evaluate the impact of a social franchising and telemedicine intervention in 
improving the clinical management of childhood illnesses in Bihar, India. Another exception is 
Das, Chowdhury et al. (2016), who use SPs to evaluate the care quality impact of a training 
program for informal healthcare providers in West Bengal, India. 275  This chapter further 
demonstrates this novel application of the incognito SP method for better evaluating randomised 
physician-targeted interventions.  
7.3 Experimental Design, Implementation and Data 
The randomised experiment evaluated in this chapter is discussed in detail in Section 4.3.2, and 
corresponds to Part 2 of this thesis study. An overview of the experiment is provided in the sub-
sections below. 
7.3.1 Sampling, recruitment and randomisation 
The experiment was conducted with private, primary care physicians (GPs) in the City of 
Johannesburg (CoJ), South Africa. The GP sample was initially recruited as part of the related 
ESRC study. GPs were contacted for recruitment over February – May 2018, and SP visits 
presenting an uncomplicated acute bronchitis case (Clinical Case 1)276 were completed with 122 
recruited GPs in June 2018. The baseline data for this experiment was collected from those visits. 
Of these 122 GPs successfully visited at baseline, 99 were deemed eligible for participation in 
this experiment.  
 
275 Li, Lin and Guan (2013) also use SPs to evaluate the efficacy of a randomised hospital-based intervention in China in changing 
provider behaviour toward HIV-positive patients, although they do not address care quality per se. Sanci et al. (2000) use SPs to 
evaluate a randomised educational intervention targeting the quality of adolescent care. However, the SP consultations in that study 
were not blinded (physicians were aware that the consulting patient was an SP, and that their consultation was being recorded), which 
raises the risk of observation (Hawthorne) effects biasing measured performance. 
276 See Section 4.1.1, and Appendices B.1 and B.2, for details on the corresponding SP clinical case.  
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Figure 7.1. Experiment participation – GP participant flow-chart 
Eligible GPs were those who were not in shared group practices277 and not assessed to have 
detected any SPs during baseline visits (based on an SP detection survey conducted after the 
visits). The 99 eligible GPs were then stratified according to baseline performance on the main 
outcome of interest (whether they prescribed an inappropriate antibiotic during the baseline SP 
visits), as well as their drug dispensing and medical scheme contracting status, and randomised 
into one of two intervention arms: i) receipt of educational materials with private performance 
feedback (‘treatment’ group), or ii) receipt of educational materials only (‘control’ group) – see 
 
277 All GPs that shared a practice with another GP in the 122 assessed for eligibility were excluded. This was due to logistical and 
fieldworker constraints, as having many participating GPs practicing in the same clinics reduces the number of fieldworkers available 
to complete all visits (the same fieldworker could not visit the same clinic twice, due to the heightened risk of detection). It was also 
designed to limit potential treatment spillovers between treated and control group GPs practicing in the same location. 15 group 
practice GPs were excluded as a result. Despite these efforts to exclude group practice GPs, there were still a few cases of GPs that 
shared group practices being retained in the final sample (6 GPs), due to errors in GPs’ practice address listings. 
GPs assessed for 
eligibility (with 
baseline data from 
ESRC study) 
N=122 
Randomised: 
N=99 
Ineligible: N=23 
Shared group practices: N=15 
Incomplete SP detection 
survey or potential SP 
detection at baseline: N=8 
 
Lost to follow-up: N=2 
Refused to continued 
participation at interview: 
N=1 
Stopped seeing acute 
patients since interview: 
N=1 
Excluded from intervention: 
N=5 
Refused to continue 
participation (refused to 
interview): N=4 
Unavailable over 
intervention period: N=1 
 
Lost to follow-up: N=1 
Retired: N=1 
Allocated to control 
group: 
N=49 
Allocated to 
treatment group: 
N=50 
Received control 
intervention 
(‘education’) at 
interview: 
N=44 
Received treatment 
intervention (A&F 
and ‘education’) at 
interview:  
N=39 
Included in final 
sample:  
N=43 
Included in final 
sample:  
N=37 
 
Excluded from intervention: 
N=11 
Refused to continue 
participation (refused to 
interview): N=8 
Unavailable or unreachable 
over intervention period: 
N=3 
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below. Randomisation was carried out in November 2018, using a random number generator in 
Excel, resulting in 50 GPs being randomised to the treatment group and 49 to the control group.278  
See Figure 7.1 for an overview of GP participation, from initial experiment eligibility to final 
sample composition. 
7.3.2 Feedback intervention and implementation 
Following random assignment, the 99 GPs were contacted for a face-to-face interview to be 
conducted at their practices. The experimental intervention was delivered at the end of these 
interviews. GPs were not informed about the intervention, but they were notified about the general 
content of the interviews and were informed that they would receive further incognito SP visits 
following the interviews.  
Before each interview, interviewers were given a sealed envelope by the research team, 
containing either a four-page educational leaflet (the ‘control’ intervention) or the educational 
leaflet with an individualised performance feedback sheet (the ‘treatment’ intervention), 
depending on the treatment status of the GP they were to interview. At the end of each interview, 
interviewers were instructed to hand over the sealed envelope to the GP. At this stage, treatment 
group GPs were informed about the content of the envelope, that the feedback was entirely 
confidential, and that it was based on previous SP visits that they had consented to.279  
Following the intervention, each interviewed GPs received two further incognito SP visits (‘end-
line’ visits), where clinical performance data was collected to evaluate the intervention impact.  
One of these two end-line SPs was identical to the one presented at baseline (Clinical Case 1). 
The other SP presented with a new, more complicated clinical case: a HIV+ young adult with a 
more severe case of acute bronchitis (Clinical Case 2). The order of these two SP visits was 
randomised for each GP, to prevent any order effects from confounding GPs’ treatment choices 
in each case. End-line SP visits were conducted within a few weeks of the corresponding 
interviews, over the period December 2018-March 2019.280  
 
278 Unfortunately the sample size was restricted by fieldwork and funding constraints, both at baseline (in the ESRC study) and during 
the experiment.  
279 The specific interviewer scripts when delivering the intervention to control and treatment group GPs are provided in Appendix 
B.9. 
280 The majority of end-line visits (154 of the 160 visits in the final sample) were conducted within a month of the corresponding GP 
interview. In 6 visit cases, however, the gap between the end-line visit and the interview were between 1 and 3 months due to issues 
with GP availability and fieldwork logistics. Potential implications for experiment validity are discussed in Section 7.3.3. 
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7.3.2.1 ‘Control’ intervention: educational leaflet 
A challenge in isolating the pure incentive effect of A&F interventions that report performance 
relative to clinical guidelines is that such feedback can also work through bridging a knowledge 
gap among physicians on the guidelines themselves.281 To rule out this knowledge-improvement 
effect, it was important that both treatment and control groups received the same information on 
best-practice guidelines. A counterfactual intervention was therefore employed where written 
guidelines information was shared with control group GPs in the form of an educational leaflet. 
The same information was also incorporated in the treatment group intervention (see below).  
The four-page (A5) educational leaflet had three components (see Appendix B.10 (b) for an 
example). The front page presented the study motivation, outlining information on AMR and 
antibiotic consumption in South Africa. The inside two pages summarised both diagnostic and 
recommended treatment guidelines for five respiratory illnesses that often present in primary care 
with overlapping symptoms: the common cold, acute bronchitis, flu (influenza), acute bacterial 
sinusitis and pneumonia. The aim was to inform GPs of the common clinical presentation and any 
appropriate diagnostic testing in each case, to enable a differential diagnosis; and to summarise 
the recommended management of each diagnosis (according to national treatment guidelines), 
emphasising if and when antibiotic treatment should be considered. Control group GPs were also 
informed that confidential feedback on their performance in SP visits would be made available to 
them (upon request) following study completion.  
7.3.2.2 ‘Treatment’ intervention: educational leaflet and individualised performance feedback  
Treatment group GPs also received a four-page leaflet (see Appendix B.10 (a)). The front page 
(‘feedback page’) presented individualised feedback on their performance in baseline SP visits, 
and the following pages detailed all contents of the control group’s educational leaflet.282 The 
feedback page outlined the clinical case that was presented (an uncomplicated case of acute 
bronchitis, in an otherwise healthy young adult), and reported three aspects of measured 
performance. First, it reported whether the GP had prescribed or dispensed an antibiotic, whilst 
outlining that an antibiotic was not clinically-indicated for the case. Second, it reported the 
percentage of all case-specific essential and recommended history-taking and examinations that 
had been completed. It was explained that this checklist was devised in consultation with 
respiratory and infectious diseases experts, and designed to enable GPs to differentiate respiratory 
 
281 Where such knowledge gaps exist, the overall effect of a private A&F intervention is the combined effect of improving knowledge 
of best-practice guidelines and providing new information to physicians’ on their relative performance. Only the latter effect operates 
through intrinsic incentives, in theory. 
282 The AMR and ESRC study information was consolidated on the back page, rather than being presented on two separate pages (as 
for control group GPs). 
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illnesses with common symptoms.283 Third, it reported the total cost of the drugs prescribed or 
dispensed by the GP, and how it compared (in multiplier terms) to the cheapest, appropriate 
treatment available on the local market for the same case.284  
A ‘traffic-light’ colour coding system was used in the text to highlight good or bad performance. 
If the GP had inappropriately prescribed an antibiotic at baseline, this was reported in red text 
(whereas green text was used when no antibiotic had been prescribed). Similarly, the colours red, 
yellow and green were used to report the case-specific checklist completion rates of less than 
40%, between 40-60%, and above 60% respectively. Lastly, if the total cost of drugs prescribed 
or dispensed was above the cheapest appropriate treatment cost, this was reported in red text (and 
in green text, if below). To emphasise the main targeted outcome, performance on antibiotic 
prescribing was presented first. 
7.3.3 Experiment validity 
7.3.3.1 Non-participation, attrition and balance 
The final sample used in this chapter’s analysis consists of 80 GPs: 37 in the treatment group and 
43 in the control. Of the 99 GPs initially randomised, 16 were dropped from the final sample due 
to non-participation (these GPs received neither the intervention nor the two end-line SP visits)285 
and 3 due to attrition (these GPs received the intervention, but not the end-line SP visits). 
This non-participation and attrition – particularly the differential rates across the treatment and 
control groups - may pose a risk to experiment validity. Internal validity is threatened if treatment 
status influences GPs’ decisions to drop-out and biases the comparability of the two groups. 
However, the majority of sample loss (84%) occurred before the intervention was administered 
(at the invite to interview) and before GPs had any knowledge of the intervention or their 
treatment status. Table 7.1 shows results from binary regressions of non-participation and attrition 
indicators on all baseline outcomes, as well as on all observable GP characteristics for which data 
was available prior to the GP interviews.286 Treatment status is not significantly associated with 
the likelihood of non-participation (Column (1)) or attrition (Column (4)). However, in the control 
group, female GPs were more likely to refuse participation (Column (2)) and contracted-in GPs 
 
283 See Appendix B.1 for a list of these checklist items for Clinical Case 1. 
284 The cheapest treatment that was considered appropriate for this clinical case was a cough suppressant syrup and paracetamol, 
priced at a total R17.86. This was based on advice from national respiratory and infectious diseases experts, recommendations in the 
2014 South African Standard Treatment Guidelines and Essential Medicines List (STG/EML), and regulated prices in the South 
African Medicine Price Registry. 
285 Most of these GPs declined to interview citing work time constraints (GPs were requested 30 minutes of their work time to complete 
the interviews). 
286 This data on a limited set of GP characteristics was taken from the online database of medical practitioners used for recruitment 
(Medpages). 
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were more likely to attrite (Column (5)) – while similar relationships are not observed in the 
treatment group.287 
Column (4) of Table 7.2 reports tests of balance across the two groups in the final (retained) 
sample for a set of baseline GP characteristics measured in the interviews. Column (4) of Table 
7.3 reports equivalent tests for all baseline outcomes. The baseline measure of altruism may be 
conceptually linked to GPs’ intrinsic motivations to provide appropriate care to patients, and 
baseline levels of intrinsic motivation may in turn determine how GPs respond to the intrinsic 
incentives from performance feedback (Lee, 2018). It is therefore reassuring that this measure of 
altruism does not significantly vary between the treatment and control groups. Some significant 
differences are notable, however. Control GPs are less likely to be black African (or mixed-race) 
than treatment GPs, and more likely to be practising in the wealthy northern suburbs of Sandton 
and Randburg. They also communicated significantly weaker beliefs that patients would expect 
antibiotics for Clinical Case 2 (when the case was presented to them in vignette form in the 
interviews).288 During the baseline SP visits, control GPs spent almost three minutes less in 
consultation time than treatment GPs. While not statistically significant, there were further sizable 
differences in the gender distribution and the total cost of drugs prescribed at baseline: control 
GPs were almost 50% more likely to be female, and generated total baseline drug costs that were 
32% higher on average than treatment GPs. These differences highlight that the treatment and 
control groups in the final sample cannot be treated as identical. In the following analyses, all 
significant and sizable observed differences are controlled for as covariates in the main regression 
specifications.  
The external validity of results would also be reduced if GPs that drop out are systematically 
different from those that remain in the final sample. Column (1) of Table 7.1 shows that GPs that 
did not participate in the study were slightly younger, and less likely to have prescribed certain 
inappropriate drugs (excluding antibiotics and steroids) in baseline visits. However, none of the 
other observed GP characteristics or baseline outcomes are meaningfully associated with study 
non-participation or attrition. 
 
 
 
 
287 The latter result is driven by the one GP that dropped out of the control group, who was contracted-out. 
288 See Section 4.2.3 for details on how such beliefs about antibiotics were measured. 
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Table 7.1. Baseline determinants of non-participation and attrition 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
 Non-participation Attrition 
    
Full sample 
(non-particip 
=1) 
Control 
group (non-
particip. 
=1) 
Treatment 
group 
(non-
particip. 
=1) 
Full sample 
(attrition=1) 
Control 
group 
(attrition=1) 
Treatment 
group 
(attrition=1) 
Group (1 = treatment group) 0.12   0.03   
  (0.07)   (0.04)   
a) GP characteristics       
Dispensing status (1 = dispensing) 0.03 0.10 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.08 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
Contracting status (1 = contracted-in) 0.12 0.13 0.11 -0.03 -0.11** 0.06 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.16) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
Age -0.01** -0.01* -0.01 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender (1 = female) 0.03 0.18** -0.13 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
Northern suburb practice -0.00 -0.06 0.14 0.02 0.07 -0.06 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) 
Local GP density (in 1 km radius) -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
b) Baseline measures of outcomes       
Antibiotic prescription (stratifying 
variable) 
0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.08 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
Total drug cost (per consultation), 
ZAR 
0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of drugs (per consultation) 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03* 0.01 0.04 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Average drug cost (per consultation), 
ZAR 
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Steroid prescription 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
Other inappropriate drug prescription -0.14* -0.07 -0.18 0.05 0.03 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
Consultation time (mins.) -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Checklist completion (share) -0.19 0.20 -0.47 -0.13 -0.03 -0.23 
  (0.27) (0.32) (0.42) (0.14) (0.16) (0.25) 
IRT score -0.03 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Correct / partially-correct diagnosis  -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 0.03 0.05 0.02 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
       
Sample mean 0.16 0.10 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.05 
Obs. (no. of GPs) 99 49 50 83 44 39 
Notes. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ‘Non-participation’ indicates those GPs that were randomized into an intervention group, but who refused to 
the face-to-face interview where the intervention was to be administered (and hence, were neither informed about nor received the intervention) (N=16). 
‘Attrition’ indicates those GPs that received the intervention but either refused to on-going participation in the study or were not successfully followed-
up (N=3). ‘Northern suburb practice’ indicates whether the GP’s practice was located in the wealthiest northern suburbs of Sandton and Randburg in 
Johannesburg. ‘Local GP density’ indicates the number of competing GPs located within a 1 km radius of the GP’s practice. See Section 4.2.2 for details 
on how drug treatment and cost outcomes were calculated; Appendix B.1 for the checklist items, and for the diagnoses coding; Appendix B.6 for how the 
IRT score is calculated from checklist items; and Appendix E.1 for a list of all checklist items included and excluded from the IRT analyses in this chapter.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.2. T-test of differences in baseline characteristics between treatment & control groups in 
final sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Full Sample Control Treatment Difference 
(treatment- 
control) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
a. GP characteristics        
Dispensing status (stratifying variable) 0.57 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.59 (0.50) -0.04 
Contracted-in status (stratifying variable) 0.81 (0.39) 0.81 (0.39) 0.81 (0.40) 0.00 
Age 53.51 (11.55) 53.06 (11.03) 54.04 (12.25) -0.99 
Female 0.30 (0.46) 0.35 (0.48) 0.24 (0.43) 0.11 
Ethnicity:        
      African / Coloured 0.31 (0.47) 0.21 (0.41) 0.43 (0.50) -0.22** 
      Asian / Indian / Other 0.38 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.27 (0.45) 0.13 
      White 0.31 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.27 (0.45) 0.08 
Northern suburb practice  0.25 (0.44) 0.33 (0.47) 0.16 (0.37) 0.16* 
Group practice 0.28 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46) 0.24 (0.43) 0.06 
Local GP density (no. competing GPs within 1 km 
radius of practice) 
8.53 (9.13) 7.91 (8.06) 9.24 (10.30) -1.34 
Average daily patient load  24.00 (13.89) 24.49 (13.24) 23.43 (14.77) 1.06 
Altruism: is (highly) altruistic 0.60 (0.49) 0.63 (0.49) 0.57 (0.50) 0.06 
b. GP knowledge & antibiotic beliefs (based on responses to case vignettes & AMR quiz) 
Knows diagnosis name for Clinical Case 1 (viral 
bronchitis) 
0.17 (0.38) 0.21 (0.41) 0.14 (0.35) 0.07 
Knows viral cause of Clinical Case 1 0.88 (0.33) 0.91 (0.29) 0.84 (0.37) 0.07 
Knows treatment guidelines for Clinical Case 1 0.24 (0.43) 0.23 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) -0.01 
Perceived antibio. effectiveness for Clinical Case 1 1 30.10 (31.37) 33.98 (31.00) 25.59 (31.62) 8.38 
Perceived antibio. prescribing norms for          
Clinical Case 1 2 
65.38 (28.24) 67.09 (29.81) 63.38 (26.56) 3.71 
Perceived patient expectations for antibio. for 
Clinical Case 1 3 
55.56 (32.07) 53.84 (30.35) 57.57 (34.27) -3.73 
Knows diagnosis name for Clinical Case 2 (bacterial 
bronchitis)  
0.55 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.54 (0.51) 0.02 
Knows bacterial cause of Clinical Case 2 0.68 (0.47) 0.70 (0.46) 0.65 (0.48) 0.05 
Perceived antibio. effectiveness for Clinical Case 2 1 71.95 (28.48) 69.56 (29.54) 74.73 (27.33) -5.17 
Perceived antibio. prescribing norms for          
Clinical Case 2 2 
82.56 (23.25) 79.42 (25.87) 86.22 (19.49) -6.80 
Perceived patient expectations for antibio. for 
Clinical Case 2 3 
74.42 (27.94) 68.84 (30.27) 80.92 (23.72) -12.08* 
AMR knowledge score (max 5.) 3.41 (1.00) 3.37 (1.00) 3.46 (1.02) -0.09 
Observations (no. of GPs) 80 
 
43  37 
 
 
Notes: Full sample includes randomized GPs with whom both the intervention (interview) and the two end-line SP visits were successfully completed. 
Most data presented here were collected during the GP interviews where the intervention was delivered. The average age, share of male GPs, share of 
GPs located in the northern suburbs of Sandton and Randburg, and the measure of local GP density were calculated using data from the online medical 
practitioner database Medpages. See Section 4.2.3 for further details on how certain GP characteristics were measured. 1GPs were firstly asked what was 
the likelihood (between 0 and 100, with 100 indicating certainty) that the patient in the vignette case would recover faster with antibiotics (rather than 
without). 2 They were then were asked how likely it was that other GPs would prescribe antibiotics to the patient in the vignette case. 3 Lastly, GPs were 
asked how likely it was that the patient would go to another GP next time they needed medical attention if they did not receive antibiotics for the case. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
While these observations (and proposed controls for observed differences) do not rule out all 
threats to experiment validity from non-participation and attrition (particularly from any 
unobserved drivers), they do give some confidence that any resulting bias is unlikely to be severe 
in a per-protocol analysis with appropriate controls. The RCT literature nevertheless proposes 
various approaches to correcting for any residual bias in the final sample (Glennerster and 
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Takavarasha, 2013), including intention-to-treat (ITT) analyses that adopt different ways of 
imputing outcomes for those research participants lost to non-participation or attrition. This ITT 
approach is carried out as an additional robustness check in Section 7.4.5. 
Table 7.3. T-test of differences in baseline measures of outcomes between treatment & control 
groups in final sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Full Sample Control Treatment Difference 
(treatment- 
control) Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Antibiotic prescription (stratifying variable) 0.61 (0.49) 0.63 (0.49) 0.59 (0.50) 0.03 
Total drug cost (per consultation), ZAR 138.42 (145.04) 156.12 (168.55) 117.84 (110.51) 38.28 
Number of drugs (per consultation) 3.42 (1.16) 3.37 (91.02) 3.49 (1.30) -0.11 
Average drug cost (per consultation), ZAR 44.56 (49.73) 51.01 (57.05) 37.05 (39.03) 13.96 
Steroid prescription 0.45 (0.50) 0.42 (0.50) 0.49 (0.51) -0.07 
Other inappropriate drug prescription 0.71 (0.46) 0.74 (0.44) 0.68 (0.47) 0.07 
Consultation time (mins.) 9.64 (4.79) 8.51 (4.05) 10.95 (5.29) -2.43** 
Checklist completion (share) 0.40 (0.15) 0.41 (0.15) 0.40 (0.15) 0.01 
IRT score  0.05 (0.92) 0.07 (0.88) 0.02 (0.98) 0.05 
Correct / partially-correct diagnosis  0.43 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.41 (0.50) 0.14 
Observations (no. of GPs) 80 
 
43  37 
 
 
Notes: Full sample includes randomized GPs with whom both the intervention (interview) and the two end-line SP visits were successfully completed. 
All listed outcomes were measured using data collected from the SP debriefing questionnaire, and any dispensed drugs or drug prescriptions, from the 
SP consultations conducted at baseline (in the ESRC study, with Clinical Case 1). For further details on how there outcomes were measured, refer to 
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.3.3.2 Treatment compliance and spill-overs 
Two further threats to experiment validity are partial intervention compliance within the treatment 
and control groups, and potential exposure of control group GPs to the treatment mechanism 
(treatment spill-over). Partial compliance in this case would amount to some GPs not receiving 
the A&F or educational materials they were assigned to (because of interviewers not complying 
with interview protocols), or simply not reading the materials they receive. To minimise this risk, 
interviewers were carefully trained on correct and timely delivery of the intervention envelopes 
at the end of each interview, and their tablet-based interview guide incorporated the intervention 
delivery script and instructions. Random audio audits were also programmed into the tablet-based 
interview guide as a quality check to ensure that interviewers followed their scripts and interview 
protocols. During interviewer debriefings, there were no cases reported of interviewers failing to 
deliver the intervention envelopes as instructed or of GPs refusing to receive them.  
While it is impossible to know if and when GPs reviewed the contents of their envelopes, 
interviewers were instructed to invite treatment group GPs to review their feedback and ask any 
initial questions. A specific question in the interview guide and questionnaire asked interviewers 
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whether the GP actually opened and reviewed the feedback envelopes in front of them. 
Interviewers reported that 35 of the 37 treatment group GPs reviewed the feedback immediately 
in their presence, suggesting that non-compliance among the treatment group is unlikely to be a 
concern. One weakness of the intervention design is that control group GPs were not similarly 
invited to review the educational materials they were given by interviewers (see corresponding 
interviewer scripts in Appendix B.9), so I cannot obtain a similar indication of likely compliance 
in the control group.  
The spill-over of A&F incentives to the control group can also confound estimated treatment 
effects. This can occur if some control GPs accidentally received the A&F intervention; or if there 
is close interaction between control and treated GPs, and the former observe and mimic the 
behavioural responses of the latter. To address the former risk, before each interview, the research 
team ensured that each interviewer took with them only the intervention envelope addressed to 
the specific GP that was to be interviewed (to avoid mix-up with other envelopes). The interview 
guide also prompted interviewers to check that they had the envelope labelled with the correct 
GP name before entering each interview. As mentioned earlier, efforts to exclude GPs working 
together in group practices from the experiment sample was designed to avoid potential 
interactions and behavioural spill-overs between treated and control GPs working in the same 
practices.289  
7.3.3.3 Evaluation and evaluator effects 
The experiment’s use of incognito SPs for gathering performance data avoids a common 
evaluation-driven effect (the ‘Hawthorne effect’) whereby research participants adjust their 
normal behaviour under observation. As in all SP studies, possible SP detection by research 
participants is a risk. Studies often run SP detection surveys with participants after study 
conclusion, to identify and control for potential cases of valid detections. A survey run by the 
ESRC study found a very low detection rate: less than 1% of SP visits were reported as suspicious 
by GP participants in that study. The present study sample includes only those GPs (and 
corresponding baseline data) that did not have a valid detection in the ESRC study. Given the low 
detection rate in the ESRC study, the research team decided that it would not be cost-effective to 
run another detection survey after the end-line SP visits in this study. Debriefings with 
fieldworkers that carried out the end-line visits also did not flag any cases of doctors raising 
suspicions about fake patients.    
 
289 Six GPs that shared a group practice with another sample GP were mistakenly retained in the final sample due to errors in their 
address listings.  
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The validity of the SP method for intervention evaluation further relies on all SP visits at baseline 
and end-line, across both intervention groups, being identical (apart from the variation in clinical 
case at end-line). One concern is that there may be individual fieldworker effects influencing GPs’ 
intervention responses, and these effects may vary systematically across intervention groups. To 
address this, SP fieldworkers were randomly allocated to GP visits across both intervention 
groups and clinical cases. No fieldworker was restricted to visits in any one clinical case or 
intervention group. In addition, fieldworkers were blinded to the experiment details and the 
treatment status of GPs, to prevent their behaviour in consultations and subsequent recall of GP 
performance being affected by the experiment aims or GPs’ treatment status.290 Fieldworker fixed 
effects are nevertheless included in all results analyses conducted in this chapter, to control for 
any residual evaluator effects. GPs were similarly blinded to the experiment details and their 
relative treatment status during the study period, to prevent any knowledge of this influencing 
their behaviour. Control GPs were further informed that they could request feedback on their 
individual performance in SP visits after study completion, to avoid any demoralisation effects 
from not receiving feedback from their participation. 
Table 7.4. T-test of differences in end-line SP visit characteristics between treatment & control 
groups in final sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Full Sample Control Treatment Difference 
(treatment- 
control) Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Visit order (1=Uncomplicated SP visit first) 0.41 (0.50) 0.37 (0.49) 0.46 (0.51) -0.09 
Hour of day        
Uncomplicated visit 12.01 (2.43) 11.84 (2.21) 12.22 (2.68) -0.38 
HIV+ visit 12.23 (2.31) 11.98 (2.02) 12.51 (2.61) -0.54 
No. days since intervention (interview)         
Uncomplicated visit 17.44 (11.58) 19.7 (14.23) 14.81 (6.67) 4.89* 
HIV+ visit 15.94 (9.96) 17.42 (13.14) 14.22 (3.27) 3.20 
Observations (no. of GPs) 80 
 
43  37 
 
 
Notes: Full sample includes randomized GPs with whom both the intervention (interview) and the two end-line SP visits were successfully completed. All 
listed visit characteristics were measured using data collected from the SP debriefing questionnaire following end-line visits and from the interviews. The 
“uncomplicated visit” corresponds to the SP visit with Clinical Case 1, and the “HIV+ visit” corresponds to the visit with Clinical Case 2.                                   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7.4 tests for balance between the treatment and control groups in a set of end-line visit 
characteristics. As each GP received two end-line SP visits, the order of these visits - if it varies 
systematically across the treatment and control groups - may confound estimated treatment 
effects. The second SP visit to each GP may have a higher risk of SP detection, and potential 
learning effects (whereby GPs perform better at treating a patient when they have seen a similar 
 
290 The interviewers that delivered the intervention were also not informed about the experiment details or aims. 
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clinical case recently), as both clinical cases are quite similar. To minimise such order effects, the 
visit order of the two clinical cases was randomised for each GP in both intervention groups, and 
at least a two-day gap was maintained in between the two visits.291 Table 7.4 accordingly shows 
no significant differences in visit order between the two intervention groups. The time of day of 
the SP visits can also influence GPs’ treatment decisions. For instance, physicians’ have been 
shown to be more prone to prescribing inappropriate antibiotics later in the day, perhaps due to 
decision fatigue (Linder et al., 2014). Unfortunately, due to logistical reasons and the large 
distances that fieldworkers often had to travel between scheduled GP visits, it was not possible to 
strictly control this during fieldwork. Nevertheless, there are again no significant group 
differences detected in Table 7.4 for the hour of day in which the two end-line SP visits were 
completed.  
Another limitation of the intervention design is that the time lapse between intervention delivery 
(in the GP interviews) and impact measurement (in end-line SP visits) was not perfectly 
controlled, due to GP availability and logistical constraints. While the majority of all end-line 
visits (154 of the final 160 sample visits) were completed within 3-4 weeks of intervention 
delivery, 6 visits were delayed and completed between 1-3 months. These 6 anomalies all 
occurred with control group GPs. Table 7.4 indeed shows a significant difference in the number 
of days since intervention delivery between treatment and control groups for the uncomplicated 
SP visit. To check the sensitivity of main results to such imbalances in end-line visit 
characteristics, these characteristics are explicitly controlled for in the results analyses as 
additional robustness checks in Section 7.4.5.  
7.3.4 Final sample characteristics 
Column (1) of Tables 7.2 summarises some basic characteristics of the final sample. The average 
age of GPs is 54 years, 30% are female, and the ethnic distribution is approximately balanced 
across the three main ethnic groups (black African or mixed-race (31%), Asian or Indian (38%), 
and white GPs (31%)). Around a quarter of the sample work in group practices, and a similar 
share are located in the wealthier northern Johannesburg suburbs (Sandton and Randburg). The 
average GP has around nine competing GPs located within a kilometre of their practice, and 
reported seeing an average of 24 patients per day.  
A large majority of sample GPs are contracted in with medical insurance schemes (81%), which 
is reflective of the broader GP population in Johannesburg. However, a higher proportion of 
 
291 The majority of sample GPs received their two end-line SP visits with a 2-7 day gap. Seven GPs had longer visit gaps: three GPs 
had an 8-14 day gap, one GP had a 30-day gap, and three GPs had a 30-60 day gap.  
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sample GPs have a drug dispensing licence (57%) compared to the sample population (38.5%). 
Measured altruism in the sample is also relatively high. To measure altruism in this study, the 
share of a R300 cash endowment that each GP chose to donate to a patient charity during a dictator 
game in the GP interviews was calculated (see Appendix B.4 for a description of the game), and 
“altruistic” (or “high-altruism”) GPs were classified as those who donated the full endowment. 
Around 60% of the sample donated the full endowment. 
To measure GPs’ clinical knowledge, a vignette-based knowledge quiz was included in the 
interviews. When presented with the clinical cases used in this experiment in vignette-form, GPs 
were more able to correctly name the diagnosis as “acute bronchitis” for Clinical Case 2 (55%) 
than for the uncomplicated Clinical Case 1 (17%). However, a high proportion of all GPs correctly 
identified the likely pathogenic cause in both cases (88% in Clinical Case 1, and 68% in Clinical 
Case 2), which is perhaps more important in informing appropriate antibiotic treatment choices. 
This is reflected in a relatively low perceived effectiveness of antibiotics for the (viral) Clinical 
Case 1 and a high perceived effectiveness for the (bacterial) Clinical Case 2: on average, GPs felt 
that there was only a 30% likelihood that Clinical Case 1 would resolve more quickly with 
antibiotics, and a 72% equivalent likelihood for Clinical Case 2. Overall, this suggests that GPs’ 
clinical knowledge pertaining to appropriate antibiotic use for the experiment’s two clinical cases 
is quite high.  
However, actual prescribing practices may be determined by more than just GPs’ knowledge (or 
perceptions) of clinically-indicated treatments. Firstly, their knowledge or beliefs about the risks 
of inappropriate antibiotic prescribing may play a role. Again, the sample demonstrates relatively 
good knowledge of these risks: on a short quiz to assess GPs’ knowledge of AMR, the average 
GP answered more than three out of five questions correctly. Secondly, perceived peer norms and 
patient expectations (‘social pressures’) around prescribing practices can influence treatment 
choices. Sample GPs reported relatively strong social pressures to prescribe antibiotics for both 
clinical cases. This is concerning for Clinical Case 1, where no antibiotics are indicated: despite 
GPs correctly believing that antibiotics would be of low effectiveness in that case, they reported 
a 65% likelihood that other GPs would prescribe antibiotics for the same case, and a 56% 
likelihood that patients would seek care elsewhere next time they are ill if they did not receive 
antibiotics for the case.  
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7.4 Results 
Most outcomes evaluated in this section were measured in end-line SP visits presenting the 
uncomplicated acute bronchitis case (Clinical Case 1).292 These visits mirror those conducted at 
baseline. End-line SP visits presenting the more severe acute bronchitis case (Clinical Case 2) are 
used to measure only one outcome:  spill-over effects on appropriate antibiotic treatment (as 
detailed in Section 7.4.3). 
7.4.1 Empirical framework 
The impact of the A&F intervention can be measured by comparing end-line outcomes across the 
treatment and control groups in a simple regression framework. For each physician-level 
outcome, I estimate the following: 
 𝑌𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑗
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 +  𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕′𝑗𝛽3 + 𝑿′𝑗𝛽4 +  𝛿𝑓 +  𝜀𝑗                   (1) 
where 𝑌𝑗  is the outcome for physician 𝑗 at end-line; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
physician 𝑗 is in the treatment group, and 0 otherwise; 𝑌𝑗
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 is the value of the same outcome for 
physician 𝑗  at baseline; 293  𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕′𝑗  is the set of stratification variables used in randomising 
treatment assignment (GPs’ dispensing and contracting status, and baseline antibiotic 
prescribing); 𝑿′𝑗  is a set of controls for all significantly (or sizeably) unbalanced GP 
characteristics and baseline outcomes in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 (baseline consultation duration, 
baseline drug costs, ethnicity, gender, northern suburb practice location, and perceived patient 
expectations for antibiotics in the complicated bronchitis case); and  𝛿𝑓 is a fieldworker fixed 
effect (for the corresponding end-line SP visit). The error term 𝜀𝑗 is assumed independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d) across sample GPs.  
𝛽1  measures the effect of interest: the marginal effect of the private, individualised A&F, 
compared to the educational intervention alone.294 The main results present estimates of 𝛽1 from 
a per-protocol analysis, including only those 80 GPs that successfully received both the 
intervention and end-line SP visits.295 In the following results tables, three sets of estimates are 
reported for each outcome. In the basic specification in Column (1), only the treatment group 
 
292 See Section 4.1.1 and Appendices B.1 and B.2 for details on the SP clinical cases. 
293 Note that 𝑌𝑗
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒  is excluded from the specification in estimating spill-over effects on appropriate antibiotic treatment (for the 
complicated HIV+ patient case). There is no baseline data for this particular outcome, since the complicated acute bronchitis case was 
only used in end-line visits.  
294 Strictly speaking, 𝛽1 captures an intention-to-treat (ITT) effect, as it is not certain that all GPs fully adhered to the intervention 
(that they read all intervention materials provided to them). 
295 An ITT analysis including all 99 randomised GPs, imputing outcomes for the 19 that were dropped due to non-participation or 
attrition, is carried out as a robustness check in Section 7.4.5.  
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dummy  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗, the baseline outcome  𝑌𝑗
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒, and the fieldworker fixed effect  𝛿𝑓 are included; 
in Column (2), the controls  𝑿′𝑗 are added, to adjust for unbalanced observables; and finally in 
Column (3), the stratification variables  𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕′𝑗 are also included to improve estimate precision. 
The specification in Column (3), which corresponds to the full equation in (1), is taken as the 
main specification in each case. All estimations are carried out using linear OLS.  
7.4.2 Impact of A&F on treatment quality and costs 
7.4.2.1 Inappropriate antibiotic treatment 
The primary outcome evaluated in this chapter is inappropriate antibiotic treatment for the 
uncomplicated acute bronchitis case (Clinical Case 1). Systematic reviews of existing clinical 
evidence, clinical expert opinions, and the South African national treatment guidelines all concur 
that antibiotics are not recommended for this case.  
Figure 7.2. Share of inappropriate antibiotic treatment at baseline and end-line,                                  
by intervention group 
Nevertheless, echoing previous study results (see Chapter 5), baseline antibiotic treatment for the 
case was very high: an antibiotic was inappropriately prescribed in 61% of all baseline SP visits 
in the sample (see Column (1) of Table 7.3).296 This rate of inappropriate treatment is much higher 
than that predicted by GPs’ relatively good knowledge of the viral cause and low effectiveness of 
antibiotics for the same clinical case (when presented in vignette-form). This may again be 
reflective of a ‘know-do’ gap in the sample, where physicians’ performance in practice is shown 
 
296 The most commonly prescribed antibiotic groups were penicillin or penicillin-clavulanate, and macrolides. 
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to be poorer than that predicted by indictors of their knowledge (Das and Gertler, 2007; Leonard 
and Masatu, 2010). Insufficient diagnostic effort or accuracy – which is explored further in 
Section 7.4.4 - may be one explanation for this gap. Perceived social pressures to prescribe 
antibiotics, as noted in the interviews, may be another.297 298 In either case, where such ‘know-do’ 
gaps exists – and physician knowledge does not translate into equivalent effort – it is reasonable 
to expect that the effort incentives from A&F should improve upon the effectiveness of 
educational interventions alone. 
Table 7.5. Effect of private performance feedback on likelihood of inappropriate antibiotic treatment 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    Antibiotic Antibiotic Antibiotic 
Treatment (1 = feedback given) -0.12 -0.22** -0.24** 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Baseline antibiotic treatment, for Clinical Case 1                                 
(1 = antibiotic given) 
0.45*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Fieldworker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Unbalanced covariates No Yes Yes 
Stratification variables No No Yes 
    
Mean of control group 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Mean of sample  0.48 0.48 0.48 
Obs.  79 79 79 
R-squared 0.36 0.52 0.55 
 
Notes. All specifications are estimated using linear OLS. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Column (1) presents the treatment effect estimate from a basic 
specification, controlling only for baseline antibiotic treatment and fieldworker fixed effects. Column (2) additionally controls for all significantly or sizably 
unbalanced observables (baseline consultation duration, baseline drug costs, ethnicity, gender, northern suburb practice location, and perceived patient 
expectations for antibiotics in Clinical Case 2). Column (3) presents the main specification, controlling also for stratifying variables (GPs drug dispensing 
and contracting status, in addition to baseline antibiotic treatment). Multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in these three specifications: mean variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for each specification was around 2, and individual VIF for all included variables were all under 4. See notes in Table 7.2 and Section 
4.2 for details on how certain covariates were measured. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7.5 presents estimates of the impact of private A&F on inappropriate antibiotic treatment. 
The binary outcome variable indicates whether an antibiotic was prescribed for Clinical Case 1 
in end-line SP visits. Focusing on the main specification in Column (3), the results suggest that 
private A&F has a substantial effect in lowering inappropriate antibiotic treatment. While 52% of 
control group GPs gave an antibiotic for the viral clinical case, GPs that received private A&F 
were 24 percentage points less likely to do so (95% CI -0.44 to -0.03) – a 46% reduction in the 
likelihood of inappropriate treatment, significant at the 5% level. For comparison, van der Velden 
et al. (2012) find that antibiotic prescriptions were reduced by 11.6% on average in their review 
 
297 Beliefs about patient expectations do influence physicians’ treatment choices – particularly under market competition – even where 
physicians’ are aware that those choices are not clinically-indicated (Das and Hammer, 2007). 
298 While not evidenced in this study, the Hawthorne effect – whereby physicians perform better whilst under direct observation during 
the knowledge quiz than when being assessed incognito by SPs – is a further potential explanation. 
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of 87 interventions (and 58 studies) targeting antibiotic use for respiratory infections in primary 
care. 
While the base rate of antibiotic treatment is still high in the control group, this has also fallen 
substantially since baseline (from 63% to 52% at end-line – a 17% decline). This may be 
indicative of the educational intervention effect. It may also be due to seasonal effects: the 
baseline visits occurred during the cold season in Johannesburg (June-August 2018) when 
respiratory infections are likely to present more frequently to GPs, whereas end-line visits 
occurred during the summer (December 2018-March 2019). However, given the lack of a pure 
control (‘no-intervention’) group, I cannot isolate the effect of the educational intervention from 
general time trend or seasonal effects.  
Lastly, there is some indication of habit persistence in prescribing behaviour: inappropriate 
antibiotic treatment at baseline is associated with an increase in treatment likelihood at end-line 
of over 50 percentage points.  
7.4.2.2 Drug treatment costs 
As secondary indicators of over-treatment, I examine A&F effects on treatment costs for Clinical 
Case 1. Baseline performance on this metric, relative to the cheapest appropriate treatment on the 
market, was also reported in the feedback sheets shared with treatment GPs. Table 7.3 (Column 
(1)) shows that treatment efficiency at baseline was low in general. GPs gave 3.4 drugs per 
baseline consultation on average, at a cost of R45 per item – although no drug treatment is 
clinically-indicated for the case.299 This amounted to a total drug cost per consultation of R138 - 
almost 7 times the cost of the cheapest recommended treatment on the market for the same 
case.300Among the SP visits analysed in previous chapters, antibiotics were the most expensive 
drug items prescribed by GPs. An inappropriate antibiotic prescription was associated with 
significantly higher total drug costs. Hence, all else equal, a lower likelihood of antibiotic 
treatment should also coincide with lower overall drug costs for the treatment group in this 
chapter.  
Table 7.6 presents estimates of the A&F effect on total drug costs, the number of drugs given, 
and the average cost per drug. While private A&F is estimated to lower total drug costs as 
expected (by R41 compared to a control group mean of R142), this result is not statistically 
 
299 Some over-the-counter (OTC) symptomatic treatment was still considered appropriate for the case, although not clinically-
indicated for case resolution.  
300 The cheapest appropriate (low-schedule, symptomatic) treatment for the uncomplicated acute bronchitis case was some cough 
syrup and paracetamol, which amounted to a total cost of R17.86.   
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significant. Similarly for the number of drugs and average drug costs, effect estimates are in the 
anticipated direction, but none are statistically significant.  
One explanation for the absence of significant cost effects may be the small sample size and a 
lack of sufficient statistical power. An effort to improve the precision of effect estimates, by 
including additional covariates, is carried out as an additional analysis in Section 7.4.5. While this 
reduces the magnitude of estimated effects, it does not improve statistical significance (see 
Appendix E.2). A further explanation may be that, although the rate of antibiotic prescribing is 
reduced in the treatment group, those GPs may substitute other inappropriate and equally costly 
drugs in place of antibiotics. This latter channel is examined in the next subsection.  
Table 7.6. Effect of private performance feedback on treatment costs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
    Total 
drug 
costs  
Total 
drug 
costs  
Total 
drug 
costs  
No. 
drugs  
No. 
drugs 
No. 
drugs 
Av. 
drug 
cost 
Av. 
drug 
cost 
Av. 
drug 
cost 
Treatment (1 = feedback 
given) 
-33.36 -37.98 -40.67 -0.23 -0.39 -0.41 -6.89 -7.64 -8.46 
  (24.19) (25.40) (25.43) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (7.41) (7.14) (7.20) 
Baseline outcome measure, 
for Clinical Case 1   
0.35*** 0.24** 0.19* 0.62*** 0.69*** 0.75*** 0.34*** 0.20** 0.15* 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Fieldworker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unbalanced covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Stratification variables No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
          
Mean of control group 142.39 142.39 142.39 3.29 3.29 3.29 45.78 45.78 45.78 
Mean of sample   124.75 124.75 124.75 3.33 3.33 3.33 40.29 40.29 40.29 
Obs.  79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.36 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.56 0.58 0.37 0.54 0.56 
      
Notes. All specifications are estimated using linear OLS, and all costs are in South African rand (ZAR). Standard errors are in parenthesis. Columns (1), 
(4) and (7) present treatment effect estimates from a basic specification, controlling only for baseline outcome values and fieldworker fixed effects. Columns 
(2), (5) and (8) additionally control for all significantly or sizably unbalanced observables (baseline consultation duration, baseline drug costs, ethnicity, 
gender, northern suburb practice location, and perceived patient expectations for antibiotics in Clinical Case 2). Columns (3), (6) and (9) present the main 
specifications, controlling also for the stratification variables (GPs drug dispensing and contracting status, and baseline antibiotic treatment). 
Multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in these specifications: mean variance inflation factors (VIF) for each specification was around 2 or lower, and 
individual VIF for all included variables were all around 4 or under. See notes in Table 7.2 and Section 4.2 for details on how certain covariates and cost 
outcomes were measured. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.4.3 Unintended effects 
7.4.3.1 Appropriate antibiotic prescribing: HIV+ patient case management 
The A&F intervention was primarily designed to target inappropriate antibiotic prescribing for an 
uncomplicated viral respiratory infection. The feedback (and its combination with the educational 
leaflet) accordingly emphasised the case-specific context in which antibiotic treatment was 
considered inappropriate. The intervention should therefore have no impact on appropriate 
antibiotic treatment - that is, in cases where antibiotics are clinically-indicated. However, it is still 
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a concern that GPs may misinterpret the feedback message and try to cut back on all antibiotic 
prescribing – both inappropriate and appropriate. To ensure there were no such unintended spill-
overs, I also test for treatment effects on the likelihood of antibiotic treatment for Clinical Case 
2, where a short course of antibiotics was recommended in national treatment guidelines (NDoH, 
2014) given the patient’s HIV+ status and the more severe case presentation (that increase the 
likelihood of a bacterial infection). 
Table 7.7 shows no evidence of such unintended A&F effects on appropriate antibiotic treatment. 
Appropriate treatment in the control group was reasonably high, perhaps in part due to the 
educational intervention: 62% of control GPs chose some antibiotic treatment for the HIV+ 
patient case. Moreover, treatment group GPs were no less likely to choose antibiotic treatment 
for this case than control GPs.  
Table 7.7. Effect of private performance feedback on likelihood of appropriate antibiotic treatment 
for the HIV+ patient case 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    Antibiotic Antibiotic Antibiotic 
Treatment (1 = feedback given) -0.06 0.05 0.05 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Baseline antibiotic treatment, for Clinical Case 1                
(1=antibiotic given) 
0.46*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Fieldworker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Unbalanced covariates No Yes Yes 
Stratification variables No No Yes 
    
Mean of control group 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Mean of sample 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Obs.  79 79 79 
R-squared 0.29 0.37 0.37 
 
Notes. All specifications are estimated using linear OLS. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Column (1) presents the treatment effect estimate from a basic 
specification, controlling only for baseline antibiotic treatment (for the uncomplicated acute bronchitis case that was presented in baseline SP visits) and 
fieldworker fixed effects. Column (2) additionally controls for all significantly or sizably unbalanced observables (baseline consultation duration, baseline 
drug costs, ethnicity, gender, northern suburb practice location, and perceived patient expectations for antibiotics in Clinical Case 2). Column (3) presents 
the main specification, controlling also for the stratifying variables (GPs drug dispensing and contracting status, in addition to baseline antibiotic treatment). 
Multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in these specifications: mean variance inflation factors (VIF) for each specification was around 2 or lower, and 
individual VIF for all included variables were all around 4 or under. See notes in Table 7.2 and Section 4.2 for details on how certain covariates and 
outcomes were measured. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.4.3.2 Substitution of other inappropriate drugs 
Another potential side-effect of A&F targeting a reduction in antibiotic treatment alone may be 
an increase in other inappropriate drug treatments, if GPs substitute other drugs in place of 
antibiotics. In a previous experiment (see Chapter 5), a number of other inappropriate drugs were 
frequently given for the same uncomplicated bronchitis case (Clinical Case 1). Treatment with 
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steroids was particularly common. Therefore, unintended A&F effects on the likelihood of other 
inappropriate drug treatments are also tested for here. 
Table 7.8 shows estimated treatment effects on the likelihood of steroid or other inappropriate 
drug treatments. Overall, there is little indication of such unintended substitution effects. 
Inappropriate drug treatment was high in general: 45% of control group GPs gave inappropriate 
steroids for Clinical Case 1, and 69% gave other inappropriate drugs. Treatment group GPs were 
16 percentage points (36%) less likely to give steroids for the same case, contrary to the 
substitution effect hypothesis (and indicative of positive spill-overs instead); however, this result 
is not statistically significant. Similar, no statistically significant differences are detected in the 
likelihood of other inappropriate drug treatment. 
Once again, there is some evidence of habit persistence in inappropriate prescribing behaviours: 
GPs that prescribed a steroid for Clinical Case 1 at baseline were 50 percentage points more likely 
to prescribe a steroid for the same case at end-line.    
Table 7.8. Effect of private performance feedback on likelihood of other inappropriate drug 
treatments  
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) 
    
Steroids Steroids Steroids 
Other 
inapprop. 
drugs 
Other 
inapprop. 
drug 
Other 
inapprop. 
drug 
Treatment (1 = feedback given) -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 0.04 0.08 0.08 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Baseline outcome measure, for Clinical Case 1 
(1 = drug given) 
0.54*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.19 0.26* 0.23 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) 
Fieldworker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unbalanced covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Stratification variables No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Mean of control group 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Mean of sample 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Obs.  79 79 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.17 0.26 0.28 
 
Notes. All specifications are estimated using linear OLS. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Columns (1) and (4) present treatment effect estimates from a 
basic specification, controlling only for baseline outcome values and fieldworker fixed effects. Columns (2) and (5) additionally control for all significantly 
or sizably unbalanced observables (baseline consultation duration, baseline drug costs, ethnicity, gender, northern suburb practice location, and perceived 
patient expectations for antibiotics in Clinical Case 2). Columns (3) and (6) present the main specifications, controlling also for the stratification variables 
(GPs drug dispensing and contracting status, and baseline antibiotic treatment). Multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in these specifications: mean 
variance inflation factors (VIF) for each specification was around 2 or lower, and individual VIF for all included variables were all around 4 or under. See 
notes in Table 7.2 and Section 4.2 for details on how certain covariates and treatment outcomes were measured. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.4.4 Potential channels: effects on diagnostic effort and accuracy 
A possible mechanism behind the estimated A&F effect on inappropriate antibiotic treatment is 
that GPs receiving the A&F intervention exert more diagnostic effort with their patients as a result 
- thereby improving their diagnostic accuracy, and lowering the likelihood of antibiotic treatment 
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due to diagnostic uncertainty. To test this, I estimate treatment effects on three measures of 
diagnostic effort (Table 7.9) and a measure of diagnostic accuracy (Table 7.10) for Clinical Case 
1. Diagnostic effort is measured by consultation duration, and the raw proportion of all case-
specific essential and recommended history-taking and examinations (checklist) completed.301 At 
baseline, the average SP consultation lasted 10 minutes, where just 40% of the case-specific 
checklist was completed. IRT analysis is also used to compute a composite index score of 
checklist completion, which weights completed checklist items by their relative value in 
discriminating among GPs of varying effort quality.302 
Table 7.9. Effect of private performance feedback on diagnostic effort 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
    
Cons. 
time 
Cons. 
time 
Cons. 
time 
Share 
check 
list 
Share 
check 
list 
Share 
check 
list 
IRT 
score 
IRT 
score 
IRT 
score 
Treatment (1 = feedback 
given) 
0.19 1.62 1.85 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.33* -0.22 -0.19 
  (1.59) (1.66) (1.69) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
Baseline outcome measure, 
for Clinical Case 1 
0.31* 0.19 0.22 0.61*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.64*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
Fieldworker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unbalanced covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Stratification variables No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
          
Mean of control group 8.93 8.93 8.93 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Mean of sample 9.80 9.80 9.80 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs.  80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.24 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.59 
 
Notes. All specifications are estimated using linear OLS. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Columns (1), (4) and (7) present treatment effect estimates 
from a basic specification, controlling only for baseline outcome values and fieldworker fixed effects. Columns (2), (5) and (8) additionally control for all 
significantly or sizably unbalanced observables (baseline consultation duration, baseline drug costs, ethnicity, gender, northern suburb practice location, 
and perceived patient expectations for antibiotics in Clinical Case 2). Columns (3), (6) and (9) present the main specifications, controlling also for the 
stratification variables (GPs drug dispensing and contracting status, and baseline antibiotic treatment). Multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in these 
specifications: mean variance inflation factors (VIF) for each specification was around 2 or lower, and individual VIF for all included variables were all 
around 4 or under. See notes in Table 7.2 and Section 4.2 for details on how certain covariates and the effort outcomes were measured.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To gauge GPs’ diagnostic accuracy, I evaluate whether the diagnoses communicated to SPs for 
Clinical Case 1 were correct or partially-correct.303 During baseline SP visits, a diagnosis was 
 
301 See Appendix B.1 for the case-specific checklists, and Section 4.2.1 for a description of how the effort measures were constructed. 
The checklist items were compiled by a panel of clinical experts, and designed to enable physicians to differentiate respiratory 
conditions with varying severities and overlapping symptoms.  
302 Section 4.2.1 provides a brief overview of how the IRT score is calculated, and Appendix B.6 gives further details on the 
assumptions underlying IRT. Appendix E.1 lists the checklist items included in this chapter’s IRT analysis at baseline and end-line, 
and the corresponding weight estimates. 
303 See Appendix B.1 for a list of diagnoses considered correct or partially correct for each clinical case. Further details on how the 
diagnosis measures were constructed are provided in Section 4.2.1. A strictly ‘correct’ diagnosis required the doctor to communicate 
the diagnosis in exact technical terms to the patient (i.e. “acute bronchitis” or “bronchitis”). The limitation here is that what the 
physician tells the patient regarding their diagnosis may be simplified (for instance, given expected limitations to the patient’s medical 
knowledge). Hence, a ‘partially-correct’ diagnosis allowed for some generality in the communicated diagnosis (such as “chest cold”) 
and for select similar diagnoses (such as “tracheitis” or “post nasal drip”). This chapter accordingly combines both outcomes in its 
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communicated to SPs by almost all GPs in the sample (79 of 80). Of these, only 43% 
communicated a correct or partially-correct diagnosis. These observations suggest that 
insufficient diagnostic effort and accuracy may partly contribute to the high rate of inappropriate 
antibiotic treatment observed at baseline.  
Table 7.10. Effect of private performance feedback on diagnostic accuracy 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    Correct / 
partially-correct 
diagnosis 
Correct / 
partially-correct 
diagnosis 
Correct / 
partially-correct 
diagnosis 
Treatment (1 = feedback given) -0.01 0.00 0.02 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) 
Baseline correct/partially-correct diagnosis,                      
for Clinical Case 1 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.00 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) 
Fieldworker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Unbalanced covariates No Yes Yes 
Stratification variables No No Yes 
    
Mean of control group 0.46 0.46 0.46 
Mean of sample  0.49 0.49 0.49 
Obs.  75 75 75 
R-squared 0.27 0.30 0.33 
 
Notes. All specifications are estimated using linear OLS. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The outcome variable indicates whether the diagnosis 
communicated to SPs was correct or partially-correct, conditional on a diagnosis being communicated. This analysis therefore excludes the 5 GPs who 
did not communicate any diagnosis to SPs either at baseline or end-line. Column (1) presents the treatment effect estimate from a basic specification, 
controlling only for baseline diagnostic accuracy and fieldworker fixed effects. Column (2) additionally controls for all significantly or sizably unbalanced 
observables (baseline consultation duration, baseline drug costs, ethnicity, gender, northern suburb practice location, and perceived patient expectations 
for antibiotics in Clinical Case 2). Column (3) presents the main specification, controlling also for the stratification variables (GPs drug dispensing and 
contracting status, and baseline antibiotic treatment). Multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in these three specifications: mean variance inflation 
factors (VIF) for each specification was around 2 or lower, and individual VIF for all included variables were all around 4 or under. See notes in Table 
7.2 and Section 4.2 for details on how certain covariates and the diagnostic accuracy outcome were measured.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Nevertheless, results in Tables 7.9 show no evidence of an impact of private A&F in improving 
diagnostic effort: there are no significant positive effects detected on consultation duration, the 
proportion of all case-specific checklist items completed, or the IRT score. Similarly, Table 7.10 
shows no evidence of an A&F effect in improving diagnostic accuracy (the likelihood of a correct 
or partially-correct diagnosis) relative to the educational intervention alone. One reason for these 
null effects may be that the feedback was not optimally designed to incentivise improved 
diagnostic effort. Although the share of all case-specific checklist items completed at baseline 
was reported in the feedback sheet, the individual checklist items (or GPs’ disaggregated 
 
analysis of diagnostic accuracy. Such considerations were also taken into account in coding specific diagnoses, particularly with 
regards to local colloquialisms. One example was in coding a “flu” diagnosis. In strict medical terms, this is incorrect. However, acute 
bronchitis is usually preceded by flu-like symptoms; and discussions with local medical practitioners highlighted that, in the South 
African context, doctors often do not make a distinction between “flu” and “cold” in communicating diagnoses to patients. 
Accordingly, no distinction was made in coding “flu” and “cold,” and both were coded as partially-correct if they were combined with 
a bronchitis or similar diagnosis (since a cold preceded the acute bronchitis according to the case history). 
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performance on each item) were not specified. Therefore, it is unlikely to have been particularly 
effective in informing GPs on their effort performance. 304  
Taken together, these results indicate that increased diagnostic effort or accuracy cannot explain 
the A&F effect on inappropriate antibiotic treatment. This suggests that alternative drivers, 
including habit persistence or social pressures in treatment choices – behavioural barriers that 
may be countered with intrinsic incentives - could instead play a role.  
7.4.5 Robustness checks 
Appendix E.2 displays output from six robustness checks on estimated results from the main 
specifications. Firstly, Columns (1) and (2) show output from two approaches to correcting for 
non-participation and attrition bias in the main results. Column (1) presents estimates from an 
ITT analysis that includes all 99 randomised GPs, where missing outcomes for those lost to non-
participation or attrition are imputed by carrying forward their baseline values.305  The estimated 
A&F effect on the main outcome (inappropriate antibiotic treatment) is reduced in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant. This reduction in effect magnitude is to be expected, as baseline 
antibiotic prescribing was used as a stratification variable in the randomisation process. Using 
those baseline values to then impute missing outcomes for almost 20% of the total sample should 
skew the result toward a null effect to some extent. Nevertheless, the absolute magnitude of the 
point estimate remains large and the effect is still negative. A further limitation of this ITT 
analysis is that the 19 GPs lost to non-participation or attrition have very limited covariate data 
available (as interviews were not conducted with 16 of these GPs). This prevents tests and controls 
for any imbalance along observable covariates between the treatment and control groups in the 
regression specification (as in the main specifications in Sections 7.4.2 - 7.4.4).  
Column (2) estimates upper and lower bounds for the true effect (in the absence of any non-
participation or attrition bias) using the Manski-Horowitz method (Horowitz and Manski, 2000). 
The upper bound is estimated by assigning the best possible outcome to treatment group GPs with 
missing outcomes, and the worst possible outcome to control GPs with missing outcomes. The 
lower bound is estimated using the reverse assumption: the worst outcome is assigned to treatment 
group GPs, and the best outcome to control GPs, with missing outcomes. This method is suitable 
when the outcome is binary and attrition rates are low, as continuous outcomes and high levels of 
 
304 Only marginal improvements in diagnostic effort and accuracy are noted even in the control group, compared to their baseline 
performance (see Table 7.2). This may indicate that the educational intervention alone also had only limited effect on these measures. 
Again, I am unable to isolate the educational (control) intervention effect from general time trend, due to the absence of a ‘no-
intervention’ group.  
305 This ‘last-value carried forward’ approach assumes that the last (baseline) observation is representative of subsequent missing 
observations. A clear limitation here is that this amounts to assuming that the intervention would have no effect on attriters and non-
participators.  
 182 
 
missing data can yield very large bounds for the estimate of interest and become uninformative 
(Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). As such, it is only used here to estimate upper and lower 
bounds for the main binary outcome of interest (inappropriate antibiotic treatment). Columns (2a) 
and (2b) suggest the true effect could fall within a large interval: somewhere between a small and 
insignificant negative effect at the lower end (-0.03, p=0.781) and a strong negative effect at the 
upper end (-0.32, p=0.002). The main estimate from this chapter (from the per-protocol analysis 
in Section 7.4.2) falls within this bound (-0.24, p=0.027). Considering the small sample size in 
this study, these results provide some assurance to the chapter’s main conclusion on the 
effectiveness of private A&F in reducing inappropriate antibiotic treatment.  
Columns (3) – (5) adjust for other characteristics of study design and implementation. Although 
the order of the two end-line SP visits was randomised for each GP in both intervention groups, 
Table Column (3) explicitly controls for the visit order to adjust for any residual order effects. 
Column (4) controls for the hour of day of each SP visit, to adjust for any time-of-day effects; 
and Column (5) controls for the number of days in between intervention delivery and end-line 
outcome measurement (the corresponding SP visit) for each GP, to account for the previously 
noted imbalance in this visit characteristic between the treatment and control groups. All results 
are shown to be robust to these three controls. 
Finally, given the small sample size of the experiment, the precision of estimated results may be 
improved with the addition of explanatory covariates that account for more of the unexplained 
variance in outcomes. Focusing on the main outcome, a number of explanatory factors behind 
inappropriate antibiotic treatment have been identified in the literature. The specification in 
Column (6) accordingly controls for additional GP-level covariates (as listed in Table 7.2), that 
proxy commonly cited factors: indicators of GPs’ perceived prescribing norms and patient 
expectations for antibiotics for the two clinical cases in the experiment, to gauge social 
prescribing pressures (Altiner et al., 2004; Dempsey et al., 2014; Farley et al., 2018);306 307 
practice location and local competitor density, to gauge local market competition (Butler et al., 
1998; Bennett et al., 2015); indicators of diagnostic competence and perceived effectiveness of 
antibiotics for the two clinical cases, to proxy knowledge and diagnostic uncertainty (Brink et al., 
2016); and reported daily patient load, to capture time constraints (Dempsey et al., 2014).308 
 
306 Perhaps the most commonly-cited driver of inappropriate treatment choices by physicians is actual or perceived patient demand 
(Butler et al., 1998; Dempsey et al., 2014; Farley et al., 2018). While actual patient demand is controlled for using scripted SPs, it is 
possible that GPs still believe that patients will expect antibiotics due to prescribing norms or culture (even if patients do not voice it). 
Whether GPs respond to these perceived pressures can also depend on market competition (i.e. how likely it is that patients can find 
alternative willing providers, and how costly it is to lose individual patient business). 
307 Two of the available indicators on perceived social pressures listed in Table 7.2 are excluded, as they are highly correlated with 
some of the unbalanced covariates included in the main specifications. These are the two variables on perceived patient expectations 
for antibiotics in Clinical Case 1 and perceived antibiotic prescribing norms for Clinical Case 2. 
308 See Section 4.2.3 for details on how these GP-level covariates were measured or constructed.  
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While the magnitude of some effects change under this specification (notably, for the drug cost 
and diagnostic accuracy outcomes), the statistical significance of all estimates remains largely 
unchanged.  
7.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
This chapter evaluates the impact of intrinsic informational incentives for physicians in lowering 
inappropriate antibiotic treatments and subsequent costs, in a context where physicians are 
informed about correct treatment guidelines as well. To solve common measurement and patient 
selection problems associated with the use of administrative data in assessing physician 
performance, it demonstrates a novel application of the SP audit approach to evaluating physician-
targeted interventions. In doing so, it provides highly granular, causal evidence on the impact of 
private A&F on physicians’ antibiotic treatment choices.   
Unlike previous studies, this chapter not only isolates the intrinsic incentive effects of A&F, but 
also investigates potential causal channels, and tests for unintended spillovers from the 
intervention. The results indicate that giving private, targeted performance feedback to primary 
care physicians reduces the likelihood of inappropriate antibiotic treatment for a common, viral 
respiratory infection by 46%, compared to providing educational materials on clinical guidelines 
alone. There is also suggestive evidence of lower treatment costs following A&F (although this 
result is not statistically significant).309 Reassuringly, the private A&F had no unintended spill-
overs on physicians’ ability to differentiate and appropriately manage more severe presentations 
of the same clinical case, or on their likelihood of giving other inappropriate drugs (such as 
steroids).310  
The main finding on inappropriate antibiotic treatment lends support to two hypotheses from 
previous literature. First, that physicians respond positively to private performance feedback, 
despite the lack of any financial, reputational or market demand consequences, aligns with a 
common characterization of healthcare providers as being – to some extent – intrinsically-
motivated (see Galizzi et al. (2015) for a review). Physicians derive some intrinsic utility from 
effort, independent of any profit or reputational motive. Moreover, this utility need not be peer-
 
309 However, treatment costs remain inefficiently high even after feedback: the average cost of drugs given by physicians who received 
A&F is still almost 6 times that of the cheapest, appropriate treatment available on the local market for the clinical case (based on 
expert advice and treatment guidelines, this included paracetamol and a cough suppressant syrup, at a total cost of R17.86). 
310 The absence of such unintended spill-over effects may be down to two features of the intervention design. First, the feedback 
content was very specific about the particular clinical case that it applied to, where antibiotics were considered inappropriate. The aim 
was to minimize the risk of physicians misinterpreting the feedback message as applying more broadly to antibiotic treatment in 
general. In addition, the educational materials that were provided to all physicians (including those that received A&F) were designed 
to inform them of appropriate treatments for a number of respiratory infections of varying severity and drug indications. This baseline 
educational intervention may have also acted to offset any adverse effects of A&F on appropriate drug use. 
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referenced, as often argued (Kolstad, 2013; Ashraf and Bandiera, 2017b): the feedback in this 
experiment gave no information on peer performance, and instead benchmarked individual 
performance to evidence-based guidelines. Second, it implies that a lack of knowledge is not the 
primary barrier to appropriate treatment choices, reflecting previous findings of a “know-do” gap 
among healthcare providers in low-and-middle-income countries (LMIC) (Das and Gertler, 2007; 
Leonard and Masatu, 2010; Mohanan et al., 2015), including among this study’s sample at 
baseline. All physicians (in treatment and control groups) received the same educational materials 
on appropriate management of the clinical cases presented by SPs. Yet the control group still gave 
inappropriate antibiotics in 52% of cases.  This suggests that the A&F intervention cannot have 
worked by improving a knowledge gap, but rather by bridging a ‘know-do’ gap in appropriate 
treatment choices.  
Visibly higher diagnostic effort or accuracy cannot explain the main A&F effect either. Physicians 
that received A&F did not spend more consultation time with the patient, conduct any more 
thorough history-taking or examinations, or give more accurate diagnoses than those in the control 
group. This suggests that measured diagnostic performance cannot fully explain treatment 
choices, and raises the question of alternative channels through which the A&F intervention might 
work. There is some indication that habit persistence, aligned with social prescribing pressures, 
may influence treatment decisions - echoing results in previous studies on prescription drivers 
(Crea et al., 2019). Physicians who chose inappropriate antibiotic treatment at baseline were 50 
percentage points more likely to choose the same treatment for the same case at end-line. 
Moreover, in interviews conducted in this study, physicians reported peer norms and patient 
expectations for prescribing antibiotics, in cases where they know antibiotics are unlikely to be 
clinically effective.311 Treatment habits and perceived social pressures are costly to overcome 
(Hellerstein, 1998; Frank, 2004; Crea et al., 2019), even where physicians are intrinsically-
motivated to provide optimal care. Thus, the observed A&F effect on inappropriate antibiotic 
treatment may demonstrate the relative effectiveness of intrinsic informational incentives in 
helping to counter such barriers to behavior change – barriers that are, perhaps to some extent, 
sustained by physicians’ limited awareness of their own performance.  
While much of the policy discourse on clinical performance improvement has focused on external 
incentives – including via pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes or public reporting – this chapter 
finds that intrinsic incentive interventions may be an alternative, effective and less contestable 
 
311 When an uncomplicated bronchitis case was presented to physicians in vignette-form, they believed there was a 56% likelihood 
that patients would seek care elsewhere if they did not give antibiotics for the case, and a 65% likelihood that other GPs would give 
antibiotics for the same case - despite also believing there was only a 30% likelihood that the case would resolve more quickly with 
antibiotics. 
 185 
 
means to achieving targeted improvements – without worsening performance in non-targeted 
aspects of care, or generating incentives for providers to ‘game’ performance auditing systems. 
Among studies that have found a positive impact of P4P on clinical performance, the effect size 
is very moderate at best (a 5% average improvement in targeted measures) (Eijkenaar et al., 
2013). Evidence on public reporting similarly concludes little to no effect on provider 
performance (Metcalfe et al., 2018). While this is a relatively small study, the 46% improvement 
in targeted performance reported here represents a sizable effect in comparison.312 Perhaps the 
most comparable existing study to this present one revealed an effect of similar magnitude: 
Meeker et al. (2016) find that private A&F lowered inappropriate antibiotic treatment for 
respiratory infections by GPs in the US by around 47% (compared to guidelines education alone). 
That study differed in its use of peer-benchmarking in performance reporting, and its reliance on 
electronic health records (EHR) for measuring clinical performance. 313  The present study 
therefore validates this earlier finding in an LMIC setting where baseline performance was much 
poorer,314 using standardised patients to improve performance measurement, and benchmarking 
performance to best-practice standards.  
As with any intervention, successful implementation relies on its acceptability to participants and 
other stakeholders. With the feedback intervention evaluated in this chapter, the confidentiality 
of feedback data, and use of SPs for accurate performance measurement, overcomes some of the 
common measurement and reputational issues tied to public reporting that have made these latter 
initiatives highly contested among healthcare providers and policy-makers. While scaling the use 
of SPs in performance measurement may not be feasible in resource-constrained settings, the 
present study nonetheless offers a proof-of-concept for evaluating its cost-effectiveness and 
feasibility on a larger scale.  
As the South African government moves forward with its plans to contract private GPs to expand 
access to free primary care, addressing the inefficiencies and norms of over-treatment noted in 
this study will be paramount. Current discussions have focused on reforming payment incentives; 
for instance, through the introduction of cost-containment measures such as capitation or bundled 
payments. However, these latter measures raise the risk that physicians instead under-treat 
 
312 It is substantial even in comparison to average effect sizes reported for other physician-level interventions targeting antibiotic 
treatment (an average 11.6% improvement in targeted outcomes (van der Velden et al., 2012)). One explanation for this is that patient 
demands for antibiotics, which can hinder appropriate treatment choices in practice, cannot be controlled for in studies using 
administrative data. In the present study, SPs were trained not to ask for any drugs, so the influence of actual patient demand (in 
tempering A&F effects) is completely eliminated. The effect size difference may also be partly due to the small sample size in this 
study (which can inflate estimated effects) and the single end-line observation per sample GP for each clinical case (rather than 
multiple observations of the same GP, which is most often the case in studies using administrative data). 
313 Meeker et al. (2016) further evaluate outcomes at the practice level, rather than at the individual physician level (although feedback 
in their intervention is provided at the physician level, as in this study). 
314 The mean inappropriate antibiotic prescription rate at baseline was around 22% in Meeker et al. (2016)’s treatment and control 
groups, compared to 61% in this study sample. 
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patients and supply poorer quality care, under pressure to cut costs. Without a perfect means to 
monitor such risks, finding ways to leverage physicians’ intrinsic motivations to provide high 
quality care will be necessary. This chapter provides preliminary evidence that physicians respond 
well to intrinsic informational incentives; and that periodic private performance feedback, 
perhaps utilizing the SP audit approach, can be an effective way to rationalize treatment choices. 
A number of limitations to this chapter’s findings must be noted. As mentioned previously, a 
weakness of the experiment design is that intervention compliance – particularly in the control 
group – cannot be verified. As I am more certain of full intervention compliance in the treatment 
group,315 the estimated ITT effect may be over-estimating the true marginal effect of A&F relative 
to the educational intervention alone (that is, if all control group GPs had also complied). 
Moreover, this study does not evaluate the persistence of A&F effects over time. Each GP was 
assessed only at one post-intervention time point for each outcome of interest. End-line SP visits 
were mostly conducted within a month of intervention delivery, and it is plausible that a later 
scheduling of these visits may have recorded diminished effects.  
The external validity of results is a further concern, given the clinical cases used and the ethical 
requirement for informed consent from all GP participants. Only two variants of an acute 
bronchitis case are employed here in assessing GP performance, which limits generalizability of 
findings to other clinical scenarios. Nevertheless, in a country where almost 20% of adults aged 
15-49 are HIV+, and where respiratory infections are the most common reason for consultations 
and antibiotic treatment in primary care, the cases remain highly pertinent to investigating 
appropriate and differential antibiotic treatment choices by GPs.   
There is also likely to be some self-selection bias in the GPs that consented to participation in this 
study. In the ESRC study, from which this study sample was drawn, the non-participation rate 
was quite high among GPs approached for recruitment (63%).316 It is possible that GPs who 
choose to participate in research studies on care quality are more intrinsically-motivated, or 
competent, than those who do not.317 If this is the case, and baseline intrinsic motivation (or 
competency) increases the likelihood that physicians respond well to private A&F (as suggested 
in Lee (2018)), then the estimated results in this chapter would represent upper bounds of the true 
effects in the population. It is difficult to verify the extent of this bias, given the limited data 
 
315 The interviewers that delivered the intervention explicitly recorded whether treatment group GPs read the intervention materials 
immediately in front of them (and almost all treatment group GPs were reported to have done so (35 of 37)). This procedure was not 
followed for control group GPs, however.  
316 Non-participation was either because GPs could not be reached (despite several contact attempts by the research team), were 
reached but refused to take part, or were reached but did not give a final decision to participate. 
317 This may partly explain the high level of measured altruism in the study sample – a trait that is conceptually related to intrinsic 
motivation. 
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available on the sample population. From available data, it can be shown that the study sample 
has a lower proportion of female GPs (30% vs. 45%) and a higher proportion of dispensing GPs 
(57% vs. 39%) than the GP population of Johannesburg (see Table 4.6 in Chapter 4). Based on 
data collected in the ESRC study, dispensing GPs tend to be located in less affluent areas, accept 
poorer patients, charge lower rates, and display higher levels of measured altruism than non-
dispensing GPs. Female GPs are also more likely to be non-dispensing, and be located in 
wealthier areas (northern suburbs of Johannesburg). This suggests that altruism in the study 
sample (and relatedly, intrinsic motivation) may indeed be positively skewed, relative to the 
broader population.  
The study’s small sample size presents three further limitations. First, there is a risk that the 
magnitude of the estimated treatment effect on inappropriate antibiotic use is inflated, as is 
sometimes the case in small sample studies. The large effect size should therefore be interpreted 
with caution. Second, there is a higher risk of obtaining false negatives, meaning I cannot rule out 
a true effect where a statistically-significant effect is not detected (for instance, on total drug 
costs) (Cohen, 1988; Button et al., 2013). Third, it prevents testing for heterogeneous treatment 
effects, which could yield valuable insights on underlying causal channels for improving the 
intervention design and targeting. Relatedly, the small sample size prevented the inclusion of an 
additional, ‘no-intervention’ comparison group in the experiment - to isolate the effects of the 
educational intervention alone (which currently forms the control intervention).  
These limitations present opportunities for future research. A larger sample study could test for 
interactions between the A&F mechanism and GP characteristics of interest. For instance, Ivers 
et al. (2012)’s review concludes that A&F is more effective in contexts where baseline 
performance is low, whereas Lee (2018) finds that health workers’ response to intrinsic 
informational incentives is greater when baseline intrinsic motivation is high.318 It would be 
interesting to validate these findings in the South African or similar LMIC context, and test 
whether the A&F effect differs between physicians with high and low altruism, or between those 
with high and low baseline performance. In addition, although A&F has proven effective in this 
study, more evidence is needed to evaluate its cost-effectiveness relative to less resource-intensive 
interventions (such as the educational intervention in this experiment), to understand its feasibility 
in resource-constrained settings. Lastly, while inappropriate antibiotic use was the main target in 
this study, the SP method can be equally applied to evaluating A&F interventions designed to 
 
318 Both these findings may also explain why the main treatment effect estimated in this chapter is so large: poor baseline performance 
in rational antibiotic use and relatively high baseline altruism (or intrinsic motivation) in the study sample on average.  
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prioritize other care quality or cost dimensions (such as diagnostic effort or treatment costs, which 
are treated as only secondary feedback components in this study)319 to test for similar effects. 
 
 
319 The lack of emphasis or actionable detail given to GPs on these other performance feedback dimensions in this study may partly 
explain the absence of any significant A&F effects on these dimensions. It remains to be seen if similar future interventions, designed 
to prioritise these alternative dimensions with more detailed feedback, can yield significant effects.  
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8 Discussion and Conclusion 
This thesis began with the observation that healthcare overuse places a significant burden on 
health systems around the world, at a time when many low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) 
are stretching public budgets to engage private providers and improve care access for their 
populations. Private healthcare providers are increasingly recognised as necessary partners for 
universal health coverage (UHC) success (McPake and Hanson, 2016; Clarke et al., 2018). 
However, valid concerns remain regarding their limited accountability to patients (Montagu and 
Goodman, 2016), and subsequent effects on the quality and efficiency of care delivery. Robust 
evidence on the drivers of inappropriate care in the private sector in LMIC settings - to inform 
the regulation of these trends – is limited.  
Focusing on inappropriate antibiotic use in particular, this thesis sought to explore the behaviour 
of private physicians, and their incentives to over-treat - particularly as patients become more 
financially protected under UHC. In the context of South Africa - where private physicians are 
set to play an integral role in the planned national health insurance (NHI) reform - it set out to 
investigate the following: 
1. The impact of increasing patient insurance (financial protection) on the quality and 
efficiency of care provided by private physicians. 
2. The mediating role of market competition and intrinsic motivation on physicians’ 
healthcare choices. 
3. The impact of intrinsic informational incentives from private performance feedback 
(A&F) in lowering inappropriate antibiotic treatment and costs. 
To explore these questions, I designed and conducted two field experiments with private primary 
care physicians (GPs) in Johannesburg, South Africa. This chapter pulls together and summarises 
the key findings of this study (Section 8.1); highlights its strengths, limitations and future research 
implications (Section 8.2); and concludes with the main policy implications (Section 8.3). 
8.1 Summary of Main Findings 
The study reveals that improved financial protection for patients significantly increases the 
likelihood of over-treatment by private physicians, even in the absence of any patient demand or 
influence. Notably, this finding holds both when physicians have direct (fee-for-service) financial 
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incentives to over-treat and when they do not - in line with the theoretical predictions in Chapter 
3 (Hypotheses 2 and 5). Patients with more generous insurance are almost twice as likely to be 
ordered unnecessary fee-for-service (FFS) tests or procedures, and are charged more in FFS 
consultation costs (Chapter 6). This aligns with findings elsewhere - in markets for healthcare, 
computer repairs and taxi rides – that support the conventional second-degree moral hazard 
hypothesis: expert suppliers will exploit the lower cost-consciousness of more insured patients to 
oversupply services when they have direct opportunities to profit (Lu, 2014; Kerschbamer et al., 
2016; Balafoutas et al., 2017). However, Chapter 5 finds that inappropriate antibiotic prescribing 
by physicians who have no opportunity to profit from drug prescriptions is also almost 25% higher 
for more insured patients. These patients further receive more, and more expensive branded drugs 
(Chapter 6), despite the absence of any clinical need for drug treatment or any financial incentives 
for the prescribing physician. This latter result runs counter to most existing literature on 
physicians’ prescription choices, which conclude that physicians are unresponsive to patient 
insurance when they have no financial gain (Hellerstein, 1998; Iizuka, 2012; Lu, 2014; Crea et 
al., 2019). These patterns of over-treatment coincide with significant reductions in the technical 
quality and efficiency of care with better insurance.  
What drives this greater tendency for over-treatment with more insured patients? While the 
conventional theory on second-degree moral hazard can explain the result for treatments 
incentivised with FFS payment, it cannot explain the same result for drug prescriptions. The study 
design eliminated all differences in patient demand or characteristics (apart from insurance 
status), which rules out the potential influence of patient moral hazard or adverse selection into 
insurance. The within-subject experiment design also rules out the influence of fixed physician-
level characteristics, such as clinical knowledge or experience.  
Instead, the theoretical framework and results point to a more nuanced effect of provider effort. 
The model developed in Chapter 3 predicts that less appropriate clinical effort and greater 
diagnostic uncertainty may be one reason for over-prescribing. Physicians are not observed to 
exert any less clinical effort for more insured patients (Chapter 5) - indeed, they exert marginally 
higher observable effort with these patients. Yet, diagnostic accuracy is still poorer for high-
insured patients, suggesting that there may indeed be some (unobserved) elements of appropriate 
clinical effort that are lower for these patients. At the same time, the study finds no significant 
association between diagnostic accuracy and the likelihood of antibiotic treatment (or the quantity 
and costs of drug treatment) on average - implying that measured diagnostic performance cannot 
be the only driver of drug treatment choices either.  
Chapter 3 further proposes a role for physician tendencies to satisfy perceived patient 
expectations, in driving over-treatment. It predicts that private physicians will prioritise aspects 
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of care that are observed and valued by patients, irrespective of clinical need. Taken together, the 
empirical findings in this study corroborate this argument that physicians provide care in line with 
the expected value and cost salience to patients, as anticipated from patients’ insurance status. 
They reduce overtreatment for more cost-sensitive, low-insured patients; and provide relatively 
more observable yet costly aspects of care (including aspects of clinical effort and treatments that 
patients value) to less cost-conscious, high-insured patients. Physicians may also ‘price-in’ their 
observable effort in their FFS costs: the results show a significant, positive association between 
measured clinical effort and FFS consultation costs – both of which are higher for more insured 
patients.  
The theoretical framework proposes that these concerns for perceived patient preferences are 
rooted in private physicians’ competitive pressures to secure repeat business, and their altruism 
towards patients. While the framework is silent on how changes in physician competition or 
altruism should alter the observed treatment differentials by patient insurance cover,320 the results 
provide some evidence on mediating effects. More altruistic physicians are found to generate 
relatively lower avoidable drug costs for less insured patients; whereas physicians located in 
wealthier suburbs (with presumably lower localised cost competition) prescribe relatively more 
inappropriate drugs to more insured patients. Physicians with a lower density of competing 
physicians in their locality are also relatively more likely to prescribe inappropriate antibiotics to 
high-insured patients.321  
Two further findings from this analysis are notable. Firstly, although physicians had a lower 
tendency to over-treat less insured patients, the average level of over-treatment with drugs was 
still very high in this patient group (and in the study samples overall) – suggesting a general 
problem of over-prescribing, as implied in Hypothesis 3. Secondly, there is some evidence of a 
‘know-do’ gap with respect to antibiotic treatment for the average physician: while a large 
proportion of physicians were able to correctly identify the viral cause of an uncomplicated acute 
bronchitis case in a knowledge quiz (and report that antibiotics would not be very effective for 
the case), many of the same physicians also prescribed antibiotics for the same case in their 
clinical practice. Indicative evidence that physicians perceive strong prescribing norms and 
patient expectations for antibiotics for that clinical case may partly explain this gap.  
These findings raise the question of how physicians may be incentivised to reduce over-treatment 
for the average patient. Chapter 7 finds that a private audit and feedback (A&F) intervention – 
 
320 The framework merely predicts how a change in these factors should change care for the average patient (not how it should affect 
care differences between high- and low-insured patients).  
321 It is nevertheless noted that the net demand elasticity effect of competitor density is unclear. Although a higher physician density 
is commonly associated with a higher level of physician competition, it may also increase search costs for patients (Satterthwaite, 
1979) and therefore lower demand elasticity. 
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informing physicians of their performance relative to professional best-practice guidelines – can 
substantially reduce inappropriate antibiotic treatment for uninsured patients (for whom both 
physicians’ competitive and altruistic incentives to reduce over-treatment should already be high) 
compared to a passive educational intervention alone. Once again, there is little evidence of a 
consistent link between diagnostic accuracy and antibiotic treatment decisions: despite reducing 
inappropriate antibiotic treatment, private A&F had no corresponding effect on diagnostic effort 
or accuracy. Together, the results underscore the implications of a ‘know-do’ gap: simply 
ensuring that physicians have sufficient diagnostic or therapeutic (guidelines) knowledge is not 
enough to minimise over-treatment. Additional incentives are required to bring actual 
performance in line with knowledge.  
8.2 Strengths, Limitations and Future Research Implications 
Each empirical chapter (Chapters 5-7) discussed the literature contributions and limitations of its 
own analysis. This section summarises those discussions, reflects on the overall strengths and 
limitations of this study, and draws implications for future research. 
8.2.1 Theoretical validity 
This thesis began with a conceptual framework that brought together several theoretical 
arguments and empirical observations on physician behaviour, to guide the empirical 
investigation and interpretation of results. The findings lend support to many of the hypotheses 
derived in that framework. While the framework’s assumptions were mostly grounded in findings 
from previous literature, a few key assumptions could not be fully validated in this study and 
invite further research.  
Firstly, the framework assumes that physicians perfectly anticipate how patient demand would 
vary with insurance cover, and perceive more insured patients to be less cost-sensitive. In this 
study setting, it is not known how actual patient demand responds to insurance cover or how 
physicians perceive this demand response in practice. The most robust evidence in support of how 
the framework models demand responses to insurance comes from the US, from the RAND and 
Oregon health insurance experiments (Newhouse and Insurance Experiment Group, 1993; 
Finkelstein et al., 2012). However, equivalent evidence from LMIC is limited;322 and moreover, 
even if patient demand responds in this way, it is not clear if physicians correctly anticipate those 
responses as predicted in the framework. A qualitative investigation into how physicians perceive 
 
322 One exception is a recent study by Hausofer et al. (2020), which randomly allocated private health insurance to patients in Kenya 
and found no effect on healthcare utilisation. This result may be due to other demand-side constraints.  
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patients’ healthcare expectations to vary with insurance would be an interesting extension to this 
study. 
Relatedly, that physicians supply more profitable services and less appropriate effort to more 
insured patients (as evidenced in this study) is consistent with both the theory of second-degree 
moral hazard – as modelled in the framework - and perfect agency (Pauly, 1980). While Chapters 
5 and 6 argue in favour of the former, to fully validate this theory it is necessary to show evidence 
of demand-inducement (SID) and effort-stinting in the study sample – in other words, that both 
high- and low-insured patients in practice demand less services and more clinical effort than what 
physicians are observed to provide. As this study does not evaluate demand-side responses to 
insurance, it cannot verify this. Although Chapters 5 and 6 show evidence of unnecessary 
treatment (more frequently for more insured patients) without any actual demand from SPs, the 
theory of perfect agency could argue that this observed behaviour is just physicians trying to 
perfectly satisfy anticipated patient demand – without any selfish, or profit-driven motivation. 
Nevertheless, there is supportive quasi-experimental evidence of SID under FFS incentives from 
other contexts (Fuchs, 1978; Gruber et al., 1999). One experimental study with SPs also succeeds 
in separating these two hypotheses (by experimentally varying both the financial incentives and 
insurance status’ facing physicians), and provides evidence in support of second-degree moral 
hazard, but not in support of perfect agency (Lu, 2014). Taken together, this evidence suggests 
that second-degree moral hazard is likely to explain the study results. Nevertheless, a 2x2 
experimental design like in Lu (2014), where both the GPs’ financial incentives and patient 
insurance status are simultaneously and exogenously varied, would be necessary to fully verify 
this. This was not feasible in this study context, and is left to future research. 
Thirdly, the two factors that are predicted to influence physicians’ sensitivity to patient demand 
are their competitive (market-based) and intrinsic motivations. The findings in Chapters 5 and 6 
lend some support to this.323 However, the results in these chapters cannot perfectly separate the 
influence of competition from that of intrinsic motivation, as both factors are predicted to 
influence physician choices in the same way (less overtreatment for less insured patients). Again, 
complementary qualitative research on the relative influences of competitive pressures and 
intrinsic motives in physicians’ care choices would be insightful. 
Lastly, the framework predicts that physicians’ intrinsic motivations can be increased by 
providing them with new information on their performance relative to an accepted ‘best practice’ 
benchmark (be it professional guidelines or peer norms). The results from the private A&F 
 
323 In interviews, physicians reported strong perceptions of patient demand elasticity with respect to their antibiotic treatment choices, 
for example. Moreover, the average level of measured altruism in the study samples were very high, and there is limited evidence that 
measures of competition and altruism mediate physician responses to patient insurance in this study. 
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intervention evaluated in Chapter 7 provide some support to this. However, the framework also 
models this intrinsic incentive effect as being proportional to the baseline performance of 
physicians: it is implicit that those performing worst relative to the benchmark will receive the 
largest incentives to improve from the ‘new’ A&F information. This assumption is drawn from 
Tonkin-Crine et al. ( 2017)’s evidence review, which concludes that A&F interventions are likely 
to be more effective when baseline performance is low. It was not possible to test this assumption 
in the present study, however. The small sample size (as discussed further in the next section) 
impeded the testing of heterogeneous treatment effects by baseline performance. Future studies 
with larger sample sizes could seek to validate this assumption – by investigating how estimated 
A&F effects vary by baseline performance – and provide further insights into how intrinsic 
incentives might operate through A&F.  
8.2.2 Methodological considerations 
The experimental methods used in this study enabled the generation of novel, field-experimental 
evidence on the impact of patient insurance on physicians’ treatment decisions, and the scope for 
intrinsic incentives in regulating these decisions. The SP audit methodology allowed the study to 
make two broad contributions. Firstly, it builds on existing evidence on the effects of patient 
insurance on treatment outcomes in two important ways: i) unlike almost all other empirical 
studies evaluating insurance effects (which rely on observational data), this study’s SP method 
enabled the isolation of physician-level drivers of treatment outcomes from patient-level factors; 
and ii) unlike the one experimental study that also uses the SP method to study insurance effects 
on treatment outcomes (Lu (2014)), this study’s within-subject experiment design enabled 
observation of the insurance effect on the same physician (which controls for all physician-level 
characteristics that can confound the estimated effect). Secondly, this study develops a nascent 
application of SPs to the evaluation of randomised provider quality interventions. To my 
knowledge, very few studies have utilised SPs in this way (Das et al., 2016; Harrison et al., 2000; 
Mathews et al., 2009; Mohanan et al., 2017). This approach also offers a promising means to 
validate findings from evaluations of similar interventions conducted with routine, administrative 
data – for instance, Meeker et al. (2016)’s evaluation of a similar A&F intervention as in this 
study, which finds a comparable effect.   
Despite these contributions, there are certain limitations to the use of SP methods in this study. 
First, SP audit studies are very resource-intensive. As such, the sample sizes in this study are 
small, and there are only two observations per GP in each experiment. This is a common limitation 
of SP audit studies in general, and this study benefits from slightly larger samples than some 
others (Lu, 2014). The small samples constrain the study’s statistical power for detecting small-
medium true effects, and for investigating heterogeneous treatment effects; and increase the risk 
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of estimating inflated effect sizes. These limitations must be kept in mind when interpreting study 
results. The small sample constraint is a relative weakness of using SPs to measure treatment 
outcomes compared to large administrative datasets, which could offer many more observations 
per participant. Again, this highlights the value of cross-validation using both approaches where 
possible, and invites future research that uses larger sample sizes and perhaps insurance claims 
data to replicate and validate this study results.  
Second, only two variants of an acute bronchitis case are used in the experiments to evaluate 
physicians’ clinical performance. These cases are appropriate for evaluating inappropriate 
antibiotic treatments, particularly in the South African primary care setting. However, there are 
other clinical cases that are also compatible with the SP methodology, and that may be used to 
test the generalizability of this study’s conclusions in future research.  
Third, patient care continuity - an important dimension of primary care quality - cannot be 
assessed through the SP method given the heightened risk of detection from repeated SP 
interactions. The SP method is only amenable to evaluating physicians’ performance in one-off, 
acute clinical cases (as in this study). Future studies could pursue a more holistic evaluation of 
physician performance by combining SP assessments with the analysis of clinical records that can 
track how the same physicians care for patients over time.  
Relatedly, administrative data could be combined with SP assessments to evaluate the persistence 
of treatment outcomes following a performance improvement intervention, like the A&F in this 
study. A limitation of the A&F evaluation in Chapter 7 is that intervention outcomes are only 
observed at a single point in time. Repeated assessments with SPs over time would be very 
resource-intensive and was infeasible in this study. Although the two methods of quality 
evaluation are not equivalent, where resources are constrained and comparable electronic health 
records (EHR) are made available (unlike in this study), EHR could be a useful complement to 
SPs for evaluating the persistence of certain outcomes over time.  
Further to the SP method constraints, four limitations to this study design must be noted. First, 
the two field experiments draw on two different GP samples. This was done partly for logistical 
reasons, and partly because different GP characteristics were of importance in the two 
experiments. Baseline data for the second experiment (which was taken from the ESRC study) 
was not available for the majority of GPs in the first experiment. To avoid funding additional 
baseline visits, it was decided to limit the second experiment sample to only those GPs with 
baseline data from the ESRC study. Moreover, all GPs in the first experiment are non-dispensing 
and contracted-in with large health insurance schemes (by design, to satisfy the research 
objectives of the first experiment); whereas GPs in the second experiment vary in their contracting 
and dispensing statuses, to better represent the distribution of these characteristics in the broader 
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GP population. As GPs voluntarily choose their dispensing and contracting status, this could 
imply systematic differences in the average GP across the two samples. For instance, in 
Johannesburg, dispensing GPs are more likely to be located in less affluent areas, accept poorer 
patients, and display higher levels of measured altruism toward patient welfare than non-
dispensing GPs (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2019b). These sample differences necessarily limit the 
extent to which the findings from one experiment sample can be generalised to the other. The 
second experiment findings are perhaps more generalizable in this respect, as the main results are 
estimated with controls for GPs’ contracting and dispensing status. 
Second, the SPs used in the two experiments have different insurance statuses. All SPs have some 
form of insurance cover in the first experiment, while all SPs are uninsured in the second. Again, 
this was done to simplify logistics and satisfy the different experiment objectives. The first 
experiment was designed to evaluate the effects of different levels of patient insurance, so it was 
necessary that all SPs had some insurance cover there. In the second experiment, insurance was 
not a research concern and it was logistically simpler to have cash-paying SPs, to avoid having to 
purchase health insurance for fieldworkers and to ensure the SPs would be seen by all sample 
GPs (irrespective of their contracting status with insurance schemes). This difference may limit 
the extent to which the findings on intrinsic incentives from the second experiment (in Chapter 
7) may be applied to a context where patients are insured, for example. However, the theoretical 
framework (in Chapter 3) would suggest that estimated effects with uninsured patients in Chapter 
7 represent a lower bound of what could be expected with insured patients. Baseline intrinsic 
incentives for minimising overtreatment – as modelled in Chapter 3 - should be at their highest 
for uninsured patients. Therefore, the marginal effect of an A&F intervention targeting an increase 
in these incentives should be relatively lower for these patients than insured ones. This is a 
hypothesis left to future empirical investigation. A similar conclusion could also apply to findings 
from the first experiment (in Chapters 5 and 6). The estimated effects of increasing the level of 
patient insurance cover are likely to be lower-bound effects of moving from a patient with no 
insurance (SPs in the second experiment) to a patient with some insurance (SPs in the first 
experiment). A comparison of estimated insurance effects in Chapter 6 to those in Lu (2014) - 
where the author compares treatment choices for an uninsured patient and an insured one - lends 
some support to this hypothesis: the magnitude of the insurance effect on drug costs (for example) 
are much larger in Lu (2014) than in this study. Nevertheless, physicians’ financial incentives 
were different in Lu’s study (the doctors there were salaried hospital physicians and had positive 
financial incentives to prescribe). It remains to be investigated if a similar result can hold with 
private, non-dispensing GPs. 
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Third, GPs in both experiment samples were recruited with informed consent, which implies some 
level of selection bias in those that opted to participate in this research. In the first experiment, 
46% of GPs contacted for recruitment refused to participate. The equivalent rate was 63% in the 
ESRC study (from which the second experiment sample is drawn). A further 16% of recruited 
GPs in the second experiment refused to on-going study participation following randomisation 
(prior to intervention delivery).324 No monetary incentives were offered at the recruitment stage, 
and it was further explained to GPs at recruitment that the study was investigating the quality of 
care provision. It is therefore plausible that GPs who agreed to participate may be more altruistic 
(intrinsically motivated) or more clinically confident than those who refused. It is difficult to 
verify this with study data. It was shown in Chapter 4 that both experiment samples have a lower 
share of female GPs, and the second experiment sample has a higher share of dispensing GPs, 
than the GP population in Johannesburg. The ESRC study found that dispensing GPs are likely 
to be more altruistic than non-dispensing GPs, whereas female GPs are more likely to be non-
dispensing and located in the wealthier areas of Johannesburg (the northern suburbs) (Lagarde 
and Blaauw, 2019b). This suggests that GPs in the study samples may indeed be more altruistic 
(and intrinsically motivated) than the broader GP population.  
If baseline intrinsic motivation compounds how GPs respond to patient insurance or to A&F, then 
estimated effects in this study may be overestimating true population effects. The theoretical 
framework assumes that any changes in baseline intrinsic motivation will not alter the insurance 
effect;325 and moreover, that baseline intrinsic motivation will not affect the intrinsic incentive 
effect. However, limited evidence from the first experiment (Chapter 6) suggests that altruism 
may mediate the insurance effect on certain care cost outcomes. Lee (2018) also finds that the 
baseline intrinsic motivations of rural health workers can mediate their performance responses to 
A&F. Nevertheless, more robust empirical research is needed to conclude how baseline intrinsic 
motivation mediates physician responses to the altruistic incentives from patient insurance, or the 
intrinsic informational incentives from A&F.   
A last limitation to be noted relates to the first experiment design (in study Part 1). The SPs in 
that experiment had different levels of insurance cover, which was hypothesised to signal different 
levels of patient cost-sensitivity to the physician. The SPs also explicitly signalled their different 
cost-sensitivities (with reference to their respective insurance covers) in their opening statements. 
These opening statements were specifically designed to ensure that physicians were aware of the 
 
324 GPs who refused to participate did so for a number of different reasons: time and work pressures, periods of unavailability (leave) 
over the study period, multiple practice locations with little foresight on their future rotas, planned relocation, and so on. Some also 
raised concerns about study implications for the NHI design, and their engagement in it.  
325 An increase in baseline altruism is modelled to affect care choices for high- and low-insured patients in the same way, thereby 
leaving the treatment differential unaltered 
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different likelihoods of OOP payment for the two SPs. However, this explicit signalling makes it 
difficult to separate the pure insurance effect (the implied patient cost-sensitivity) from the effect 
of patients explicitly voicing their relative cost concern (in some ways, different explicit demands 
for cost-effective care). This distinction is unlikely to be of much consequence to treatment 
differences, since the SPs do not make differential treatment or treatment cost demands in their 
opening statements. Nevertheless, this could be investigated with an alternative 2x2 experiment 
design, where both the patient’s insurance status and their explicit signalling of cost awareness 
(or explicit demand for cost-effective care, such as generic substitution in drug treatment) is 
experimentally varied. Such an experiment would yield further insights into the potential for 
patients to influence cost-effective treatment choices.  
8.3 Policy Implications 
Findings in Chapters 5 and 6 show that healthcare overuse related to patient insurance is not just 
a demand-side issue, as commonly implied in the literature on ex post moral hazard. The optimal 
choice of patient cost-sharing in insurance contracts must also consider subsequent incentives on 
the supply-side. The findings contribute to the current debate on how private GPs should be 
contracted under the NHI system in South Africa. It is clear that the most prevalent financial 
incentive structure for these GPs (fee-for-service, non-dispensing) will not be optimal, given the 
incentives to over-treat - and over-treat more as patients become better insured. Eliminating all 
patient co-payment (as proposed in the 2018 Medical Schemes Amendment Bill and the 2019 
NHI Bill) without altering this incentive structure is likely to be inefficient. Given the already 
high rates of inappropriate, broad-spectrum antibiotic prescribing in South Africa, the potential 
public health consequences are considerable. A related study shows that the dispensing status of 
GPs ensures some level of supply-side cost-sharing (given the drug pricing regulations in South 
Africa) (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2019a) and could be a means of cost-containment as patients 
become more insured. Alternative cost-sharing proposals include some form of capitation 
payment for GPs, in place of (or combined with) FFS. Nevertheless, further evidence is needed 
to understand how these cost-sharing incentives will interact with patient insurance, and whether 
they instead create perverse incentives for under-treatment. The extent to which these alternative 
payment arrangements will be attractive to private GPs is another concern.  
In the absence of a perfect means to contract for optimal patient care, Chapter 7 shows that 
appealing to physicians’ intrinsic motivations instead may be an alternative (or complementary) 
strategy – even under the current FFS payment structure. It presents preliminary evidence that 
private A&F, combined with clear information on treatment guidelines, can encourage 
appropriate treatment choices. While the A&F intervention tested in this study specifically 
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targeted antibiotic treatment, a similar intervention could also target generic substitution (as 
branded drugs were another important driver of avoidable treatment costs in Chapter 6). However, 
any proposal to roll out a similar intervention at scale must first address two things.  
First, the cost-effectiveness of such an intervention must be considered. As stated earlier, SP 
audits are highly resource-intensive, so ways of combining these audits with more readily 
available data sources could be investigated. To facilitate this, the routine collection of 
standardised and comparable data on contracted provider performance and costs should be a 
priority in the NHI system. Although such administrative data collection and monitoring is 
vulnerable to provider manipulation (for example, through up-coding of recorded diagnoses), the 
scope for this may be minimised by limiting the ties between monitored provider performance 
and pecuniary incentives. Moreover, the intervention effects detected in this study should ideally 
be validated in a larger sample study, and with both insured and uninsured patients. Economic 
analyses of such antibiotic stewardship interventions must also find ways to value the broader 
public health benefits of intervention effects, in relation to antibiotic resistance, in evaluating their 
cost-effectiveness (Leal et al., 2017).  
Second, although the scope of this study has been restricted to the private sector, the effectiveness 
of such an intervention in the public primary care clinics of South Africa should also be assessed. 
Blaauw and Lagarde (2019) found that rates of inappropriate antibiotic treatment in public 
primary care clinics (where more than two thirds of urban South Africans are estimated to seek 
primary care (NDoH et al., 2019)) were almost 17% higher than in the private GP practices of 
Johannesburg, highlighting a considerable need for antibiotic stewardship also in those settings. 
The responses of salaried public health workers to private A&F may differ from those of private 
GPs – particularly if baseline intrinsic motivation is associated with the decision to work in the 
public sector (Kolstad and Lindkvist, 2013). 
A final consideration for policy is the influence of patient demand. This study has primarily 
focused on evaluating supply-side incentives for over-treatment. However, a repeated argument 
throughout the study (and others) is that perceived patient demand may have an important 
influence on physicians’ treatment choices, even in the absence of actual demand. This highlights 
an important role for patients, and patient education, in encouraging appropriate antibiotic use 
and treatment choices. Other studies have shown that when patients signal appropriate treatment 
preferences, this can result in better choices by physicians (Currie et al., 2011; Lagarde and 
Blaauw, 2019). It seems reasonable to expect that if physicians respond to the implied cost-
sensitivity of patients from their insurance, they would be just as responsive when patients 
vocalise this sensitivity. This suggests an important role for informed patient demand in 
influencing not only clinically-appropriate treatment choices (as evidenced in Currie et al. (2011) 
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and Lagarde and Blaauw (2019)), but also cost-effective ones like generic drug equivalents. 
Patient-side interventions – to educate and encourage patients to question physicians’ antibiotic 
or branded drug choices, for example – could therefore be important complements to altering 
supply-side incentives.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A.1. Private provision of healthcare for diarrhoea and fever/cough in 
children under 5 
 
Source. National Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), between 2000 and 2008. 
Notes. The figure summarises the source of care reported by all respondents with children under 5 that sought care for diarrhoea or fever/cough in the two 
weeks prior to the survey. The data is summarised by geographical region and the regional population wealth quintile of respondents.  
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Appendix A.2. Johannesburg: A microcosm of spatial inequality in South Africa 
The city of Johannesburg – the largest metropolis, and financial centre of South Africa – is 
emblematic of the country’s legacy of urban segregation, and the shortfalls in the redress policies that 
followed. Composed of 7 administrative regions (see Figure 2.2), the city remains effectively divided 
into the predominantly white, middle-class neighbourhoods in the north – around the former whites-
only suburbs of Sandton and Randburg (in Regions B and E) – and the predominantly black, working-
class neighbourhoods in the South, exemplified by Soweto (Region D).  
Regions of the City of Johannesburg 
This north-south divide along race and class lines is the combined result of two factors. First, there 
is the concentration of a declining (and northward shifting) manufacturing sector in the south, and a 
rapidly growing services sector in the north. Second, apartheid policies since 1950 restricted 
residential occupation in the northern neighbourhoods to whites only, and relocated black residents 
to the southern suburbs of Soweto, Eldorado Park and Lenasia.326 By 2001, almost a decade after the 
end of legal spatial segregation, Crankshaw (2008) estimates that the white population still accounted 
for 73% of residents in the former whites-only northern neighbourhoods (despite comprising only 
16% of the Johannesburg population). Moreover, all areas where the middle-class comprised more 
 
326 There are two exceptions to this north-south pattern of racial segregation in Johannesburg. One is the suburb of Alexandra in the 
northern region E, bordering Sandton, which was a blacks-only neighbourhood. It still remains a predominantly blacks-only 
neighbourhood, with black Africans comprising 99% of the area population according to the 2011 census. Another exception is Region 
A in the northern periphery, which was (and still is) predominantly resided by black Africans. The term “northern suburbs”, as 
referenced in this thesis, refers to only those previously whites-only suburbs of Sandton and Randburg (Regions B and E, excluding 
Alexandra).  
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than two-thirds of the population were found in these predominantly white, northern 
neighbourhoods – concentrated around the areas of Sandton and Randburg. 
Post-1994 government policies significantly expanded access to basic services, such as affordable 
housing, water, sanitation, electricity and public transport in deprived areas. However, spatial 
inequalities in access to economic opportunity - increasingly concentrated in the north – have 
perpetuated a “spatial poverty trap” among the working class neighbourhoods in the south (Pieterse 
and Owen, 2018). Despite being one of the richest municipalities in South Africa, around 43% of 
Johannesburg’s 5 million residents live below the poverty line, and deprivation levels are highest in 
the city’s south. High unemployment (over 23% in 2016, up from 6.8% in 1993), and a widening 
wage gap between low- and high-skilled workers, continues to exacerbate pre-existing inequalities. 
Unemployment is highest in the region of Soweto (35%), and black Africans comprise a 
disproportionately high share of low-wage and unemployed workers in the city (Pieterse and Owen, 
2018). Health and human development outcomes are also aligned with these spatial patterns. Soweto 
had the highest density of HIV+ cases and AIDS-related deaths among all regions over the decade 
2001-2011, followed by the other southern regions and Region A in the northern periphery. 
Conversely, Regions B, C and E (with the majority of all previously whites-only neighbourhoods) 
consistently had the highest rankings in the Human Development Index (HDI), which considers 
levels of literacy, education, life expectancy and income (HSRC, 2013).  
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Appendix B.1. Classifications of checklist items, diagnoses and treatments 
  
 
Clinical Case 1 
Uncomplicated (viral) acute bronchitis in 
otherwise healthy young adult 
Clinical Case 2 
Complicated (bacterial) acute bronchitis 
in HIV+ young adult 
A. Checklist items  
Essential history-
taking 
Duration of cough; temperature / fever; productive 
cough; coughing up blood; weight loss; night sweats; 
chest pain; breathing difficulty; smoking status; 
having TB before; HIV status; allergy to penicillin  
Duration of cough; temperature / fever; productive 
cough; coughing up blood; weight loss; night sweats; 
chest pain; breathing difficulty; smoking status; 
having TB before; HIV status; allergy to penicillin; 
HIV history; any HIV treatment / ARV 
(antiretroviral) therapy; most recent viral load / 
CD4 count; any antibiotics (Bactrim) for 
pneumonia; any preventive drugs for TB 
Recommended 
history-taking 
Details about initial cold; having similar problem 
before; sore throat; ear ache; whistling noise with 
breaths; occupation / job status; contact with 
someone coughing / someone with TB; asthma 
(personal and family history); any regular 
medication; breathing fast; heart beating fast / 
palpitations; any allergies (in general) 
Details about initial cold; having similar problem 
before; sore throat; ear ache; whistling noise with 
breaths; occupation / job status; contact with 
someone coughing / someone with TB; asthma 
(personal and family history); any regular 
medication; breathing fast; heart beating fast / 
palpitations; any allergies (in general) 
Essential 
examinations 
Take temperature; take blood pressure; take pulse 
rate; examine throat; listen to lungs; tap lungs 
(percuss) 
Take temperature; take blood pressure; take pulse 
rate; examine throat; listen to lungs; tap lungs 
(percuss) 
Recommended 
examinations 
Palpate for lymph nodes (below ears); examine ears; 
listen to heart; check oxygen saturation 
Palpate for lymph nodes (below ears); examine ears; 
listen to heart; check oxygen saturation 
B. Diagnoses   
Correct / partially 
correct 
Post-nasal drip; Coughing from bronchitis / 
bronchial irritation from coughing; Post-infectious 
cough; Acute bronchitis / bronchitis / inflammatory 
bronchitis; Tracheitis; Post-flu symptoms / after-
effects of flu; Chest cold; Viral infection  
Post-nasal drip; Coughing from bronchitis / 
bronchial irritation from coughing; Post-infectious 
cough; Acute bronchitis / bronchitis / inflammatory 
bronchitis; Tracheitis; Post-flu symptoms / after-
effects of flu; Chest cold; Minor chest infection; 
Bacterial infection 
Incorrect Sino-bronchitis / chronic bronchitis; Allergies / 
hayfever; Rhinitis / laryngitis / pharyngitis / URTI; 
Throat inflammation / infection / irritation; 
Seasonal irritation; Lower respiratory infection;  
Minor chest infection; Chest inflammation / 
inflammation; Reactive / irritated airways; Sinusitis; 
Cough / persistent cough; Respiratory infection; 
Tonsilitis; Nasal irritation; Cold / flu; Asthma; TB; 
Bacterial infection 
Sino-bronchitis / chronic bronchitis; Allergies / 
hayfever; Rhinitis / laryngitis / pharyngitis / URTI; 
Throat inflammation / infection / irritation; 
Seasonal irritation; Lower respiratory infection; 
Chest inflammation / inflammation; Reactive / 
irritated airways; Sinusitis, Cough / persistent cough; 
Respiratory infection; Tonsilitis; Nasal irritation; 
Cold / flu; Asthma; TB; Viral infection 
C. Treatments   
Appropriate Cough suppressants/expectorants; Analgesics; 
Throat preparations (e.g. lozenges)  
Antibiotics (short course of Amoxicillin); Cough 
suppressants/expectorants; Analgesics; Throat 
preparations (e.g. lozenges)   
Inappropriate / 
harmful 
Antibiotics; Steroids; Nasal decongestants; 
Antihistamines; Bronchodilators; Probiotics; 
Vitamins; Other 
Steroids; Nasal decongestants; Antihistamines; 
Bronchodilators; Probiotics; Vitamins; Other 
Notes. For ease of comparison, listed items that are not shared across the two clinical cases are underlined. Any listed ‘correct / partially correct’ diagnosis 
for Clinical case 1 that was preceded by “bacterial” (e.g. “bacterial tracheitis”) was classified as ‘incorrect’, whereas any preceded by “viral” (e.g. “viral 
bronchitis”) was also considered ‘correct / partially correct’. The classification of listed diagnoses apply to single diagnoses only. In a number of cases, 
multiple diagnoses were given, and protocols were established by the research team for classifying those. One example is where a ‘Cold/Flu’ diagnosis was 
given alongside a correct/partially-correct diagnosis (except just a ‘viral infection’). Although ‘Cold/Flu’ on its own is incorrect (as classified above), the 
SPs presenting both clinical cases do report that a cold/flu preceded their current symptoms. As such, the combined diagnosis was also considered 
correct/partially-correct.  
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Appendix B.2. Q&A scripts for clinical cases 
Clinical Case 1  
POSSIBLE QUESTION ASKED BY THE DOCTOR/NURSE: ANSWER GIVEN BY THE STANDARDISED PATIENT: 
When did you have the flu/cold? It started a week ago / last XXday.  
Tell me more about the flu/cold? It was like a normal cold. I had a blocked nose, a sore 
throat and my nose was running. I felt quite tired/I had 
no energy. And I was coughing.  
NOT: 
shivering 
dizziness 
body pain 
How long did the flu/cold last? 4-5 days 
Tell me more about the cough? It is really disturbing me. It is not going away.  
How long have you had the cough? About a week/ 7 days. Since the cold/flu started. 
Did you take anything for the cold? / did you see a doctor? I only took Panado/disprin and Medlemon / Stoney / 
Strepsils 
Are you taking anything for the cough.  I’ve been taking cough syrup / Benylin/ Alcophyllex. 
Is anything coming up when you cough? Yes. A little 
Is your cough dry? Sometimes some white stuff comes up.  
What you are coughing up – what does it look like? White/clear stuff. 
It is not green or yellow. No 
Is there any blood? No 
When are you coughing? All the time. Both day and night. It really bothers me. 
Do you have a fever? No  
Do/did you have any earache? No  
Is your throat sore now? It is a bit irritated from the coughing.  
Is the cough worse at night? Or worse in the morning? Not really. But it is keeping keep me up at night. 
Have you had this before? I have had colds before and coughing. But this cough is 
worse than before.  
Does anything make the coughing better / help the 
coughing? 
I have been taking cough syrup. It doesn’t help really.  
Do you have any chest pain?  No  
Are you in pain? / Do you have any pains? Not really. My throat is sore from the coughing.  
Is it painful when you breathe? No 
Do you feel short of breath/difficulty breathing? No.  
Do you have difficulty walking up the stairs or up a hill? No. 
Do you have any shortness of breath at night? No 
Have you had any wheezing/ whistling noise when you 
breathe? 
Wheezing: What is that?   
No.  
Is anyone else in your family/around you sick?  My flatmate / friend had the flu just before me. They 
are fine now.  
Is there anyone around you that has been coughing for a 
long time / with a bad cough? 
No 
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POSSIBLE QUESTION ASKED BY THE DOCTOR/NURSE: ANSWER GIVEN BY THE STANDARDISED PATIENT: 
Did you have any breathing problems / asthma as a child? I don’t think so. I’ve never heard that I did. 
How is your appetite? OK 
Have you had any nausea or vomiting? No 
Have you had any diarrhoea? No 
Are you allergic to anything? No, not that I know of. 
Are you having night sweats? No  
Sweating a lot at night? No 
Are you losing weight? Have you lost weight recently? No 
Do you smoke? Have you ever smoked? No 
Do you drink? Sometimes, with friends. OR never 
Have you ever had TB? No 
Have you ever been tested for TB? No 
Have you ever had asthma? No 
Have you had any other lung problems before? No 
Are you HIV positive? No  
When did you last check for HIV? About 2/4/6 months ago / at the beginning of the year 
Why/Where/how were you last tested?  - I wanted to give blood 
- There was a campaign at work 
- I went with a friend 
- I broke up with my boyfriend when I found out he was 
cheating so I got tested 
Do you have any other medical problem (Diabetes? 
Hypertension? Asthma? Pneumonia?) 
No  
Does anyone in your family have any  medical problems 
(Diabetes? Hypertension? Asthma? Pneumonia?) 
 
Are you taking any other medication? No. Just the cough syrup 
Are you using oral contraceptives? No 
Are you pregnant? No 
When was your last menstrual period? / Have you missed 
your period? / Are your periods irregular? 
2 weeks ago / No / No 
What do you want me to do for you? I am not sure. I just want to get better / I want this 
cough to go away. 
NOT: 
prescription/treatment/drugs 
Sick note 
Is there anything else wrong? I am not sure what you mean. 
Have you been travelling recently?/ Have you been out of 
the country recently? 
No 
Tell me about where you live? Your current living situation. 
NOT: 
Informal settlement, shack 
Do you share a room with anyone? No 
Are you exposed to dust/fumes at work No 
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Clinical Case 2 
POSSIBLE QUESTION ASKED BY THE DOCTOR/NURSE: ANSWER GIVEN BY THE STANDARDISED PATIENT: 
When did you have the cold? It started about 2 weeks ago.  
Tell me more about the cold? It was like a normal cold. I had a blocked nose, a sore throat 
and my nose was running. I felt quite tired/I had no energy. 
And I was coughing.  
NOT: 
shivering 
dizziness 
body pain 
How long did the cold last? 4-5 days 
Tell me more about the cough? It is really disturbing me. It is not going away.  
How long have you had the cough? About 2 weeks. Since the cold started. 
Did you take anything for the cold? / did you see a 
doctor? 
I only took Panado/disprin and Medlemon / Stoney / 
Strepsils 
Are you taking anything for the cough.  I’ve been taking cough syrup / Benylin/ Alcophyllex. 
Is anything coming up when you cough? Yes. For the last 3 or 4 days. Some greenish stuff. 
Is your cough dry? No. Sometimes some greenish stuff comes up  
What you are coughing up – what does it look like? Green/Yellow stuff. 
It is not green or yellow. Yes it is. 
Is there any blood? No 
When are you coughing? All the time. Both day and night. It really bothers me. 
Do you have a fever? Yesterday in the afternoon I did feel a bit feverish.  
My friend at work felt my head and said I was hot. / I 
measured my temperature and it was 38 degrees.     
Do/did you have any earache? No  
Is your throat sore now? It is a bit irritated from the coughing.  
Is the cough worse at night? Or worse in the morning? Not really. But it is keeping keep me up at night. 
Have you had this before? I have had colds before and coughing. But this cough is 
worse than before.  
Does anything make the coughing better / help the 
coughing? 
I have been taking cough syrup. It doesn’t help really.  
Do you have any chest pain?  No  
Are you in pain? / Do you have any pains? Not really. My throat is sore from the coughing.  
Is it painful when you breathe? No 
Do you feel short of breath/difficulty breathing? No.  
Do you have difficulty walking up the stairs or up a hill? No. 
Do you have any shortness of breath at night? No 
Have you had any wheezing/ whistling noise when you 
breathe? 
Wheezing: What is that?   
No.  
Is anyone else in your family/around you sick?  My flatmate / friend had the flu just before me. They are 
fine now.  
Is there anyone around you that has been coughing for 
a long time / with a bad cough? 
No 
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POSSIBLE QUESTION ASKED BY THE DOCTOR/NURSE: ANSWER GIVEN BY THE STANDARDISED PATIENT: 
Did you have any breathing problems / asthma as a 
child? 
I don’t think so. I’ve never heard that I did. 
How is your appetite? OK 
Have you had any nausea or vomiting? No 
Have you had any diarrhoea? No 
Are you allergic to anything? No, not that I know of. 
Are you having night sweats? No  
Sweating a lot at night? No 
Are you losing weight? Have you lost weight recently? No 
Do you smoke? Have you ever smoked? No 
Do you drink? Sometimes, with friends. OR never 
Have you ever had TB? No 
Have you ever been tested for TB? Yes. 
When were you last tested for TB? They have done the TB skin test and tested my sputum at 
the clinic. The last sputum was about 3 months ago. It was 
negative. 
What was the result? It was negative.  
Have you ever had asthma? No 
Have you had any other lung problems before? No 
You say you are HIV positive? Yes 
How long have you known that you are HIV positive? About 1 and a half years now. 
How were you tested for HIV? They used that finger prick test and they took blood from 
my arm.  
How did you know that you were HIV positive? Were 
you sick when you discovered that you were HIV 
positive? 
No. I was not sick / I completely well. I just had myself 
tested. 
- I wanted to give blood 
- There was a campaign at work 
- I went with a friend 
- I broke up with my boyfriend when I found out he was 
cheating so I got tested 
Were you surprised to find that you were HIV positive.  Yes. It was a big shock. It took me some time to accept it.  
How did you get the HIV? I think it was my previous boyfriend/girlfriend. After I 
found out I had my suspicions and I went and asked them 
but s/he didn’t really admit it.  
Have you told your family about your status? Yes.  
Have you told your boyfriend/girlfriend about your 
status? 
I don’t have a boyfriend/girlfriend at the moment. 
Have you had lots of boyfriends/girlfriends? No. I was just unlucky with that one. 
Are you on ARVs / taking treatment for the HIV? Yes 
Where are you getting the ARVs? I go to XXX clinic,  which is close to where I stay.  
Why are you going to the public clinic for ARVs? I don’t have medical aid so have to go to the clinic for ARVs.  
Why didn’t you go to the clinic for this cough? The queues are very long there. If you are sick you have to 
wait in the sick/acute queue which takes a long time. So it 
is better to go to private. 
/ My next clinic visit is only in 2 weeks’ time.    
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POSSIBLE QUESTION ASKED BY THE DOCTOR/NURSE: ANSWER GIVEN BY THE STANDARDISED PATIENT: 
Don’t you have a regular private doctor? Why did you 
come to see me? 
I have just got a new job nearby / This is close to where I 
work.  
How often do you go to the clinic for your ARVs? Every month to collect my drugs. 
Which ARVs are you taking? I am on the three-in-one tablet. Atripla /Tribuss. (Both pink 
oval tablets). I can’t remember the 3 drug names.  
 
 
 
How many tablets are you on/taking? One tablet a day / One tablet at night with supper.  
When do you take your ARVs? I take the tablet at night with supper.  
When did you start the ARVs? I was started after I was told I was positive. About 1 and a 
half year ago.  
What was your CD4 count when you started the ARVs? I don’t remember exactly. I think it was about 450. 
Have you changed your ARVs since you started? No. 
Did you bring the tablets with you? No. I don’t have them with me at work. I take them at home 
in the evening after supper.  
Don’t you have your clinic card with your HIV details?  Sorry. No I don’t.  
Do you take your ARVs properly/regularly? Yes. I know that is important.  
When was your last viral load test? They only test it every 6 months. The last time was about 3 
months ago.    
What was your viral load? It was not detected / not detectable  
When was your last CD4 test? About 3 months ago.    
What was your CD4 count? They told me it was more than 800. 
Have you had any side effects from the ARVs? I did have some nausea and dizziness when I first started. 
But it is better now.  
Do you know about the side effects from the ARVs? Yes. They told me. The serious one are problems with your 
liver…or your kidneys. They test my blood for that at the 
clinic.  
Do you have any of these side-effects from the ARVs: 
nausea, diarrhoea, dizziness, insomnia, strange 
dreams, rash….. 
Not at the moment. I did have some nausea and dizziness 
when I first started. But it is better now. 
Is your boyfriend/girlfriend HIV positive? No. I don’t have a boyfriend/girlfriend at the moment.  
Are you using condoms when you have sex? I don’t have a boyfriend/girlfriend at the moment. 
Are you on Bactrim every month?  No  
Are you taking any other drug other than the ARVs? I am also taking the TB prevention drug. 
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POSSIBLE QUESTION ASKED BY THE DOCTOR/NURSE: ANSWER GIVEN BY THE STANDARDISED PATIENT: 
Are you on TB prevention drugs / IPT/Isoniazid 
preventive therapy? 
Yes. They did my TB skin test and told me I had to take it 
for 3 years.  
Are you taking Isoniazid? Is that the drug to prevent TB? Yes I am also taking that.  
Have you ever had enlarged/big lymph nodes? No 
Have you ever had thrush/meningitis?  What is that? No 
Have you ever been in hospital for your HIV No 
Do you have any children? No 
Do you have any other medical problem (Diabetes? 
Hypertension? Asthma? Pneumonia?) 
No  
Does anyone in your family have any  medical 
problems (Diabetes? Hypertension? Asthma? 
Pneumonia?) 
 
Are you taking any other medication? The ARVs. And TB prevention tablet. And the cough syrup 
for the cough.  
Are you using oral contraceptives? No 
Are you pregnant? No 
When was your last menstrual period? / Have you 
missed your period? / Are your periods irregular? 
2 weeks ago / No / No 
What do you want me to do for you? I am not sure. I just want to get better / I want this cough to 
go away. 
NOT: 
prescription/treatment/drugs 
Sick note 
Is there anything else wrong? I am not sure what you mean. 
Have you been travelling recently?/ Have you been out 
of the country recently? 
No 
Tell me about where you live? Your current living situation. 
NOT: 
Informal settlement, shack 
Do you share a room with anyone? No 
Are you exposed to dust/fumes at work No 
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 Appendix B.3. Role-specific Q&A scripts & insurance plan details 
Patient Role A (“low-insured” patient) 
POSSIBLE QUESTION ASKED BY THE DOCTOR 
(the doctor could ask you other questions) 
ANSWER GIVEN BY THE STANDARDISED PATIENT: 
Which medical aid / plan do you have? I am on the Discovery Saver plan.  
Are you paying for this consultation with your medical 
savings / through your medical aid? 
Yes. 
Are you paying / do you want to pay for this consultation 
in cash? 
No, my medical aid will cover it. 
 
(NOTE: if the GP asks that you pay in cash AND CLAIM 
LATER, say ‘Ok’) 
Do you have / do you know if you have enough medical 
savings to cover this consultation? 
Yes, I checked. I have enough. 
How much medical savings do you have left / how low 
are your savings? 
It should be around R1200 
How did you get your medical aid cover? Through my work / my employer pays for it. 
Have you claimed a lot recently / how did you run down 
your savings? 
Just for one episode. I had some pain in my right knee 
recently, so I went to see a specialist about it. I had to 
have an X-ray and a lot of physio for that 
How did the pain start / how did that happen? I tripped and fell, and landed on my knee OR  
I was playing football, and it started hurting 
When did it happen / when did the pain start? A few weeks ago. 
Is the knee pain better now? Yes, the physio has helped a lot. 
What did the knee specialist / doctor say? What was the 
injury / was it anything serious? 
It’s nothing serious. He said it was a routine injury, and I 
just need to rest the knee a bit. 
 
Insurance plan details for Patient Role A: 
GP Consultation Rate  R 430.40 
Plan reimbursement rate 100% 
Premiums per month R 2773 
Medical Savings per year R 8316 
How are GP visits paid for?  Through your Medical Savings 
What happens when you run 
out of Medical Savings? 
If you run out of Medical Savings for the year, the plan will cover 3 additional GP 
consultations (day-to-day extender benefit) if the GP is part of a specific Discovery 
network. After you've used up these 3 GP consultations as well, all other 
consultations in the same year will have to be paid for in cash. All other services, 
procedures or drugs prescribed during these consultations will also have to be paid 
in cash, if you run out of Medical Savings. 
Co-payments None, until the medical savings per annum are depleted 
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Patient Role B (“high-insured” patient) 
POSSIBLE QUESTION ASKED BY THE DOCTOR 
(the doctor could ask you other questions) 
ANSWER GIVEN BY THE STANDARDISED PATIENT: 
Which medical aid / plan do you have? I am on the Discovery Comprehensive plan.  
Are you paying for this consultation with your 
medical savings / through your medical aid? 
Yes. 
Do you want to pay for this consultation in cash? No, my medical aid will cover it. 
 
(NOTE: if the GP asks that you pay in cash AND CLAIM 
LATER, say ‘Ok’) 
Do you have / do you know if you have enough 
medical savings to cover this consultation? 
Yes, I checked. I have a lot. 
How much medical savings do you have left? I don’t know exactly. But you should be able to check this on 
your system?  
How did you get your medical aid cover? Through my work / company. 
 
Insurance plan details for Patient Role B: 
GP Consultation Rate  R 430.40 
Plan reimbursement rate 100% 
Premiums per month R 4882 
Medical Savings per year R 14640 
How are GP visits paid for?  Through your Medical Savings 
What happens when you run 
out of Medical Savings? 
If you run out of Medical Savings for the year, the plan will cover unlimited 
additional GP consultations in the same year (day-to-day extender benefit) if the GP 
is part of a specific Discovery network. If you see a GP outside the network, or for 
any additional services, procedures and drugs prescribed during the consultations, 
you have to pay in cash once you finish your Medical Savings. 
Co-payments None, until your medical savings per year are depleted 
 
 
  
  229 
Appendix B.4. Primary data collection tools 
1. SP Debriefing Questionnaire 
The tablet-based questionnaire, completed and submitted by SPs immediately after each GP 
consultation, was one of the two primary data collection tools in this study. The questionnaire was 
made up of 13 sections (groups of questions), as outlined below. 
 
 
  
Questionnaire Section Contents 
1. Introduction • GPS coordinates of the GP practice location. 
• Fieldworker’s details (name, gender) 
• Patient role / clinical case to be played in consultation  
• GP name 
2. Arrival / Waiting 
Area 
• Time of arrival at facility 
• Questions on how and when fieldworkers’ health insurance status was communicated to 
the receptionist 
• Number of other patients waiting to be seen by GP in waiting area (before and after 
consultation) 
3. Consultation Time  • Consultation start and end times 
• GP time spent doing other things during consultation (e.g. talking on phone) 
4. Patient Role 
Reaction 
• GP’s reactions (if any) to specific patient role played / SP opening statements  
(N.B. this section is only relevant to Part 1 of this study) 
5. Vitals Station • Any vitals taken prior to consultation (e.g. temperature, blood pressure) 
6. History-taking • Questions on which of a list of 25-30 history-taking items were completed (depending on 
clinical case) 
7. Examinations • Question on whether any examinations were completed; and if so, which of a list of 10-12 
physical examinations were completed 
8. Tests • Questions on which of a list of 11 diagnostic tests were conducted / ordered during 
consultation 
9. Diagnosis • Question on whether any diagnosis was communicated by the GP; and if so, whether the 
diagnosis was volunteered or had to be asked for,  and what was the specific diagnosis 
given  
10. Advice  • Questions on which of a list of 10 recommendations / referrals were given by GP (e.g. 
advice on whether and under what circumstances to seek a follow-up consultation). 
11. Drugs • Any drugs dispensed, prescribed or recommended to buy OTC 
• Any advice given by GP with respect to taking drugs / potential side-effects 
• Instructions to fieldworkers to photograph dispensed drugs / prescription with tablet 
• Instructions to fieldworkers to place dispensed drugs / prescriptions into a sealable bag 
(labelled with correct fieldworker and GP name), for collection by research team 
12. Payment • Total cost of consultation 
• Question on whether dispensed drugs or diagnostic tests were charged for separately (if 
given) 
• Question on if consultation was paid for in cash or if GP would claim directly from 
insurance 
13. Satisfaction • Questions asking for a subjective assessment of the quality of the GP interaction 
• Fieldworkers’ overall satisfaction with GP (on a scale of 1-10) 
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2. GP Interviews 
The second primary data collection tool in this study was the face-to-face interview conducted with 
study participants. The interviews generally lasted 20-30 minutes, and were conducted at the GP 
practices between November 2018 and February 2019. A tablet-based interview tool was developed 
to guide the enumerators (including by displaying their script) and to capture the interview data. 
Enumerators from predominantly public health and nursing backgrounds were recruited and trained 
over the course of three days in November 2018 to carry out the interviews.327 The timing of 
individual interviews was wholly dependent on GPs’ availability. GPs were telephoned to schedule 
the interviews, and were asked for 30 minutes of their time. Enumerators followed a set script during 
these scheduling calls.328 
The interviews consisted of five shorts parts, including a dictator game and an incentivised knowledge 
quiz, as detailed below.  
a) Dictator Game 
The first part of the interview involved a simple dictator game, to obtain a measure of GPs’ individual 
altruism; specifically, their commitment to the wellbeing of patients. In this game, GPs were given 
R300 in cash in an envelope, and told that they could choose to keep all the money or donate some 
or all of it to a patient charity. The ‘recipient’ was chosen to be a patient charity, as the objective of 
the game was to elicit GPs’ relative preferences for patient welfare in particular (rather than pro-
social preferences in general), and it has been shown that the type of ‘recipient’ can influence allocator 
decisions (Eckel & Grossman 1996). A sealable, tamper-proof and opaque donation bag was 
provided inside the cash envelope, for GPs to deposit any cash they wished to donate. A list of four 
well-known patient charities, both local and national, were listed at the front of this bag for providers 
to choose from. Allowances were also made for providers to indicate another patient charity of their 
choice, if they wished.  
The interviewer would begin the game by handing the cash envelope to the GP, and explaining all 
instructions following a set script. The script was carefully phrased to be as neutral as possible, as 
language can influence the game framing and subsequent outcomes (Aguiar et al. 2008). Any 
references to a “game” or “experiment” were avoided. GPs were told that the donation is entirely 
voluntary and anonymous; neither the interviewer nor the recipient patient charity would know if 
and how much they choose to donate. Experimenter and recipient blinding to participant donations 
is a common feature of dictator games, to avoid reputational or reciprocity concerns affecting 
donation choices (Hoffman et al. 1996; Hoffman et al. 1994). Recipient blinding may be particularly 
 
327 Some form of healthcare or health sciences experience was preferred in these enumerators, both to facilitate their comprehension 
and ease with some of the more technical parts of the interview, and to maintain credibility with the doctors. 
328 GPs were not told at this stage about the cash payoffs in the dictator game or knowledge quiz portions of the interview, to avoid 
these incentives influencing GPs’ decisions to participate or undermining the purposes of the payoffs during the interview itself. 
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appropriate in experiments seeking to elicit physician preferences for patient welfare, given the 
asymmetries in information that tend to exist between physicians and patients in actual clinical 
settings, where some types of patient welfare-inducing physician effort may not be visible (or 
obvious) to the patient.  
To reassure GPs of recipient blinding, they were told that donations to individual charities would be 
pooled before the donations were transferred to the charities, so that individual donation amounts 
were not identifiable. The interviewer also explained that they would turn around, while the GP 
decides how much to donate (if any) and seals the donation bag provided, to ensure interviewer 
blinding. GPs were further instructed to seal and hand back the donation bag even if they did not 
wish to donate anything, so that the interviewer cannot infer the decision to donate from the GP’s 
retention of the bag.   
Once the GP had finished sealing the donation bag, they were asked to inform the interviewer to 
turn back around, and hand the bag to them. At this stage, the interviewer would also ask the GP to 
sign a receipt confirming their receipt of the initial R300. The R300 endowment represented roughly 
70% of the average consultation rate charged by these GPs for insured patients (approximately R434). 
While it was important to make the monetary payoff materially meaningful to the GPs, it may be 
argued that the absolute payoff amount is of little importance for measuring relative altruism 
(Carpenter et al. 2005); this study is ultimately interested in the distribution of altruism across the 
sample population, and how GPs’ individual altruism relative to the sample population might explain 
within-sample variations in outcomes of interest.  
b) Demographic and Practice Characteristics 
The next part of the interview included a set of basic demographic and clinical practice questions. 
The demographic questions covered details on the GP’s age, gender, ethnicity and nationality. Clinical 
practice questions covered the GP’s years in professional practice; average daily patient load over the 
previous week; standard consultation rate for acute patients; contract status with specific medical 
insurance schemes; and drug dispensing status. Practice questions also asked whether the GP worked 
in a group practice, and if so, the number of other GP working there; and whether the GP only 
worked in the private sector, or also in the public sector.  
c) Diagnosis & AMR Knowledge (Knowledge Quiz) 
The decision was taken to incentivise most knowledge-based questions in this interview due to some 
(albeit limited) evidence that incentives can improve the quality of responses and reduce recall errors 
in surveys (Singer & Ye 2013), which are particular concerns when trying to measure the true 
knowledge of respondents. To minimise order and context effects in interview responses, whereby 
responses to certain questions may be influenced by preceding ones (Schwarz and Sudman, 1992), 
the ordering of questions within the knowledge quiz was randomised in each interview.  
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The first part of the quiz tested GPs’ diagnostic knowledge on four patient case vignettes, presenting 
four respiratory illnesses with overlapping symptoms (uncomplicated (viral) acute bronchitis, 
complicated (bacterial) acute bronchitis, bacterial sinusitis, pneumonia). See Appendix B.5 (a) for a 
presentation of these vignettes. GPs were handed a typed copy of the vignettes to follow, while the 
interviewer read out each case. They were asked for the most likely diagnosis and pathogenic cause 
(virus, bacteria or neither) in each case. The order in which the four case vignettes were presented to 
each GP was randomised, to account for potential order effects in GP responses. The randomisation 
was programmed in the electronic questionnaire that was used by interviewers to complete the 
interviews, which generated a random ordering of the quiz questions for the interviewer to follow.  
Before presenting the vignettes, the interviewer informed GPs that they would earn R20 for each 
correct answer to the eight questions in this section, and that they would receive their total cash 
reward at the end of the interview. To avoid any positive or negative encouragement effects on GPs’ 
responses to remaining parts of the interview, it was decided to avoid revealing the quiz scores until 
the end. 
The second part of the quiz covered five questions on GPs’ understanding of AMR, including its 
definition, causes and risks. As with the diagnoses questions, GPs were told that each correct answer 
would be rewarded R20 at the end of the interview. Again to minimise order and context effects, 
these AMR questions were given at the end of the interview, to avoid biasing GP responses to 
previous questions on recommended treatment options (including antibiotics) – see details below. 
d) Treatment Guidelines Knowledge  
Following the diagnosis knowledge vignettes, GPs were presented with three further patient case 
scenarios where the diagnosis was revealed to them (see Appendix B.5 (b)). For each case, GPs were 
asked to indicate the most appropriate medications as recommended by the South African treatment 
guidelines. GPs could indicate multiple medications for each case. The purpose of this section was 
to assess GPs’ knowledge of national treatment guidelines, accounting for patient characteristics and 
conditional on a correct diagnosis. The diagnoses given in the three cases were common cold, 
community-acquired pneumonia, and uncomplicated (viral) acute bronchitis.  
As with the diagnosis vignettes, the ordering of the three case scenarios was randomised in each 
interview. However, it was decided not to incentivise these questions with cash rewards, as a ‘correct’ 
response is less clear in these cases. My main interest in these questions was to assess whether GPs 
made correct decisions as indicated in national guidelines for the prescription of antibiotics (and their 
type) in each case. It is more debatable whether other palliative medications can be considered 
appropriate or not, especially those that are not explicitly discouraged in the guidelines. Therefore, 
only the decision on antibiotic treatment was assessed in these questions. 
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e) Antibiotic Beliefs 
GPs were informed that this part of the interview was not part of the knowledge quiz, but would ask 
for their opinions on the four patient cases presented in the diagnosis vignettes (see Appendix B.5(a)). 
For each case, GPs were presented with three questions, asking their opinions on the likelihood that 
the patient would recover faster with antibiotics (rather than without), the likelihood that other GPs 
would prescribe antibiotics to the same patient, and the likelihood that the patient would go elsewhere 
(visit another provider) next time they were ill if they were not given antibiotics for the case. For each 
question, the GP was asked to indicate a probability between 0% (meaning not likely at all) and 100% 
(indicating full certainty). The purpose of these questions was to gauge provider beliefs about the 
efficacy, peer norms, and patient expectations with regards to prescribing antibiotics in each patient 
case. 
The interview concluded by giving GPs their overall score and total cash reward from the knowledge 
quiz. Each GP was also given a written summary of aggregate results from the SP visits in this part 
of the study, covering aggregate GP performance on recommended history-taking and examination 
completion, antibiotic prescribing, and costs of care.329 Directions for contacting me and other 
members of the ESRC study team were also provided in the results summary sheet, in case of any 
clarifying questions or issues that GPs wished to flag.   
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329 GPs that were part of the randomized experiment in Part 2 of this study (see Section 4.3.2) were not given this written feedback on 
aggregate study results at the end of their interviews. They were instead given individualized feedback or no feedback, depending on 
their experimental group assignment. The aggregate results were then shared with them at a later stage, after the experiment was 
concluded. 
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Appendix B.5 (a). Diagnosis knowledge – case vignettes 
Patient Case Description 
A 
A 25 year old man presents with three-day history of a blocked nose, sore throat 
and rhinorrhea. On examination he was found to have a temperature of 37.1ºC, a 
slight pharyngitis, a respiratory rate of 16 breaths per minute, and clear lungs. 
B 
An 18 year old woman presents with a 3-day history of fever, shortness of breath 
and a productive cough. On examination she is found to have a temperature of 
38.2ºC, a respiratory rate of 26 breaths per minute, and crackles in both lungs. 
C  
A 25 year old man reports having a sore throat and rhinorrhoea for 10 days. 
However, over the last 5 days he has also developed a persistent cough 
throughout the day. The cough is productive of a white mucoid phlegm. On 
examination he was found to have a temperature of 37.1ºC, a respiratory rate of 
17 breaths per minute, and clear lungs. 
D 
A 27 year old woman reports developing a cough after recovering from a cold. 
The cough has been persistent for the last 10 days and is productive of a yellow-
green sputum. On examination she was found to have a temperature of 38.0ºC, a 
respiratory rate of 19 breaths per minute, and clear lungs. 
 
 
Appendix B.5 (b). Treatment guidelines knowledge – case vignettes 
Patient Case Description 
1 A 21 year old HIV-positive man suffering from a cold. His HIV is well-
controlled and he is not allergic to penicillin. 
2 
A 38 year old woman with community-acquired pneumonia who is not allergic to 
penicillin. 
3  A 36 year old HIV-negative man with a 10-day history of acute bronchitis, who is 
not allergic to penicillin. 
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Appendix B.6. Item Response Theory (IRT) assumptions 
First applied in the context of psychometrics and educational testing, IRT is a model-based approach 
to developing and scoring tests (or checklists) for estimating latent individual traits (such as ability, 
or in this case, effort). Using maximum likelihood methods, IRT analysis calculates a weighted index 
score (the ‘IRT score’) that assigns greater weight to items that are more difficult (less likely to be 
completed) and that discriminate better among individuals in terms of the latent, unobserved trait of 
interest (Das and Hammer, 2005).  IRT requires the following assumptions: 
1. Uni-dimensionality (‘UD’). This requires that the selected item set measures only one 
underlying trait – in this study’s case, unobserved provider effort.  
2. No differential item functioning (‘DIF’). This requires that item completion (or non-completion) 
is only a function of underlying provider effort, and not any other provider- or 
consultation-level characteristic.  
3.  Conditional independence (‘CI’) of included items. That is, completion (or non-completion) of 
one item should not depend on the completion (and results) of other included items.  
These assumptions are not straightforward to satisfy in the context of this study. On the no DIF 
assumption for instance, it is plausible that providers’ performance in completing certain history-
taking and examinations may depend on their diagnostic competence (knowledge). Conceptually, this 
issue is partially resolved by the theoretical modelling of knowledge as a pre-requisite for effort 
(alongside motivation), rather than as a direct and independent determinant of clinical practice 
(checklist completion). This notion is supported by evidence on a “know-do” gap in clinical 
performance in LMIC (Das and Gertler, 2007; Leonard and Masatu, 2010; Mohanan et al., 2015), 
where knowledge does not always translate into appropriate practice – an intermediate variable 
(effort), perhaps driven by factors additional to knowledge (such as motivation), seems to be at play.  
Typical history-taking and patient examination procedures also tend to follow a decision tree, where 
decisions to ask certain questions or complete certain examinations may be triggered by results (or 
patient responses) to previous completed items. This presents a potential violation of the third CI 
assumption. Whilst it is difficult to omit all such dependencies, this was a key consideration in 
determining which checklist items to retain in the IRT analysis, and some items were merged as a 
result. For example, the need to ask about a specific “penicillin allergy” may be negated by first asking 
about “any allergy”. Similarly, if a provider asks the item about a “productive cough”, he may expect 
the patient to also volunteer information about “coughing up blood”; if so, he may not follow up 
with the specific item on “coughing up blood”. In these cases, I merged the two checklist items into 
one item (for example, “productive cough / coughing up blood”) to be included in the IRT analysis, 
coded as ‘completed’ if the provider asked about one or both component items. Finally, the UD 
assumption is validated in the IRT analyses of by checking the eigenvalues from factor analysis of 
checklist items (Drasgow and Lissak, 1983). 
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Following Birnbaum (1968) and Das and Hammer (2005), I employ a three-parameter (‘3pl’) logistic 
function for modelling the probabilities that providers successfully complete individual checklist 
items, given their unobserved effort level. In addition to allowing for varying item characteristics 
(difficulty and discrimination levels), this allows for the possibility that certain checklist items can 
simply be guessed. Model fit is assessed through a chi-square test to check if model predictions for 
each item are significantly different from what is observed in the data.  
 
References 
Birnbaum, A. (1968) ‘Some latent trait models and their use in inferring an examinee’s ability.’, Statistical theories 
of mental test scores. Addison-Wesley, pp. 397–472. 
Das, J. and Gertler, P. J. (2007) ‘Variations In Practice Quality In Five Low-Income Countries: A Conceptual 
Overview’, Health Affairs. Health Affairs, 26(3), pp. w296–w309.  
Das, J. and Hammer, J. (2005) ‘Which doctor? Combining vignettes and item response to measure clinical 
competence’, Journal of Development Economics, 78(2), pp. 348–383.  
Drasgow, F. and Lissak, R. I. (1983) ‘Modified parallel analysis: A procedure for examining the latent 
dimensionality of dichotomously scored item responses.’, Journal of Applied Psychology. US: American 
Psychological Association, 68(3), pp. 363–373.  
Leonard, K. L. and Masatu, M. C. (2010) ‘Using the Hawthorne effect to examine the gap between a doctor’s 
best possible practice and actual performance’, Journal of Development Economics, 93(2), pp. 226–234.  
Mohanan, M., Vera-Hernández, M., Das, V., Giardili, S., Goldhaber-Fiebert, J. D., Rabin, T. L., Raj, S. S., 
Schwartz, J. I. and Seth, A. (2015) ‘The Know-Do Gap in Quality of Health Care for Childhood Diarrhea and 
Pneumonia in Rural India’, JAMA Pediatrics, 169(4), pp. 349–357.  
 
  
  237 
Appendix B.7. Study information sheet (shared with ESRC study) 
This study is investigating clinical decision-making by private and public primary care providers in 
Johannesburg. We thank you for your participation in this research.   
 
The study has 4 components:  
1. Fieldworker visits as patients  
2-4 fieldworkers trained to act like patients will visit the clinic you work at over a period of 6-8 
months.  
You will not know who the fieldworker is because the study is blinded.  
 
2. Follow-up telephone calls  
To check whether you identified any of our fieldworker-patients.  
 
3. Face-to-face interview 
A 20-25 minute interview with you about primary health care and clinical decision-making.  
The interview will include the opportunity to earn a small amount of money for your participation.  
 
4. Private and confidential individual feedback 
You will receive feedback on our findings from the fieldworker-patient visits to the clinic where 
you work.  
 
Confidentiality  
All information collected in this study is confidential. The results from this study may be published, 
but only aggregated results for groups of clinicians will be reported. 
Your identity and your individual clinical performance will never be revealed or reported to anyone 
else.  
 
Your participation  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. There will be no negative consequences if 
you do not want to participate. You may discontinue your participation at any stage.  
 
Potential benefits and risks  
There are no personal risks to you from this study.  
The face-to-face interview will include the opportunity to earn a small amount of money.  
The information from this study will contribute to knowledge about the factors influencing clinical 
decision-making in primary care, in both the public and private sector.  
 
Ethical aspects  
Ethical approval for this study has been obtained from the University of the Witwatersrand Human 
Research Ethics Committee and the Ethics Committee of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science.  
Ethical approval for this study has also been obtained from the District Research Committee, City of 
Johannesburg.  
 
Questions  
If you have any further questions about the survey, you can contact the researcher, Dr Duane Blaauw, 
at 082- 295-7377 or by email at duane.blaauw@wits.ac.za.  
You can also contact the Wits University Human Research Ethics Committee, which is responsible for 
overseeing the ethical aspects of this study through Ms Zanele Ndlovu on (011) 717-1234. 
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Appendix B.8. Institutional ethics approval letters 
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Appendix B.9. Intervention delivery scripts for interviewers, by intervention group 
(study Part 2) 
Treatment group Control group 
 
“As you may recall, Part 1 of this study [the ESRC 
study] involved sending standardised patients – that 
is, healthy actors trained to act as patients – to all 
participating providers.  I can now offer you some 
private feedback on your individual results from the 
visits. 
This information is entirely confidential, and only 
shared with you for private feedback purposes. 
When we report the study results more broadly, we 
will only ever report the aggregate results - no 
individual providers will be named.   
The first page of the booklet inside summarises 
your results on a number of different aspects that 
we evaluated. Please read through the findings. I 
will try and answer any immediate questions that 
you might have.   
On the following page, there is also some general 
information on clinical guidelines for common 
conditions in primary care, which might be of 
interest.” 
 
 
“I will now give you some general information on 
clinical guidelines for common conditions in 
primary care, which might be of interest. 
Again, if you have any questions on the study or 
this interview, please feel free to contact the 
research team – their contact details are provided 
there as well.” 
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Appendix B.10 (a). Template of feedback and educational leaflet for A&F treatment 
group 
Pages 1 and 4 (front and back covers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pages 2 and 3 (inside pages) 
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Appendix B.10 (b). Template of educational leaflet for A&F control group 
Pages 1 and 4 (front and back covers) 
 
Pages 2 and 3 (inside pages) 
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Appendix C.1.  Determinants of non-participation in the GP interviews – provider 
characteristics and care quality outcomes 
 
    Non-participation 
(1=Yes) 
a) Provider characteristics  
Age 0.00 
   (0.00) 
Gender 0.05 
   (0.06) 
Is in a northern suburb -0.09 
   (0.06) 
Number of GPs within 1 km radium (density) 0.01* 
   (0.00) 
b) Care quality outcomes  
Consultation length -0.00 
   (0.01) 
Checklist completion (%) -0.00** 
   (0.00) 
Essential exams (%) -0.00*** 
   (0.00) 
Essential history-taking (%) -0.00 
   (0.00) 
IRT score -0.06* 
   (0.03) 
Correct / partially correct diagnosis -0.01 
   (0.07) 
Antibiotic prescribed 0.05 
   (0.06) 
Other inappropriate drugs prescribed 0.02 
   (0.10) 
Appropriate follow-up advice -0.00 
   (0.06) 
 Obs. 178 
  
Notes: Column 2 shows estimates from univariate linear OLS regressions of provider 
attrition on a small set of provider characteristics (with available data on the full visits 
sample) and consultation outcomes of interest. Data on provider characteristics was taken 
from the Medpages database. The number of observations on “age” and “correct 
diagnosis” are marginally fewer than the stated 178 (at 172 and 177 respectively).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C.2.  IRT analysis of history-taking and examination checklist items 
(study Part 1) 
Table A: Checklist items included in the IRT score 
 Item type Item description 
Item 
complet. 
rate 
Discrim. 
parameter 
Standard 
error 
Difficulty 
parameter 
Standard 
error 
1 History Any regular medication 0.85 0.72 (0.27) -2.62 (0.88) 
2 History 
Allergies (general) / 
penicillin allergy 
0.93 1.29 (0.45) -2.53 (0.63) 
3 Examination Listen to lungs 0.94 1.54 (0.53) -2.42 (0.54) 
4 Examination Examine throat 0.94 1.83 (0.60) -2.15 (0.41) 
5 History Cough duration 0.85 1.04 (0.31) -1.98 (0.49) 
6 History 
Productive cough / 
coughing up blood 
0.84 1.16 (0.33) -1.79 (0.40) 
7 History Temperature / fever 0.83 1.17 (0.32) -1.70 (0.37) 
8 History Occupation status 0.63 0.32 (0.19) -1.69 (1.06) 
9 Examination Listen to heart 0.58 0.24 (0.18) -1.46 (1.26) 
10 History Sore throat 0.77 1.07 (0.29) -1.37 (0.32) 
11 Examination Examine ears 0.84 1.96 (0.53) -1.35 (0.22) 
12 History Chest pain 0.68 0.73 (0.22) -1.15 (0.37) 
13 Examination Measure blood pressure 0.65 0.77 (0.23) -0.92 (0.32) 
14 Examination Palpate lymph nodes 0.68 1.19 (0.28) -0.81 (0.21) 
15 Examination Take temperature 0.63 0.98 (0.25) -0.66 (0.22) 
16 History Smoking status 0.57 0.59 (0.20) -0.54 (0.32) 
17 Examination Measure pulse rate 0.57 1.38 (0.32) -0.29 (0.15) 
18 History Asthma history 0.53 0.57 (0.20) -0.25 (0.29) 
19 History 
Details about the initial 
cold 
0.56 1.41 (0.31) -0.24 (0.15) 
20 History Night sweats 0.31 1.04 (0.27) 0.94 (0.25) 
21 History Ear ache 0.25 1.58 (0.38) 1.01 (0.20) 
22 History Breathing difficulty 0.35 0.63 (0.21) 1.08 (0.41) 
23 History Weight loss 0.23 0.80 (0.26) 1.70 (0.50) 
24 History 
Exposure to anyone with 
TB 
0.17 1.05 (0.33) 1.83 (0.46) 
25 History Similar problem before 0.12 0.67 (0.29) 3.16 (1.23) 
26 Examination Tap lungs (percuss) 0.07 0.77 (0.37) 3.60 (1.49) 
27 Examination Check oxygen saturation 0.13 0.41 (0.26) 4.69 (2.86) 
28 History HIV status 0.10 0.43 (0.32) 5.43 (3.86) 
29 History 
Whistling noise when 
breathing 
0.19 0.26 (0.22) 5.70 (4.89) 
30 History TB history 0.15 0.16 (0.25) 10.64 (16.47) 
        
Obs. 
 
178 
     
      
Notes: The discrimination and difficulty parameters (and their standard errors) were estimated using a three parameter logistic model, 
which also allows for the possibility of item completion through guessing. The estimated 'pseudo-guessing' parameter was close to zero 
and insigificant, however, suggesting that the likelihood that doctors completed items on this checklist purely through guessing (and 
zero effort) is close to zero. Item completion rate is the share of all consultations (178) in which the specific item was completed. The 
difficulty parameter is a measure of the likelihood that a specific item is successfully completed in any given consultation, with higher 
parameter values indicating more difficult items. The discrimination parameter indicates how well an item can distinguish between high- 
and low-effort providers, with high-discrimination items having a higher correlation between their completion and provider effort. 
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Table B: Checklist items that were either excluded or merged in the IRT score 
 
 Item type Item description 
Item 
completion 
rate 
1 History Productive/dry cough 0.83 
2 History Coughing up blood 0.07 
3 History Breathing fast 0.02 
4 History Heart beating fast / palpitations 0.02 
5 History Allergy to penicillin 0.41 
6 History Any allergies (in general) 0.87 
    
Notes: Items 1 and 2 were merged into one item in the IRT analysis, as they are likely to overlap and 
potentially violate the conditional independence assumption necessary for the IRT score validity (see Section 
5.3.1.1.1). Items 5 and 6 were also merged for the same reason. Items 3 and 4 were excluded as they were 
completed in only 2% of consultations, and their inclusion was problematic for the convergence of the 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure. 
 
Columns 5 and 7 of Table A present estimates of the discrimination and difficulty parameters for 
each item from the IRT analysis, indicating their relative ability to discriminate between high- and 
low-effort physicians and their likelihood of completion in any given consultation, respectively. There 
appears to be very little correlation between an item’s difficulty and its discriminating ability. For 
instance, the three most discriminating items are examination of the ears, examination of the throat 
and asking about earache. The first and last of these may be needed to rule out acute otitis media 
(AOM), while the second item is necessary for diagnosing an upper respiratory infection (rather than, 
or in addition to, a more systemic or lower respiratory condition). Yet, the most difficult items appear 
to be history-taking on a patient’s TB history, HIV status, and the presence of any whistling noises 
when breathing (although the difficulty parameter point estimate for TB history is very imprecise). 
As expected, there is a high degree of correlation between the proportion of consultations in which 
a particular item was completed and its difficulty parameter. 
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Appendix C.3. Statistical approaches to handling cluster-correlated data 
Four methods are generally proposed for handling cluster-correlated data, and the optimal approach 
is largely study-dependent (and to some extent, subject to disciplinary preferences (McNeish and 
Kelley, 2019)). The first approach is a paired-sample t-test, which is most appropriate when there are 
only two levels of treatment (as in the present case: high- or low-insured) and the primary objective 
is to test for differences in outcomes of interest across the two levels. This is equivalent to 
differencing the outcomes across treatment levels for each physician, and running a simple one-
sample t-test of the differences. The limitation here is that the effects of additional (potentially 
confounding) covariates cannot be estimated or controlled for, unlike in a formal regression 
framework. Alternative approaches for handling clustering within linear regression frameworks 
include the marginal model (estimated through the generalised estimating equations (GEE) method 
(Liang and Zeger, 1986)), which can adjust OLS standard errors for clustering at the physician-level 
using a cluster-robust “sandwich” variance estimator. It requires no assumptions on the within-
cluster correlational structure (Wooldridge, 2003), and can provide robust OLS parameter estimates 
when the number of clusters is sufficiently “large” (at the conservative end, more than 50 for balanced 
clusters (Cameron and Miller, 2015)). Another common approach to handling clustered data, 
particularly in the economics literature, is to include cluster-specific fixed effects in the linear 
regression model. This is equivalent to estimating the following: 
𝑄𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝛿𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                           (1)  
where 𝛿𝑗 are physician-specific indicators, that allow for unique intercepts and control for any general 
variation among physicians.330 As the physician fixed effects control for all physician-level variation, 
it is not possible to estimate the effects of any covariates that do not vary within-physician. One 
advantage in this study context is that the fixed effects will automatically control for fieldworker-pair 
effects that can confound the estimated insurance effect (and therefore should be controlled for), as 
assigned fieldworker pairs do not vary within-physician in this experiment.  
There are two common methods for obtaining the same cluster fixed effects estimate of 𝛽1: OLS 
estimation of the mean-differenced version of model (2) (‘within’ estimation) or direct OLS 
estimation of (2) with the inclusion of physician-specific dummy variables (‘least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV)’ estimation). These two methods are generally considered equivalent; however, the 
first method is preferred in this study context for the following reason. The inclusion of cluster fixed 
effects may not absorb all within-cluster correlation in 𝜀𝑖𝑗  (Cameron and Miller, 2015), and it is 
 
330 To allow that the insurance effect may also vary among physicians (i.e. to allow unique slopes, in addition to unique intercepts per 
physician), additional interaction terms of each physician-specific indicator and the insurance variable would need to be included. 
This may be very costly in terms of degrees of freedom, and will not be possible in some cases. 
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recommended to use the cluster-robust variance estimator even with the inclusion of cluster fixed 
effects (Arellano, 1987). In such cases where the cluster-robust variance estimator is used alongside 
cluster fixed effects, and the number of observations within clusters is very small (e.g. 2 in this case), 
the within estimator should be used instead of LSDV as the finite sample correction applied by 
STATA for correcting standard error biases in small samples is incorrect under LSDV (Cameron and 
Miller, 2010). 331 
An alternative approach, commonly employed in the behavioural sciences, is a linear mixed effects 
model (LMEM), where individual physicians are treated as random (rather than fixed) effects: 
    𝑄𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝑢0𝑗 +  𝑢1𝑗𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗                        (2)  
Here, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the only fixed effect, and physician-level variation is captured by allowing for 
random variation in the intercept and slope (insurance effect) of the estimated regression line by 
physician. By including a random intercept (by estimating the variance of the 𝑢0𝑗’s), we allow that 
physicians can vary in their average care quality choices. This is equivalent to estimating the fixed 
effects 𝛿𝑗 in (2). By further including a random slope (by estimating the variance of the 𝑢1𝑗’s), we 
also allow that physicians can vary in their care quality responses to patient insurance. This is 
equivalent to adding interaction terms between the 𝛿𝑗 ’s and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 in (2); although, as the 
LMEM only estimates the variances of the random effects (rather than the individual effects), we 
save several degrees of freedom. The LMEM nevertheless relies on stronger assumptions than both 
the marginal and fixed effects models, particularly in relation to the covariance structure of the 
random effects and distribution of the error terms. In general, it requires that all relevant random 
effects are included in the model (random intercepts and slopes), the random effects and error terms 
are normally distributed and their covariance structures properly specified, the random effects are 
independent of the error terms, and the distribution of error terms is homoscedastic (Laird and Ware, 
1982). Several studies have investigated the effects of violations of these assumptions on the 
maximum likelihood inference of 𝛽1 and its variance. It has been demonstrated that 𝛽1 estimates are 
robust to non-normal random effect distributions (Verbeke and Lesaffre, 1997), non-normal or 
heteroscedastic error distributions (Jacqmin-Gadda et al., 2007), and misspecification of the 
covariance structure (Liang and Zeger, 1986). However, the mixed effects model with random 
intercept and slope, as in (3), has been shown to be more robust to misspecification of the covariance 
structure than the mixed effects model with just a random intercept. It has also been shown that the 
cluster-robust variance estimator can correct for biased variance estimates of 𝛽1 when the covariance 
structure is incorrectly specified (Liang and Zeger, 1986).  
 
331 LSDV estimation will inflate the cluster-robust variance estimate, particularly when the number of observations per cluster is very 
small (as in this study context). 
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The three linear regression approaches outlined above (marginal model with cluster-robust standard 
errors, cluster fixed effects, and LMEM) are preferred to response simplification (paired-sample t-
test) given their ability to control for potential physician-level confounders of the insurance effect - 
most crucially, any fieldworker-pair effects.332 The cluster fixed effects model is generally preferred 
to the LMEM due to its ease of specification, and the need for fewer assumptions for valid inference. 
Moreover, it automatically controls for all fixed physician-level confounders of the insurance effect 
without need for explicit specification of these confounders as model covariates. 
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Appendix C.4. Paired-sample t-test of differences in individual checklist item 
completion between low-insured and high-insured patient consultations 
 (1) (2)  
   Low-insured   
patient 
High-insured  
patient 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Difference 
a. History-taking 
     
Cough duration + 0.82 (0.39) 0.88 (0.33) 0.06 
Details about the initial cold 0.45 (0.50) 0.67 (0.47) 0.22*** 
Temperature / fever + 0.83 (0.38) 0.83 (0.38) 0.00 
Productive cough + 0.84 (0.37) 0.82 (0.39) -0.02 
Coughing up blood + 0.07 (0.25) 0.08 (0.27) 0.01 
Similar problem before 0.11 (0.32) 0.14 (0.34) 0.02 
Weight loss + 0.21 (0.41) 0.25 (0.43) 0.03 
Night sweats + 0.21 (0.41) 0.40 (0.49) 0.19*** 
Sore throat 0.80 (0.40) 0.74 (0.44) -0.06 
Chest pain + 0.71 (0.46) 0.65 (0.48) -0.06 
Ear ache 0.24 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44) 0.02 
Breathing difficulty + 0.28 (0.45) 0.42 (0.50) 0.13** 
Breathing fast 0.03 (0.18) 0.01 (0.11) -0.02 
Palpitations 0.02 (0.15) 0.01 (0.11) -0.01 
Whistling noise when breathing 0.21 (0.41) 0.17 (0.38) -0.04 
Smoking status + 0.56 (0.50) 0.58 (0.50) 0.02 
Occupation status 0.64 (0.48) 0.62 (0.49) -0.02 
Exposure to anyone with TB 0.12 (0.33) 0.21 (0.41) 0.09* 
TB history + 0.10 (0.30) 0.20 (0.40) 0.10** 
Asthma history 0.57 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) -0.08 
HIV status + 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.30) 0.01 
Penicillin allergy + 0.48 (0.50) 0.34 (0.48) -0.15** 
Penicillin allergy, conditional on 
antibiotic prescription (Obs. = 38)^ 0.61 (0.50) 0.37 (0.49) -0.24** 
Any allergies (in general) 0.80 (0.40) 0.94 (0.23) 0.15*** 
Any regular medication 0.84 (0.37) 0.85 (0.36) 0.01 
b. Physical examination      
Take temperature + 0.63 (0.49) 0.65 (0.48) 0.02 
Measure blood pressure + 0.67 (0.49) 0.80 (0.46) 0.12** 
Measure pulse rate + 0.54 (0.50) 0.73 (0.48) 0.19*** 
Examine throat + 0.97 (0.18) 0.91 (0.29) -0.06** 
Palpate lymph nodes 0.71 (0.46) 0.65 (0.48) -0.06 
Examine ears 0.86 (0.34) 0.82 (0.39) -0.04 
Listen to heart 0.76 (0.43) 0.40 (0.49) -0.36*** 
Listen to lungs + 0.93 (0.25) 0.96 (0.21) 0.02 
Tap lungs (percuss) + 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.25) -0.01 
Check oxygen saturation 0.10 (0.30) 0.17 (0.38) 0.07 
      
Observations 89  89   
+ indicates items that were considered essential by clinical experts, for enabling a differential diagnosis of the underlying 
condition.  
^ This presents results from a paired-sample tttest of differences in the likelihood of a penicillin allergy check by insurance 
cover among the subsample of 38 physicians that prescribed an antibiotic to both high-insured and low-insured patients. 
Equivalent results were all found in an independent-sample ttest of differences among the subsample of 101 consultation 
observations where an antibiotic was prescribed.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C.5. Paired-sample t-test of differences in care quality outcomes between 
low-insured and high-insured patient consultations 
 (1) (2)  
   Low-insured patient High-insured patient  
Mean SD Mean SD Difference 
a. Diagnostic effort 
     
Consultation length (mins.)  10.337 (4.22) 10.573 (6.52) 0.236 
History-taking and examinations checklist 
completed (share) 
0.481 (0.11) 0.497 (0.15) 0.016 
Essential examinations completed (share) 0.646 (0.21) 0.697 (0.23) 0.051** 
Essential history-taking completed (share) 0.434 (0.16) 0.463 (0.18) 0.281 
IRT score -0.111 (0.74) 0.111 (1.01) 0.221** 
b. Diagnosis      
Gave a correct or partially-correct diagnosis 0.60 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) -0.136* 
c. Treatment      
Prescribed an antibiotic 0.506 (0.50) 0.629 (0.49) 0.124** 
Prescribed other inappropriate drugs  0.921 (0.27) 0.967 (0.18) 0.045 
Gave appropriate follow-up advice  0.506 (0.50) 0.719 (0.45) 0.213*** 
      
Observations 89  89   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C.6. Effect of insurance cover on care quality outcomes (mixed effects model specification) 
 Diagnostic effort Diagnosis & Treatment 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (9) (10) (11) 
    
Consult. 
length 
Checklist 
completion 
Essential. 
exams 
Essential. 
history 
IRT score 
Correct 
/Partially -
correct 
diagnosis 
Antibiotic 
Other 
inapprop. 
drugs 
Approp. 
follow-up 
advice 
Panel A: provider-level random effects (RE)          
High-insured 0.24 0.02 0.05** 0.03 0.22** -0.14** 0.12** 0.04* 0.21*** 
  (0.80) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) 
Obs. 178 178 178 178 178 177 178 178 178 
AIC  1103.19 -222.95 1595.98 1520.27 448.62 261.60 242.15 -23.03 249.81 
          
Panel B: provider-level RE; fieldworker-pair 
fixed effects 
      
   
High-insured 0.25 0.01 0.05** 0.03 0.22** -0.14** 0.12** 0.04 0.22*** 
 (0.80) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) 
Obs. 178 178 178 178 178 177 178 178 178 
AIC 1094.41 -213.65 1604.85 1498.29 455.06 271.32 253.16 -15.41 260.30 
          
Mean of low-insured 10.34 0.48 0.65 0.43 -0.11 0.60 0.51 0.92 0.51 
           
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. In Panel A, estimates from a linear mixed effects model with provider-level random effects (intercept and slope with respect to insurance) are shown. In Panel D, results 
from the same mixed effects model with the addition of fieldworker-pair fixed effects are shown. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is employed as a measure of model fit for maximum likelihood models.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Appendix C.7. Consultation-level predictors of select care quality outcomes 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
    
IRT score 
Correct/  
partially 
correct 
diagnosis 
Correct/ 
partially 
correct 
diagnosis 
Antibiotic 
prescribed 
Antibiotic 
prescribed 
Antibiotic 
prescribed 
 Consultation length 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 IRT score   0.05  -0.13** -0.14** 
     (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) 
Correct / partially correct 
diagnosis 
     0.04 
        (0.08) 
 Obs. 178 177 177 178 178 177 
 R-squared  0.31 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.15 
 
Sample mean 0.00 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.57 0.57 
       
Notes: All models are linear OLS, with robust standard errors clustered at the provider-level shown in parenthesis. All model 
specifications include fieldworker fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix C.8. Effect of insurance cover on care quality outcomes – robustness 
checks 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    SP 
detection 
Order 
effects 
Cash 
consult. 
Extreme 
values 
Consultation length 
    
High-insured (effect)  0.14 0.25 0.39 -0.45 
  (0.82) (0.80) (0.81) (0.66) 
Obs. 174 178 178 176 
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 
     
Checklist completion (share)     
High-insured (effect) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Obs. 174 178 178 174 
R-squared 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 
     
Essential exams (share)     
High-insured (effect) 0.05* 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Obs. 174 178 178 174 
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
     
Essential history-taking (share)     
High-insured (effect) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Obs. 174 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.02 
     
IRT score     
High-insured (effect) 0.21* 0.22** 0.23**  
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Obs. 174 178 178  
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.05  
     
Correct or partially-correct diagnosis     
High-insured (effect) -0.14* -0.13* -0.13*  
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Obs. 173 177 177  
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.04  
     
Antibiotic prescribed     
High-insured (effect) 0.13** 0.12** 0.12**  
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  
Obs. 174 178 178  
R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.06  
     
Other inappropriate drugs prescribed     
High-insured (effect) 0.05 0.04 0.05  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
Obs. 174 178 178  
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03  
     
Appropriate follow-up advice     
High-insured (effect) 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.22***  
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Obs. 174 178 178  
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.10  
     
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All specifications are fixed effects (mean-differenced) models, 
estimated with linear OLS. Column (1) excludes providers that were assessed as having likely valid SP 
detections. Column (2) controls for the order of SP visits to each provider. Column (3) controls for 
consultations that were paid for in cash on-site. Lastly, column (4) excludes extreme values of continuous 
outcomes, crudely defined as those above or below 3 standard deviations of the sample mean. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C.9. Sub-sample analyses of insurance effect on diagnostic effort 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    Consultation 
length 
Checklist 
completion 
Essential 
exams 
Essential 
history 
IRT score 
Panel A: Altruism      
High-insured 2.76 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.31* 
  (2.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.18) 
High-altruism 0.74 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.11 
 (1.13) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.18) 
High-insured*high-altruism -3.16 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.09 
 (2.22) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.24) 
Obs. 150 150 150 150 150 
R-squared  0.09 0.07 0.09 0.20 0.12 
      
Panel B: GP density      
High-insured 1.11 0.03 0.07* 0.04 0.29** 
  (1.32) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.14) 
High-density 0.33 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.17 
 (1.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.18) 
High-insured*high-density -1.67 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.16 
 (1.66) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.22) 
Obs. 178 178 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.14 
      
Panel C: Northern suburbs      
High-insured -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.21 
  (1.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) 
Northern suburb 0.80 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.16 
 (1.00) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.18) 
High-insured*northern suburb 0.82 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 (1.72) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.22) 
Obs. 178 178 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.12 
      
Mean of low-insured 10.34 0.48 61.24 43.45 -0.11 
      
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All models are linear OLS with provider-level cluster-robust standard errors. All models 
include fieldworker-pair fixed effects. Panel A presents estimates of an interaction effects analyses between insurance and GP altruism, 
where “high altruism” indicates GPs who contributed the full amount of their dictator game endowment to a patient charity (this was 
the sample median contribution). Panels B and C present estimates of interaction effects between insurance and measures of GPs’ 
competitive pressures.  “High density” indicates GPs with a number of competing GPs located within a1km radium of their practice 
that is at or above the sample median (7).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  255 
Appendix C.10. Sub-sample analyses of insurance effect on diagnosis & treatment 
outputs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    Correct / 
partially-
correct 
diagnosis 
Antibiotic 
Other 
inappropriate 
drugs 
Appropriate 
follow-up 
advice 
Panel A: Altruism     
High-insured -0.14 0.17** -0.00 0.18* 
  (0.13) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) 
High-altruism 0.01 -0.26** 0.01 -0.26** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.11) 
High-insured*high-altruism -0.07 -0.13 0.05 0.05 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.06) (0.15) 
Obs. 150 150 150 150 
R-squared  0.10 0.15 0.11 0.15 
     
Panel B: GP density     
High-insured -0.20* 0.23*** -0.00 0.30*** 
  (0.10) (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) 
High-density -0.12 0.11 -0.01 0.06 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) 
High-insured*high-density 0.11 -0.21* 0.09 -0.16 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.06) (0.14) 
Obs. 177 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 
     
Panel C: Northern suburbs     
High-insured -0.19** 0.14* -0.00 0.20* 
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) 
Northern suburb -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) 
High-insured*northern suburb 0.11 -0.04 0.10* 0.04 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.06) (0.14) 
Obs. 177 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.09 
     
Mean of low-insured 0.60 0.51 0.91 0.51 
     
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All models are linear OLS with provider-level cluster-robust standard errors. All models 
include fieldworker-pair fixed effects. Panel A presents estimates of an interaction effects analyses between insurance and GP altruism, 
where “high altruism” indicates GPs who contributed the full amount of their dictator game endowment to a patient charity (this was 
the sample median contribution). Panels B and C present estimates of interaction effects between insurance and measures of GPs’ 
competitive pressures. “High density” indicates GPs with a number of competing GPs located within a1km radium of their practice 
that is at or above the sample median (7).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix D.1. Summary of prescription items from insured SP visits (study Part 1) 
 
Total items 
prescribed 
Average cost per 
prescribed item 
(ZAR) 
No. of prescribed items per consultation 
 
All patients Low-insured High-insured Difference in 
means 
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
All drugs 590 79.52 3.31 (1.20) 3.17 (1.23) 3.46 (1.17) 0.29*** 
    Branded (originator) 228 127.91 1.28 (1.01) 1.13 (0.92) 1.43 (1.10) 0.29** 
    Generic 361 55.23 2.02 (1.14) 2.03 (1.20) 2.02 (1.09) -0.01 
Appropriate drugs 133 54.80 0.75 (0.76) 0.69 (0.73) 0.81 (0.78) 0.12 
    Analgesics 28 48.43 0.16 (0.37) 0.11 (0.32) 0.20 (0.40) 0.09** 
    Cough syrups  96 55.23 0.54 (0.55) 0.55 (0.54) 0.53 (0.57) -0.02 
    Throat preparations 9 71.89 0.05 (0.24) 0.02 (0.15) 0.08 (0.31) 0.06* 
Inappropriate drugs 457 88.22 2.57 (1.06) 2.48 (1.06) 2.65 (1.06) 0.17* 
    Antibiotics 102 147.9 0.57 (0.51) 0.51 (0.50) 0.64 (0.51) 0.13** 
Penicillins /  
Penicillin-clavulanates 
51 122.03 0.28 (0.45) 0.24 (0.43) 0.33 (0.47) 
0.09 
Cephalosporins 6 224.33 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.18) 0.00 
Sulphonamides 1 120.83 0.01 (0.07) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 
Macrolides 38 174.28 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.00 
Floruoquinolones 4 190.73 0.02 (0.15) 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 
Tetracyclines 2 4.94 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.00 
    Nasal decongestants 91 98.61 0.51 (0.66) 0.51 (0.64) 0.52 (0.68) 0.01 
    Bronchodilators 56 79.16 0.31 (0.55) 0.31 (0.58) 0.31 (0.54) 0.00 
    Antihistamines 55 49.99 0.31 (0.46) 0.34 (0.48) 0.28 (0.45) -0.06 
    Steroids 111 45.59 0.62 (0.53) 0.61 (0.54) 0.64 (0.53) 0.03 
    Probiotics 28 96.49 0.16 (0.38) 0.15 (0.36) 0.17 (0.41) 0.02 
    Other 14 113.64 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.25) 0.09 (0.32) 0.02 
Observations (no. consultations) 178 
        
Notes: Column (9) - the difference in means - presents results from a paired sample t-test of differences in the mean of each outcome between the two patient insurance types.                                                             *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix D.2. Consultation-level predictors of drug cost outcomes – all drugs 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    No. of drugs Average drug cost Total drug costs 
Consultation length 0.01 0.26 0.05 
   (0.02) (0.71) (2.41) 
IRT score -0.21 4.45 21.02 
   (0.13) (3.84) (15.36) 
Correct / partially correct diagnosis 0.02 -6.50 -26.04 
   (0.21) (5.90) (25.76) 
Antibiotic prescribed  18.63*** 136.70*** 
    (7.00) (28.69) 
 Obs. 177 177 177 
 R-squared  0.13 0.16 0.24 
    
Sample mean 3.31 79.52 268.46 
    
Notes: This analysis is with the sub-sample of 177 of a total 178 consultations where a diagnosis was given (which allows inclusion of 
the diagnosis variable in the multivariate regression analysis). All estimates are from multivariate regressions with linear OLS and 
provider-level cluster-robust standard errors (shown in parenthesis). All model specifications include fieldworker fixed effects. Costs 
are in South African Rand (ZAR). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
Appendix D.3. Consultation-level predictors of drug cost outcomes – unnecessary 
drugs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    No. of 
inapprop. 
drugs 
Average 
inapprop. 
drug cost 
Total 
inapprop. 
drug costs 
Any 
branded 
drugs 
No. of 
branded 
drugs 
Average 
branded 
drug cost 
Total 
branded 
drug costs 
Consultation length 0.02 0.36 0.52 -0.00 -0.02 0.71 -1.38 
   (0.02) (0.89) (2.54) (0.01) (0.02) (1.87) (1.64) 
IRT score -0.05 2.33 29.10* -0.04 -0.06 17.73** 12.45 
   (0.13) (5.53) (15.20) (0.05) (0.11) (8.28) (15.17) 
Correct / partially 
correct diagnosis 
0.07 -6.94 -24.21 -0.07 -0.13 -0.66 -18.29 
   (0.18) (8.15) (23.40) (0.07) (0.17) (12.61) (25.72) 
Antibiotic prescribed  20.13** 138.34*** -0.01 0.22 42.63*** 78.03*** 
    (9.86) (27.19) (0.07) (0.19) (12.25) (26.10) 
 Obs. 177 176 177 177 177 136 177 
 R-squared  0.08 0.14 0.25 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.09 
        
Sample mean 2.57 88.22 227.42 0.76 1.28 127.91 159 
  
Notes: All estimates are from multivariate regressions with linear OLS and provider-level cluster-robust standard errors (shown in 
parenthesis). This analysis is with the sub-sample of 177 of a total 178 consultations where a diagnosis was given (which allows inclusion 
of the diagnosis variable in the multivariate regression analysis). All model specifications include fieldworker fixed effects. Costs are in 
South African Rand (ZAR). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix D.4. Consultation-level predictors of fee-for-service cost outcomes 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    Any FFS tests / 
procedures 
No. FFS tests / 
procedures 
Total consultation 
costs 
Consultation length 0.02*** 0.04*** -2.22 
   (0.00) (0.01) (2.21) 
IRT score -0.03 -0.04 33.25*** 
   (0.02) (0.03) (12.55) 
Correct / partially correct diagnosis 0.11*** 0.16** -25.37** 
   (0.04) (0.07) (11.88) 
Antibiotic prescribed -0.02 -0.00 2.95 
   (0.05) (0.08) (13.98) 
Any FFS tests / procedures   198.48*** 
   (57.50) 
 Obs. 177 177 177 
 R-squared  0.23 0.28 0.30 
    
Sample mean 0.08 0.12 469.58 
    
Notes: This analysis is with the sub-sample of 155 consultations where a diagnosis was given (which allows inclusion of the diagnosis 
variable in the multivariate regression analysis). All estimates are from multivariate regressions with linear OLS and provider-level 
cluster-robust standard errors (shown in parenthesis). All model specifications include fieldworker fixed effects. Costs are in South 
African Rand (ZAR). FFS = fee-for-service. In column (3) the dependent variable “total consultation costs” excludes all drug costs 
(but includes the fee-for-service costs of any tests / procedures ordered). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
  259 
Appendix D.5. Determinants of non-participation in the GP interviews – care 
quantity and cost outcomes 
 
    Attrition 
    (1=Yes) 
No. of drugs prescribed -0.02 
   (0.02) 
Average prescribed drug cost  0.00* 
 (0.00) 
Total drug costs (total prescription cost) 0.00 
 (0.00) 
 No. of inappropriate drugs prescribed -0.01 
   (0.03) 
Average inappropriate drug cost 0.00 
   (0.00) 
Total inappropriate drug costs 0.00 
   (0.00) 
Likelihood of a branded drug prescription 0.05 
 (0.06) 
No. of branded drugs prescribed 0.01 
 (0.03) 
Average branded drug cost 0.00 
 (0.00) 
Total branded drug costs 0.00 
 (0.00) 
Any FFS tests / procedures -0.03 
   (0.10) 
No. of FFS tests / procedures -0.04 
   (0.06) 
Total consultation cost (excl. drugs) -0.00 
   (0.00) 
 Obs. 178 
 
Notes: FFS = fee-for-service. Column 2 shows estimates from univariate 
linear OLS regressions of provider attrition on consultation outcomes of 
interest. All drug outcomes are on a per prescription basis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix D.6. Sub-sample analyses of insurance effect on all drug expenditures 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    
No. drugs 
Average drug 
cost 
Total drug cost 
Panel A: Altruism    
High-insured 0.35* 14.66** 42.77 
  (0.19) (7.19) (31.74) 
High-altruism -0.22 0.77 -39.82 
 (0.34) (9.34) (45.91) 
High-insured*high-altruism -0.09 -6.12 10.93 
 (0.23) (9.49) (38.81) 
Obs. 150 150 150 
R-squared  0.14 0.20 0.14 
    
Panel B: GP density    
High-insured 0.27** 13.88** 48.89* 
  (0.12) (6.40) (24.77) 
High-density 0.24 17.33* 58.79 
 (0.27) (8.88) (39.04) 
High-insured*high-density 0.01 -10.10 -14.18 
 (0.20) (9.27) (33.57) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.13 
    
Panel C: Northern suburbs    
High-insured 0.12 12.61** 38.18* 
  (0.13) (6.01) (21.70) 
Northern suburb -0.16 16.99* 31.41 
 (0.28) (9.89) (43.30) 
High-insured*northern suburb 0.37* -9.01 8.22 
 (0.20) (9.40) (33.60) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.12 
    
Mean of low-insured 3.17 75.25 247.36 
    
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). All models are linear OLS 
with provider-level cluster-robust standard errors and fieldworker-pair fixed effects. Panel A presents estimates 
of interaction effects between insurance and GP altruism, where “high altruism” indicates GPs who contributed 
the full amount of their dictator game endowment to a patient charity (this was the sample median contribution). 
Panels B and C present estimates of interaction effects between insurance and measures of GPs’ competitive 
pressures. “High density” indicates GPs with a number of competing GPs located within a 1km radium of their 
practice that is at or above the sample median (7). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix D.7. Sub-sample analyses of insurance effect on unnecessary drug 
expenditures 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    
No. of 
inapprop. 
drugs 
Average 
inapprop.
drug cost 
Total 
inapprop. 
drug 
costs 
Any 
branded 
drugs 
No. of 
branded 
drugs 
Average 
branded 
drug cost 
Total 
branded 
drug 
costs 
Panel A: Altruism        
High-insured 0.14 16.11* 30.26 0.18* 0.32 -26.85 3.56 
  (0.18) (8.75) (32.77) (0.11) (0.19) (20.38) (29.84) 
High-altruism -0.20 8.02 -26.55 0.21* -0.10 -11.34 -25.65 
 (0.26) (11.80) (42.15) (0.11) (0.27) (22.06) (38.22) 
High-insured*high-altruism -0.05 -2.10 12.94 -0.18 -0.04 51.40** 55.03 
 (0.22) (11.74) (39.35) (0.13) (0.26) (25.40) (39.45) 
Obs. 150 150 150 150 150 113 150 
R-squared  0.14 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.18 0.07 
        
Panel B: GP density        
High-insured 0.16 15.90* 36.28 0.05 0.27* 1.55 28.93 
  (0.15) (8.45) (25.21) (0.08) (0.16) (17.31) (28.64) 
High-density 0.24 15.65 48.51 -0.02 0.12 3.23 16.40 
 (0.23) (11.21) (36.93) (0.09) (0.21) (18.78) (32.09) 
High-insured*high-density -0.01 -10.60 -7.22 0.05 0.04 -6.03 1.98 
 (0.20) (11.28) (34.10) (0.11) (0.23) (22.72) (36.41) 
Obs. 178 177 178 178 178 136 178 
R-squared 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.04 
        
Panel C: Northern suburbs        
High-insured -0.02 16.39** 26.83 0.06 0.41*** -11.38 40.59* 
  (0.13) (7.55) (21.32) (0.07) (0.16) (11.87) (23.69) 
Northern suburb -0.18 22.15* 29.29 -0.03 0.21 -6.80 24.63 
 (0.23) (11.98) (40.90) (0.10) (0.22) (18.92) (35.81) 
High-insured*northern 
suburb 
0.41** -13.71 13.50 0.02 -0.28 22.09 -25.01 
 (0.19) (11.19) (34.47) (0.12) (0.23) (23.40) (36.04) 
Obs. 178 177 178 178 178 136 178 
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.04 
        
Mean of low-insured 2.48 82.99 210.85 0.73 1.13 128.54 144.09 
        
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). All models are linear OLS with provider-level 
cluster-robust standard errors and fieldworker-pair fixed effects. Panel A presents estimates of interaction effects between insurance 
and GP altruism, where “high altruism” indicates GPs who contributed the full amount of their dictator game endowment to a patient 
charity (this was the sample median contribution). Panels B and C present estimates of interaction effects between insurance and 
measures of GPs’ competitive pressures. “High density” indicates GPs with a number of competing GPs located within a 1km radium 
of their practice that is at or above the sample median (7). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix D.8. Sub-sample analyses of insurance effect on fee-for-service 
expenditures 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    
Any FFS tests / 
procedures 
No. FFS tests / 
procedures 
Total consultation 
cost (excl. drugs) 
Panel A: Altruism    
High-insured 0.07 0.22 47.61** 
  (0.05) (0.14) (21.58) 
High-altruism 0.04 0.07 11.79 
 (0.06) (0.08) (21.22) 
High-insured*high-altruism -0.01 -0.16 -20.19 
 (0.08) (0.15) (34.19) 
Obs. 150 150 150 
R-squared  0.07 0.09 0.08 
    
Panel B: GP density    
High-insured 0.02 0.11 31.87** 
  (0.05) (0.10) (15.26) 
High-density -0.00 0.04 16.71 
 (0.05) (0.06) (17.47) 
High-insured*high-density 0.07 -0.02 -4.63 
 (0.07) (0.10) (30.80) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.07 
    
Panel C: Northern suburbs    
High-insured 0.02 0.04 22.04* 
  (0.05) (0.06) (11.75) 
Northern suburb 0.02 0.07 38.84* 
 (0.06) (0.08) (19.81) 
High-insured*northern suburb 0.09 0.15 17.56 
 (0.07) (0.11) (34.76) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.08 0.11 0.11 
    
Mean of low-insured 0.06 0.07 454.62 
    
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). All models are linear OLS 
with provider-level cluster-robust standard errors and fieldworker-pair fixed effects. Panel A presents estimates 
of interaction effects between insurance and GP altruism, where “high altruism” indicates GPs who contributed 
the full amount of their dictator game endowment to a patient charity (this was the sample median contribution). 
Panels B and C present estimates of interaction effects between insurance and measures of GPs’ competitive 
pressures. “High density” indicates GPs with a number of competing GPs located within a 1km radium of their 
practice that is at or above the sample median (7). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix D.9. Paired-sample t-test of differences in care quantity and cost 
outcomes between low-insured and high-insured patient consultations 
 (1) (2) 
Difference    Low-insured patient High-insured patient 
Mean SD Mean SD 
d. All prescription items 
     
Number of drugs prescribed 3.17 (1.23) 3.46 (1.17) 0.29*** 
Average cost of prescribed drugs (ZAR) 75.25 (45.26) 83.79 (36.59) 8.54* 
Total cost of drugs prescribed (ZAR) 247.36 (177.87) 289.57 (153.26) 42.21*** 
b.  Inappropriate prescription items      
Number of inappropriate drugs  2.48 (1.06) 2.65 (1.06) 0.17* 
Average cost of inappropriate drugs (ZAR) 82.99 (55.55) 93.07 (48.79) 10.09* 
Total cost of inappropriate drugs (ZAR) 210.85 (171.20) 243.99 (151.50) 33.14** 
c.  Branded prescription items      
Likelihood of branded drug prescription 0.73 (0.45) 0.8 (0.40) 0.07 
Number of branded drugs 1.14 (0.92) 1.43 (1.09) 0.29** 
Average cost of branded drugs (ZAR) 130.59 (75.16) 130.57 (70.24) -0.02 
Total cost of branded drugs (ZAR) 144.09 (147.02) 173.91 (150.04) 29.81* 
e. Fee-for-service items      
Additional fee-for-service tests / procedures 
billed  
0.06 (0.23) 0.11 (0.32) 0.06* 
Number of additional fee-for-service tests / 
procedures billed  
0.07 (0.29) 0.17 (0.53) 0.10** 
Total cost of consultation, excl. drugs (ZAR) 454.62 (78.37) 484.54 (138.71) 29.91** 
      
Observations (no. consultations) 89  89   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix D.10. Effect of insurance cover on treatment intensity and care costs – all 
drugs (mixed effects model specifications) 
 
Appendix D.11. Effect of insurance cover on treatment intensity and care costs – 
unnecessary drugs (mixed effects model specifications) 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    
No. drugs 
 
Average drug 
cost 
Total drug 
cost 
Panel A: provider-level random effects (RE)    
High-insured 0.29*** 8.54* 42.21*** 
  (0.10) (4.49) (16.08) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
AIC  516.17 1814.85 2296.91 
    
Panel B: provider-level RE; fieldworker-pair fixed effects    
High-insured 0.28*** 8.77* 41.59*** 
 (0.10) (4.48) (16.06) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
AIC 515.68 1812.81 2303.14 
    
Mean of low-insured 3.17 75.25 247.36 
    
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). In Panel A, estimates from a linear mixed effects 
model with provider-level random effects (intercept and slope with respect to insurance) are shown. In Panel D, results from the same 
mixed effects model with the addition of fieldworker-pair fixed effects are shown. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is employed 
as a measure of model fit for maximum likelihood models. All outcomes are per prescription (per consultation). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    
No. 
inapprop
.drugs 
Average 
inapprop
drug cost  
Total 
inapprop
drug cost 
Any 
branded 
drug 
No. 
branded 
drugs 
Average 
branded 
drug cost 
Total 
branded 
drug 
cost 
Panel A: provider-level random effects 
(RE) 
       
High-insured 0.17* 10.24* 33.14** 0.07 0.29*** -0.83 29.81* 
  (0.10) (5.46) (16.38) (0.05) (0.11) (10.48) (17.34) 
Obs. 178 177 178 178 178 136 178 
AIC  491.14 1883.82 2293.18 202.83 491.13 1553.32 2278.95 
        
Panel B: provider-level RE; 
fieldworker-pair fixed effects 
       
High-insured 0.15 10.39* 32.36** 0.07 0.29*** -1.15 29.90* 
 (0.09) (5.45) (16.27) (0.05) (0.11) (10.40) (17.35) 
Obs. 178 177 178 178 178 136 178 
AIC 488.60 1887.63 2296.59 213.69 503.23 1558.10 2292.84 
        
Mean of low-insured 2.48 82.99 210.85 0.73 1.13 128.54 144.09 
        
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). In Panel A, estimates from a linear mixed effects 
model with provider-level random effects (intercept and slope with respect to insurance) are shown. In Panel D, results from the same 
mixed effects model with the addition of fieldworker-pair fixed effects are shown. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is employed 
as a measure of model fit for maximum likelihood models. All outcomes are per prescription (per consultation). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
  265 
Appendix D.12. Effect of insurance cover on treatment intensity and care costs – 
fee-for-service items (mixed effects model specifications) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Any FFS tests 
/ procedures 
No. FFS tests 
/ procedures 
Total 
consultation 
cost (excl. 
drugs) 
Panel A: provider-level random effects (RE)    
High-insured 0.06* 0.10** 29.91** 
  (0.03) (0.05) (14.77) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
AIC  34.96 162.12 2161 
    
Panel B: provider-level RE; fieldworker-pair fixed effects    
High-insured 0.06* 0.10** 29.74** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (14.78) 
Obs. 178 178 178 
AIC 46.45 174.08 2174.04 
    
Mean of low-insured 0.06 0.07 454.62 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. FFS = fee-for-service. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). In Panel A, estimates from 
a linear mixed effects model with provider-level random effects (intercept and slope with respect to insurance) are shown. In Panel D, 
results from the same mixed effects model with the addition of fieldworker-pair fixed effects are shown. The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) is employed as a measure of model fit for maximum likelihood models. All outcomes are per prescription (per 
consultation). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix D.13. Effect of insurance cover on treatment intensity and care costs – 
robustness checks 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    SP 
detection 
Order 
effects 
Cash 
consult. 
Extreme 
values 
No. of drugs prescribed 
    
High-insured (effect)  0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Obs. 174 178 178 176 
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 
     
Average prescribed drug cost      
High-insured (effect) 7.31 8.53* 8.68* 10.48** 
  (4.49) (4.54) (4.56) (4.12) 
Obs. 174 178 178 177 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 
     
Total drug cost (total prescription cost)     
High-insured (effect) 40.78** 42.10** 42.51** 53.21*** 
  (16.52) (16.23) (16.36) (14.49) 
Obs. 174 178 178 176 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.14 
     
No. of inappropriate drugs prescribed     
High-insured (effect) 0.16 0.17* 0.16 0.14 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Obs. 174 178 178 177 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 
     
Average inappropriate drug cost     
High-insured (effect) 8.88 10.00* 10.26* 11.36** 
  (5.53) (5.52) (5.56) (5.21) 
Obs. 173 177 177 175 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
     
Total inappropriate drug cost      
High-insured (effect) 31.51* 33.10** 33.53** 44.10*** 
  (16.82) (16.57) (16.66) (14.85) 
Obs. 174 178 178 176 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 
     
Likelihood of branded drug prescription     
High-insured (effect) 0.05 0.07 0.07  
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)  
Obs. 174 178 178  
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02  
     
No. of branded drugs prescribed     
High-insured (effect) 0.25** 0.29*** 0.28** 0.29*** 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Obs. 174 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.07 
     
Average branded drug cost     
High-insured (effect) -0.02 -0.22 1.44 -6.74 
  (11.34) (11.46) (11.45) (9.30) 
Obs. 134 136 136 135 
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 
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Appendix D.13. Effect of insurance cover on treatment intensity and care costs – 
robustness checks (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    SP 
detection 
Order 
effects 
Cash 
consult. 
Extreme 
values 
Total branded drug cost     
High-insured (effect) 27.02 29.66* 30.35* 32.96** 
  (17.72) (17.47) (17.63) (16.33) 
Obs. 174 178 178 176 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 
     
Likelihood of any fee-for-service procedures     
High-insured (effect) 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
Obs. 174 178 178  
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03  
     
No. of fee-for-service procedures     
High-insured (effect) 0.10** 0.10** 0.10**  
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Obs. 174 178 178  
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04  
     
Total consultation cost (excl. drugs)     
High-insured (effect) 30.60** 29.88** 22.03* 16.92** 
  (15.19) (14.94) (12.74) (6.67) 
Obs. 174 178 178 174 
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.31 0.07 
     
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All specifications are fixed effects (mean-differenced) models, estimated 
with linear OLS. Column (1) excludes providers that were assessed as having likely valid SP detections. Column (2) 
controls for the order of SP visits to each provider. Column (3) controls for consultations that were paid for in cash 
on-site. Lastly, column (4) excludes extreme values of continuous outcomes, crudely defined as those above or below 
3 standard deviations of the sample mean. All costs are in South African Rand (ZAR). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix E.1. IRT analysis of clinical effort during baseline and end-line visits 
(study Part 2) – Clinical Case 1 
Table A (a). Checklist items included in the IRT score at baseline 
 
 
Table A (b). Checklist items that were either excluded or merged in the IRT score at baseline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Item type Item description 
Item 
complet
. rate 
Discrim. 
parameter 
Standard 
error 
Difficulty 
paramete
r 
Standar
d error 
1 History-taking Cough duration 0.96 0.94 0.60 -3.79 1.96 
2 History-taking 
Productive cough / coughing 
up blood 
0.83 0.96 0.38 -1.92 0.66 
3 Examination Examine throat 0.82 0.94 0.38 -1.86 0.64 
4 Examination Listen to lungs 0.88 1.60 0.60 -1.73 0.43 
5 Examination Listen to heart 0.64 0.49 0.26 -1.20 0.73 
6 History-taking 
Allergies (general) / penicillin 
allergy 
0.71 1.21 0.41 -0.92 0.31 
7 Examination Measure blood pressure 0.61 0.56 0.27 -0.82 0.52 
8 History-taking Temperature / fever 0.67 1.06 0.35 -0.80 0.31 
9 History-taking Sore throat 0.65 0.94 0.33 -0.75 0.33 
10 History-taking Any regular medication 0.55 0.76 0.30 -0.27 0.31 
11 History-taking Occupation status 0.54 0.66 0.28 -0.23 0.34 
12 Examination Examine ears 0.52 0.94 0.33 -0.07 0.25 
13 History-taking Details about the initial cold 0.51 0.72 0.29 -0.03 0.31 
14 Examination Measure pulse rate 0.49 0.73 0.29 0.04 0.31 
15 History-taking Chest pain 0.47 1.15 0.37 0.12 0.22 
16 Examination Palpate lymph nodes 0.45 0.91 0.31 0.24 0.27 
17 History-taking Smoking status 0.44 1.21 0.37 0.24 0.22 
18 History-taking Asthma history 0.27 1.66 0.55 0.87 0.24 
19 History-taking Exposure to anyone with TB 0.24 1.58 0.51 1.03 0.27 
20 Examination Take temperature 0.40 0.36 0.25 1.12 0.94 
21 History-taking Weight loss 0.24 1.19 0.42 1.21 0.37 
22 History-taking Night sweats 0.34 0.57 0.29 1.22 0.66 
23 History-taking TB history 0.19 0.97 0.39 1.75 0.60 
24 History-taking Ear ache 0.13 1.37 0.53 1.80 0.50 
25 History-taking Breathing difficulty 0.16 0.76 0.40 2.41 1.10 
26 History-taking Similar problem before 0.10 1.05 0.49 2.46 0.91 
27 
History-taking 
Whistling noise when 
breathing 0.08 0.70 0.48 3.77 2.29 
28 Examination Tap lungs (percuss) 0.11 0.57 0.40 3.87 2.53 
29 History-taking Breathing fast  0.05 0.42 0.56 7.13 9.10 
30 History-taking HIV status 0.14 0.09 0.33 19.29 68.31 
31 Examination Check oxygen saturation 0.06 0.12 0.49 23.19 95.30 
        
Ob
s 
 
80 
     
      
Notes: The discrimination and difficulty parameters (and their standard errors) were estimated using a three parameter logistic model, which also allows 
for the possibility of item completion through guessing. The estimated 'pseudo-guessing' parameter was close to zero and insigificant, however, suggesting 
that the likelihood that doctors completed items on this checklist purely through guessing (and zero effort) is close to zero. Item completion rate is the 
share of all consultations in which the specific item was completed. The difficulty parameter is a measure of the likelihood that a specific item is successfully 
completed in any given consultation, with higher parameter values indicating more difficult items. The discrimination parameter indicates how well an 
item can distinguish between high- and low-effort providers, with high-discrimination items having a higher correlation between their completion and 
provider effort. 
 Item type Item description Item completion rate 
1 History-taking Productive/dry cough 0.83 
2 History-taking Coughing up blood 0.09 
3 History-taking Heart beating fast / palpitations 0.02 
4 History-taking Allergy to penicillin 0.19 
5 History-taking Any allergies (in general) 0.66 
    
Notes: Items 1 and 2 were merged into one item in the IRT analysis, as they are likely to overlap and potentially violate the conditional 
independence assumption necessary for the IRT score validity (see Appendix B.6). Items 4 and 5 were also merged for the same reason. 
Item 3 was excluded as it was not completed in any consultation. 
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Table B (a). Checklist items included in the IRT score at end-line 
 Item type Item description 
Item 
complet
. rate 
Discrim. 
parameter 
Standard 
error 
Difficulty 
paramete
r 
Standar
d error 
1 Examination Listen to lungs 0.94 0.93 0.55 -3.30 1.59 
2 Examination Listen to heart 0.64 0.25 0.27 -2.27 2.53 
3 History-taking Productive cough / coughing 
up blood 
0.71 0.49 0.31 -1.96 1.24 
4 History-taking Cough duration 0.8 0.88 0.38 -1.81 0.70 
5 Examination Examine throat 0.9 2.54 1.17 -1.58 0.35 
6 Examination Measure blood pressure 0.74 0.85 0.36 -1.39 0.57 
7 History-taking Details about the initial cold 0.68 0.67 0.31 -1.19 0.60 
8 History-taking Temperature / fever 0.6 0.70 0.31 -0.64 0.43 
9 History-taking Allergies (general) / penicillin 
allergy 
0.68 1.95 0.63 -0.58 0.22 
10 Examination Examine ears 0.64 1.34 0.48 -0.55 0.26 
11 History-taking Occupation status 0.56 0.81 0.33 -0.35 0.34 
12 History-taking Sore throat 0.53 0.46 0.28 -0.22 0.53 
13 Examination Measure pulse rate 0.54 1.04 0.39 -0.16 0.27 
14 History-taking Any regular medication 0.51 1.19 0.41 -0.04 0.24 
15 History-taking Smoking status 0.5 0.95 0.37 0.01 0.28 
16 Examination Take temperature 0.49 0.87 0.34 0.08 0.30 
17 Examination Palpate lymph nodes 0.48 1.43 0.49 0.11 0.22 
18 History-taking Asthma history 0.39 1.57 0.53 0.43 0.22 
19 History-taking Chest pain 0.44 0.52 0.29 0.51 0.52 
20 History-taking Night sweats 0.38 0.51 0.30 1.07 0.75 
21 History-taking Breathing difficulty 0.31 0.59 0.31 1.45 0.80 
22 History-taking Ear ache 0.13 1.73 0.80 1.62 0.46 
23 History-taking Exposure to anyone with TB 0.13 1.62 0.69 1.68 0.47 
24 
History-taking 
Whistling noise when 
breathing 0.14 1.29 0.68 1.81 0.67 
25 History-taking Similar problem before 0.21 0.75 0.38 1.94 0.89 
26 History-taking Breathing fast 0.11 1.19 0.65 2.13 0.87 
27 Examination Check oxygen saturation 0.05 1.76 1.05 2.32 0.82 
28 
History-taking 
Heart beating fast / 
palpitations 0.06 1.33 0.85 2.54 1.14 
29 History-taking Weight loss 0.26 0.32 0.32 3.26 3.13 
30 Examination Tap lungs (percuss) 0.14 0.58 0.41 3.37 2.20 
31 History-taking TB history 0.16 0.45 0.39 3.79 3.10 
32 History-taking HIV status 0.11 0.56 0.46 3.92 3.00 
        
Ob
s 
 
80 
     
      
Notes: The discrimination and difficulty parameters (and their standard errors) were estimated using a three parameter logistic model, which also allows 
for the possibility of item completion through guessing. The estimated 'pseudo-guessing' parameter was close to zero and insigificant, however, suggesting 
that the likelihood that doctors completed items on this checklist purely through guessing (and zero effort) is close to zero. Item completion rate is the 
share of all consultations in which the specific item was completed. The difficulty parameter is a measure of the likelihood that a specific item is successfully 
completed in any given consultation, with higher parameter values indicating more difficult items. The discrimination parameter indicates how well an 
item can distinguish between high- and low-effort providers, with high-discrimination items having a higher correlation between their completion and 
provider effort. 
 
Table B (b). Checklist items that were either excluded or merged in the IRT score at end-line 
 
 Item type Item description Item completion rate 
1 History-taking Productive/dry cough 0.66 
2 History-taking Coughing up blood 0.19 
3 History-taking Allergy to penicillin 0.22 
4 History-taking Any allergies (in general) 0.68 
    
Notes: Items 1 and 2 were merged into one item in the IRT analysis, as they are likely to overlap and potentially violate the conditional 
independence assumption necessary for the IRT score validity (see Appendix B.6). Items 3 and 4 were also merged for the same reason.  
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Appendix E.2. Effects of private performance feedback – robustness checks 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    
ITT 
Manski-Horowitz 
bounds 
Order 
effects 
Hour-
of-day 
effects 
No. days 
since 
interven. 
Additional 
covariates 
  Lower (a) Upper (b)     
Antibiotic prescription (1 = Yes) 
       
Treatment (1 = feedback given)  -0.14 -0.03 -0.32*** -0.23** -0.24** -0.23** -0.21** 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
Obs. 98 98 98 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.52 0.43 0.46 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.73 
        
Total drug costs, per consultation (ZAR)        
Treatment (1 = feedback given) -33.82   -41.06 -41.44 -42.69 -25.32 
  (25.88)   (25.68) (25.51) (25.92) (29.31) 
Obs. 98   79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.57   0.48 0.48 0.48 0.57 
        
No. of drugs, per consultation         
Treatment (1 = feedback given) -0.13   -0.41 -0.41 -0.43* -0.40 
  (0.27)   (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) 
Obs. 98   79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.33   0.58 0.58 0.58 0.66 
        
Average drug cost, per consultation (ZAR)        
Treatment (1 = feedback given) -10.02   -8.52 -8.75 -8.54 -3.70 
  (6.83)   (7.27) (7.19) (7.35) (7.84) 
Obs. 98   79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.48   0.56 0.57 0.56 0.68 
        
Antibiotic prescription for HIV+ case (1 = Yes)        
Treatment (1 = feedback given)    0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 
     (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Obs.    79 79 79 79 
R-squared    0.38 0.37 0.38 0.53 
        
Steroid prescription (1 = Yes)        
Treatment (1 = feedback given) -0.10   -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.20* 
  (0.09)   (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Obs. 98   79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.51   0.47 0.47 0.48 0.69 
        
Other inappropriate drug prescription (1 = Yes)        
Treatment (1 = feedback given) 0.06   0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 
  (0.10)   (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Obs. 98   79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.34   0.28 0.32 0.28 0.48 
        
Consultation time (mins.)        
Treatment (1 = feedback given) 1.06   1.78 1.84 1.96 1.60 
  (1.40)   (1.71) (1.71) (1.72) (1.90) 
Obs. 98   80 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.32   0.37 0.36 0.36 0.50 
        
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All specifications are linear OLS with fieldworker fixed effects. Column (1) shows results from an ITT analysis with the initially 
randomized sample of 99 GPs, where missing outcomes are imputed with baseline values for the 19 GPs lost to non-participation or attrition. Column (2) estimates upper 
and lower bounds for the true effect (in the absence of any attrition) using the Manski-Horowitz method. The specifications in (1) and (2) do not control for all imbalanced 
covariates, due to the limited covariate data available for those 19 GPs that did not participate in the interviews. Column (3) controls for the order of SP visits to each provider 
(as each provider received two SP visits in this experiment, in a random order). Column (4) controls for the hour of day in which each SP visit occurred. Column (5) controls 
for the number of days between intervention delivery (in the GP interviews) and impact assessment (in the corresponding end-line SP visit). Column (6) controls for additional 
provider covariates – namely, all listed variables in Table 7.2, excluding the two variables on perceived patient expectations for antibiotics in the uncomplicated bronchitis 
case and perceived antibiotic prescribing norms for the complicated (HIV+) bronchitis case, which were highly correlated with some of the unbalanced covariates included 
in the main specification. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix E.2. Effects of private performance feedback – robustness checks (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ITT 
Manski-Horowitz 
bounds 
Order 
effects 
Hour-
of-day 
effects 
No. days 
since 
interven. 
Additional 
covariates 
  Lower (a) Upper (b)     
Checklist completion (share) 
       
Treatment (1 =feedback given) -0.04   -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Obs. 98   80 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.54   0.53 0.53 0.54 0.66 
        
IRT score        
Treatment (1 = feedback given)  -0.29*   -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 -0.23 
  (0.15)   (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Obs. 98   80 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.60   0.59 0.59 0.59 0.73 
        
Correct / partially-correct diagnosis        
Treatment (1 = feedback given) -0.05   0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.13 
  (0.11)   (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Obs. 93   75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.35   0.33 0.35 0.33 0.57 
        
        
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All specifications are linear OLS with fieldworker fixed effects. Column (1) shows results from an ITT analysis with the initially 
randomized sample of 99 GPs, where missing outcomes are imputed with baseline values for the 19 GPs lost to non-participation or attrition. Column (2) estimates upper 
and lower bounds for the true effect (in the absence of any attrition) using the Manski-Horowitz method. The specifications in (1) and (2) do not control for all imbalanced 
covariates, due to the limited covariate data available for those 19 GPs that did not participate in the interviews. Column (3) controls for the order of SP visits to each 
provider (as each provider received two SP visits in this experiment, in a random order). Column (4) controls for the hour of day in which each SP visit occurred. Column 
(5) controls for the number of days between intervention delivery (in the GP interviews) and impact assessment (in the corresponding end-line SP visit). Column (6) 
controls for additional provider covariates – namely, all listed variables in Table 7.2, excluding the two variables on perceived patient expectations for antibiotics in the 
uncomplicated bronchitis case and perceived antibiotic prescribing norms for the complicated (HIV+) bronchitis case, which were highly correlated with some of the 
unbalanced covariates included in the main specification. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
